

F.O.

406

N
8

45

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(11835)

F.O.

F.O. 406/45

406

PART VI.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

REIMPRINTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

45

January to March 1921.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(11835)

PART VI.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

January to March 1921.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	Sender.	Page.
Chapter I.—THE CAUCASUS.			
1 Colonel Stokes No. 132. Secret	1920 Dec. 6	Georgia. General situation report. Foreign relations. Internal affairs. Cabinet. Financial affairs. Communications	1
2 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1688	" 20	Armenia. Transmits report by Rev. H. W. Harecourt on the present situation in Armenia. The problems of Government since the organisation of the State. The military situation. Financial position. Transport. Immediate prospects	4
3 Petroleum Department Memorandum	1921 Jan. 13	Azerbaijan, Baku. Report on the conditions of the Baku oil industry since September 1918, its fall in production and drilling, also the state of the coking fields at Grozny, Erzurum and Maikop	11
4 Colonel Stokes No. 21. Tel.	Jan. 20	Georgia. Gives the military requirements for Georgia, and states that Georgian Government desire to obtain one-third immediately. States that he is convinced Georgians will fight	17
5 Sir H. Rumbold No. 52. Tel.	" 23	Georgia. Refers to Tiflis Tel. No. 19. States that Georgians have received certain quantities of kerosene and crude oil. Senior Naval Officer informs him that crude oil could be supplied from naval stocks	18
6 Admiralty Conf.	Mar. 14	Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Transmits report from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, on general situation in Southern Caucasus, the relations of the republic with each other and their neighbours, and Communist activities in the Caucasus	18
7 To Colonel Stokes No. 32	" 17	Georgia. Reports conversation of Secretary of State with M. Tchekelashvili on the subject of present position in Georgia	25

Chapter II.—TURKEY.

8 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1339. Tel.	1920 Dec. 29	Mission to Anatolia. Grand Vizier stated that he has instructed mission to return to Constantinople	27
9 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1679. Secret	" 21	General intelligence report. Transmits copy for week ending 24th December	27
10 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1685. Secret	" 24	General intelligence report. Transmits copy for week ending 2nd December	32
11 Lord Hardinge No. 3582	" 30	Revision of treaty. Gives substance of an interview granted by member of Senatorial Commission for Foreign Affairs to correspondent of "Echo de Paris" regarding supposed discrepancies between statements regarding Eastern affairs by Mr. Lloyd George and President of Council in the Chamber	37
12 Lord Hardinge No. 4. Tel.	1921 Jan.	Revision of treaty. Reports that General Townshend has granted interview to press, in which he advocates revision of treaty	38
13 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1708	1920 Dec. 31	General situation. Gives report of, in Turkey at the close of the year	38

432 [6608]

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
14 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1707. Secret	1920 Dec. 31	General intelligence. Transmits copy for week ending 16th December	39
15 To Sir G. Buchanan No. 22	1921 Jan. 10	Ratification of treaty. Italian Chargé enquired of Sir Eyre Crowe whether His Majesty's Government had any information regarding report that Mustapha Kemal wished the Sultan to ratify, which he considered would be detrimental to Allies; Sir Eyre Crowe replied that rumors had been received, but that he did not consider ratification would be detrimental to Allies	44
16 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 38	" 13	Ratification of treaty. Reports substance of conversation between Sir Eyre Crowe and Mustafa Reshid Pasha, the newly-appointed unofficial representative for Turkey in London	44
17 Mr. Davis	" 13	Mandated territories. Requests views of His Majesty's Government regarding desire of United States Government to publish certain notes exchanged on subject of mandated territories	45
18 Sir H. Rumbold No. 25. Tel.	" 12	Mission to Angora and general situation. Reports that no official news has been received from mission. That Turkish Government are spreading report that Financial Controllers are responsible for distress prevailing among Turkish officials	45
19 Sir H. Rumbold No. 10	" 4	Heads of foreign missions. Report on	45
20 Sir H. Rumbold No. 31	" 8	Intelligence report. Transmits copy for fortnight ending 16th December	47
21 Sir H. Rumbold No. 40	" 8	Mission to Anatolia. Transmits extract from "Agency of Anatolia" of 6th December, and an extract from the "Yeni Kuvvet" of 16th December, dealing with activities of the mission	54
22 To Mr. Davis	" 20	Mandated territories. His Majesty's Government would prefer to delay publication of correspondence until their answer to Mr. Colby's note of 20th November has been delivered	55
23 Sir H. Rumbold No. 43. Tel.	" 20	General situation. Gives statement of his views regarding Nationalist movement and situation in Turkey. Considers situation inextricable if Treaty of Sévres is to remain as a basis for the future	55
24 To Lord Hardinge No. 243	" 24	Negotiations with Nationalists. French Chargé d'Affaires in London states that certain Nationalist Turks have arrived in Rome and are anxious to negotiate as intermediaries between Allies and Mustapha Kemal	58
25 Lord Hardinge to Sir W. Tyrrell No. 59. Tel.	" 25	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Conference discussed Turkish and Greek questions. Italian representative produced proposal made by Turkish representatives in Rome regarding the reconstruction of treaty	59
26 Sir H. Rumbold No. 57. Tel.	" 26	Negotiations with Nationalists. Has received communication from French High Commissioner concerning decision of Supreme Council regarding summoning of a conference in London to discuss Eastern affairs	59
27 Lord Hardinge to Sir H. Rumbold and Earl Granville (repeated to Foreign Office No. 50. Tel.)	" 26	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives decisions of Supreme Council regarding summoning of Conference in London at which Greek and Turkish representatives shall be present to discuss Eastern questions	59

[6608]

a 2

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
29 Sir H. Hambold No. 59. Tel.	1921 Jan. 27	Negotiations with Nationalists. Refers to No. 26. States that tenor of note in reply to Allied note has been communicated to French High Commissioner ...	60
29 Earl Granville No. 56. Tel.	" 26	Negotiations with Nationalists. Acknowledges receipt of decision of Supreme Council, and states that President of Council appeared delighted with decisions and announced his intention of personally proceeding to Paris and London ...	60
30 Earl Granville No. 57. Tel.	" 27	Negotiations with Nationalists. President has notified his acceptance of invitation to London Conference, but expresses surprise that invitation has been extended to Kemal ...	60
31 Earl Granville No. 59. Tel.	" 27	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Greek Government are not likely to allow President of Council to represent press. M. Calogeropoulos informed journalist that if M. Rholes were allowed to go alone to London or M. Gounaris was sent he himself would resign ...	61
32 Sir H. Hambold No. 62. Tel.	" 28	Negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits translation of reply to joint note received from Porte ...	61
33 Sir H. Hambold No. 64. Tel.	" 29	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives review of opinions of press in Greece and Turkey regarding decision to call London Conference ...	61
34 Sir H. Hambold No. 70. Tel.	" 31	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Mustafa Kemal, slated by invitation to attend conference, is becoming intractable. Doubts, if proposal were made to Turkish Government to establish financial commission, whether they would agree, as they hope for modification of financial clauses ...	62
35 Sir H. Hambold No. 71. Tel.	Feb. 1	Negotiations with Kemalists. Transmits translation of telegram from Angora to Allied representative denying the right of Constantinople to represent Turkey at conference, and requesting a direct invitation from Allies to Grand National Assembly ...	62
36 Earl Granville No. 48. Tel.	" 1	Greek activities. Reports conversation between British military attaché and Colonel Pallas, of Greek army. Latter states that offensive should be postponed until April, but political situation may force offensive at any moment ...	63
37 Sir H. Hambold No. 93	Jan. 29	Financial control. Transmits copy of letter from Sir A. Bick regarding steps taken by Provisional Financial Commission and letters exchanged between that commission and Minister of Finance, and relating the steps taken by High Commissioners ...	63
38 Sir H. Hambold No. 108	" 29	Negotiations with Nationalists. Reports conversation with Sefa Bey, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who stated his views regarding a modification of the Treaty of Sèvres ...	67
39 Sir H. Hambold No. 78. Tel.	Feb. 4	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Italian High Commissioner has shown him a telegram from Angora to the European Powers which repeats that it is the only Government entitled to represent the Turkish nation ...	69

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
40 Sir H. Hambold No. 81. Tel.	1921 Feb. 6	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Grand Visier reports that Angora had not yet come into line, but that he still hoped they would do so. Whether they did or not, Central Government proposed to despatch delegation to London. Request views on this possibility ...	70
41 Sir H. Hambold No. 82. Tel.	" 6	Negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits text of telegram received from Angora stating that delegation will leave Angora on 7th February ...	71
42 Sir H. Hambold No. 84. Tel.	" 7	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Government delegation will leave Constantinople on 12th February, and gives its probable composition ...	71
43 Sir H. Hambold No. 88. Tel.	" 8	Negotiations with Nationalists. Grand Visier intimated that he would personally go as head of delegation and discuss views of His Majesty's Government ...	71
44 To Sir H. Hambold No. 87. Tel.	" 10	Negotiations with Nationalists. Requests information of persons leaving Angora delegation and attitude of Constantinople Government towards it ...	72
45 Sir H. Hambold No. 91. Tel.	" 11	Greek activities. States that Greek offensive is imminent and is obviously intended to influence proceedings of the London Conference ...	72
46 To Sir H. Hambold No. 91. Tel.	" 11	Negotiations with Nationalists. His Majesty's Government are unable to postpone conference to meet the Angora delegation, which can only be received as a part of Constantinople delegation ...	72
47 Sir H. Hambold No. 93. Tel.	" 11	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Constantinople delegation leaves on 12th February. Gives information as to its composition. Adds that no certain information as to composition of Angora delegation is available ...	72
48 Sir H. Hambold No. 139	" 2	General situation. States that His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome has forwarded him copy of his despatch No. 67 dealing with conference at Rome between Moderate Nationalists and Kemal. Also inscribes general conditions at Constantinople ...	73
49 Sir H. Hambold No. 145	" 2	General situation and negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits a translation of interview given by Mustafa Kemal to "United Telegram" Press Agency. A translation of speech by Makhtar Bey before Grand National Assembly and translation of telegram to Grand Visier from Angora Government ...	74
50 Sir H. Hambold No. 100. Tel.	" 14	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives composition of Nationalist delegation to London Conference ...	77
51 Sir H. Hambold No. 101. Tel.	" 14	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives information regarding persons composing the Nationalist delegation and date of its departure ...	78
52 Sir G. Buchanan No. 45. Tel.	" 17	Negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits telegram from Sir M. Hankey giving summary of an interview with Count Sforza regarding attitude of Angora delegation ...	78
53 Sir G. Buchanan No. 46. Tel.	" 17	Negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits telegram from Sir M. Hankey regarding Count Sforza's general idea as to procedure of London Conference ...	79

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
54 Sir G. Buchanan No. 47, Tel.	1921 Feb. 17	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Osman Nizam, Turkish Ambassador, intimated that he would attend conference, and forecast no possibility of merging the two Turkish delegations into one	79
55 Colonel Stokes No. 48, Tel.	" 12	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives substance of telegram addressed to Chichester by Bekir Sami Bey regarding objects of Nationalist delegation to London conference	79
56 Sir H. Rumbold No. 178	" 16	Financial control and situation. Transmits copy of note prepared by Sir A. Block giving short summary of financial situation of Turkish Government	80
57 Sir H. Rumbold No. 181	" 9	Negotiations with Nationalists. Comments on publication of correspondence between Constantinople and Angora regarding the London Conference, and transmits French translation of the first three telegrams	82
58 Sir H. Rumbold No. 185	" 12	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives date of departure of Constantinople delegation, and comments on the general situation and its possible influence on attitude of both delegations	85
59 Sir H. Rumbold No. 180, Tel.	" 17	Revision of treaty. Gives substance of conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs on subject of Eastern Thrace and Smyrna	86
60 To Mr. Davis	" 18	Mandated territories. States that note on subject of economic rights in mandated territories will be presented on 29th February, and agrees to simultaneous publication in England and United States of America of all correspondence	86
61 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 208	Mar. 7	Negotiations with Nationalists and financial situation. Gives substance of conversation at interview granted to Tewfik Pasha by Lord Curzon	86
62 To Mr. Balfour	" 2	Mandated territories. Transmits copy of reply to United States Ambassador in answer to Mr. Colby's note of 20th November, regarding economic rights in the mandated territories	87
63 Sir H. Rumbold No. 249	" 8	Local foreign post offices. Transmits copies of identical notes by French, Italian and British High Commissioners to Polish, Rumanian and Russian representatives and Greek High Commissioner, regarding closing of local post offices other than for powers provided for under article 202 of Treaty of Sèvres	88
64 Sir H. Rumbold No. 260	" 9	Greek activities in Thrace. Transmits copy of memorial by two delegates regarding alleged persecution of Moslem population in Thrace by occupying Greek forces	89
65 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 240	" 15	General, and negotiations with the Nationalists. Gives account of farewell visit to Lord Curzon of Tewfik Pasha, Grand Vizier	90
66 Sir H. Rumbold No. 280	" 8	Situation in Caucasus. Gives information regarding general situation in Georgia and Armenia received from Rev. H. Harecourt, representative of Lord Mayor's Fund	91
67 Earl Granville No. 118	" 10	Revision of treaty. States that since news has reached Athens that London Conference may revise treaty as regards Thrace and Smyrna, protests have been received from Greeks all over the country	92

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
68 Earl Granville No. 126	1921 Mar. 17	Negotiations with Nationalists. Greek comments. Submits Greek comments and criticisms on the proposals of the London Conference	93
69 Lord Hardinge No. 918	" 24	Revision of Turkish Treaty. Gives M. Briand's views regarding the attitude of Turkey over the questions of Smyrna, Thrace and Cilicia	94
70 Sir H. Rumbold No. 292	" 25	Negotiations with the Nationalists. Reports conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the proposals made by the London Conference for a modification of the treaty	95
71 Sir H. Rumbold No. 300	" 27	General situation. Gives account of interview accorded by Sultan, and transmits copy of memorandum left with His Majesty	96

Chapter III.—PALESTINE AND SYRIA.

72 Sir R. Graham No. 5	1921 Jan. 3	Zionists. Political activities of. Gives account of first great meeting of Zionists and of enthusiastic reception accorded to His Majesty's representative	100
73 Sir H. Samuel No. 218	1920 Dec. 17	Immigration into Palestine. Details of Jewish immigrants for November	101
74 Sir H. Samuel No. 219	" 21	Zionists. Political activities of. Refers to Part V, No. 204. Gives corrected version of Article VIII of the Resolutions of the Elected Assembly	101
75 Sir H. Samuel No. 220	" 24	Officials in Palestine. Submits lists showing proportion of British and Palestinian officials in the Administration	102
76 Sir H. Samuel No. 229	" 27	Privileges, religious, in Palestine. Describes Christmas ceremonies at Bethlehem and privileges accorded to the French consuls	103
77 Sir H. Samuel No. 243	1921 Jan. 1	Finance in Palestine. Reports unsatisfactory state of municipal finances, and encloses report of Municipal Tax Commission for Jerusalem	104
78 Sir H. Samuel No. 244	" 1	Palestine. Situation report. Transmits report for December enclosing a memorandum presented by Kaim-el-Husseini and reply thereto; a communiqué issued by the Government regarding a movement aiming at a change in His Majesty's Government's policy; enclosing also the text of the Statutes of a Workmen's Conference held at Haifa, and of a note from the Greek consul relative to hoisting of a flag on arrival of King Constantine at Phalaron	144
79 To Lord Hardinge No. 87	" 10	Mandates. Confirms refusal to accept Italian attitude towards conferment of mandates. Instructs to inform French Government and at same time express agreement that certain provisional administrative measures should be put into operation	146
80 To Sir M. Hankey	" 10	Mandates. Transmits copies of correspondence referred to in No. 79, and requests that views contained therein may be brought to the attention of Mr. Balfour	148
81 War Office	" 10	Communication between French and British in Middle East. Expresses opinion that the system of communication by liaison officers at Cairo and Beirut respectively should be maintained	149

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
82 Sir H. Samuel to Sir J. Tilley	1920 Dec. 24	Council. Economic, in Palestine. Encloses correspondence with Sir A. Mond relative to formation of the Council and requests transmission of a letter to Sir A. Mond	149
83 To Sir H. Samuel	1921 Jan. 12	Holidays. Official, in Palestine. Approves eight holidays each for Moslems, Christians and Jews. The King's birthday to be a holiday for all creeds	151
84 Comand Fontana No. 117. Conf.	1920 Dec. 21	Syria. Situation report. Deals with situation in the Great Lebanon and Aleppo. Reports country to be devastated and deserted, villages desolate and trade at a standstill	152
85 To Sir G. Buchanan No. 17. Tel.	1921 Jan. 12	Holy Places. Guard at. Instructs Sir G. Buchanan to urge the Italian Government to withdraw their guard detachment	155
86 To Sir H. Samuel No. 30. Tel.	" 12	Council. Economic, in Palestine. Refers to No. 82. Approves proposals for formation, provided Zionist organisation agree and co-operate closely	156
87 Sir H. Samuel No. 1	" 4	Palestine. Administrative report. Transmits report for December, dealing with agriculture, antiquities, commerce, finance, legal, and medical work, postal telegraphs, public security and public works	156
88 Sir H. Samuel No. 20. Tel.	" 17	Wakf. Refers to Part V, No. 818, and submits proposals	158
89 To French Ambassador	" 16	Holy Places. Guard at. Urges that French detachment be withdrawn, and points out that Italian Government have undertaken to withdraw their detachment simultaneously	158
90 To Sir H. Samuel No. 89	" 13	Extradition. Refers to Part V, No. 832. Outlines situation after mandates are in force, and approves draft proposals submitted as a temporary measure	159
91 To Sir H. Samuel No. 77	" 19	Legislation and jurisdiction. Discusses question of rights of Palestinians to jurisdiction of Egyptian Mixed Courts. Prefers maintenance of status quo pending modifications introduced by terms of mandate	160
92 To Sir H. Samuel No. 49. Tel.	" 17	Wakf. Refers to No. 89. Approves proposals, and requests reply to question in Part V, No. 818	160
93 Sir H. Samuel No. 10	" 2	Wakf. Refers to Part V, No. 308. Transmits copy of resolution reached on 2nd December, 1920. Outlines loss of administration of Wakf prior to the war	160
94 Sir H. Samuel No. 11	" 24	Finance. In Palestine. Submits appreciation of finances of country with particular relation to cost of defence	163
95 Sir H. Samuel No. 13	" 7	Transjordan. Situation report. Outlines administrative and political situation in Ajlun and Belka districts	168
96 To Sir H. Samuel No. 98	" 27	Wakf. Acknowledges receipt of No. 51, and refers to No. 92. Approves resolutions of the committee	173
97 To Sir H. Samuel No. 55. Tel.	" 29	Officials. In Palestine. Refers to Part V, No. 203. Comments on proposals it contained, and gives instructions as to scales of pay and allowances which have been sanctioned	175
98 Board of Trade	" 29	Preference. Imperial. Extension to Palestine. Refers to Foreign Office letter of 15th January. Consents generally in terms of the draft letter which Lord Curzon proposes to address to the Law Officers of the Crown. Suggests addition to the draft	174

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
99 To Lord Hardinge No. 322	1921 Jan. 31	Communication between French and British in Middle East. Outlines proposals for regulating inter-communication, and instructs Lord Hardinge to enquire whether the French Government approve them	175
100 Sir H. Samuel No. 18	" 18	Magistrates. In Palestine. Submits ordinance dealing with the constitution and functions of benches of local magistrates. Considers institution of honorary magistrates will be popular	175
101 Sir H. Samuel No. 30	" 12	Advisory Council. In Palestine. Transmits minutes of fourth meeting, dealing with the abolition of the tobacco monopoly, village water supply, port dues, Commission of Enquiry Ordinance, Mewat lands, roadwork, Palestinians and Government posts, law of evidence, police wage, mortgages on property, land and property in cities, need of a credit bank, registration of properties in English language, prison labour gangs, weights and measures, and cotton	177
102 Sir H. Samuel No. 32	" 20	Tobacco. Turkish Régie monopoly. Reports warm reception of news of abolition of the monopoly by Advisory Council. Points out that if the concession can be shown to be invalid Palestine will not have to pay compensation. States steps will be taken to prevent smuggling	180
103 Sir H. Samuel No. 45	" 25	Immigration. Into Palestine. States numbers of Jewish immigrants for December	191
104 To Sir H. Samuel No. 44. Tel.	Feb. 7	Magistrates. In Palestine. Refers to No. 100. Comments on Sir H. Samuel's proposals, and invites his views as to position of foreigners in relation to magistrates' courts	191
105 To Colonial Office	" 6	Magistrates. In Palestine. Invites comments on Sir H. Samuel's proposals	191
106 League of Nations	1920 Dec. 1	Mandates. Syria. Communicates letter from French delegate containing the text of the French mandate for Syria and Lebanon as approved by the French Government, expressing the hope that the Council will approve it, and inviting attention to the desirability of putting an end to the existing temporary régime	192
107 Sir H. Samuel No. 53	1921 Feb. 1	Palestine. Situation report for January. Refers to No. 4, and reports interview with Musa Kassin Husseini, anti-Jewish attitude of people of Nablus, and arrival of Sir Alfred Mond. Discusses progress of commission of enquiry into affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate and deals with the political situation in Transjordan which is on the whole satisfactory, but would improve if there were less uncertainty as to its future administration	195
108 Sir H. Samuel No. 66	" 4	Palestine. Administrative reports. Transmits report for month of January	198
109 Sir H. Samuel No. 67	" 4	Finance. In Palestine. Refers to No. 94, and outlines financial requirements of the country, and describes economic and commercial development, e.g., harbours at Haifa and Jaffa, railways, posts and telegraphs	202
110 Law Officers	" 18	Imperial preference. In Palestine. Expresses opinion that it cannot be extended to Palestine	210
111 Sir H. Samuel No. 79	" 7	European subjects. Refers to despatch No. 45, and encloses draft copy of Rules of Criminal Procedure, with particular reference to the rights of European subjects. Invites approval	211

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
112 Sir H. Samuel No. 81	1921 Feb. 12	Advisory Council. In Palestine. Transmits minutes of meeting on 9th February, at which a message of thanks from Imperial War Graves Commission was read and a statement on position of Palestine railways was made	218
113 Sir H. Samuel No. 83	" 12	Hadi, Auni Abdul. Reports interview with. Sir H. Samuel stated that the British Government would be opposed to any anti-French aggression and urged that Sherif Ali should withdraw to Maan	219
114 Consul Palmer No. 4	" 13	Syria. Unification of. Reports that the French Administration appear to be considering a modified unification of Syria	221
115 Consul Palmer No. 7. Conf.	" 21	Syria. Situation report. Transmits copy of a report by the military liaison officer, Damascus, dealing principally with arms traffic, and pointing out that the fall of Aintab did not have any great moral effect in Syria	221
116 Consul Palmer No. 10	" 23	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 115. States that bridge destroyed was between Zeiton and Makarin, and that it is reported to be the work of Abdulla's followers	224
117 Consul-General Rabou No. 33	" 24	Syria. Unification of. Refers to No. 114, and points out that the component elements of Syria are so dissimilar that it is hard to see upon what a serious unity could be based	224
118 Consul Palmer No. 11	" 25	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 116. States that bridge is said to have been blown up by Ahmad Murawid and his followers	225
119 Consul Palmer No. 12	" 26	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 118. States that Murawid was accompanied by Mahmud Fawar with about 150 horsemen. Murawid has since attacked Shagara in Kanaitra district and the French have despatched a force to that district	225
120 Consul Palmer No. 16	Mar. 2	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 119, and gives further details of Murawid's raid	225
121 Consul Palmer No. 16	" 2	Dromes. Constitutional Government for. Reports progress made in this direction, and encloses copy of memorandum drawn up by Farhan Sharaf	226
122 Consul Palmer No. 17	" 3	Syria. Situation report. Explains present boundaries of Damascus State	227
123 Consul Palmer No. 18	" 5	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 119, and gives further details of the raid and of French reprisals	228
124 Consul Palmer No. 19	" 7	Syria. Situation report. Report that Amal Attarash and others have joined Abdulla at Maan and that an attack is considered imminent. Refers also to No. 115, and states that consignments of arms are likely to be picked up at Duma and Aden	228
125 To General Haddad Pasha	" 27	Faisal. Negotiations with. Refers to No. 123. Points out that the frontier between Turkey and Syria is defined in the Treaty of Sevres, which is not yet in force; and that, when it is in force, France will be responsible for the integrity of her mandated territory	228
126 French Ambassador	" 25	Transjordan. Draws attention to the anti-French activities of Abdulla, and points out that His Majesty's Government's efforts to restrain them have not achieved appreciable results (see also No. 155)	229

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
127 Consul Palmer No. 21	1921 Mar. 2	Syria. Situation report. Explains the system of administration of Damascus State	229
128 Consul Palmer No. 24	" 10	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 123. Gives further details of the attack on the village of Shagara, and adds that Tadmor (Palmyra) is a likely collecting place for those engaged in arms traffic to Mesopotamia	232
129 Consul Palmer No. 26	" 14	Syria. Situation report. Reports movements of Abdulla in Transjordan. Emir Zeid with guns and aeroplanes is said to be moving up to support him. Abdulla has addressed letter to Damascus notables asking them to send him volunteers as officers	232
130 French Ambassador	" 28	Tobacco. Turkish Régie monopoly. Protests against the suspension of the monopoly, and requests that the matter be laid before a tribunal	238

CHAPTERS IV, V AND VI.—MESOPOTAMIA, ADEN AND ARABIA, AND GENERAL.

131 To American Ambassador	1921 Feb. 28	Oil rights. In Mesopotamia. Points out that Anglo-French Petroleum Agreement, as far as it relates to Mesopotamia, is in fact merely an adaptation of previous arrangements to existing arrangements	234
132 British Agent, Jeddah Secret	1921 Dec. 21	Jeddah. Situation report. Reports on Hussein's attitude regarding the status of British Indians. Reports his increasing avowed adherence to Wahabism. Attention of Government has been drawn to increase of customs duties. Reports departure of El Kadiri	237
133 Political Resident, Aden No. 80	" 25	Aden. News letter. Reports conflicting news regarding Ibn Saud's movements. Reviews situation in the Yemen, where Mahmud Nadhim exercises considerable influence. Discusses activities of the Zeidis	241
134 Minute by Earl Curzon	1921 Jan. 18	Faisal. Negotiations with. Records conversation with Emir Faisal. The Emir complained that Ibn Saud was receiving a subsidy, while his father's subsidy was suspended. He laid stress on the menace of Wahabism and appealed for material aid in the shape of aeroplanes and armoured cars in addition to financial assistance	242
135 British Agent, Jeddah Secret	1921 Dec. 31	Jeddah. Situation report. Reports Hussein's suspicions of intrigues against him by Ali Halder and his general complaints regarding the insecurity of the Hedjaz, especially vis-à-vis Ibn Saud. States Hussein also complains of shortage of supplies and maltreatment of Arab prisoners by the French. Discusses possibility of arms traffic through the Red Sea	244
136 Foreign Office Minute	1921 Jan. 20	Faisal. Negotiations with. Refers to No. 134. Reports conversation between Mr. Lindsay and the Emir Faisal, in the course of which the McMahon correspondence was discussed. It was made clear to the Emir that the renewed subsidy which it was hoped to pay to King Hussein could not be comparable with that paid to him during the war	248

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
137 To Lord Hardinge No. 244	1921 Jan. 24	Feisal. French opposition to. Reports conversation between the French Ambassador and Sir E. Crowe. The former urged that His Majesty's Government should drop Feisal, who was not to be trusted. Sir E. Crowe pointed out that we were bound to redeem our pledges to the Arabs, and that if Feisal were chosen by the people of Mesopotamia it would be hard for us to deny him support ...	251
138 British Agent, Jeddah No. 4	" 19	Jeddah. Situation report. Comments on fighting around Taif, which does not appear in any way to confirm Hussein's fears of an attack on Mecca. He appears to be using these events as a lever to compel assistance from His Majesty's Government. Reports virtual independence of Medina. Discusses Capitulations, pilgrimage matters, &c. ...	252
139 Political Resident, Aden No. 3	" 12	Aden. News letter. Discusses the situation as regards the Imam and the Idrisi, and recent events in the Yemen and the protectorate ...	257
140 Political Resident, Aden No. 5. Conf.	" 20	Yemen. Political situation of. Forwards copy of a letter from Captain Faruqin, who considers that the Imam does want a peaceful settlement with His Majesty's Government and the Idrisi, but is surrounded by Turcophiles. Reports despatch of two Yemenite representatives to the Ottoman Parliament, and urges the desirability of evacuating the Turks, still remaining in the Yemen ...	259
141 British Agent, Jeddah No. 9. Secret	" 20	Jeddah. Situation report. Reports abatement of fighting around Taif and negotiations between the Emirs Ali and Khalid. Discusses difficulties of Indian pilgrims. Contains Mecca report, hinting, <i>inter alia</i> , at Hashimite-Kemalist intrigues ...	261
142 Field-Marshal Vis- count Allenby No. 66	" 21	Pilgrimage and quarantine arrangements. Transmits a letter from the Quarantine Board submitting observations on the Jeddah pilgrimage report. Points out inacceptability of suggestion that the Tor station should in future years be left closed ...	265
143 Political Resident, Aden No. 6. Secret	" 27	Aden. News letter. Reports continued friction between the Imam and the Idrisi and desire of the people of Hodeida to be ruled by the latter. Discusses events in the Yemen and the protectorate ...	266
144 Emir Feisal ...	Feb. 15	Feisal. Negotiations with. Requests to be informed of date on which he may attend the conference on the Near and Middle East ...	268
145 British Agent, Jeddah No. 13	Jan. 29	Capitulations. In Hedjaz. Reports that passports issued since 1914 are not accepted as evidence of British nationality or protection. Patni Indians are recognised as British subjects, but the claims of other British or British-protected residents are contested by King Hussein. Estimates number of British and British-protected residents of Mecca at 30,000 ...	269
146 British Agent, Jeddah No. 14	" 30	Jeddah. Situation report. Reports cessation of hostilities with Khalid, and that King Hussein is rumoured to have offered to confirm him in Emirate of Khurma. States that Emir Ali may be leaving to join his brother Abdulla at Mecca ...	272
147 To Emir Feisal ...	Feb. 18	Feisal. Negotiations with. Replies to No. 144. Informs Feisal that conference to be held in London shortly was to consider modifications of the Turkish Treaty, but if questions affecting the interests of Arab countries arise His Majesty's Government will support a proposal that he should be heard ...	275

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
148 Emir Feisal to the Prime Minister Confidential	1921 Feb. 21	Feisal. Negotiations with. Sets out the wishes of King Hussein and the consideration on which they are based. Requests that he may be allowed to attend the conference, and transmits copy of a telegram from Hussein addressed to Haddad Pasha stating that the decision of the conference will be a barometer for the Maan movement ...	276
149 To Lord Hardinge No. 200	" 25	Feisal. French opposition to. Transmits memorandum of a conversation between Sir E. Crowe and the French Ambassador, who made it clear that his Government were quite determined in their opposition to Feisal. Sir E. Crowe repeated that for the present the candidate for the rulership of Mesopotamia was Abdallah, and urged that the French should adopt a more conciliatory policy towards the Arabs ...	277
150 Colonial Office ...	Mar. 1	Palestine. Situation report. Transmits report for month of February, indicating that the publication of text of the mandate has had but little effect, and that there is a tendency among Christians in Haifa to entertain idea of fusion of Syria and Palestine. Deals with opposition of Hapool Hassir to Mafage Poale Socialism and withdrawal of French and Italian guard detachments. States Abdulla wishes to remain on good terms with Palestine Administration ...	278
151 British Agent, Jeddah No. 15. Secret	Feb. 20	Jeddah. Situation report. Gives account of Hussein's visit to Jeddah and of interviews with him. Describes commercial difficulties in that town due to Hussein's arbitrary attitude. Deals also with quarantine matters, Capitulations, the question of the Hedjaz Railway, &c. ...	281
152 British Agent, Jeddah No. 12	" 21	Jeddah. Situation report. Transmits summary of events in the Hedjaz for the period July-December 1920 ...	284
153 To British Agent, Jeddah No. 24	Mar. 17	Feisal. Negotiations with. Reports conversation between General Haddad and Mr. Lindsay. Haddad protested against the alleged reason by the French of Urfa and Aintab to the Turks. Mr. Lindsay discouraged the idea of Arab diplomatic representation in Europe. General Haddad stated that he felt sure that the report that Emir Abdulla had taken Deraa was incorrect ...	289
154 To Lord Hardinge No. 818	" 19	Feisal. French opposition to. Refers to reception of General Haddad by Prime Minister, M. Briand and Secretary of State. States that General Haddad's request for an interview with M. Berthelot, which M. Briand promised to support, has received no reply. Instructs Lord Hardinge to point out to the French the lack of wisdom in such behaviour ...	290
155 Note by Sir E. Crowe	" 26	Transjordan. Report of conversation between Sir E. Crowe and the French Ambassador, who suggested a joint pronouncement by the local British and French authorities that their policy was identical. Sir E. Crowe replied that such declarations lost much of their value so long as the French-inspired local press remained the source of a constant and systematic anti-British propaganda ...	293
156 To British Agent, Jeddah No. 35. Tel.	" 28	Feisal. Negotiations with. Transmits message for King Hussein from Feisal which embodies a message from Colonel Lawrence urging Feisal to start at once for Mecca, leaving Haddad in London to represent him ...	299

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
157 British Agent, Jeddah No. 31. Secret	1921 Mar. 11	Jeddah reports. Reports fruitless efforts to induce Hussein to adopt the solution of fixing an inclusive rate for quarantine dues. Explains reason for Hussein's attitude. Also encloses Jeddah report for period 1st-11th March and reports further quarantine difficulties and frictions between Hussein and Mesara. Held	501
158 To Sir G. Buchanan No. 196	Feb. 12	Tripartite Agreement and the Turkish Treaty. Records conversation with Italian Ambassador	312
159 To Lord Hardinge No. 315	16	Conference on Treaty of Sèvres. Records conversation with French Ambassador, who asks His Majesty's Government not to agree to any postponement of Suggests release of Turkish prisoners at Malta to create favourable atmosphere	313
160 To Lord Hardinge No. 307	Mar. 23	Mustapha Kemal, Enver Fehri and Mesopotamia. Records conversation with French Ambassador respecting latest developments	314

SUBJECT INDEX.

[The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.]

Chapter I.—THE CAUCASUS.

ARMENIA—		GEORGIA—	
General situation. Report by Rev. H. W. Harcourt	...	General situation. Report	1, 6
General situation	...	M. Tchekeli. Interview with Secretary of State	7
	...	Supply of oil fuel	5
	...	Military requirements	4
AZERBAIJAN—		MISCELLANEOUS—	
Baku oil industry	...	Report on conditions of oil industry in Caucasus	3
General situation	...		

Chapter II.—TURKEY.

REVISION OF TREATY	11, 12, 15, 16, 39, 57, 69	FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES	13
GREEK ACTIVITIES...	26, 43, 44, 67	NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATIONALISTS, MODIFICATION OF TREATY AND LONDON CONFERENCE	24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 70
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS	5, 10, 14, 20		
SITUATION IN CAUCASUS	66		
MISSION TO ANATOLIA	8, 18, 21		
GENERAL SITUATION AND INTERVIEW WITH SULTAN	13, 23, 43, 49, 71	FINANCIAL CONTROL AND FINANCIAL SITUATION	37, 56, 61
MANDATED TERRITORIES	17, 22, 30, 42	LOCAL FOREIGN POST OFFICES	63

Chapter III-VI.—MESOPOTAMIA, ADEN AND ARABIA, AND GENERAL.

ABDULLA. Emir	113, 124, 126, 129, 141, 146, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155	ANTIQUITIES. In Palestine	87, 108
ADEN NEWS LETTERS	133, 139, 143	ARMS TRAFFIC—	
AGRICULTURE. In Palestine	87, 101, 108	In the Hedjaz	125, 158
AKHWAN MOVEMENT	125, 141, 152	In Syria	113, 124, 125
ALIX. Emir	113, 130, 133, 141, 146, 151, 157	AWKAF. See "Wakil."	
		CAPITULATIONS IN HEDJAZ	132, 133, 134, 135, 136
		CEMETERY. Non-Moslem, in the Hedjaz	135

Chapter III-VI.—MESOPOTAMIA, ADEN AND ARABIA, AND GENERAL—(continued).

COMMERCE IN PALESTINE	87, 108	LEGISLATION. In Palestine	87, 91, 101, 108, 111
COMMUNICATIONS. Between British and French in the Middle East	81, 29	LOTFALLAH. HAKIM	157
COTTON. In Palestine	101	MAGISTRATES. In Palestine	100, 104, 105
COUNCILS IN PALESTINE—		MANDATES—	
Advisory	101, 112	General	79, 89
Economic	87, 88	Palestine	150
		Syrian	100, 150
CURRENCY—		MEXIA, & Co. British representative at	152, 157
In the Hedjaz	132, 157	MEDINA, & Co. Status of	138, 151
In Palestine	97, 103	MERETWID. AMRO	116, 129
CUSTOMS—		NADHIM. MAHMUD	133, 139, 140, 143
In the Hedjaz	132, 151		
In Palestine	87, 108	NEJD PILGRIMAGE	151, 152
DAMASCUS. State of	120, 127	OFFICIALS. In Palestine	75, 97
DEFENCE. See under "Palestine."		OIL RIGHTS. In Mesopotamia	131
DRUSES. Constitutional Government for	121	PALESTINE—	
EDUCATION. In Palestine	108	Administrative reports	87, 108
EMIGRATION. From the Hedjaz	138	Defence of	94
EXTRADITION. From Palestine	90	Situation reports	78, 107, 150
EUROPEAN SUBJECTS. Rights in civil and criminal procedures	111	PASSPORTS. In the Hedjaz. See "Capitulations."	
FEISAL—		PILGRIMAGE AND QUARANTINE	133, 138, 141, 142, 146, 151, 152, 157
Negotiations with	125, 134, 136, 144, 147, 148, 153, 156, 160	POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS. In Palestine	87, 108, 109
French opposition to	137, 142, 154	PORTS. Administration of, in Palestine	101, 108, 109
FINANCE. In Palestine	77, 94, 100	PREFERENCE. Imperial, in Palestine	98, 110
FISHERY.	108	PRESS, Jeddah. See "Jeddah. Situation reports."	
FORESTRY.	87, 108	PRIVILEGES. Religious, in Palestine	76
GOURAUD, GENERAL. Hussein's complaint against	135	QUARANTINE. See under "Pilgrimage and Quarantine."	
HADI, ACHI ARDOL	113	RAILWAYS—	
HAIDAR, ALI	135	In the Hedjaz	151
HARBOURS. In Palestine	102	In Palestine	108, 109, 112
HEALTH. Public, in Palestine	87, 108	SAUD. See	132, 133, 135, 138, 141, 146, 151, 152, 157
HOLIDAYS. Official, in Palestine	83	SECURITY—	
HOLY PLACES. Guard at	85, 89, 150	Lack of, in the Hedjaz	134, 135, 138, 151
HUSSEIN—		Public, in Palestine	87
Relations with Ibn Saud	132, 135, 138, 141, 146, 151, 152, 157	SHIPPING. To and from the Hedjaz. See "Jeddah. Situation reports."	
Visit to Jeddah	151, 152	SUAKIM CABLE	133, 145, 151
Difficulties with	152, 157	SUBSIDY. Hussein's urgent request for	134, 136, 152
IBN SAUD. See "Saud."		SUPPLIES. For the Hedjaz	135, 151, 152
IDRISI	133, 139, 140, 143	SYRIA—	
IMAM—		Situation reports	84, 113, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129
Relations with Idri. See "Idri."		Unification of	114, 117
Relations with His Majesty's Government	133, 140	TAIF. Fighting around	135, 136, 141, 146, 151, 152
IMMIGRATION. Into Palestine	72, 103, 108	TRANSJORDANIA	95, 107, 126, 129, 153
JEDDAH. Situation reports	132, 133, 138, 141, 146, 151, 152, 157	THRANA. Kvents in. See "Aden News Letters."	
JURISDICTION. In Palestine	87, 91		
KADERI. Samsi Si	132, 138		
KEMAL. Reported intrigues of Hussein with	141, 152		
KHALIFATE	151		
KHALID. Emir	132, 135, 136, 141, 146, 151		

Chapter III VI MESOPOTAMIA ADEN AND ARABIA AND GENERAL (continued).			
TOBACCO, Turkish Régie monopoly ...	101 102	WORKS, Public, in Palestine ...	87, 108
	108, 120		
TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ...	138	YEMEN—	
VETERINARY REPORTS, From Palae-		Events in. See "Aden News Letters."	
stine ...	67 106	Political situation of ...	140
WAUABISM ...	139, 134, 139, 141	ZEID, East ...	5, 12
WAKF ...	88, 92, 98, 96, 130	ZIONISTS, Political activities of	74, 10

Printed in England

CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs

PART VI

CHAPTER I.—THE CAUCASUS

E 55 55 58

No. 1

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon — (Received January 3, 1921)

(No 132 Secret.)

Tiflis, December 3, 1920

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following observations on the situation in Georgia:—

Foreign Relations

The main object of the foreign policy of Georgia is to safeguard its newly-gained independence. The chief threat to that independence comes from Russia whatever be the form of government that may exist in that country. Georgia cannot hope to withstand unaided an attack by Russia. She is therefore obliged to seek support. Until April 1920 neither of the two conflicting parties in Russia, the Bolsheviks and General Denikin's followers, was in a position to attack her. After the disappearance of General Denikin and the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan, Georgia was attacked by the Bolsheviks, but fought and concluded on the 7th May a treaty of peace with Soviet Russia. That treaty is still in force, but Georgia is well aware that it exists only until the Bolsheviks feel themselves strong enough to attack her. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks are endeavouring by propaganda to facilitate the attainment of their object to incorporate Georgia in Soviet Russia. Their propaganda has so far made but little headway. The reasons for this comparative failure are not far to seek. Firstly, the idea of independence and the spirit of nationality have undoubtedly taken deep root in the minds of the Georgian people. Secondly, the Georgian people have watched at close quarters the working of the Soviet régime in Azerbaijan, and have found nothing in it to make Bolshevism attractive to them. Indeed, it may well be doubted that Bolshevism would have secured a single convert in Georgia but for the economic distress from which Georgia, in company with many other countries, is at present suffering. The depreciation of Georgian money and the lack of manufactured goods, not articles of luxury but those of necessity, such as clothes and boots, combined with the high price of living have rendered it impossible for all except the rich to make both ends meet. The resulting discontent has alone enabled Bolshevism to gain any footing at all in Georgia. That footing is still small, the policy of the Georgian Government and the spirit of the Georgian people remain anti-Bolshevik.

Situated, as Georgia is, in direct contact with Soviet Russia and dependent for oil supplies, essential to her existence, on Soviet Russia, it is not surprising that she should endeavour to keep on friendly terms and should further conclude a commercial agreement with the latter, by the terms of which she receives oil supplies in return for merchandise.

Until October 1920 the sole menace to Georgia was from Soviet Russia, but in

E 55 55 58

B

that month the Turkish Nationalists began their invasion of Armenia. Their well-known claims of Turkey to the provinces of Batoum and Andahan, produced a feeling of uneasiness in the mind of the Georgian Government as to Turkish intentions towards Georgia. This feeling of uneasiness was increased by the knowledge that the Turkish Nationalists were acting in conjunction with the Bolsheviks. At this moment the Georgian Government received from the Armenian Government a request to enter into a defensive alliance. The Georgian Government was by this request placed in a position of great difficulty, and called upon to take a decision of great moment.

By throwing in her lot with Armenia, Georgia would have been safeguarding herself and provided that the armistice with the Bolsheviks proved really the well-known claims of Turkey to the provinces of Batoum and Andahan, produced a feeling of uneasiness in the mind of the Georgian Government as to Turkish intentions towards Georgia. This feeling of uneasiness was increased by the knowledge that the Turkish Nationalists were acting in conjunction with the Bolsheviks. At this moment the Georgian Government received from the Armenian Government a request to enter into a defensive alliance. The Georgian Government was by this request placed in a position of great difficulty, and called upon to take a decision of great moment.

Another factor which carried great weight was the deep seated distrust existing between Georgia and Armenia.

In 1919, when threatened by General Denikin, Georgia proposed to Armenia a defensive military alliance but Armenia hesitated the proposal after consulting the British and French Governments. The British and French Governments were not in favour of the proposal. The British and French Governments were not in favour of the proposal. The British and French Governments were not in favour of the proposal.

The collapse of Armenia before the Nationalists, and the establishment of a Soviet Government in Armenia, have created a new situation in the Caucasus. This situation is described above for Georgia. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks undoubtedly are being brought to heel by propaganda or by force, although they are still a powerful factor in the Caucasus. On the other hand, the Turks not only covet the province of Batoum, but are bent on securing the rest of the Caucasus. The British and French Governments are therefore as much as possible, and are therefore urging Georgia to sever all connection with the Entente. The Bolsheviks and Nationalists are, in name at least, allies, but now that direct contact between them has been established in Armenia the inevitable conflict of interests is beginning to make itself felt. So long as relations between them continue in their present uncertain state, it is probable that neither will take any active action in furtherance of its aims in Georgia. Georgia is therefore in a position of great isolation, and is being surrounded by two powerful neighbours, and thereby endeavour to frustrate the aims of the other. Such a course is bound to imperil her relations with the Allies, and is therefore to be avoided. It is therefore the duty of the Georgian Government to know to what extent the Allies are willing to assist her. The British and French Governments have to assist her with arms and money, but the Allies can do nothing more. The British and French Governments have to assist her with arms and money, but the Allies can do nothing more. The British and French Governments have to assist her with arms and money, but the Allies can do nothing more.

If the Allies, in particular His Majesty's Government attach sufficient importance to the Caucasus, they will assist Georgia in her efforts to secure her independence. The Allies can decide to assist Georgia against the Bolsheviks and Nationalists, and not to come to terms with either the Bolsheviks or Nationalists. The Allies can decide to assist Georgia against the Bolsheviks and Nationalists, and not to come to terms with either the Bolsheviks or Nationalists.

It, on the other hand, the Allies either attach no importance to the fate of Georgia, or while expressing sympathy, and not to come to terms with either the Bolsheviks or Nationalists. The Allies can decide to assist Georgia against the Bolsheviks and Nationalists, and not to come to terms with either the Bolsheviks or Nationalists.

As time is of the utmost importance, I have already, in my telegram No. 551 dated the 5th December 1920, telegraphed to His Majesty's Government.

(a) *Internal Affairs*.—The Government of Georgia claims to be a Socialist Government, and it has introduced legislation on advanced Socialistic principles. It has expropriated the land of large landowners and allotted it to peasants.

At the present moment the defects of such measures are more apparent than their merits. If we take for instance the land laws, these have created discontent amongst all the former landowners, while the contentment of the new peasant owners has not been secured owing to the institution of "zemstvo". These local councils, to whom is given the monopoly of the sale of surplus produce of the peasants, pay the peasants a much lower rate than that at which they could have sold it. The Government has also failed to import the articles of necessity on which the peasant class is heavily dependent, boots and agricultural implements. The peasants are, therefore, equally with the landowners, discontented.

In the various industries a similar state of discontent prevails, for while the Government monopolizes the right of export of the produce and receives payment for its exports in foreign currency, it pays to the mineowner or tobacco grower or silk producer a sum in Georgian roubles on the basis of 3,000 roubles for 1/ when the market rate may be 15,000 roubles for 1/. This amount is insufficient to enable the owner or producer to pay his workmen a living wage. The result is that the industry is brought to a standstill. Nearly all the Greeks engaged in the tobacco industry have emigrated, and I understand that little or no work is being done at the manganese mines. In fact, the Government has been living on the proceeds of the manganese mines. In fact, the Government has been living on the proceeds of the manganese mines. In fact, the Government has been living on the proceeds of the manganese mines.

Until the Georgian Government can secure a foreign loan there does not appear to be any likelihood of an amelioration of the state of affairs described above.

This state of general discontent is calculated to provide a fertile field for Bolshevik propaganda, nevertheless, that propaganda has not up to the present time made any great progress. At the same time it is clear that the longer the Georgian Government is unable to improve the condition of the working classes the more converts Bolshevism is likely to make.

The other form of foreign propaganda which constitutes a menace to the internal peace of Georgia is that of the Turkish Nationalists. This is always ripe, but up to the present time has led to no serious results, and it is improbable that any serious trouble, as for example, a rising, will occur unless Turkish troops actually invade Georgian territory.

(b) *The Cabinet*.—There has been considerable discontent with the methods and alleged incapacity of certain of the Ministers, and a prolonged Cabinet crisis has resulted in a reshuffling of portfolios. The Minister of Finance and Supplies, M. Ramishvili, is now also Minister of Communications. M. Lordkipanidze, formerly Minister of War, has become Minister of Public Instruction, a newly-created post. The real object of this is to add to the Cabinet a Minister who shall relieve the President of the greater part of his work. M. Jordania enjoys but poor health, and experience has shown that his work is rather too heavy for him. It is probable that he personally would not be unwilling to resign, but his undoubted influence with the people at large is an asset with which the Government cannot at present do without. M. Lordkipanidze, formerly Minister of the Interior, has become Minister of War.

The result of these changes is to place practically all power in the hands of MM. Ramishvili and Lordkipanidze and is accordingly to be commended.

(c) *Financial Affairs*.—The Government has no fixed sources of income, and the continually diminishing value of its paper money, the rate to-day is 15,000 roubles to 1/ pound, is a very delicate matter. The Government has no fixed sources of income, and the continually diminishing value of its paper money, the rate to-day is 15,000 roubles to 1/ pound, is a very delicate matter. The Government has no fixed sources of income, and the continually diminishing value of its paper money, the rate to-day is 15,000 roubles to 1/ pound, is a very delicate matter.

the expenditure incurred on them. It is difficult to see how, unless she can obtain a loan abroad Georgia can stabilise her currency.

It is not necessary to discuss internal politics at the present time, but the work at hand was so evident and the choice of method so circumscribed that the outlook of the men in power would have made little difference to the work done so far, unless it had been possible to choose Ministers for their honesty alone.

Conclusion

An attempt has been made in the above paragraphs to give a brief description of the present state of affairs in Georgia. It is clear that in many respects there is considerable room for improvement. But having regard to the difficulties with which Georgia is faced, as being a small State in a hostile environment, it is not surprising that the progress made is not more rapid. The situation is still very difficult and somewhat dangerous.

I have &c

C. B. STOKES, Lieut.-Colonel,
Chief British Commissioner for Transcaucasia

[E 45 23 58]

No. 2

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1921.)

(No. 1088.)

My Lord

Constantinople, December 20, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report on the Armenian situation which I have received from the Rev. H. W. Harcourt, who has been in Erivan for the greater part of the year, and is at the Lord Mayor of London's request.

I have &c

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 2

Report on the Situation in Armenia

TO understand the present situation in Armenia and the various changes in its political orientation, it is necessary to realise that this country has recently undergone a change of outlook which has lately puzzled Western observers. In the past, Armenia has been a semi-independent State, but in the last few years it has become a part of the Russian Empire. The change of outlook has been the result of the Russian Revolution and the subsequent civil war. The Russian Government has been unable to maintain its authority in Armenia, and the country has been divided into several small, independent States. The situation is still very difficult, and the future of Armenia is uncertain.

Against the above have acted three different Governments: Russian, Turkish and Persian, and subjected to the influence of their differing cultures. The war and the chaos that followed the break up of the Russian army resulted in a general crowding of these people of the same race and religion, but of differing cultures and social habits, of the land which had been Russian Armenia and which became the Republic of Erivan. Even here, though mixed together to a certain degree, they still remained in sections, sections in which a mingling of culture and opinion certainly took place

but a mingling which resulted, not in the emergence of a solid national outlook and will, but in the development of divergent tendencies in the different sections, which, as the section was at the moment important or not, influenced more or less the Erivan Government in its internal and external policy.

It is not necessary to discuss internal politics at the present time, but the work at hand was so evident and the choice of method so circumscribed that the outlook of the men in power would have made little difference to the work done so far, unless it had been possible to choose Ministers for their honesty alone.

But in external politics this sectionalism, the result of geography and the war explains much that was puzzling in the veering and changing orientation of the Armenian Government and people, and the confused and contradictory reports reaching the Western press. This sectionalism has been aggravated greatly during the time since the armistice by the pressure of external politics and propaganda. No decisions having been made by the Allies, territorial disputes were continuous and on all sides, and amicable relations and the opening up of trade with the surrounding peoples rendered impossible because everybody in regard to the disputed areas was trying to create *faits accomplis*. The neutral zones—that between Georgia and Armenia with Karabagh and Zanguezur—and the districts which refused to recognise the authority of the Erivan Government, as Zangabasar, Sharuar and Nachetchewan, were the subjects of endless intrigue and dispute and the scenes of fighting and often of massacre by one party or another. An added source of disturbance was the quarrel between the Allied and the Soviet Government, and the miserable state of the people gave a chance for active propaganda to bring Armenia once more into the sphere of Russian influence, propaganda carried on not only by real Bolsheviks, but by all classes of Russians, who one and all sympathise with the Soviet attempts to restore the old boundaries.

There were three possible orientations for Armenian external politics, and one immediate need recognised by the most thoughtful men. The need of the moment was peace for the recuperating and the organising of the nation. The desire to attain this as soon as possible explains the tendency to depart from one orientation to another. The three orientations were as follows.—

1. The Nationalist and pro-Ally, especially pro-British, with its goal complete independence. This has been the dominant policy till now. Of course it has been to a great extent that they think this to be the true path of self-interest that has kept the Armenian Government pro-Ally, and which, in the past, has been linked with exaggerated promises. But the loyalty to the Allied cause, in spite of delays and disappointments, exhibited by them alone among the Caucasian peoples, places upon Britain and France a responsibility to see that those who have incurred the hostility of their neighbours by this loyalty get justice done them. This loyalty has been shown at various times since the armistice, as in the accepting of Allied advice in regard to Karabagh, Zanguezur and the neutral zone and again in the refusal of the Soviet terms when it was made clear by Allied authorities that such acceptance would displease Britain and France. (It should be understood that the arrangement of August, so misinterpreted in the West was not a treaty or agreement but an armistice, an armistice made by the Government of a very small State who realised, what was patent to anyone who knew the country and its resources, that nothing but bloodshed and bitterness would result from challenging in warfare the reviving strength of Russia, in hope that the negotiations then going on in London with the Soviet representatives would be brought to successful issue, would define the relations between Armenia and Russia, and ensure from the first security from attack on her eastern border.) But though the Nationalist and pro-Ally policy seemed at one time to be the one that would give the largest area of territory to the nation and the best security for future progress, yet with the long delay on the part of the Allies in settling affairs with Turkey and Russia it has proved a means of holding up peace for Armenia and of preventing the energies of the people being turned into the channels of reconstruction. There have been moments, therefore, when sections of the people—especially those inhabiting the area nearest the point where attack was threatening—have shown a desire to seek an immediate peace by a new orientation and by the sacrifice of some of the territorial ambitions and ideas of independence that have inspired the Nationalist movement.

The alternatives have been —

2. Russia, with the ultimate aim of becoming a federated State of the Russian Republic. There are few real Bolsheviks in Armenia, but many pro-Russians. And

these are of the merchant and one time wealthy class as well as of the peasantry. There has been always present among the bulk of the Armenians, besides a pro-Aily feeling (and it is a real off set against the bad qualities of the race), a deep and sincere gratitude to Russia and the Russians for what they have done in past years for Armenians, a realization that the pre-war prosperity of Russian Armenia and the Turkish border was due to Russia alone, a knowledge that if the Russian plan of "the Armenian Question" had been carried out, the Armenian nation might to-day have been in a condition of prosperity and numerical importance which would have enabled the transition to complete independence at the revolution to have been successfully effected, and left the country in a position easily able to defend itself against external enemies. The wider realization of this, coupled with the memory of the comparative happiness of former years as contrasted with the misery of to-day, accounts for the spasmodic and sudden swerving towards a Russian orientation (often pseudo Bolshevik), seen from time to time in certain sectors, as all hope of assistance from the Allies seemed disappointed, and for the expression of violently anti British sentiment to be found at times in the Armenian press.

3. Turkish to the immediate end of an autonomous State under Turkish suzerainty. It seems strange to find this current of thought after the happenings of the war, and it has had but a vague currency and expression, and could have no more with the memory so recent. Nevertheless it exists, perhaps most strongly among Turkish Armenians and Assyrians, and is the basis of the policy of the Armenians spread in Turkey before the war. They believe that whatever happens so large a measure of control will be exercised by the Western Powers in the Turkish dominions.

This movement for an arrangement with the Turks has received certain impetus lately in the presence of the defeat of the Armenian army from Turkish propaganda among the soldiers and people, offering peace and announcing that they have the support of the British in their desire to pass through to Baku and turn out the Bolsheviks. Indeed this belief in English support to the Turks explains to some

Note.—This current of propaganda was not the only one. There was also a current of purely Russophile propaganda from the Russians, and the promises and suggestion were often contradictory, but they all strengthened the animosity of the Armenians. At the same time it shows the presence of what is in Transcaucasia the very general belief, that the Turkish-Russian war of 1914-15 was a temporary thing, the result not of common aims but of collision of opposition to the Entente, that some day it will pass and that Russians and Turks will once more be found disputing for the country in open warfare.)

Problems of the Government since the organisation of the State

The second is that the village of ~~_____~~ and ~~_____~~ in the
case of Armenia this wealth resulting from the ~~_____~~ in the country was
utterly stripped of resources by the war-time requisitions and by the destruction
and pillage of the Russian retreat and the Turkish invasion. It was necessary to
~~_____~~ and ~~_____~~ to plant ~~_____~~ of the land and the sowing of
the seeds.

Belief that a truck had been involved was not a possibility because it was a narrow way and the North Post Road was a very narrow street and it would not have been possible to turn around.

Military Situation

In addition to this difficulty in the way of the organisation of an efficient and disciplined army, there were others —

$\mathbf{A} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 2 & 3 & 4 \\ 3 & 4 & 5 \end{bmatrix}$

3 Paramount necessity last autumn and spring of using man-power for sowing the crops. No real attempt could be made in calling up the men in any number for training till the corn had been sown and also

5. The continual fighting and threats of fighting on almost all frontiers. Those with the colours were engaged continuously in guarding the frontier, in scrapping with one enemy or another and ~~being~~ ~~confronted~~ ~~with~~ ~~an~~ ~~slow~~ ~~and~~ ~~inadequate~~ transport—from one point to another of the circle as danger threatened from a new direction. This made steady further training impossible.

But there is certainly not the talent in the country itself to build up such a force quickly even if peace gave a chance to do it. If Armenia remains within the orbit of the Allies, the sending of a military mission of staff and regimental officers with non-commissioned officers from one of the Allied Powers is the only way to give Armenia a force capable of defending her territory and one that may be relied on not to commit excesses on the non-Armenian population.

Financial.

Armenia after the armistice was left a land utterly devastated. Unlike

day the entire oil industry of the Apsheron peninsula was seized by the Moscow commissars.

Immediately after the 28th April the export of oil and oil products began from Baku to Astrakhan, at the order and under the personal supervision of the special authorised Soviet representative, Soloviev. This same representative was, prior to the seizure of Baku by the eleventh army, carrying on negotiations in Baku with the Azerbaijan Government re the purchase of oil for the Soviet Government.

At the expiration of one month from the above date the entire Baku oil industry was officially "nationalised" (the 28th May, 1920), and during this intervening month the late administration and staff remained at their posts, but their position was more than unbearable. *De facto* the entire management of the oil-fields and refineries was in the hands of the so-called "Oil fields and Refineries Committees", composed entirely of workmen belonging to the Communist Party. The behaviour of these committees towards the old administration and staff was, on the whole, prudent, with the exception of the requisitioning of their flats, quarters, house furniture and fittings. But this requisitioning was effected on a wide scale towards almost the entire Baku population, excluding only members of the Communist Party and labourers (proletariats).

Immediately after the "nationalisation" of the oil-fields and refineries, everything belonging to these firms and companies was seized by the Bolsheviks, such as cash in hand, money in banks, bills, bonds, securities, trading books, office furniture and fittings—in fact, all that they possessed on that date.

The export of oil to Batoum, of course, ceased from the 28th April, communication with Georgia and Western Europe via Batoum was also interrupted.

The amount of oil and oil products which the Bolsheviks managed to export from Baku to Astrakhan in May was 16,000,000 poods.

Their preliminary plans re export were rather modest. They supposed that the "12-foot roads" (at the mouth of the River Volga) would hardly be able to accept more than 15,000,000 poods of oil monthly as the "12-foot roads" fleet and the whole of the Volga oil carrying fleet, consisting of tugs, iron and wooden barges, had no fuel and had undergone no repairs for nearly two years, hence they would be incompetent to cope with a larger monthly quantity of oil.

The Bolsheviks were then so badly off for fuel that in order to run the first tug to Astrakhan to the "12 foot roads" they had first to despatch a sailing ship with crude oil in barrels from Baku to Astrakhan and only after this had reached its destination could empty barges be tugged to the "12 foot roads" to receive the oil that arrived from Baku.

Later on various stringent and energetic measures were assumed by the Bolsheviks in order to raise the monthly export to the "12-foot roads" to 30,000,000 to 35,000,000 poods of oil. For the Caspian fleet of oil tankers such a monthly export represented in normal times no difficulty at all as in 1916 the monthly export was at least 45,000,000. It must not, however, be forgotten that the Bolsheviks could not make use to the full extent of the Caspian fleet of oil tankers, as a certain number of the largest oil tankers were at the beginning of the war in the Mediterranean and the Channel, and hence they were not returned until several years after the end of the war. These ships were evacuated in March 1920 from Petrovsk to Enzeli.

On the occupation of Enzeli by the Bolsheviks in May 1920 the whole of this fleet fell into their hands and was brought back to Baku. These tankers, which numbered 120 oil tankers, were brought to the Baku-Astrakhan fleet were all repaired and were then used for the export of oil. The total amount of tonnage was 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 poods, and the amount of voyages made month Baku-Astrakhan and back—was 6-2, hence the maximum monthly export of oil to the "12 foot roads" reached about 31,000,000 poods.

On the whole the fleet at the "12 foot roads" coped satisfactorily with its work, and was able to tranship all that was brought from Baku. It is not known whether the fleet was assisted by the Bolsheviks to increase export from Astrakhan to the Volga. It is likely, however, that it was not, as the fleet was not so well equipped as it was in 1916, and part of the total quantity of oil arrived as far as Nijni-Novgorod during the summer.

The total quantity of oil exported from Baku during the navigation was 1,000,000 poods of which 10,000,000 poods were kerosene, 5,000,000 poods lubricating oils, 500,000 poods various solar oils and the rest was crude oil and residuals.

As was mentioned here before that on the day of the Bolshevik occupation of Baku the stocks of oil and oil products were about 300,000,000 poods. During the navigation in the 28th April to 28th November about 9,000,000 poods of oil and oil products were exported from Baku to the "12 foot roads" fleet. Taking into consideration that the total production of oil in the oil fields (the stocks of oil thus accumulated by the 1st November 1921 re the export of oil) should be approximately 255,000,000 to 260,000,000 poods.

It is probable that the Moscow oil committee intended to export to Astrakhan in 1921 about 150,000,000 poods of oil. On 1st November 1921 all stocks of oil will be cleared out in Baku. Of all the oil products exported to Central Russia in 1920 the greatest attention was paid to kerosene, which serve as fuel.

The monthly production of oil in the oil fields in 1920 was approximately as follows—

	Poods
January, February, March	57,000,000
April	18,000,000
May and June	29,000,000
July	14,000,000
August	13,000,000
September	10,800,000
October	11,700,000
November	11,500,000
December	11,000,000
Total	178,000,000 gross

Deducting from this 15 per cent. for fuel used on the oil-fields (26,000,000), the net production of oil in 1920 was about 150,000,000 poods.

The production of oil in 1921 and the export of oil to the "12 foot roads" fleet, kerosene and lubricating oil, occupy the main part of the total production of oil in 1921, and the rest (63 per cent.) residuals.

Parallel with the production and export of oil comes the question of the work of the refineries.

A part of the stocks of refined oil kerosene and lubricating oils which were held in 1920 were exported during the navigation in 1920. The total amount of refined oil kerosene and lubricating oils which was exported in 1920 was 40,000,000 poods. The total amount of refined oil kerosene and lubricating oils which was exported in 1920 was 40,000,000 poods.

The total amount of refined oil kerosene and lubricating oils which was exported in 1920 was 40,000,000 poods. The total amount of refined oil kerosene and lubricating oils which was exported in 1920 was 40,000,000 poods. The total amount of refined oil kerosene and lubricating oils which was exported in 1920 was 40,000,000 poods.

Taking into consideration the lamentable state in which the oil-fields and refineries are at present situated, owing to the lack of the essential technical materials, it is well known that the proposed programme of work for 1921 will hardly be carried out. As an example of the lack of materials in November 1921 there was a shortage of tubes and the stock of tubes was only 1,500,000 poods. There was a shortage of tubes, which amounted in the aggregate to 1,500,000 poods, with a most urgent need for tubes. There was a shortage of tubes, which amounted in the aggregate to 1,500,000 poods.

The Baku (Azerbaijan) Naphtha Committee repeatedly applied to the Chief Moscow Naphtha Committee to urgently supply the Baku oil industry with the necessary materials, but the Moscow Committee refused to supply the Baku oil industry with the necessary materials. In other words, the Baku oil fields could only expect to receive in the best of cases one-tenth of its wants of materials, and even the necessary materials.

As is well known by now, all questions are decided by the Bolsheviks very simply

and easily. "For the Soviet Government everything and anything is possible." This phrase is very popular at present in Bolshevik Russia, and sufficient confirmation of it will be found at least in its political display.

It is very problematic whether the Baku refineries will be supplied this winter with caustic soda and sulphuric acid. The latter was usually manufactured in the Baku sulphuric acid factories out of Sicilian sulphur or sulphur pyrite. In November last there was barely any sulphur in Baku and recently only a small amount of its requirements. Delivery of Sicilian sulphur to Baku has at it is very small, at such a rate that it is not enough for the refineries. Delivery of pyrite has also been very small. It is estimated that Baku was supplied with sulphur in November last received as much as would just last for ten days' work. Under such conditions of supply it is highly improbable whether the programme of work intended for the winter will be completed.

Attention must also be called to another and a very important factor that is the shortage of labour. In the first half of 1940, the number of workers in the oil fields and refineries decreased almost half, the main cause of this being the want of workmen. Besides this, the productivity of labour by the workmen on the oil fields and at the refineries also decreased to its utmost degree. The Baku engineers, owing to their many years of observation and experience, define the present low productivity of labour to one-fifth to one-sixth of its normal state.

The desertion of workmen from the Baku oil-fields, stated above, has at the root of it very serious motives.

The question of food supply and wages are often decided by the State, says the *Pravda*. Money, the Bolsheviks say, is not wanted by workmen—because money is only an invention of the bourgeoisie and capitalists. The result of such a policy, the *Pravda* says, was that the workmen ran away in hundreds of thousands.

The daily food rations dealt out lately in Baku to a workman consisted of
of very bad fish, like herring, etc. It was also very lean meat of his family.
On an average, a family of a Baku workman consisted of wife and one child,
therefore such a family would receive daily 2 lb. of food.

This is all the Soviet Government dealt out in the way of foodstuffs to every workman and family. The Soviet Government charged 2 roubles per lb. for rice 7 roubles per lb.

	Roubles per lb
Barley bread	400
Wheat bread	750
Granulated sugar	1,000
Ice	6.00
Meat	6.700
Butter	500
Potatoes	4,000
	300

It is hardly necessary to prove that a workman with his family cannot exist on the wages he receives. The fact is, that the wages of the workman are not sufficient to support his family, and that the family must be supported by the wages of the capitalist.

[illegible]

Over and above the question of food, the conditions of clothing and boots are

also very heavy. Second-hand coats cost 15,000 to 20,000 roubles, boots of the lowest quality and make 25,000 to 30,000 roubles a pair, and when we recall to memory that for the last years 1918 and 1919 the oil producers could not afford to pay the workmen correspondingly to the cost of living, owing to the depressed state of the oil trade, it becomes clear that the purchasing capability of the workmen was very low, and therefore the lamentable state in which the labouring class is now placed in Baku is clearly understood.

Hunger, cold, followed by epidemic diseases (mainly typhoid) is the usual lot at present of the workmen and employees of the Baku oil industry, yet they quietly shut away their little hard-earned savings for a speedy and bright future, and when these hopes leave them they desert and run to the country, or begin speculating in foodstuffs. This illegal trade the people of the West will find difficult to understand. But in Russia it is widespread at present, and it has really become a State necessity, as owing to this neglect of the vital interests of the masses perhaps millions of lives have been saved from a death of hunger. This trade has become very popular amongst the workmen, and as it gives large profits, which enable them to buy a few necessities, all the more do they desert from the oil fields by the workmen has assumed enormous proportions.

Very few qualified workmen are to be found now in the Russian factories, and the Soviet Government is no longer able to hide this fact. It is expected in Baku that the desertion of workmen from the oil-fields will increase during this winter owing to the critical state of the supply of food.

The state of the administration, concerning staffs employed in the refineries and at the refineries is also very trying, both materially and morally. Officially they are invested with very large rights, all orders given by them must be fulfilled, and only the next higher authority can change or stop their orders. But in reality it is quite different: these staffs have any amount of duties to perform and responsibilities to bear, but are invested with no rights.

At the head of some department, say, stands an engineer; he is responsible for the moral work of his department and its manufacture, but he has no right to dismiss or engage or make any substitution. This can only be done by his assistant, who is a member of the Communist Party. The latter has all the rights, and the manager (engineer) bears all the responsibilities. This is the strange system of management of the nationalised industries created by the Bolsheviks.

In addition to this, another Communistical system has lately been introduced. On all oil fields and refineries, besides the managing committees, consisting of workmen of the Communist Party, they have what is called Communistical "Yatchetka," in which only members of the Communist Party are allowed

The part played by these "Yatcheika" in all industrial enterprises and Government offices is very considerable. First of all, it watches over the political fidelity of all persons in that given office, oil-field, refinery, workshop, &c., as well as over their private lives. The main aim of the "Yatcheika" is to propagate Communism amongst the working class and to remove all that is against or unpleasant for, or inimically disposed towards, the Soviet Government. They are in direct communication with all the "Extraordinary Commissions," and owing to their denouncements many a person has been thrown into prison or shot. The existence of this espionage in industrial enterprises acts most oppressively on all, especially on the administrative staff.

This net of espionage embraces almost the whole of Russia. There is hardly a village, a home, or a house, which is not watched by these "Yatcheika."

It will be fully understood that under such conditions the administrative and engineering staffs think very little of their work, but more of the safety of their lives. Such is the moral conditions under which these staffs have to work.

Up till October last the highest salary of an engineer was 8,000 roubles a month. The food rations were the same as those supplied to the workmen. As the prices of necessities, mentioned above, were very high, it is clear that on a salary of 8,000 roubles a month an engineer, especially with a family, could only carry on a half-starved existence. In order to somewhat ameliorate his existence, he was compelled by force of circumstances to sell his old clothes, boots, books, linen, crockery, &c (if these were not already requisitioned).

Since October the salaries of the said staffs had been increased by a premium scale, and the average monthly pay of an engineer was thereby raised to 30,000 to 35,000 roubles, but even this salary was hardly sufficient for the maintenance of his family and self.

Though it may at first seem somewhat strange, the Bolshevik system of working "nationalized" industries is in the final, more or less, a State-organised sabotage, leading to a fundamental destruction of all those industries that fall into their hands. All the Baku oil fields are now divided into six administrative regions, and the refineries into five administrative groups. The former being as follows —

- 1 Romany
- 2 Sabounchy
- 3 Balakhany
- 4 Bibi Eibat and Holy Island
- 5 Binagady, together with Khourdalan and Shatany
- 6 Sourakhany

At the head of all the oil-fields stands the so-called Oil field Department of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Naphtha Committee. The managers of each of the above six oil field regions are engineers, as well as of the Oil field Department their nearest assistants are workmen of the Communist Party, appointed by the professional unions with the approval of the Central Council. Thus, their second assistants are also engineers whose duties are purely technical. Thus the management bears in principle a kind of collegiate character but *de facto* there is no collegiate at all, it is either sole management or chaotic disorder.

All the Baku refineries are divided into five groups —

The 1st group embraces all refineries belonging to the Sty. Nobel Brothers.

The 2nd group embraces all refineries belonging to the Caspian Black Sea Sty., Schibael Company and Russo-Caucasian Company.

The 3rd group embraces all refineries belonging to the Caspian Sty and Rielsky Elts.

The 4th group embraces all refineries belonging to the Mantashev Company, Lammof Company and K. Bikhovsky.

The 6th group embraces three toluol factories

At the head of all these five groups again stands the Refinery Department of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Naphtha Committee. Groups 2, 3 and 5 are managed by engineers, whereas groups 1 and 4 are managed by workmen belonging to the Communist Party. The appointment of workmen as managers of refineries is the first trial made by the Soviet Government, in future the Government intends to appoint as managers of all industrial enterprises workmen of the Communist Party, and the engineers will be acting as advisers only.

Most of the refineries were shut up, and work was carried on only at Nobel's, Schiaef's and Caspian Black Sea Sty, a refineries (the best and largest refineries in Balkan) and in the refinery at the Black Sea coast. The refineries at the Black Sea coast were connected also at Mankassky refiners.

The construction of this administrative organ is the same as on the oil fields.

In general, the work on the oil-fields and at the refineries is carried on very

Repeated mention has been made here of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Naphtha Committee. This committee is actually the fully empowered and managing organ of the entire Baku oil industry. Officially it is under the command of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Council of People's Economy, but this submission is only to a certain extent of a visionary character, and it only submits to the orders of the Chief Moscow Committee.

At the head of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Naphtha Committee stands a collegiate consisting of five members, of which one is president-Communist, two engineers, and two workmen, also Communists. Hence the majority is Communistical. The management is in reality, notwithstanding the official collegiate form, entirely in the hands of its president, M. Serebrovski.

This committee has the following departments: Oil fields, Refineries, Financial, Commercial, Supply, Electric, Mechanical, Structural, Chemical, General, and Fuel. Oil, steel and machine works, etc. The members of these departments speak for themselves.

As stated above, the production of oil in Baku from 19,000,000 dropped to 11,000,000 per month. Boring work decreased also to an unusual degree. As

For example, in September 1920 only 450 feet were bored and 80 boring rigs in use with a ~~total~~ ^{total} of rigs the ~~at~~ least that should have been bored is 6,500 to 7,000 feet and a total of 12,000 feet.

[illegible]

Previously about 55,000,000 pounds of ketosene were refined annually in Baku. But in 1920, when the refinery was nationalized, only 10,000,000 pounds was refined. At the whole the work at the refinery was dropped to 30 per cent. For instance, the refinery of the Schibael (Schibael) refinery, which was the best, usually refined about 4,000,000 pounds of ketosene. At present it barely refines 200,000 to 220,000 pounds. The same applies to other refineries. If this exists at the other refineries. During the war, the refinery of 1920 saw a reduction in the production of ketosene to be about 10 per cent. The refinery of 1920 saw a reduction in the production of ketosene to be about 10 per cent. The refinery of 1920 saw a reduction in the production of ketosene to be about 10 per cent.

Yet the Bolsheviks are very anxious to bring the laboring classes to rise the standard of living, and the productivity of the peasants. Very large programs have been worked out regarding new buildings, the founding of new villages in the center of each and of workers villages in Buzgady and Balaibat districts, and wherever it is possible to build up a new industry is introduced.

in the meantime the Balkan industry continues to exist on the oil stocks of past years. These, however, are already on the eve of exhaustion, and if the conditions of affairs as described in this report continues for another six months many of the factories and refineries will fall into ruin. The leaders of Bolshevism at home, and those operating out of Russia, may be said to be one of the chief reasons for their efforts to overthrow the Russian Czarists to bring about a

In conclusion, it must be added that at all the other Russian oil regions (Grozny and Maikop were, as far as November 1920, still being exploited, but Baku, Tbilisi and T'rkistan were not producing

The production of oil in Azerbaijan was about 3,000,000 poods a month and that of Main Transcaucasian was about 250,000 to 300,000 poods a month. The former fields could produce more if it were it was possible to increase its exports. Growth of storage is practically impossible and it is a matter of impossibility to increase the capacity of the oil pipelines. The main reason for this is that the pipelines are in a dilapidated state or the rolling stock, but the main reason is made now of the pipe due to Petrovsk. Firstly, because of the Petrovsk oil fields (their capacity about 2,000,000 poods) are full up with Baku oil, and secondly, because the Caspian oil fleet is overburdened with work transporting oil from Baku.

January 18, 1921

E 1177/86 68]

No. 4

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon — (Received January 25.)

Trip (in monomorph), January 20, 1921.

RECEIVED my telegram No. 19 of 20th January

Military requirements of Georgian Government are as follows -

[illegible]

29 centimetres; for 20 per cent, 28 centimetres, equipment should be of medium size; for 20 per cent, large size, and for 20 per cent, small size.

Georgian Government urgently desire to obtain third of above immediately, in order to be kept at Constantinople, ready to be sent when required. Georgian Government of the power and they think that I agree. I am convinced that Georgian nation will fight for its independence, and submit to no demand that we should assist it so far as we can.

[4668]

1

(Sent to India and Constantinople, No. 20)

No. 5

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 23, 1911.

In reply to previous enquiry from Colonel Stokes group undecy[erable], 1,500 tons of crude oil and [unclear] stocks here. Senior naval officer now informs me that crude oil could be supplied, subject to Admiralty approval, from naval stocks in Constantinople.

(Repeated to Tiflis, No. 4.)

(Repeated to Tiflis, No. 4.)

No. 8

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received March 17

(1) (b)(7)(D)

54

Admiralty, March 14, 1921

herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a report, dated the 17th February, 1921, which has been received through the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, relative to the general situation in the Southern

2. A copy of the above-mentioned report, excepting the portion relating to

1 mm. dia.

V. W. BADDELEY

Enclosure in No. 11

Report on General Situation in the Southern Caucasus up to February 10, 1918.
(Confidential.)

1. Activity of the Georgian Communist Party.

...the true designs of the Communists. The

in protocol of the district conference of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of

- " 1 The order of the day.
- " (a.) Report on the present situation.
- " (b.) Reports by members.
- " (c.) Reports by the province committee.
- " (d.) Organization of propaganda.
- " (e.) Elections for the district committee.
- " (f.) Elections for the conference of Communists.
- " g.) Current affairs.

⁴⁴ Firstly, comrades (brigomants and other members) reported on the progress of events in Soviet Russia and in other countries.

"(c) We, the comrades Communists, having arrived to the district of re-
velation... movement is connected with the establishment of Soviet rule and frustration of
the... of

"(b.) The members stated that at present only the Privolnitsky organisation is carrying out their work legally, and all the other organisations—Votontsovsky, Akhpatasky, Shipikhsky and Movornakaky—are working secretly. The comrades in our party are gallantly defending the principles of Communism, and will at the first opportunity lend a helping hand to their comrades, who are fighting for Soviet rule.

"(c.) The report of the provincial committee to be noted

"(d) Organisation in the country should be carried on. New members should be accepted according to the regulations laid down by the provincial committee. Party Courts of Justice must be established and their sentences must be carried out only on approval of the district committees. A district committee has the right to select the members of the organisation.

" e) To request the provincial committee to appoint to village N Z. there organisers, one of whom must be a Mahommedan, supply them with propaganda literature and various papers in order to raise the activity to a necessary height.

"(f) The following persons have been elected to the district committee: From Privolnoye, P. Bolotnikov and T. Tarsaof; from Vorontsovka, V. Fedorof; from Akhpat, Sarkis Izraeliants; from Shipikh: Grigory Babiniants. The following have been elected for the Communist conference at Tiflis. From Privolnoye, Luka Gorodkov; from Vorontsovka, Akhpat and Shipikh.

"(g.) The 3rd Region Committee to keep in close touch with the Kemalists and keep the district committee well informed of all proceedings. The comrades who are going to Tiflis are entrusted to order Communist rubber seals for the district organisation. The district conference of Lory express their sympathies to the paper 'Communist,' being the only organ struggling for the unity of the working classes of Georgia.

"(Signed by the President, Petr Kolomoisky, his assistant and one secretary.)"

2. Relations between Georgia and Nationalist Turkey.

Declaration made by the Social Democrats, who are the leading party in Georgia. -

"Being Social Democrats, we first of all wrote openly and announced that we sympathise with the Kemalist movement, as with any struggle for the freedom of a nation, in so far as it is really a movement towards freedom. Apart from this we wrote several times that we are definitely opposed to the principles of this movement, so far as it contains elements of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, connecting itself with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and imperialistic designs of Enver Pasha.

"We are opposed in principle to Bolshevism, but we sincerely strive to establish friendly connections with Bolshevik Russia, nor can we sympathize with the aggressive designs of the Allies in any way. But we are making all efforts to establish normal relations with France, Britain and Italy."

"We are not Bolsheviks, but Social Democrats. We therefore do not recognize the right of one nation to interfere with the rights and internal affairs of other nations, or the right of one State to dictate its will to some other State."

"We are Social Democrats, and as such recognise that the only method of action as to the internal affairs of independent nations is through organs of international union, recognised by themselves, and by moral pressure of the Proletarian International Assembly, at which we are represented.

"We approach the mutual relations of Georgia and Angora from this Social Democrat point of view."

"Be the feeling towards Kemal's Government what it may, it must be admitted that it is the only Government recognised and supported by the Turkish nation. Angora is now Turkey, and there is no other Turkey."

"This Turkey has approached our frontiers and we want to be with her, as with other nations, bearers of principles of peace and solidarity of States.

We want to be in friendship with the Turkish nation, and do not want to interfere with their interior affairs, but we also demand that their Government shall not abuse the sovereignty of our State and respect our frontiers and interest.

"If the Government of Angora will keep to this track honestly and to the end, that is the way of recognition of Georgian sovereignty, then the Georgian authorities will not see any obstacles for the establishment of peace with Turkey, just as well as they will not see any obstacles to the establishment of peace with any other States, who will recognise the independence of the republic."

Shipping of Russian Ships in Georgian Ports to Soviet Russia

"We, the undersigned, authorised representatives of the (1) Georgian Democratic Republic, G. Z. Andronikof, and (2) Russian Soviet Republic, V. P. Zveref and A. K. Strakhov, in execution of agreement of the 16th December, 1920, re recognition of all ships belonging and at the disposal of the Soviet Republic, which were in the Georgian ports on the 15th November, 1920, and arriving in these ports after that date including those that might arrive under the old or new Russian flag, if ship's documents show their nationality and home port under Soviet rule. Having considered the documents which have been examined by the authorised commission on the 16th December, 1920, in pursuance of the above agreement, the following ships are considered at the disposal of the Soviets:—

'Murza,' 'Vesta,' 'No Tron Mlenya,' 'Anapa,' 'St. Nikolai,' now lying in Poti Harbour; 'St. Nikolai,' 'Nakhimov,' 'St. Nikolai No. 604,' 'Geron,' 'Amavron,' 'Bayan,' 'Ilya Morozov,' 'Lebed,' 'Alexander,' 'Bezymenny,' 'Iisk,' 'St. Alexey,' 'Aristo Bakhelzi Vash,' 'Petr Veliki (Peter the Great),' 'Strogg,' 'Ventun,' 'Vostok,' lying in the port of Batumi. From the day of receipt of the above ships by the authorised representative of the Soviet Republic in Georgia, in any case from the 16th January, 1921, the guarantee given by the Georgian Government in execution of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, No. 10641, regarding the detention of ships which arrived in Georgian ports under the old or new Russian flag is cancelled.

"The committee have also found that steamship 'Prinsep,' escaped from Poti during the night of the 29th December, was also due to be handed over to the Soviets.

"Signed by the chief of Georgian ports, Engineer ANDRONIKOF, Soviet consul at Batumi, ZVEREF, Councillor of Naval Affairs of the Soviet Consulate at Batumi, STRAKHOV."

The statement of the Batumi Soviet consul. —

"To the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Georgian Republic.

"Having signed this day the protocol of committee re handing over Russian ships lying in Georgian ports to the Soviets, in accordance with instructions received by me from the authorised representatives, we have the honour to state that the dredger 'Castor,' steamship 'Donets,' and the ships 'Alexander Nevsky,' 'Svoboda Rossi' and 'Niki' are, according to our information, of Russian origin and belong to the class of ships mentioned in the agreement of the 16th December, 1920, and therefore must be handed over to the Soviets. These ships are trading between Georgian ports, and dredger 'Castor' is in Poti. We have not made a special clause regarding these ships, previously wishing to avoid the delay in the work of the commission, but herewith beg to make arrangements to demand the ships' documents and examine them by the commission in order to establish their nationality and hand them over to the Soviets. We have in view your assurances of the validity of the agreement of the 16th December, 1920, and are convinced that urgent steps will be taken. Apart from this we draw your attention to the fact that the question regarding the ships 'Klena,' 'Yondith' and 'Clandia' was already mentioned in the agreement of the 16th December, and therefore will not be dealt with by this commission.

"Signed by the members of the Soviet Commission, ZVEREF and STRAKHOV."

4. General Situation in Baku

The following information was obtained from a person who, with great difficulty, escaped from Baku:—

The oil capital gives nowadays the impression of a town suffering from shortage of this commodity. The streets are not lighted at night, and all electric lamps have been taken away for some Government institutions. No tram, and in fact no carriage traffic, may be observed in the streets. The trams are used sometimes for transporting paraffin oil to different suburbs, but the delivery and distribution of same are at a very low level, and the inhabitants are having practically none. It is definitely known that the stock of oil in Baku may be considered as exhausted in comparison to the great demands of Soviet Russia. There is no new production, as over a half of the

oil-wells are not in working order. At the different meetings and in the press the Communists express their alarm at the critical state of the oil industry, but this does not in the least relieve the situation. All branches of industry connected with the oil production have been declared as "storming," which must be understood in the sense that these must get their supplies of materials and labour in the first turn and in full amount. The workmen of the storming branches of the industry must get increased rations, clothing, fuel and best accommodation. This merely remains on paper, and the works are not supplied with the necessary materials, as there are none, nor do the workmen receive their due. In fact, the workmen live under dreadful lack of housing accommodation.

Not only that, but the workmen increase, and to put a stop to it a "robbery week" was arranged, during which all that was possible was taken away from the civil population. Only one or two tables, chairs and stools were left in the houses, according to the number of inhabitants. Counter-revolutionary categories were left with only one change of underwear, other categories two changes and more. All this was intended to be handed over to the workmen, but distribution is being proceeded with on a rather small scale. For instance, the workmen are entitled to have three to six changes of underwear.

Now the workmen are selling back to the inhabitants the underwear and other domestic items. The "robbery week" has not in the least improved the condition of the workmen and made beggars of the other part of the population. Also there is nobody left to be robbed.

The prices in the "free" market of Baku are as follows: white bread, 1,300 roubles per lb.; one egg, 600 roubles; fowl, 7,000 to 10,000 roubles.

The most dreadful thing in the life of Baku inhabitants is their state of constant fear, which cannot be described in words or imagined if not actually experienced. There is no protection or support to be sought from anybody, as there are no lawful means for same. Ransacking, arrests and uncertainty of the fate of prisoners is the topic of daily conversations, limited, of course, to the intimate circle. As there are many spies and provocateurs.

The housing question is no longer a crisis, but a real nightmare. People are thrown out of their houses at a moment's notice, and are not allowed to take their belongings. These people are generally sent to houses in suburb of Armenikond, outside of the town. All the best houses are occupied by Soviet institutions, which do no work.

5. General Situation in Armenia

The Red Army.

The military commissar of troops in Armenia is a certain Sviridof. The paper of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia, the "Communist," publishes a long conversation held by the correspondent of "Armukavrosta" and Sviridof regarding the organisations of the Red Army of Soviet Armenia.

"At the head of the military organisation of Armenia stands Avia, and the whole of the army, including the district military commissariats, are under his orders. The sovietisation of the army is nearly completed; perhaps the supplies department may be somewhat behindhand owing to the difficulty experienced by the supply officials of the old military school in adapting themselves to the new system of supplies.

"The commanding circles of the Red Soviet Army of Armenia, apart from their direct duties, must also educate the soldiers.

"The institute of commissars in the Red Army of Soviet Armenia was at first opposed to, perhaps owing to the fault of the commissars, who did not rightly understand their functions and duties.

"Our purpose is to teach the army to carry on propaganda. As the Red Army advances, every soldier must act as an instructor to the Revolutionary Committee of every village."

At the end of the interview Sviridof denied the rumours that the army of Soviet Armenia would be considered by the Russian Government as part of the 11th Soviet Army.

The Armenian Army belongs only to Armenia, and the Soviet commanders and commissars came here only to introduce their three years' fighting and organising experience.

The Russian Soviet Revolutionary Committee in Armenia, being afraid of a national danger systematically discharge Armenian officials and soldiers and officers.

At the head of this committee stands a youth of 18 years of age, bright and he does not condescend to speak to the visitors. His vocabulary is "Get out!"; "Send him to join Romanof's staff in Heaven."

The following is a communication of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Armenia to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey:

Armenia is a plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Armenia in Georgia, Shaverdof

importance of this communication I am quoting it in full. —

"My Government is observing with a feeling of complete satisfaction the interest displayed by the Government of Angora in the future of Syria. We wish to express by this note our sincere appreciation of the interest in the Syrian question which the Government of Angora has displayed from the very beginning of the war, and we assure the Government of Angora that the United States Government is fully cognizant of the efforts which the Government of Angora is making to bring about the restoration of Syrian independence."

being firmly aware of its historical mission, the Communist Government of the Soviet Union is safeguarding the attainments of the revolution in the interior of the country, and will be a watchful sentry of the revolution in the Near East. In carrying out its task, the Soviet Government will be guided by the principle of the peaceful co-existence of peoples and will continue to work for the triumph of the revolution in the Near East.

We shall gladly receive criticism on the part of the Orient and will indicate a real and sincere interest of the critics.

[illegible]

"The Government of Armenia cannot understand the object of the Turkish Government's policy towards Armenia."

"The Government of Soviet Armenia do not see the justification for Turkish troops remaining in Alexandropol and the adjoining districts which are at least as Armenian as the districts of the Republic of Armenia. The Turkish troops are depriving the Armenian population of the right to live in their own land."

Being convinced that all questions under discussion will receive a satisfactory solution, the Government of Armenia at Moscow the Armenian Government express their hope that the Turkish Government will prove itself fully deserving of the Soviet rule in Armenia and Soviet Russia, and will not fail to recall their troops from the district of Alexandropol.

"The Government feel sure that the Government of Angola will not refuse to receive an ~~report~~ ~~the~~ ~~prisoners~~ of war partly reported to unknown destination, and partly to be interned in the district of Luanda where they are compelled to work under most trying conditions.

"The Armenian Government consider that the further detention of these prisoners would be against the friendly assurances given by the Turkish Government."

The wireless station at Batoum has intercepted a wireless message from Erivan

[illegible]

everything is taken away, agricultural implements, engines, tools, etc. People are forced to work. Where, then, are the Russian Communists who profess to benefit Armenia?

(Translation.)

(Translation.)
"Erivan. Urgent. Angora, copy to Hahn to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
Gusseinof. [Jammed] continuous violence, pillaging and murder of the peace
population, in places occupied by Turks [jammed]. The private property and hom-
holds, the cattle of the peasants driven away and the [jammed] of the poplars.
[jammed] as well as [jammed]
[jammed] way or
[jammed] No more
condemning the population to starvation. An arm men [jammed]
have been deported by force from their native country and compelled to work
the mines [jammed]

the military command.

"The revolutionary committee repeatedly receives demands from your commanding officers [jammed] these demands have nothing to do with the functions of the revolutionary committee, for instance, mobilisation of men, delivery of 10,000 rifles, delivery of some Turkish soldier killed unknown, where and by whom, &c. [jammed] has brought down the functions of the Alexandropol revolutionary committee to a level of a tool in the hands of the occupationary force stationed in this town. This only makes revolutionary committee recognise that its further existence is completely useless and only discredits the principles of Soviet rule in the opinion of the working classes. In areas where military occupation prevails using the above methods of serfdom and devastation, no rule of workmen and peasants can exist.

"The impartial analysis of the above-mentioned facts makes it obvious that the Soviet Government of Armenia cannot tolerate Turkish attitude leading to economical ruin of the country which is considered as belonging to Armenia by right [jammed] severe discipline of your troops and their obvious sympathy with the Soviet rule precludes the possibility of presuming the presence of violence [jammed] I draw the attention to the above facts on behalf of the Armenian nation, who only wish to establish peaceful life conditions and friendship with revolutionary Turkey.

"Being sure that there can be no difference of opinion with regard to the above facts, my Government does not doubt that the Turkish National Government will take urgent steps to stop these atrocities and recall the Turkish occupationary force from the district of Alexandropol. (Signed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Armenia - BEKZADIAN)"

General Information.

When the Turks were occupying Kara, all the Armenian population left the town and took shelter in a gorge. A Turkish officer went there and commenced to persuade the refugees that there was no danger, and eventually ordered them to return to their homes. The returning people were registered when passing the bridge. After this the men were separated from the women and sent to work. On the same day the Moslems arrived from the vicinity of Kara, including Kurds, and after dark commenced looting and massacring the Armenians. Towards the morning the Tartars joined them.

Mr. Fox, the American consular agent, showed the Turks that American orphanages contained not only Christians but also Mahomedans. As the result of this, not a single American in Kara was killed. At Kara and in these villages robberies and murders lasted for two weeks. The American Relief Committee was running short of supplies, and the refugees were compelled to free all the buildings - the Turks demanded them for their troops.

The first commandant of Kara was appointed, Rushtin Bey. He took up his residence in the house of the Governor, but after his promotion to Rushtin Pasha he was transferred to Alexandropol and relieved by Kiazim Pasha. Having occupied Kara, the Turks immediately commenced to take away all objects of value - guns, ammunition, machinery, furniture - and transported this to Erzerum and Sarakamysb.

Alexandropol

Alexandropol is in the hands of the local Bolsheviks, and is governed by the Revolutionary Committee. The station and the fortress are in the hands of the Turks. The Turks are trying to take away all that is possible from this town, just as well as from Kara, even taking away parts of old railway engines. A caravan of 200 camels, loaded with requisitioned property, leaves daily for Sarakamysb. The militia in Alexandropol consists of Turks and Bolsheviks.

All shops are closed, and only small grocers' stores are opened, chiefly dealing in tea and tobacco. The first train from Erivan arrived at Alexandropol on the 7th January and left for Karaklis.

On the Way to Karaklis.

The railway line from Alexandropol to the station Kaltakchi is in possession of the Turks, and the next station, Amuly, is in hands of the Armenian troops.

In Karaklis

About 1,000 Bolshevik Russian troops are stationed here according to information received from the peasants.

A permission must be obtained from the Bolsheviks and the Georgian consul to leave Karaklis for Satian.

Armenian troops are stationed half-way between Karaklis and station Shagah, after this comes the Georgian sphere of influence.

7. The Russo-Turkish Azerbaijan Conference at Moscow.

The Turkish delegation left Tiflis for Moscow. The members of the Azerbaijan delegation are not yet known. The permanent representative of the Angora Government in Moscow is Faud Pasha.

8. Ex-Russian Moslem Officers joining Kemalist Army

According to information received, many Mahomedan officers, formerly belonging to the Russian Volunteer Army, have arrived at Anatolia. Most of these officers are ex-officers of the Russian Caucasus Division. They are now forming property organised detachments within their villages and are carrying out the Kuden district. Their guerrilla warfare was no longer of any use after the fall of Erzurum, and one by one are leaving the region. Kemalist forces are recruiting them.

It is through these officers that the Angora Government get their information regarding the situation in the Northern Caucasus and Daghestan, and their communication with these regions and send their recruiting agents.

E 3432 55 58]

No. 7

Earl Curzon to Colonel Stokes (Batumi)

(No. 22.)

Sir

Foreign Office, March 17, 1921.

M. A. H. NAKHLEH, the Federated States of Georgia, called upon me at the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to descend upon the misfortune of his country and to ask the advice of the British Government as to the course they had better pursue.

He did not seem to be very well acquainted with the latest position of affairs in Georgia, which, no doubt, is changing from day to day, and was under the impression that the Turkish had marched into Batumi not as our information went to show, with the intention of not at the instigation of the Georgian Government in order to save the town from the Bolsheviks but as a movement of aggression on the part of the Turkish Government. He was in a state of great anxiety and was anxious to find in any direction an alleviation for its pain.

I told him that I was for the misfortune of Georgia, who had had no better friend than myself during the events of the last two years, I felt that who had a better right to be upon himself. The only barrier that could have been successfully opposed to the Bolshevik advance in the Caucasus was a union or confederation of the three Caucasian States. I had impressed this upon the Georgian representatives with all the insistence of which I was capable at San Remo nearly a year ago, and my private secretary, Mr. R. Vansittart, had devoted hours of time to the task of concluding an agreement between the Armenian and Azerbaijan representatives to conclude an agreement with the Georgian Government. I had also been very anxious to see that the Georgian Government was not in a position to be able to do so. Further, he did not seem to me to have utilised the interval for the small at night or his national existence in the degree which it is

have been expected, while, from the rapidity with which her forces had dwindled and her Government been submerged, it was clear to me that a large portion of the population must be themselves in sympathy with the Soviet attack. In these circumstances, I did not see what Great Britain or the Powers could do at the moment to save Georgia from a situation which she had to a large extent brought upon herself.

M. Tchenkeli seemed to be very much hurt that he had not been heard at the recent conference, which had given so full a hearing to the Turks, Greeks and other parties.

I told him that I thought this complaint was without justification, since the question of Georgia was not raised by the Treaty of Sèvres.

On the other hand, I informed him that we had done our best for Georgia in our conferences with the Turkish delegates from Angora, and that though we could not in all probability exercise any influence upon what was happening on the northern frontiers of Georgia, or on their relations with the Bolsheviks, we would certainly do our best to secure the recognition of their independent existence and the determination of their frontiers on the southern side by arrangement with the Turks.

We had found, in conversation with Bekir Sami Bey, that the latter himself was strongly in favour of a Caucasian confederation as a barrier between the Turks and the Bolsheviks, and he had indicated that, instead of desiring to retain Batoum, as M. Tchenkeli appeared to be convinced, the Turkish occupation of this town and neighbourhood was intended only to be temporary in character.

I suggested that, in the light of what I had told him, M. Tchenkeli, who was about to leave for Paris, and who was already acquainted with Bekir Sami Bey, should at once reopen conversations with the latter and endeavour to secure from him friendly assurances in this respect. He might then come back to England and inform me of what he had done.

M. Tchenkeli, who had evidently entered the room with no very clear idea, either as to what he was to ask for or what he might expect to receive, expressed almost unbounded relief at this advice, which seemed to hold out for him hopes that he had not anticipated, and he left with the expressed intention of acting immediately upon the advice that I had given.

I am, &c
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

CHAPTER II.—TURKEY

[E 12 1 44]

No. 8

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 1, 1921)

(No. 1339)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, December 29, 1920

GRAND VIZIER has informed my French colleague that he has instructed Mustapha Kemal by telegraph to return to Constantinople, as he considers mission has been at Angora quite long enough.

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that Turkish Government had received private information from a person just arrived from Angora that Izzet Pasha had announced to him his intention of starting for Constantinople on 29th December.

[E 53 52 44]

No. 9

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1921)

(No. 1679. Secret)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 21, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of Intelligence Reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople, for the week ending the 24th December, 1920)

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 9

Summary of Intelligence Reports for the Week ending December 9, 1920

TOWARDS the end of last week the tedious preliminary between the Sublime Porte and Angora concerning the commencement of official negotiations were terminated, and on the 3rd December a delegation from the Central Government left Constantinople for Angora. The delegation was expected to arrive in Angora by the 6th or 7th December, but some time must elapse before any definite result can be

the establishment of telegraphic communication between Constantinople and Angora, partly owing to the refusal of the Hellenic military authorities to allow the transmission of messages through the zone controlled by the Greek forces. In addition to the steps which have been taken for the restoration of order in Anatolia, the Government has also been making efforts to reap some benefit from the recent changes in the domain of foreign affairs by the appointment of Charges d'Affaires abroad. In this connection Ghalib Kemal Bey, who recently returned to Constantinople from Rome, submitted a report to the Cabinet, which is summarised below, and which throws some more light both upon his own activities and upon Italian policy. With regard to conditions in Anatolia, it would appear that the Nationalists, in deference to their "allies," are continuing to enact measures for the protection of "workers," but it is improbable that these measures are intended to have any other effect than that of hoodwinking the Bolsheviks. The latter appear to have definitely vetoed the original Nationalist plan for seizing Batoum, and it would now seem that more intricate methods are being pursued with the assistance of the Muslim population of the disputed area.

1. Turkish Affairs

(a.) The foreign situation was explained to the Council of Ministers held on the 27th November by Sefa Bey, and more especially with regard to the meeting of Entente statesmen in London. It was pointed out that the situation had not changed, and that there was no complete change in the situation, but, as the Allied High Commissions in Constantinople had no information as to the progress of the deliberations, it was impossible for them to

give any reply to the Sublime Porte's overtures regarding certain modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres. He thought, therefore, that it would be as well for the delegation to Anatolia to postpone its departure for a few days until the situation had been cleared up. Mustapha Arif Bey emphasised the necessity of sending a diplomatic mission to London, and proposed that, if it were not possible to send someone to London at once, the mission should be entrusted to someone already in Europe. The Council agreed to this proposal, and Izzet Pasha was requested to sound the Allied representatives with regard to their views on the subject, while Sefa Bey, with the President of the State Council and the Minister of Commerce, would deliberate as to who should be sent to London and what instructions should be given.

(b) Ghali Kemal Bey's views on Italian policy were embodied in a report submitted to the Ministerial Council, in which he admitted that, after the advent to power of Damad Ferid Pasha in April, he had acted as the official representative of the Nationalists in Rome. In his opinion, both France and Italy were dissatisfied with the Treaty of Sèvres, but had been unable to take independent action. If, however, unity could be established in the Turkish administration, he felt sure that the two Powers would give all the assistance in their power so that the peace negotiations were concerned. He had made it known to the Italian Government to this effect, and had even counselled the latter to make certain sacrifices in the interests of a reconciliation. As a result of his investigations, he was satisfied that the Italian public opinion considered that the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres was essential to the re-establishment of peace in the East, and he felt certain that their friends would assist them to obtain every advantage from the situation created by recent developments in Greece. Various highly-placed personages had expressed their confidence that matters would take a turn for the better if Turkey pursued a discreet and firm policy. The Italian Government was anxious to secure the Nationalists' assurances from the Italian Government.

He had met Jami Bey, Minister of the Interior, who had asked him to communicate the Nationalist point of view to the Sublime Porte. These interviews had given him his own private investigations to the effect that the Peace Treaty would be modified. The Central Government, by acting as a mediator between the Nationalists and the Entente Powers, would secure the support of those Powers interested in the maintenance of Turkish independence. He had also had interviews with certain Greek personages in Rome, and had been given to understand that there was some possibility of an understanding between Turkey and Greece now that the Opposition had come to power. He thought it would be better to accept the Greek Government's offer of a truce, and begged to add that no time should be lost. Documentary evidence was attached to the report.

(c) The negotiations with the Nationalists were the principal concern of the Ministerial Council held on the 23rd November and the 1st December at the former of which Izzet Pasha stated that the only obstacle to the immediate departure of the official delegation was the reserved attitude of the Allies. He proposed that the instructions drawn up by himself should be immediately submitted to the Council for sanction. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, opposed this on the ground that it would be advisable to wait until the Allies had defined their attitude. The Council agreed. Sefa Bey was instructed to approach the Allied authorities with regard to the difficulties that had arisen in the re-establishment of telegraphic communication by reason of the refusal of the Hellenic military authorities to permit the repair of the wires and other matters in the land district.

On the 27th November the Council was informed that Zekki Pasha would be unable, for reasons of health, to accompany the delegation to Anatolia, which was therefore composed as follows:—

President.—Izzet Pasha, Minister of the Interior
Members.—

Hussein Kazim Bey, Minister of Commerce
Jevad Bey, newly appointed Minister to Berna
Munir Bey, Legal Advisor of the Foreign Ministry
Fatih Khoja, Astronomer Imperial

Jevad Bey and Munir Bey were included at the instance of Sefa Bey, who is apparently anticipating complications on account of the foreign engagements made by the Nationalists.

At a later stage of the same deliberations the Minister for War was asked whether he had any information with regard to an offensive by the Nationalists against the Greeks. The reply was that there was no official information, but that it was believed the Nationalists would transfer some of their troops from the Eastern front for the purpose of a general attack against the Greeks, but nothing was known as to the progress of the operations. Izzet Pasha thought that a success on the part of the Nationalists would facilitate matters between the Central Government and the Allies.

On the 1st December the Council was informed by Sefa Bey that the Allies had no objection to the departure of the delegation, which could therefore leave at once. Izzet Pasha then read a communication, dated the 29th November from Mustapha Kemal, in which the latter stated that he had received the key to the city of Constantinople. The orders for the departure of the delegation were issued. On the 2nd December, it was requested that the date of the latter's departure should be notified forthwith, together with the names of the members of the delegation; it was considered that the inclusion of Izzet Pasha was essential.

Sahib Pasha signified his willingness to accompany the delegation. The Minister stated that Staff-Major Hassan Bey had been selected in place of Zekki Pasha. Finally, it was decided that the delegation should leave on the 3rd December, and Izzet Pasha was requested to communicate with Angora at once in order to settle the route to be followed. A communication to the Sultan was then drawn up and signed by all the members of the Cabinet, in which the attributions and purpose of the delegation were defined and the Imperial approval was requested. With regard to certain foreign personages accompanying the delegation, Izzet Pasha stated that, although they would have no official status, and although he himself saw no obstacle, the matter depended entirely upon the decisions of the Angora administration. At a later stage of the deliberations a telegram arrived for Izzet Pasha from Fevzi Pasha, Minister for War, in which it was stated that, owing to the bad state of the roads between Zunguldak, Ineboli-Bamsin, the delegation should travel by the railway and motor-car, all measures had been taken, and two officers had already been sent to Eski Shehir to await the delegation.

A further meeting was held on the same evening at the home of the Grand Vizier at which the members of the delegation were all present and were given the following instructions:—

- (1) The principal object of the delegation was to secure the submission of the Nationalists to the Central Government, in order that the latter could adequately represent the entire nation and afford satisfactory guarantees for the execution of engagements made. The utmost efforts were to be made to abolish the dualism which had arisen in the Administration.
- (2) After having fully explained the political situation and emphasised the disastrous consequences that would ensue if the restoration of order in Anatolia were delayed, the delegation would endeavour to ascertain the final terms of the Nationalists.
- (3) Replies should be communicated to the Nationalists, and further instructions should be given as required.
- (4) The Central Government would not require the abolition of the National forces until the question of peace had assumed a definite form, but during the negotiations of the Central Government with the Entente Powers no movement should be undertaken contrary to the Government's policy. Assurances should be requested to this effect.
- (5) The delegation would require the Nationalist Administration itself to draw up the project for the negotiations with the Allies in order that there might be no subsequent dispute.
- (6) After a general agreement had been reached, a special commission would be formed including Nationalist members for the purpose of settling other details.
- (7) In accordance, the Central Government will cite all persons implicated in the Anatolian movement before civil tribunals, but will adopt the principle of non-responsibility of individuals, and, if need be, will proclaim a general amnesty.

(8) The Government promises neither to approve nor ratify any engagements entered into by the National Assembly to be convoked after the conclusion of the present negotiations.

(9) The Government will make every endeavour to consolidate the advantages obtained by recent actions on the part of the Nationalists.

(d) A communication from Mustapha Kemal to the Sultan is said to have been brought to Constantinople by the Government emissary to Angora, Captain Nesliet Bey. Mustapha Kemal is said to have protested the absolute loyalty of the Nationalists to the Sultanate and also to the Sultan himself personally; they had never entertained the idea of trying to replace him, and all such stories, circulated by traitors, were the inventions of the enemies of the country; the sole purpose of the Nationalists was the salvation of the nation and the Khalifat; the prestige of the Khalifat would be maintained by the union of Islam, for the achievement of which great assistance was being accorded by a Power that was the declared enemy of Imperialism.

(e) Nationalist measures for the protection of labour was the theme of an article published in the Angora newspaper "Yeni Gun" on the 30th October. After a somewhat bombastic foreword, the article detailed the following conditions which are added by order of the Economy Commissioner to concessions for the exploitation of forests:

- (1.) The contractor to pay an indemnity of not less than £1 150 to all workmen incapacitated by malaria, pleurisy, dysentery, or other complaints requiring lengthy treatment, syphilis, or by injuries arising from accidents.
- (2.) Contractors shall submit their wages accounts once a month to the Government Forests Department. Employees are to be regularly paid, and the decision of the Commission of Economy will be binding in all disputes.
- (3.) In the event of a breach of these conditions, the concession will be cancelled and the contractor will not be entitled to any compensation whatever.

It was added that the Economy Commissioner had given orders that concessions were to be divided in such a manner as to prevent several concessions being granted to one person.

(f) The tax for exemption from military service was said to have been fixed at 100,000 liras. The exemption was to be granted to those who had served in the army for a period of not less than 10 years.

(g) A clause in the Nationalist programme, which was said to have been published in the "Yeni Gun" on the 10th November, was said to have been remembered by the Nationalists as a result of Bolshevik pressure, and more oblique methods adopted.

On the 13th November a Nationalist mission arrived in Tiflis for the purpose of negotiating with the Georgian Government concerning the Moslem population of Ajartistan. Shortly after the arrival of this mission the Georgian Cabinet was changed and a new one was formed. The mission was said to have been made to attack Batoum. This project now appears to have been abandoned, possibly as a result of Bolshevik pressure, and more oblique methods adopted. On the 13th November a Nationalist mission arrived in Tiflis for the purpose of negotiating with the Georgian Government concerning the Moslem population of Ajartistan. Shortly after the arrival of this mission the Georgian Cabinet was changed and a new one was formed.

On the 13th November a Nationalist mission arrived in Tiflis for the purpose of negotiating with the Georgian Government concerning the Moslem population of Ajartistan. Shortly after the arrival of this mission the Georgian Cabinet was changed and a new one was formed.

On the 13th November a Nationalist mission arrived in Tiflis for the purpose of negotiating with the Georgian Government concerning the Moslem population of Ajartistan. Shortly after the arrival of this mission the Georgian Cabinet was changed and a new one was formed.

Mehmed Abashidze
Ismet Kadizade
Suleiman Abashidze
Suleiman Vartanlian
Jemal Kikava

2. Bolshevism in Transcaucasia, etc.

(a.) Interest at present centres in the advance of the Turks into Armenian territory and the fall of Kara. Reports state that the Bolsheviks had not expected such a rapid collapse of the Armenian forces, and had hoped to have effected a coup d'état in Armenia before the Turks actually invaded Armenian territory. Failing to achieve this, they are said to have made a dash for the Mtskheta-Kelley region, and an instant cessation of hostilities. The question of the moment throughout Transcaucasia is whether the Turks will cease the offensive, or whether they will push farther into the Erivan district and reach the Azerbaijan frontier. The general opinion is that in the latter case the whole of Azerbaijan would rise against the Bolsheviks, and that a general conflagration would take place throughout the Caucasus. There is no doubt that the Moslems of the Caucasus are very much alarmed at the Turkish advance, but the question is whether the Bolsheviks will be able to insist on a cessation of hostilities. The general opinion is that the Armenian question may result in an open breach between the two forces, though it is realized that everything possible will be done to prevent such an event occurring.

(b.) The attitude of the Georgian Government towards contemporary events may best be described as that of the reed bending before the storm. Georgia realizes that she lies between two forces much more powerful than herself, and she endeavours to remain neutral. She has assimilated so many Bolshevik principles that there is little ground for the Soviet authorities to harbour hostile designs against her. As regards the Turks, on the other hand, she cannot but consider herself a natural friend of Turkey. The Georgian Government have latterly brought forward a proposal to establish Moslem autonomy in Adjara. This would mean the withdrawal of the Moslem population from the Batoum province and also of taking the wind out of the sails of the Turks, who have latterly been showing every sign of taking early measures to occupy the Batoum province.

(c.) Anti-Bolshevik risings are still occurring in Daghestan, but there cannot be any doubt that the leading spirit in the revolt was Imam Najiud-Din Gotsinsky. The latter has been reported to have been killed. The insurrection should not be considered as being anything very serious. Daghestan is full of discontented elements, most of whom have been compelled to take refuge in the highlands, out of reach of the Bolsheviks. The latter have not many troops in Daghestan, and have no means of defending many of the more isolated towns, which are in consequence at the mercy of the insurgent raiding bands. The Bolsheviks take the view that under present winter conditions it is impossible to conduct operations in the snow-covered highlands, but that in the spring two or three battalions will speedily liquidate the trouble. Turkish agitation is being actively conducted, and finds a fertile field throughout Daghestan, where the population is thoroughly tired of the Bolsheviks and longs for Turkish intervention. In this respect the feeling is the same as in Azerbaijan, and there is little doubt but that, should the Turks show any definite intention of advancing into the Caucasus, the Moslem population would rise in their favour to a man.

3. Egyptian Affairs.

The ex-Khedive is reported to be extremely depressed over the news of the sale of his properties in Egypt, which has been definitely ordered by the British authorities. As he regards this as the death knell of his hopes of being restored to power in Egypt, he proposes to devote himself in future to a life of pleasure and personal comfort in Switzerland. He therefore intends to sever his connections with Egypt, although he may return here for two or three months in the year to visit his family at Anana.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1921)

(No. 1688 Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 24, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information summary of intelligence reports received from the Constantinople Branch for the week ended the 2nd December 1920.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 10

Summary of Intelligence Reports for the Week Ending December 2, 1920

SOME further information has come to hand during the past week with regard to the attitude of the Nationalists towards the Central Government and the Allies. It was reported that Mustafa Kemal Pasha's attitude was regarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as one of a desire to bring about a reconciliation between the Central Government and the Allies. The general trend of Turkish public opinion is towards a reconciliation with the Allies, and the resumption by Turkey of the rôle of a buffer against Russia. It was at all events the theme of an article which was to have been published in the *Yeni Dünya* (the paper edited by Lütfi Fikri Bey during the week ending the 14th October) but which was suppressed. With regard to the communications between the Central Government and the Nationalists, it would appear that Captain Nesbet Bey, who is associated with the Palace Staff, which consists of four or five officers of the Ministry of War, is a fervent Unionist. It is believed that he has always been in constant communication with the Nationalists, and has on more than one occasion acted as an intermediary between the Sultan and the Nationalist leaders. Some interesting information have also been obtained with regard to the negotiations between the Central Government and the Nationalists. The Italian Government would appear to be in a position to negotiate upon much more favourable terms with the Allies, and could thus obtain considerable concessions. If the Allies were prepared to make certain concessions, the Nationalists would undertake to meet them in every possible way, both as regards the application of the treaty and as to the general policy of the Allies in the East. İzzet Pasha states that the Nationalist point of view had been made sufficiently clear, and that there were only two lines of action open to the Government: either to resign if the Nationalist conditions were regarded as impracticable, or to send a delegation to the Nationalists at once if it was thought that the Nationalists could be persuaded to modify their conditions. He personally did not regard those conditions as impossible, although he admitted that some were exaggerated. At the same time, no practical decision could be taken until the attitude of the Allies had been ascertained in view of recent developments. After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that a note should be sent to the Allies asking them to communicate their views in the name of the Central Government. The following is a summary of the letter sent by Mustafa Kemal —

After a short preface, Mustafa Kemal stated that the following decisions had been approved by a majority in the Great National Assembly:—

- (i) The Assembly considered it to be its duty to second the efforts of the Central Government in all its efforts to re-establish national unity.
- (ii) Before negotiations could be commenced with the Central Government, however, the latter must obtain assurances that the Treaty of Sèvres will be modified, in principle if not in detail, in accordance with the principles of Wilson.
- (iii) After proof had been obtained that the Entente Powers would repair the injustice that had been committed, the Assembly would afford the Government every facility with regard to the negotiations.
- (iv) The Assembly would thereafter undertake to pursue a policy in conformity with the interests of peace and the interests of the Entente Powers in the East.
- (v) The organisation of the Nationalists would be retained until normal conditions had been established, when it would either be totally dissolved or transformed into a political party.

1. Turkish Affairs.

(a.) A Communication from Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the Sultan was said to have been brought to Constantinople by the Government courier No. 121. It was headed "The Sultan's Message to Mustafa Kemal Pasha." The object of this communication

was to ensure the Nationalist point of view being placed before the Sultan without any possibility of its being distorted, and to reiterate the expressions of loyalty on behalf of the population of Anatolia. Captain Nesbet Bey is attached to the palace staff, formed at Yıldız for purposes of liaison between the sovereign and the Ministry of War. The chief of this staff is Damad Ismail Hakkı Bey, a son of Tewfik Pasha and a fervent Unionist and Nationalist partisan.

(b.) Outside influences are being exerted, to a certain extent through the intermediary of Ghalib Kemal Bey, who was sent to Rome on a special mission by Ali Rıza Pasha and remained there as an informal representative of the Nationalists. Ghalib Kemal Bey recently returned to Constantinople, but, before leaving Rome, it is said that he had an interview with Talaat, who gave him a message for İzzet Pasha, urging the latter to maintain a firm attitude towards the Allies, and to avoid by every possible means the ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres. It was further reported that after Ghalib Kemal Bey's departure from Italy, Talaat left for Rhodes, where he remained for three days, and met a number of Nationalists who had been sent for the purpose from Angora by Mustapha Kemal. From another source it was reported that the Italian Government is still anxious to bring about a reconciliation between the Central Government and Angora. In a letter from Rome on the 25th October to the Nationalist Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Ghalib Kemal Bey is reported to have stated that he had been visited by the Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who intimated that, if the Nationalists would adopt a reasonable attitude, the Italian Government would do its utmost to obtain a modification of the peace terms. This communication is said to have reached Angora on the 3rd November, and a courier was sent to Rome with special instructions for Ghalib Kemal Bey.

(c.) The reply of Mustapha Kemal to the Government overtures, as brought by the Government courier No. 121, was received at the Ministry of War on the 22nd November. According to Nesbet Bey, the Nationalists were convinced that, as a result of recent developments in Greece, the Crimea and Armenia the Central Government was in a position to negotiate upon much more favourable terms with the Allies, and could thus obtain considerable concessions. If the Allies were prepared to make certain concessions, the Nationalists would undertake to meet them in every possible way, both as regards the application of the treaty and as to the general policy of the Allies in the East. İzzet Pasha states that the Nationalist point of view had been made sufficiently clear, and that there were only two lines of action open to the Government: either to resign if the Nationalist conditions were regarded as impracticable, or to send a delegation to Angora at once if it was thought that the Nationalists could be persuaded to modify their conditions. He personally did not regard those conditions as impossible, although he admitted that some were exaggerated. At the same time, no practical decision could be taken until the attitude of the Allies had been ascertained in view of recent developments. After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that a note should be sent to the Allies asking them to communicate their views in the name of the Central Government. The following is a summary of the letter sent by Mustapha Kemal —

After a short preface, Mustafa Kemal stated that the following decisions had been approved by a majority in the Great National Assembly:—

- (i) The Assembly considered it to be its duty to second the efforts of the Central Government in all its efforts to re-establish national unity.
- (ii) Before negotiations could be commenced with the Central Government, however, the latter must obtain assurances that the Treaty of Sèvres will be modified, in principle if not in detail, in accordance with the principles of Wilson.
- (iii) After proof had been obtained that the Entente Powers would repair the injustice that had been committed, the Assembly would afford the Government every facility with regard to the negotiations.
- (iv) The Assembly would thereafter undertake to pursue a policy in conformity with the interests of peace and the interests of the Entente Powers in the East.
- (v) The organisation of the Nationalists would be retained until normal conditions had been established, when it would either be totally dissolved or transformed into a political party.

The Government of Commissioners had already been authorised to correspond with regard to the arrangements for the negotiations, but for the present cyphered telegrams could only be sent through the intermediary of the President.

(vii) Until the conclusion of negotiations, the Government of Commissioners would continue its functions, but, in the event of a

(ix) A general amnesty without restriction was to be promulgated.

The above points were to form the basis of negotiations, and any delegation arriving to discuss matters on this basis would be gladly welcomed and all facilities would be accorded to it.

The Cabinet then considered the question of the despatch of the delegation, and came to the conclusion that, as it was impossible to send the persons originally chosen, a new delegation would have to be chosen. This was finally agreed upon as follows —

Izzet Pasha, Minister of the Interior
Hussein Kazim Bey, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture
Fatih Hoca, Ambassador Imperial

(d) A declaration of policy, as favoured by the Reconciliation Committee formed by Lutfi Fikri Bey (see summary dated the 14th October), was embodied in an announcement that was to have been published in the press, but which was suppressed by the censor. The following is a digest of the article in question —

The Reconciliation Committee had been formed for the purpose of terminating the duality that was causing so much harm to the country. Attention was drawn to three important recent developments, viz (a) the occupation of Armenia by the National forces, (b) the defeat of Wrangel, and (c) the result of the Greek elections. In consequence of these events, it was considered that the settlement of the great problem was no longer a domestic question, but a matter of foreign policy. If the western Powers would show the same spirit as when they drew up the Treaty of Paris in 1858, the entire nation would desire nothing better than peace. The confidence which has been reposed in Turkey as the guardian of eastern Europe had been lost by the war, but it was hoped that as a result of recent developments that confidence might be restored. The "children of the nation" were therefore begged, at a moment when the star of hope was appearing on the horizon, to maintain the peace and unity of the nation. The Nationalists, by their actions, might become the instrument between Europe exhausted by war and Russia in revolt. Under such circumstances, discord would spontaneously disappear.

(e) "Election by Workers" was the title of an article that appeared in the official Nationalist organ at Angora, the "Hakimet-i-Millie," on the 23rd October. The object of the article was to explain a scheme that apparently already had been announced, and which was in some way connected with the electoral system. After a brief preface to this effect, it stated that the object of representation by workers was "to transfer the whole administration to working men" ("Emekji"). Those who were not workers would not have the right to vote, but in order to ensure the proper exercise of the franchise, the workers should be organised as in other countries in accordance with the nature of their callings. A law would therefore be enacted ordering the formations of trade unions throughout the country and all workers would be obliged to join one of these unions. The old guilds ("Esnaf Lonja") really embodied the same principle, and one of the most useful objects of these organisations was to ensure better service. In other countries there had been considerable overlapping of callings and, if the same confusion were produced in Turkey, the organisation of the unions would be difficult. On the other hand, if the organisations were formed on the basis of callings, the confusion would be avoided. The callings were the professional, commercial, industrial, and agricultural. Some of these were generally distributed, others were local. An organisation would

be formed wherever the calling existed, and would be represented even though in an electoral minority. Some callings would in time develop in districts where they did not exist at present, as for instance with the miners. Divisions would be made in nature of various callings. Each calling, however, would have a separate organisation. Thus the professions of law, medicine, painting, teaching &c., would each have a separate organisation, and would together form a federation of Liberal professions. In the course of time some callings would be sub-divided and others would disappear. Thus the vocation of railway employees would soon be developed whilst that of merchant would disappear. With regard to the functions of the organisation, each union would have two duties —

- (i) To organise, conduct and administer the special business of the calling
- (ii) To perform certain public duties

The first comprised the ordinary functions of the European trade unions, and in this respect the principles of Bolshevism would be accepted. The second duty would be connected with the conduct of elections, and under this head the following points should be taken into consideration. "As in Russia, the unions would be permitted to concern themselves with politics, but each individual was free as to his union, and would vote with his comrades in that calling." The Assembly would be chosen by this means, and would constitute a general federation of workers' unions. The private business of the various callings would not be regulated by one great organisation, but by nine centres, which would fulfil both public and private functions.

(f) A mixed war council at Angora was to have been held on the 15th November. In this council, this council was to have consisted of Bolshevik and Azerbaidjan delegates and a delegate of the Executive Council of the Moslem Eastern Committee of Baku. The object of the council, which was said to have been formed at the request of the Bolshevik Commissary for War, was to decide the nature and scope of the assistance to be accorded by the Bolsheviks to the Nationalists. It was also reported that preparations were being made for a general offensive on the western front. From another source it was reported that the Intelligence Department of the Turkish War Office had recently received a communication from Angora, dated the 17th November, to the effect that the Nationalist Government had been informed by Moscow of the departure from Novorossiysk for Trebizond of a mission consisting of twenty members. It was further stated that the object of the mission was propaganda, but it is possible that this object was in reality connected with the council mentioned above. According to further information said to have been received by the Turkish Intelligence Department, and dated the 18th November, the Soviet representative Legrand had left Erivan for Baku on the 6th November to obtain further instructions from Moscow in connection with his negotiations with the Armenian Government. During his absence from Erivan one Adesnelin was acting Soviet representative. The same report stated that the Nationalists were pursuing their plan of pushing forward to Delijan in order to establish contact with the Soviet Government. Finally it was stated that in accordance with the agreement with the Soviet Government, Bolshevik consulates were being established in various parts of Anatolia.

(g) The attitude of the Georgian Moslems towards the Nationalists appears to have undergone a transformation, for the tone of an article, summarised below, which was published in the Tiflis newspaper "Yeni Dunya" on the 5th November, was entirely different from that published in the result of an Enterprise.

Although six months had elapsed since the Greeks had opened fire upon the Turks in Anatolia, there was no sign of an end. M. Venizelos was going to settle the matter in a very short time by means of Greek cartridges, but his words had not been fulfilled. There was also dissatisfaction in Greece regarding the policy of the Greek Government, but the movement against the Venizelist administration had been met by imprisonments and deportations. Matters of life and death cannot be settled by bayonets, and the Greek bayonets could only settle the Turkish problem by annihilating the entire nation, which was more than either M. Venizelos or Mr. Lloyd George could achieve. The problem could only be solved by the Turkish nation itself, and to exert force would only be energy thrown away.

2. *Bolsheriism* in *Transcaucatum*, &c.

(4) As was to be expected, the French authorities have been unable to cope with the overwhelming numbers of Russian refugees at Constantinople, and have found it impracticable to enforce their original intention of allowing no military elements on shore. It had been decided that all military must be kept on ships until they could be sent down to one of the two concentration camps at Lemnos or Gallipoli. In practice, however, several thousand Russian officers and other ranks have straggled on leaving their ships and coming ashore, until the town is packed with

The great majority of them are penniless and have no hope of obtaining either employment or shelter. The Russian authorities in Constantinople are helpless to deal with the situation. The danger lies in the fact that large numbers of these men are armed. Cases have already occurred of officers selling their revolvers, and there have even been cases in which machine-guns were similarly disposed of. It is understood that the Allied police authorities intend taking measures to enforce the disarmament of all Russians on shore.

There is a considerable amount of anti British propaganda being conducted in Constantinople at the present moment the main object being to disparage Britain in the eyes of all people and cause ill-feeling between the British and French. The source of this propaganda is partly German, though the Bolsheviks are also actively engaged in the work.

(b) According to an unofficial but reliable Armenian source, interesting developments have taken place in the relations between the Nationalists and the Bolsheviks. The successful advance of the Turks and the fall of Kars caused no little apprehensions in the Bolsheviks, since a land invasion of Turkish troops in the vicinity of the Azerbaijan frontier might quite conceivably cause a Moslem rising in that province. Rumour has it that Chicherin despatched a note to Mustafa Kemal, in which he insisted on a cessation of hostilities against the Armenian Republic, the integrity and independence of which had been recognised by Soviet Russia and also declared that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty would no longer be considered binding as between the Turks and Bolsheviks.

Whether there be any truth in the above report or not it is impossible to say but the fact remains that the Turkish advance was watched with enthusiasm by the Moslems of Georgia, Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, and from all accounts, had the Turks succeeded in pushing right through to Georgia and Azerbaijan a Moslem rising would have been inevitable on a very large scale.

The fact of the matter is that the Bolsheviks wish to maintain an alliance with the Turkish Nationalists because firstly, it gives them considerable prestige and a theoretical right to style themselves the friends of Islam, and secondly because it gives them a footing in Turkey with the possibility of eventually establishing their control over the country and attaining their ultimate object of obtaining possession of the Dardanelles.

[illegible]

The attitude of the Georgian Government towards the events going on around her is one of complete neutrality. She has through- out remained aloof from the struggle between the Turkish and Russian armies, and has not allowed her territory to be used as a base for either. In so far as the Turkish army is concerned, she has to be content with the few and scattered detachments which have been sent to fight in the Caucasus, and which are not strong enough to do any serious work. On the other hand, she has removed her own national army from the region, and has marked it out as neutral to carry favour and the winning cup. It has not been able to do anything to curtail Turkish sympathies in the first place, and it is not in a position to do so now. Moslems in Georgia appear to have no objection to the possibility of a conflict between the Turkish forces and the

Bolsheviks, and wishes to maintain good relations with both parties until it becomes evident which side is likely to win. For the time being the Turks appear anxious to have the friendship of the Georgians, and have appointed a representative to Tiflis in the person of Kiazim Bey. Georgia fears, of course, that should Turkish ambitions carry the Nationalists further than their present limits, they will endeavour to link up with the North Caucasus—in which case, of course, Georgia would immediately become the theatre of operations. The Georgians are also considerably alarmed at the possibility of a Turkish occupation of the Batoum province, and the draft scheme for the new constitution of Georgia contains a clause providing for the establishment of an autonomous Moslem Georgia.

(c) Anti Bolshevik risings are still occurring in Daghestan, but there cannot be said to be any general movement on foot against the Soviet authorities. The two leading spirits in the present revolt are Imam Najm-ud-Din Gotsinsky and grandson of the Imam Shamil. In the opinion of a responsible individual who was recently in Daghestan, the insurrection should not be considered as being anything very serious. Daghestan is full of discontented elements, most of whom have been compelled to take refuge in the highlands out of reach of the Bolsheviks. The latter have not many troops in Daghestan, and have no means of defending many of the more isolated towns. Thus the town of Khunsakh, some 30 miles south-west of Temir Khan Shura, was besieged by the insurgents, who appeared sufficiently strong to prevent reinforcements being sent from Temir Khan Shura. According to the last reports, the Bolshevik garrison were still holding out after a three weeks' siege. The Bolsheviks take the view that under present winter conditions it is impossible to conduct operations in the snow-covered highlands, but that in the spring two or three battalions will speedily liquidate the trouble. Some reports state that Gotsinsky has given up the struggle and abandoned the leadership to Shamil.

Turkish agitation is being actively conducted, and finds a fertile field throughout Daghestan, where the population is already thoroughly tired of the Bolsheviks, with their endless requisitioning and repression. It is exactly the same story as in the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan, and the general opinion is that the Bolsheviks are laying up very serious trouble for themselves in the not distant future. They are admittedly far too strong to be ousted by anything but a general movement throughout the North Caucasus, and the only impetus for such a movement could come from the Turks. Many of the senior Bolshevik leaders must perceive the danger growing in the distance, but the Bolshevik press has so far been completely silent on the subject.

No 11

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1921).

Paris, December 30, 1907
to "Eclaire de Paris".

The writer of the article states that he enquired whether it was true that M. de Belven, the president of the commission, had written to M. Leygues a letter calling attention to the discrepancies between the statements regarding Eastern affairs, made by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons, and those of the President of the Council in the Chamber, and asking M. Leygues to explain these differences to the Senatorial Commission. In reply to his question, the writer declares that he was informed that M. Antonin Dubost had on the previous day expressed a wish that M. Leygues should again appear before the commission. As a result, M. Leygues, at the request of M. de Belven, has accepted the invitation to appear before the commission, and that there was no disagreement between Mr. Lloyd George and himself regarding Eastern affairs, but that the French Foreign Office had decided not to question the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres should be publicly discussed. It would indeed be maladroit, at the moment when negotiations were about to begin, to appear to admit the necessity of an agreement with England. M. Leygues, however, is not a member of the commission, was at present with him.

In these circumstances the commission had considered it better, for the moment, not to enter into a public discussion of Eastern affairs and of the military burden which

...y still impose upon France but, on the contrary, to leave full liberty of action to the Government. M. d'Escurvilles de Constant, who had prepared an interpellation, had accordingly consented to put it off until a latter date.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

[E 157/1 44]

No. 12

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, January

THIS evening's newspapers announce that President of the Council this morning received General Townshend and General Achmed Riza, former Resident of Ottoman Chamber.

General Townshend has already given press interview, in which he advocates rejection of Treaty of Sevres, and French will undoubtedly make as much capital as possible out of his views.

The President of the Council impressed upon me again to-day the necessity of effecting a settlement in the Near East owing to the presence of Bolshevik emissaries in Angora.

In reply to my enquiry as to what he would propose, he urged afresh a modification of the Treaty of Sevres in regard to Smyrna, and necessity of making peace with those lines before Greeks had been forced to evacuate that city.

He did not tell me that he had seen General Townshend.

[E 346 1 44]

No. 13

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 7, 1921.)

(No. 1708)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 31, 1920

THE close of the year finds the Turkish Government in a more difficult situation than ever.

2. It now seems practically certain that the mission to Mustafa Kemal has failed, the Nationalists having adopted an unyielding attitude. There are persistent rumours that the mission is on its way back, but, beyond the fact that it has failed, it is unlikely that the Turkish Government will be willing to give detailed information as to what passed at Angora. Matters have therefore, politically speaking, reached a deadlock.

3. The financial situation has gone from bad to worse. A large proportion of the officials have only received 75 per cent. of their salaries for October, and nothing either for November or December. At the present moment the three High Commissioners are engaged in a struggle with the Turkish Government regarding the question of effective control over the Turkish finances, this control being bound up with the disposal of any sum which may be advanced by the banks on the stocks belonging to the Ottoman Government, including the £ T. 252,000 in gold, the release of which our respective Governments have authorised.

4. In reply to the note which the three High Commissioners addressed to the Grand Vizier on the 17th December, the Turkish Government have sent us a long note explaining their view of the nature of the control which they are willing should be exercised by the provisional Financial Commission, and putting forward certain proposals in this connection.

5. I have had two long interviews, separately and alone, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance on this question, and I have pointed out the flaw in the Turkish proposals. These, as formulated, would enable the Minister of Finance to continue the system of paying a percentage of their salaries to all Government employees impartially, whereas, having regard to the insufficiency of the receipts to meet the monthly expenditure, the provisional Financial Commission is insisting, in the interests of law and order and of the proper collection of the customs revenues, on the necessity of making payments in order of their importance. The

provisional Financial Commission holds, and is supported in that view by the three High Commissioners, that services such as the police, customs, prisons and hospitals would constitute a first charge on the revenues. It is admitted that this system operates with great hardship on the employees of the other administrations. But there is no help for it, and, given the crisis, the three High Commissioners are driven to have recourse to expedients. At the present moment it has not been found possible to reconcile the views of the Finance Minister, who, with his colleague the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is fighting this question, with the view held by the High Commissioners. In the meanwhile the Turkish Government are living mainly on the receipts from the vilayet of Constantinople and on the customs receipts, which show signs of falling off owing to the fact that the fall in the value of the lira has acted as a check on importation of articles of luxury. It may be that financial distress will eventually drive the Turkish Government to agree to the form of control on which we are insisting, and even to ratify the treaty. This remains to be seen.

6. An interesting point of my conversations with both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance was the attempt of these two Ministers to enlist my sympathies on their side by agreeing that the police should be paid regularly. This proposal was, in reality, equivalent to a bribe, and I rejected it, as I pointed out that other administrations were almost, if not quite, as important to the State as the police. I informed the two Ministers, in short, that, speaking for myself, I would not accept any embargo on the £ T. 252,000 in gold if, and when, the provisional Financial Commission expressed themselves as satisfied that they had obtained effective control over the Turkish finances. There the matter rests for the moment, pending the examination by the provisional Financial Commission of the latest proposals of the Turkish Government. The controversy over this matter may last for some little time.

7. In the meantime the struggle with the Turkish Government over this question of control is really invested with a political character. It has become evident for some time past that the Turkish Government are pursuing a policy of passive resistance and are almost arrogant. I have had to take up two cases which savoured of political persecution, but I have not troubled your Lordship with these cases. It will be sufficient to say that one of the cases concerned Mustafa Pasha, who, as president of the court-martial which had been set up by the late Government to try Turks who have committed atrocities during the war, had incurred the enmity of the Nationalists and their pathfinders. No sooner had the present Government come into office than Mustafa Pasha and his three colleagues on a technical charge of treason were arrested. In reality there was every reason to believe that their prosecution was due to motives of revenge. I am hopeful of settling this and the other case in a manner satisfactory to the High Commission, but the attitude of the Turkish Government in these two cases as well as their attitude in the matter of the control of the Turkish finances, indicate an attempt to see how far they can go in resisting our demands.

8. The general outlook is very obscure and unsatisfactory.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 477 52 44]

No. 14

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921.)

(No. 1707 Secret.)

My Lord

Constantinople, December 31, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of intelligence reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the week ended the 16th December, 1920.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Bolsheviks' emissary Legrand in the peace negotiations at Alexandropol. The latter, in his opinion, were matters which concerned only the combatant parties, and did not call for outside interference. The Turkish commander is now thought to be in a very difficult position from a military point of view. It will be almost impossible for him to maintain his force in the Kara highlands owing to the extreme cold and lack of provisions. The most natural scheme would have been for him to have advanced into the Erivan or Ehzavetpol lowlands, and it is generally believed that this was his original plan of campaign. In any case, the fact of Kiazim Karabekir's having been thwarted in the continuation of a campaign in which his own personal aims were prominently concerned will scarcely tend to increase his friendship with the Bolsheviks.

The opinion is held by many people that the establishment of a Soviet Government in Armenia must shortly be followed by a similar event in Georgia. The Bolsheviks acted with promptness and decision in Armenia so soon as it became a question of forestalling the Turks. They will in all probability act with equal promptness again should the Turks continue to betray designs on the Batumi province. (Report HC, 1562)

2. Polinome in Transliteration

(a.) A letter has recently been sent by Zughbiul Pasha to Shefik Pasha, dated London, the 11th November, in which he states that a disagreement has arisen between the delegation and Lord Milner over the question of English advisers being retained in the Ministries of Finance and Justice. He therefore proposes to leave the delegation to work out its own plan of action and not to return to Egypt with it, but to remain in Paris. (Report HD 1564)

(b) A meeting of Egyptian Nationalists was caused by the receipt of a letter by Dr Amin, the Egyptian, son-in-law of Dr. Essad Pasha, from his sister in Egypt, in which he stated that the Egyptian cause was being helped by their quarrellings. The meeting condemned the behaviour of the Egyptians, whom they regarded as unstable and half-hearted, and proposed to support Zaghlul as being their only hope. A Watanist pamphlet, written in Arabic and sent from Berlin, was circulated during the meeting and contained false statements regarding the Midner-Zaghlul draft agreement. (Report HD 1565)

(c) An emissary from the ex-Khedive to Mustapha Kemal recently returned to Constantinople, bringing a letter from the latter in answer to one sent by him by the hand of an Egyptian who left for Angora on the 22nd November, 1920. In this letter the ex-Khedive compliments Mustapha Kemal on his recent victory over the Armenians, and assures him of his whole-hearted collaboration with him. He counsels him to continue his offensive on the Brusa and Smyrna fronts, and assures him that the press of Egypt, Syria and Arabia is being well propagandized. With regard to the Ottoman Empire, he says that the ex-Khedive has been told by a reliable source that any negotiations with it, as by doing so he would be furthering British policy, and it is only by continued fighting that the Ottoman Empire will be completely freed from the fetters of the occupation. We have no actual proof that the contents of the letter have been accurately reported, though informant's reputation is good. It goes to the credit of the ex-Khedive that he reckoned definitely on the side of our enemies. (Report HD/1569)

(d) Information is now to hand that the French Government is thinking of subsidizing the Arabic newspaper "El Adel," which is published by Mohamed Safa in Constantinople weekly. Mohamed Safa came to Constantinople after having been prosecuted by the Egyptian Government for writing slightly about Queen Victoria, and about twelve years ago started the publication of "El Adel." It is a paper of pronounced Pan Islamic tendencies, was used during the war as an organ for propaganda, its paper being supplied by the Germans, and is now said to penetrate all parts of the Moslem world. The Italians have more than once used its columns to publish inspired articles on Tripolitan affairs, and have paid for the distribution of numerous copies in Tripoli. Safa is anxious to secure French support, as he considers England to be the enemy of Mahomedans and France their friend. He has approached Commandant Labonne, Director of the French Bureau du Levant, pointing out the advantage the French would gain from having the support of a paper with such a large circulation. Commandant Labonne has so far confined himself to promising to subscribe for one year to the paper, but has asked for information regarding the paper's connection with India. (Report HD-1563)

sent intelligence to the Soviet Kremlin. K. J. Bakir is said to have
told her in the course of a conversation declaring that now there
was no longer a war between the Turks and Armenians since
they had both been united. It is generally agreed that Bakir has
since K. J. Bakir's very firm satisfaction with the late events have
taken and it is reported that he protests strongly against the interference of the

[E 261 1, 44]

No. 15.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 10, 1921.

ON the 5th instant the Italian Chargé d'Affaires enquired of Sir Eyre Crowe whether His Majesty's Government had heard a report that Mustapha Kemal was sending Ismet Pasha back to Constantinople with the advice that the Sultan should now ratify the Treaty of Sévres. This appeared, if true, advice rather dangerous to the Allies, as it would enable the Sultan at Constantinople to claim all the benefits of the treaty while Kemal the responsibility for preventing the execution of the treaty as to all the clauses which the Turks thought objectionable.

Sir Eyre Crowe replied that His Majesty's Government had received a somewhat similar report, but not in a form which invested it with a high degree of reliability. He did not, however, share the view that the advice alleged to have been given by Mustapha Kemal was dangerous to the interest of the Allies; it seemed, on the contrary, that the Allies could only gain from that advice being followed. What we all desired was peace and the return to legality in our relations with the Turkish Government. Peace would, in the first instance, contribute powerfully to the stability of the territories, as also in the zones established under the tripartite agreement. If, after ratification, Mustapha Kemal continued to oppose the execution of the treaty in those regions to which his material power extended, that would create no worse situation than existed now, without the treaty. Peace would lastly bring into operation the financial clauses to which the Allies were unanimous in attaching great importance, which would, in the first instance, contribute powerfully to the stability of the territories at Constantinople, where at this moment arrears in the payment of taxes are at high prices, threatened to create widespread unrest.

3. Signor Proton did not dissent from the views expressed by Sir E. Crowe, with which I myself entirely agree.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 262 1, 44]

No. 16

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 39.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 13, 1921.

I HAVE to inform you that on the 5th instant Mustafa Kemal Pasha paid his first call to this Department, and was received by the Under-Secretary of State. He expressed the thanks of the Turkish Government for his being allowed to come to London and to enter into unofficial relations with this Office. Sir Eyre Crowe said that His Majesty's Government would be happy to discuss with him informally any questions which could conveniently be treated without raising the issue of the re-establishment of official relations between the British and Turkish Governments. Sir Eyre Crowe expressed the hope that this re-establishment would not be long delayed and peace definitely realised, which was in the interests not only of both countries but of all the world. From this point of view His Majesty's Government could only hope for the early ratification of the Treaty of Peace. Pending this, Sir Eyre Crowe thought there would be difficulties which Mustafa Kemal Pasha, as an old diplomatist, would readily understand might prevent his being received by the Secretary of State.

2. Reshid Pasha then proceeded to give Sir Eyre Crowe a long account of recent political development at Constantinople. He was apologetic as to Tawfik Pasha's Government not having kept strictly to their promise to ratify the treaty as soon as they had heard of Ismet Pasha's arrival at Angora. But he felt sure that on Ismet's return to Constantinople the situation would rapidly clear. The Sultan and his Government were determined to do all in their power to support the future of Turkey depended.

3. Mustafa Kemal Pasha then pictured the acute distress prevailing at Constantinople and the need for affording temporary relief by an arrangement with the Ottoman Bank had fallen through. The conditions as to control put forward by the bank were unacceptable;

but whilst the French High Commissioner was ready to meet the Turkish Government on this point, the opposition of the British High Commissioner could not be overcome. Sir Eyre Crowe interrupted Reshid Pasha by observing that there was no advantage in making any attempt to pay the debt of the Ottoman Bank. This savoured of a diplomatic device which Sir Eyre Crowe begged him to consider as a mere suggestion. Reshid Pasha at once disclaimed any intention of making any such suggestion. As he was about to depart, Sir Eyre Crowe requested that he should forward to him a copy of the Turkish proposals relating to an advance, Sir Eyre Crowe requested that he should forward to him a copy of the Turkish proposals relating to an advance, Sir Eyre Crowe requested that he should forward to him a copy of the Turkish proposals relating to an advance. Sir Eyre Crowe warned him, however, that this matter would no doubt have to continue to be treated by the High Commissioners at Constantinople who had all the requisite local knowledge. Sir Eyre Crowe also mentioned that the Turkish Government had agreed to the Treaty of Peace, in which proper provision was made for dealing with this problem.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 643.576 93]

No. 17

*Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 14)**United States Embassy, London,
January 13, 1921.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honor to inform your Lordship that I am in receipt of a telegraph communication from Washington stating that it is the desire of my Government to publish, in the form of a White Book, the following notes exchanged between His Majesty's Government and that of the United States with regard to rights in mandated territories:—

My note of the 12th May, 1920; my note of the 28th July, 1920; your Lordship's note of the 9th August, 1920, and Mr. Collyer's note to your Lordship of the 20th November, 1920 (transmitted under cover of my note of the 6th December, 1920).

It is my belief that the publication of the above-mentioned correspondence at this time would be agreeable to His Majesty's Government and that it would be the earliest possible moment an expression of your Lordship's views.

I have, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS

[E 714 1 44]

No. 18

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 15)

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic)

Constantinople, January 12, 1921.

PRESENT situation may be summarized as follows:

Nothing authoritative has transpired as to what has passed between that Ministry and Nationalists.

Turkish Government have not yet given way on the question of control of their finances and the Turkish Government have not yet been released. Turkish Government wish to make financial controllers responsible in the eyes of the people for the financial situation. Turkish officials steps are being taken to counter this mischievous propaganda.

In my view Turkish Government are awaiting results of forthcoming meeting of Supreme Council, and will live on, from hand to mouth, until they hear of the decisions taken by the Council. Mustafa Kemal Pasha is in a position to exchange views with the Nationalists by way of the Supreme Council. New Greek offensive attempts also have a bearing on the movement of mission.

[E 779 779 44]

No. 19

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 17)

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 4, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions at this capital, in so far as they are known to me. Having only recently arrived, I fear that the report must be necessarily somewhat incomplete.

In view of the fact that I am thrown into especially close contact with my French and Italian colleagues owing to the weekly meetings of the High Commissioners, and to the nature of our work here, good relations with the French and Italian High Commissioners are especially important.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 19

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Constantinople, January 1921

France.—The French High Commissioner, M. De France, came here from Egypt March 1919. He is the senior of the three Allied High Commissioners, and having been here a considerable time is naturally better acquainted with most of the questions dealt with at the High Commissioners' meetings than either my Italian colleague or myself. His experience is thus valuable to me.

I have found M. De France an excellent colleague, and I regret his approaching departure for Madrid. He is conciliatory in the handling of questions of a controversial character, and, as far as I can judge, has done his utmost to work cordially with us. I have cultivated close relations with him.

Italy.—The Marquis Garroni arrived here in the latter half of November, a week or so after my own arrival. He was Italian Ambassador at Constantinople before the war, and therefore knows this part of the world. He is not a regular member of the Italian Diplomatic Service, his appointment being a political appointment made by Signor Ciccotti. He is a very elderly gentleman, but he is very alert. My impression is that he is determined to push Italian interests to the utmost, vide his recent proposal to send an agent to Mustapha Kemal with a view to facilitating the development of interests which Italy has acquired under the Tripartite Agreement. This effort was, however, nipped in the bud. I have found the Marquis Garroni a very pleasant colleague, anxious for close relations with us. He is a man of great loyalty, and he was perfectly frank about his proposal to send an emissary to Mustapha Kemal.

United States.—Admiral Bristol, the United States High Commissioner, came to Constantinople in 1919. He has hitherto been more longer than any of the High Commissioners. Before I arrived here he was described to me by the American naval attaché in London as a man of "transparent candour." I have not had much intercourse with him since my arrival, but I have always found him friendly, and certainly in one case, in which an American subject and the British military authorities were concerned, conciliatory. I am under the impression, however, that he is inclined to be jealous of the fact that the Allied High Commissioners are practically directing the administration of Constantinople. I have dealt with two categories of Americans since the armistice. The one category, whilst deeply regretting that America has, through her own action, renounced participation in the post-war settlement, nevertheless do their best to help their former allies. The other category are jealous of the necessarily preponderant rôle played by England in the settlement of European affairs. I conclude that Admiral Bristol belongs to this latter category. His occasional comments on decisions taken at the High Commissioners' meetings and communicated to him seem to indicate a desire to remind us to be careful of what we are doing.

A friend of mine, Mr. D. S. [Name], who has recently arrived as First Secretary at the American High Commission, and his influence will no doubt be beneficial.

Greece.—M. Canellopoulos is the Greek High Commissioner. I have seen very little of him as, since my arrival, he has been in a particularly difficult position owing

to the result of the elections in Greece. He is inclined to be a trimmer. We have to address frequent notes to M. Canellopoulos on the proceedings of the Greek troops in the territories which they occupy in Asia Minor. Of late he has shown a desire to be conciliatory and to meet our requests.

Belgium.—M. Michotte de Welle came here in October of last year. He is somewhat garrulous and plays no part.

Sweden.—M. Wallenberg was appointed here from Tokyo, where I knew him in 1909-13. He was very pro-German whilst in Japan, and I understand that this made his position very difficult when Japan entered the war. He has been absent since I arrived, but is now on his way back to his post. He is in charge of German interests at Constantinople.

Denmark.—M. Wandel is the Dutch Minister. I have only met him once.

Spain.—M. Servet y Vest is the Spanish Minister. I am told that he is quite efficient and rarely appears.

There are also representatives from Jugo-Slavin, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Roumania.

[E 840 52 44]

No. 20

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 18)

(No. 31.)

My Lord,

Constantinople January 8, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of intelligence reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the fortnight ended the 30th December, 1920.

I have &c

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 20

Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the Fortnight ending December 30, 1920

(Secret.)

DURING the past fortnight interesting information has been obtained with regard to the Nationalist movement in Asia Minor. As a result of the progress of the movement up to the 25th November, and also for the 2nd December, the Nationalists appear to have adhered practically to their original uncompromising attitude, although the members of the mission were treated with the utmost personal consideration. According to semi-official announcements on the 30th December, Izzet Pasha and the other members of the Government delegation left Angora for Constantinople on Wednesday, the 29th December, at the request of the Central Government, which, it is reported, is under the impression that the Allies are prepared to discuss Mustapha Kemal's proposals. It is very probable that the negotiations with the Nationalists are terminated. Izzet Pasha is expected back in the course of next week, when it may be possible to obtain full confirmation of the reports hitherto received with regard to the progress of the negotiations.

An interesting item of the general scheme of Nationalist policy is the decision that the Sultan must abdicate in favour of the pro-Nationalist Heir-Apparent, in order that the Nationalists may be able to put forward a candidate, Izzet Pasha, and a return to his policy of ruthless suppression of everything savouring of unionism. In the meanwhile, the Nationalists are taking advantage of the truce between Anatolia and the capital to recruit officers for service with the national forces, and in this respect the inability of the Central Government to pay salaries and pensions is probably a favourable element from the Nationalist point of view.

Ghalib Kemal Bey, whose return to Constantinople from Rome was mentioned in the summary for the 9th December, has now gone back to Rome again, but this time as the special agent of the Sublime Porte.

1 Turkish Affairs

(a.) The policy of the Nationalist Government was defined before the Grand National Assembly on the 4th December by Mustapha Kemal, Mukhtar, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, and Colonel Ismet, Chief of the General Staff.

Mustapha Kemal stated that it was impossible to refuse to negotiate with the Constantinople Government, since the Cabinet was composed of Ministers whose patriotism was beyond doubt, and since one of the principal purposes of the Nationalist movement was to unite the nation, he regretted that the Central Government's negotiations would proceed in accordance with the desire of the Assembly, no information would be given however, until a definite result in one direction or the other had been achieved, there would be not the slightest divergence from the Assembly's original principles, the European situation had become favourable and, although the negotiations would be protracted, there was no need for pessimism, rumours to the effect that the delegation was accompanied by suspected persons were false, and the delegation itself would be unable to communicate with unauthorised persons, in case of necessity, the delegation would be allowed to send a courier to Constantinople under constant surveillance.

Mukhtar Bey a speech concerned foreign relations, which, he said, were limited to certain non-European Powers, although France and Italy had realised the necessity of the good will of the Nationalists, the fall of Venizelos had given rise to every effort had been made to assist the anti-Venizelist party in power, the latter party had evinced the spirit as the Venizelists, it would soon be clear whether this was on and it would be as well, therefore, to wait before condemning as fruitless the support given to the anti-Venizelist Party, the peace negotiations with Armenia were proceeding, and a treaty in harmony with Turkish interests would shortly be submitted to the Assembly, relations with the Soviet Government were more friendly than ever, and rumours of hostility on the part of the Moscow Government were untrue; the note, which had been received from the Soviet Foreign Commissioner contained nothing unfriendly, as a matter of fact, the two Governments had long been in agreement with regard to Armenia, and the Angora Government knew that such a communication would be made by the Bolsheviks at a certain moment, Georgia had shown a desire to maintain good relations, and had received an assurance that there was no need to fear an attack, Ismet Bey stated that the army movement had not yet developed, little information could be given, he could say that the enemy army was weary and demoralised, the principal action was taking place at Ushaq, Demirji, Sumav and Gediz had been recaptured, and the Nationalist forces were advancing against Alashehir, he hoped to give further information shortly, but for military reasons no further details could be given for the moment.

(b.) On the 8th December the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, Mukhtar Bey, made a confidential statement to the Great National Assembly to the effect that before the negotiations with the delegation of the Central Government would proceed, it was essential, in the interests of honour and discretion, to ascertain the views of the Moscow Government with regard to those negotiations, and more especially to prevent the Central Government from making any communication to the Nationalist Government had sent a communication to the Soviet Government, and the Assembly would be informed of all developments and, if an agreement were concluded, it would be submitted to the Assembly for ratification, rumours concerning the delegation's being prevented from returning to Constantinople were false, whatever the result of the negotiations, the delegation would be free to return.

The above-mentioned communication to the Soviet Government is reported to have been addressed to Chicherin on the 7th December and, after informing the latter of the arrival of the Central Government's delegation, stated that the Nationalists were more than ever resolved to fulfil their engagements, they would only discuss the Central Government's proposals if convinced of the possibility of their being accepted, the Nationalists considered it essential to ascertain the views of the Soviet Government with regard to the policy to be pursued for the safeguard of their mutual interests.

(c.) Negotiations with the Nationalists were officially commenced on the 7th December when the Constantinople Mission under Izzet Pasha arrived in Angora.

In the telegram which Izzet Pasha despatched to the Constantinople Government after his arrival in Angora, it was stated that the mission had received a tremendous ovation, and that in all the towns and villages the people had cheered the Sultan, at Eski Shehir, Izzet Pasha, after inspecting the 77th regiment, which was said to have been the first to enter Kars, told the commander that he deeply appreciated the sacrifices that were being made by the Turkish army, but he hoped that before long existing evils would be overcome, so that every man could return to his home, at Angora the mission was received by Mustapha Kemal, who subsequently informed Izzet Pasha that the decisions of the Great National Assembly rested irrevocably upon the modification of the Treaty of Sevres, although the question would be again considered in the light of the proposals brought forward by the mission, Izzet Pasha expected to commence negotiations the following day, and added that success depended upon the result of the negotiations that were being conducted by the Sublime Porte to the Entente Powers, the telegram ended with a message from Mustapha Kemal to the effect that the whole of Anatolia was completely loyal to the Sultan.

(d.) On the 11th December Izzet Pasha addressed another telegram to the Sublime Porte, in which he stated that all the members of the Nationalist Administration with whom he had conversed had told him that, before negotiations could be commenced, they would have to receive a reply to certain communications which they had made in fulfilment of existing agreements, Mustapha Kemal had also informed him that it was hoped that the military action which had been commenced upon the Western front would have a salutary effect, both upon the negotiations and upon the political situation; hitherto, there had been only an exchange of views, and in the meanwhile Jevad Bey and Mukhtar Bey were going to report upon the manner in which the negotiations would be affected by the foreign engagements entered into by the Nationalists. This message was discussed at the Ministerial Council held upon the 18th December, and was considered by the Grand Vizier as not being sufficiently explicit to permit the Government to take any action. Mustapha Arif Bey, interim Minister of the Interior, expressed the opinion that the Nationalists were delaying matters in the hope that successes would be gained upon the Smyrna front, as well as in order to obtain the opinions of the States with whom they had made certain agreements, he suggested that a message should be sent to the mission urging that the Government's final terms should be placed before the Nationalists, and pointing out that the Entente representatives were impatiently awaiting the result of the negotiations. It was finally decided by the Cabinet to wait until Monday, the 20th instant, before sending such a communication. At the Council held on the following day, however, two further communications from Izzet Pasha, dated the 13th and 14th December respectively, were submitted to the Council of Ministers. The first communication stated that each member of the mission had been given in writing the terms upon which the Nationalists were prepared to come to an agreement. Those terms were as follows:—

- (i) An Imperial proclamation and a provisional law whereby the Felvas against the Nationalists and the decisions of the courts-martial would be annulled.
- (ii) A Chamber of Deputies to be convoked as soon as possible for the purpose of reconsidering all measures adopted by both the Constantinople and the Angora Administrations, and to decide whether they should continue to be applied or not.
- (iii) All who have suffered on account of their connection with the Nationalists at the hands of the Constantinople Government to be indemnified.
- (iv) Assurances to be obtained from the Entente Governments with regard to the modification of the Treaty of Sevres in accordance with Nationalist claims. Meanwhile the Nationalists will renounce any hostile movement.
- (v) The modifications of the treaty as desired by the Great National Assembly were:—
 - (a) The Entente Powers to accept the principle of acknowledging complete Turkish independence wherever there was a Turkish majority of population, and to submit differences of opinion to international arbitration.
 - (b) Claims regarding Smyrna and Thrace to be settled without arbitration.
 - (c) A certain period to be allotted to the Arbitration Commission for purposes of studying ethnographical and other questions.

- [illegible]

(1) The relations of the Central Government with Italy entered upon a fresh phase with the advent of the present Government to power. The return of Ghalib Kemal Bey to Constantinople from Rome has already been noted previously (see

...ted the 9th December). He remained in Constantinople only a few days, however, and went back to Rome about the 5th December, after having been charged with special functions by the Turkish Government. He was given instructions which embraced the following points:—

- (a) He was to proceed to Rome on behalf of the Government, not in an official capacity, but on account of his intimacy with various Italian Government officials.
- (b) The expenses of the mission would be covered by the secret funds of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- (c) He would remain in Rome until the return of the Government Mission from Angora and his services would then either be terminated or renewed as the Government thought fit.
- (d) While in Rome he would maintain constant contact with Italian political personages, particularly to convey the following:—

- (i) Turkey was grateful for Italian assistance already afforded.
- (ii) Turkey now had more need than ever of Italian support.
- (iii) The Turkish Government was doing its utmost to carry out the advice given by the Italians to eliminate the duality which had arisen in Turkey, but begged to point out that this object could not possibly be achieved unless a guarantee were given that the unjust Treaty of Sèvres would be modified.
- (iv) Once this guarantee were given, the Turkish Government would faithfully follow all recommendations emanating from the Italian Government or the other *Entente* Powers for the safeguarding of Italian or *Entente* political and economic interests in the East.
- (v) Italy's position in Anatolia as defined by the Treaty of Sèvres was accepted in advance by the Turkish Government which was prepared to conclude further agreements as soon as a peace securing Turkish rights had been concluded.
- (vi) The Turkish Government would give every material and moral assistance to the Italian Government in return for the latter's friendly support.

- (e) He would ascertain and inform the Turkish Foreign Office immediately with regard to what immediate economic and financial assistance the Italians were prepared to afford and upon what conditions.
- (f) He would keep the Turkish Government constantly informed with regard to Italian public and official opinion, and would strive in every way to influence them in a favourable manner.

(g) The finances of the Turkish Government are in a very bad way, and form one of the principal subjects of the deliberations of nearly every Council. At a Council held on the 10th December, the Minister of Finance painted the situation in very gloomy colours and stated that a crisis would become inevitable unless something was done before the end of the month. He was prepared to resign at once if anyone could do better, but the measures that had been taken were insufficient. On the 23rd both the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that the financial situation could not be improved until a definite result had been obtained in the negotiations with the Nationalists, and proposed that the Government should make a submission on the fact. In reply to the Finance Minister's suggestion that the *Entente* Powers should be informed of the grave consequences that would ensue if the present state of affairs were prolonged, the Grand Vizier stated that every possible measure had been taken without success, and there was nothing further that could be done but to put a brave face on the matter until the negotiations begun at Angora had produced a favourable result.

2. Egyptian Affairs

(a) It is reported that the ex-Khedive has recently approached the Italian authorities in Constantinople with a view to obtaining permission to settle in Italy under Italian protection, in return for which permission he promises to use his

influence in Italian interests in the Near East generally. It is understood, however, that no definite conclusion has been arrived at regarding this scheme, as the Italian authorities have apparently given the ex-Khedive to understand that they do not wish to offend the British authorities, to whom, they say, he should look for assistance.

Reports have recently been received of meetings which took place in September and November between the Sultan of Turkey and the ex-Khedive, at the first of which the independence of Egypt was discussed and the authority which the Sultan would have over Egypt in his position as Khalif. The ex-Khedive, in a letter communicating the results of the interview to the Sultan of Egypt, is said to have expressed his complete approval of these proposals. At the meeting in November, the Sultan of Turkey expressed himself as dissatisfied with the British for allowing the formation of a Cabinet opposed to himself, and for being in favour of an understanding between Anatolia and the Central Government, which he understood, would result in loss of prestige to himself. The ex-Khedive apparently expressed the belief that an agreement would be reached with the Central Government, although he is reported to have previously urged Mustapha Kemal to abstain from entering into any proposals coming from Constantinople (see summary dated the 16th December).

(b) A meeting of Egyptians belonging to the Hizb-el Watan Party took place on the 29th November at the house of Dr Muhammad Amin, the son-in-law of Dr Essad Pasha, in order to discuss the news received from London of the failure of Zaghaf Pasha to reach an agreement with Lord Milner. In view of this, it was unanimously decided to write to Sheikh Abdul Aziz Sanusi imploring him to work in conjunction with Zaghaf Pasha. The Watanists have always been keen advocates of pan-Islamism, and it is significant therefore that the meeting at Dr. Amin's house (he himself being a strong pan-Islamist) should appeal to A. A. Shawish, who is known to be a strong supporter of pan-Islamism, in spite of any veil of politics or Nationalism he may have chosen to throw over his true feelings.

Shawish is reported to have written to Mahmud Zeki Bey, at one time connected with the production in Constantinople of "El Adel," stating that the Egyptians in Berlin are not in harmony with each other, and that he has therefore left them to live with Sheikh Arslan, the notorious Druse pan-Islamist.

A new club has been formed by Egyptians in Berlin under the title "El Shark" (the Orient) for the purpose of bringing and holding together all Orientals of whatever nationality.

(c) A representative from the French Levant Bureau in Constantinople, which is of fairly recent institution and is interested in the repatriation of Armenians, is reported to have had an interview with the Armenian delegate from Erivan with regard to the Armenians' attitude towards the French. The representative from the Bureau, Dr. Marquis, endeavoured to persuade the Armenian delegate that the Armenians were making a great mistake in endeavouring to sever their connection with France, as by so doing they were becoming tools of British policy. He assured him that ten ships with munitions had lately been sent to Armenia by the French.

General Gouraud's visit to Paris is reported to have had, as one of its objects, the surrender to the League of Nations of France's mandate in the Near East in so far as Cilicia is concerned.

In spite, however, of the indications of anti-British feeling in the Bureau du Levant, it is reported that one of its aims is to come to an agreement with the British on a basis of non-interference by either side, but at the same time rumours have also been in circulation in the Bureau that the recent troubles in Iraq were mainly provoked by the partisans of the French.

(d) The anti-British tone of the Tunisian press is of interest in view of the important part played by Tunisians during the war in pan-Islamic affairs from Constantinople. Many of the newspapers are edited by disciples of the late distinguished Tunisian pan-Islamist, Ali Bash Hamba, and many active members of the League of Nations, of which Ali Bash Hamba was the first vice-president. The fact that the Tunisian press is so completely controlled by the French prevents it from condemning the Christian and *Entente* Powers in general and therefore its only way of forwarding the pan-Islamic cause is by an attack on that nation which it believes to be France's rival. This anti-British tone of the press

is said by some to be only a ploy in order to flatter France and induce her to grant independence to Tunis. The papers are not known to be subsidised by the French Administration of Tunis, but it is believed that the general policy of the papers have the approval of the French local authorities. These journals come into Constantinople through the French post office to about a score of readers, among whom is Muhammad Safa, editor of the notorious Arabic newspaper "El Adel".

(e) The Arabs of the Hedjaz are now reported to have come to a perfect agreement with their former enemies the Wahabites of Central Arabia, owing to the success of the British scheme to place the Emir Feisal on the throne of an independent Arabia. For this reason they have turned bitterly against King Hussein whom they regard as responsible for the failure by listening to British proposals.

The tone of the Arabic press still suggests that it is being subsidised by the French Government, and it still expresses the same anti-British sentiments—namely that England in order to satisfy her lust for world power, is crushing the small nations of the East and trampling Islam generally. The Islamic-Bolshevik union, however, is causing England to seek terms of her victims at the last moment and therefore, the present moment is the time to secure emancipation for Islam and the "lived nations of the world". France, on the other hand, and occasionally Italy, are regarded as the long tried friends of Islam and will it is hoped aid Turkey by dealing skilful blows at England the enemy of all right thinking nations of Europe.

E 842 1 44,

No 21

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon—(Received January 18)

(No 40)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 8, 1921

WITH reference to my telegram No 1314 of the 15th December, and other previous correspondence relative to Izzet Pasha's Mission to Angora, I have the honour to transmit herewith translations of two documents which have now come into my possession, namely, a statement issued by the "Anatolian Telegraph Agency," on the 6th December, and a telegram from the headquarters of the Kemalist headquarters in the Eastern front as published in the newspaper "Yeni Kirasun" of the 16th December, 1920.

2 The "Anatolian Telegraph Agency" is the chief propaganda organ of the *de facto* Angora Government, and anything published by it has the imprimatur of the Kemalist movement. It is to be regarded as an official Kemalist pronouncement, and as such they are of great interest. They not only account for the rumours mentioned in my telegram under reference, but what is more interesting, they show that the leaders at Angora have considered it advisable to conceal as far as possible from the public in Asia Minor the fact that they were in negotiation with the Central Government. They have preferred to represent the Izzet Pasha Mission as not being a mission at all, but as being a party of eminent patriots, whose position had been rendered so precarious by British action in Constantinople, that they decided to take refuge in Angora and to join the Kemalist movement.

3. It is also interesting to note the recent and present attitude of the Government here regarding the mission. There is some reason to suppose, though I cannot affirm positively, that important reports have been received from the mission. If the information which reaches me to this effect is correct, the reports of the mission show that the attitude of the Angora Government is most uncompromising, and that the Kemalist leaders stand out for nothing less than the abrogation of the Treaty of Sèvres. According to the same information, the Central Government are said to have instructed Izzet Pasha to urge the Kemalists to take up a less extreme attitude.

4. To all enquiries addressed to them by myself and my colleagues, however, they have invariably replied that the mission reached Angora on the 8th December. They have, contrary to a general rule prohibiting any reference in the press to the proceedings of the mission, declared that the mission reached Angora on the 29th December via Ineboli, but even after this the Government continued to declare themselves to be without any official information whatsoever.

5. It is a matter of the utmost difficulty at the present moment to decide what is the balance of probability as regards the mission having really left Angora. On the one hand, I am assured that the statement published here is borne out by state-

ments published in the Angora press as long ago as the 23rd December, to the effect that the mission was leaving Angora, and was bringing with it an "agreement"—which could of course only mean a statement on the Nationalists' minimum demands, for it is quite certain that the mission has not induced the Angora Government to accept the Treaty of Sèvres. On the other hand, much scepticism prevails here as to whether the mission has left, or has any present intention of leaving Angora at all. In support of this theory, it may be said that the Government here certainly want it to be believed that they wish and expect the mission to return, and that they also want to gain all the time they possibly can, in order to see how the cat jumps in Greece, and how the views of the Allied Great Powers develop.

6. At the moment, I am inclined to think that there is some foundation for the report that the mission is coming back, though if it is, it is probably rather as the bearer of Kemalist terms to be proposed to the Allies, than as persons standing for the authority of the Central Government over Angora rebels. At the same time, I should be very sorry to commit myself to any confident statement, and I would observe that, if the tale of the mission's imminent return is merely a time-saving intention, its authors have shown ingenuity in suggesting that it is coming via Ineboli. The selection of that route for the purpose of such a fiction affords the maximum possibility of staving off any definite announcement, as communications between Angora and Ineboli in winter time, and between Ineboli and Constantinople at any time, are very defective.

7. I have great pleasure in attaching herewith a translation of a statement of the importance which I attach to having the earliest possible news of the mission, and the results that are achieved by it, in view of the approaching meeting of the Allied Premiers.

I have &c

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No 21

Extract from the "Agency of Anatolia" of December 6, 1920.

UNION WITH ANATOLIA

(Translation)

IT is a well-known fact that one of the means which our enemies have adopted to weaken the Turkish Republic is to induce the Turkish people to believe that the British Government is interested in the Turkish country, and their interest in its welfare, and to exterminate those who do not obey their orders.

Izzet Pasha, Salih Pasha, and Hussein Kazim Bey, members of the Cabinet in Constantinople, have been observed by the British Government, and are now under observation by the English and by those who act as instruments of the English, and they are expected to leave Constantinople and to go to Angora, and to enter Angora, and to work more usefully and more efficaciously for the safety and welfare of the country.

The above reached our town this afternoon at 2 o'clock.

Enclosure 2 in No 21

Extract from the "Yeni Kirasun" of December 16, 1920.

COPY OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HEADQUARTERS ON THE EASTERN FRONT

Translation

R. S. Hughes, Izzet Pasha, Salih Pasha, Hussein Kazim Bey, formerly second Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, and other members of the Turkish Government, have come to Angora, and have joined the Nationalist forces.

The whole world has been astonished at the heroism shown by our eastern army in the face of hostile attacks.

The English wished to deceive our nation once again by their latest trick. They secured the nomination of honest patriots, such as Izzet Pasha and Salih Pasha, as members of the cabinet. Now these two venerable personages have joined the self-sacrificing army. This Holy War will save the honour of the whole Mahomedan world and pray for divine assistance.

In the name of the army I have welcomed our beloved Ministers, and I have saluted them in the name of all my comrades.

E 843 576 93

No. 22

Mr Curzon to Mr. Davis

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, January 20,

I HAVE the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 17th instant.

I have observed, not without surprise, that one of the notes, namely that from Mr. Colby to myself of the 20th November, has already been communicated to the American public.

2. It had been the intention of His Majesty's Government, subject to the consent of the United States Government, to publish only the correspondence detailed in your note under no. 1. It was not to do so until their answer to Mr. Colby's note of the 10th November had been prepared and delivered to you. His Majesty's Government would therefore prefer to delay publication until this has been done, and I may add that the writing of the note is now being completed, and that it is hoped to deliver it to you in a few days. His Majesty's Government will therefore consent to publication of the correspondence on any day that may be mutually agreed on after their answer is presented to you.

His Majesty's Government feel the more justified in proposing this procedure, as it is identical with that put forward on a previous similar occasion by Mr. Butler Wright in his note of the 3rd September last.

I have, &

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 1006 1 44

No. 23

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 21)

Constantinople, January 20, 1921

GENERAL HARRINGTON has shown me his recent telegrams to War Office regarding the situation in Turkey, including his telegram No. 1,9766 of the 10th.

It may be useful for your Lordship to have connected statement of my own views on other than purely military aspects of situation before meeting of Allied Prime Ministers.

I am in agreement with my telegram No. 1258 of the 10th, and the points indicated in third paragraph of that telegram are still in view now, though difficulty of carrying them out is increasing.

The Government of Asia Minor are not in effective foreign control. It exercises all functions of Government with average efficiency gone in Turkey. Bulk of population, about 80% is Moslem. It is essential that we should keep our hold here and maintain semblance of legitimate Government. This involves maintenance of order. I entirely share General Harrington's views as to extent to which it is menaced by starving condition of officials and by the presence of Russians. It is difficult to see how things can be kept going here unless means are found to finance Turkish Administration and unless someone continues to feed Russians.

Economic situation in Anatolia is, of course, bad. Accounts differ as to financial situation of Ankara Government. It must evidently be precarious, but country will stand almost unlimited amount of extortion, and it would be most unwise to count upon collapse of Kemal in the near future from lack of money. Officials are better off than those of Central Government. Prospects held out to military are sufficient to draw many away from Constantinople. Troops appear to be well found.

Foreign orientation of Ankara Government still turns mainly on quest for relations with Bolsheviks. These are undoubtedly subject to frequent strain, due to frequent differences over Caucasus question and, secondly, to mistrust of Bolsheviks amongst large numbers of Turks, who fear penetration of Bolshevik principles into Asia Minor. Nevertheless, all recent indications point to conclusion that guiding spirits on both sides attach utmost value to continued co-operation, and desire to avoid anything in the nature of rupture.

In this connection it is well to bear in mind considerable rôle played by certain members of old Union and Progress gang in Bolshevik councils, as exemplified in use made of Enver and Djemal's Mission to Afghanistan. It is very doubtful how far, even if leaders at Ankara now wished to disentangle themselves from Bolsheviks, they would find themselves able to do so. It is not impossible that at given moment Bolsheviks might be in a position to put any acquiescent element on one side and impose new leaders who would take Bolsheviks' orders.

I am familiar with theory that Nationalist movement contains sufficiency of moderate element to be capable of being drawn into our orbit by relatively small concessions. There was a time when, if we had been prepared to drive Turkey less far, after of territorial sacrifices, we might have divided moderate Nationalists. But they have worked out movement has maintained its cohesion, and extreme elements claim that its present strength justifies their attitude. I do not say it would be impossible to make bid for cohesion of more moderate elements to Allied point of view. But it would be necessary not merely to offer substantial concessions, but also to show that Allies disposed of and intended to use force necessary to impose any new settlement.

Whatever their difficulties, leaders of Nationalist movement are now elated and self-confident, and their acts and pronouncements show them to be intensely hostile to Allies with the exception of Italy, whose compliance is, however, her only recommendation in their eyes. They are especially hostile to Great Britain. That is their chief enemy. They are still far from being ready to give up their claims to sovereignty over whole of Asia Minor, but they are ready to give up some of them, and some of them do not go so far as this, and some of them would even like to revert to traditional friendship with Great Britain if only Great Britain would transfer her affections from Greece to Turkey, but even these would now regard retention of whole "Turkey proper" with complete sovereign rights, subject, perhaps, to mitigation by financial control, as object to be attained.

I do not altogether exclude possibility of attempts at direct rapprochement between Ankara and now Greek Government. I should, however, require more evidence than at present exists to believe that any exchange of views is on foot, and, in any case, I cannot conceive any basis on which definite understanding could be reached.

It would be a mistake to regard at present Constantinople Government as submissive to Allied point of view. They regard substantial revision of treaty as now being foregone conclusion. Their rôle is to keep the Government until Nationalists will back as much as possible for Turkey. They are compelled to render much help service to Allies, but their attitude over every important question and some minor ones since they came into power shows strong determination to give nothing away.

Their strongest motives are probably sympathy with moderate Nationalists and fear of extremists.

I cannot believe that Nationalist leaders are indifferent to fate of Constantinople, as is sometimes alleged. It is quite likely, however, that, even if Allies' position here collapsed in next few months, they would still remain in Ankara until settlement was complete. It is essential that we should keep our hold here and maintain semblance of legitimate Government. This involves maintenance of order. I entirely share General Harrington's views as to extent to which it is menaced by starving condition of officials and by the presence of Russians. It is difficult to see how things can be kept going here unless means are found to finance Turkish Administration and unless someone continues to feed Russians.

All this amounts to saying that Turkish situation as a whole has become almost inextricable if Treaty of Sevres is still to be regarded as basis of future unless Allies are united and are prepared to fight new war on large scale. Assuming that treaty is to be modified, way out may possibly be found by making our displeasure with Greece excuse for new territorial settlement, by giving controls more palatable appearance while sacrificing as little possible of their efficacy, by gradually extending our administration on sound financial basis, creation of gendarmerie and progressive extension of authority outward from here. Obstacles to realization of revolutionary programme are enormous, and may be insuperable. They include usual difficulty of adjustment between Allies, difficulty of liquidating Greek complications imparted by ourselves into Asia Minor and difficulty of finding elements to form Turkish Government suitable for purpose in view. I nevertheless recommend that [group undecipherable] presently to recognize Kemal Government, to which it is certainly not desirable that victorious Allies should go as suitors for peace.

[E 800 800 44]

No. 24

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 243.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 24, 1921.

I have to inform your Excellency that, on the 15th instant, the French Charge d'Affaires called on the Under-Secretary of State in order to give the following information—

2. There are at Rome a number of Nationalist Turks who are anxious to put themselves forward as intermediaries between the Allies and Mustafa Kemal. Their spokesman, M. de Fleuriau explained is Ahmet Riza Bey, and Djamal Bey is in contact with them. They recently approached M. Barrère, the French Ambassador, on the subject of Cilicia, and offered to facilitate an arrangement with Mustafa Kemal for the withdrawal from Cilicia of both Kemal and French forces, the former beginning the evacuation. A gendarmerie to be established under French officers would keep order in the province.

3. This arrangement, M. de Fleuriau said, would entirely suit the plans of the French Government, and would in fact be in harmony with the provisions of the tripartite agreement. In those circumstances, M. Barrère had been authorized to reply that if Mustafa Kemal were to put forward proposals to the above effect the French Government would be quite prepared to consider them.

4. Sir E. Crowe asked M. de Fleuriau whom these Turks at Rome purported to represent. He replied that he did not know in the least.

5. Sir E. Crowe then enquired whether the French Government contemplated dealing with the problem of Cilicia all by itself, or whether they desired to use an understanding on this subject as a lever for obtaining a general settlement with the Kemalists. It seemed to Sir E. Crowe of advantage to avoid attacking the problem that was confronting the Allies.

6. On this point also, M. de Fleuriau had no information, but he said he could at least give an assurance that in no case would the French Government make any decision, or any bargain, except in complete understanding with their Allies.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 1207 1 44

No. 25

Lord Hardinge to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, January 25, 1921

FOLLOWING FOR KING AND CABINET—

Following for King and Cabinet

Conference this afternoon discussed Turkish and Greek questions. Italian representative produced, but did not definitely support, proposal which had been made

by representative of Turks in Rome, purposing to represent Kemal views, effect of which would have been to complete Treaty of Sevres. Prime Minister and Lord Curzon pointed out uncertainty of any arrangement with Kemal proving permanent, and strong moral objections which existed to our purchasing peace with Turkish Nationalists at exclusive expense of Greeks. French Government did not press for any drastic revision of treaty, and welcomed proposal which was then advanced by Lord Curzon that matter should be discussed by an Allied Conference at which both Greeks and Turks should be represented. After further discussion, the resolutions contained in my immediately following telegram were adopted, and necessary instructions have to-night been sent to High Commissioners at Constantinople and Ministers at Athens.

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople)

[E 1227/1/44]

No. 26

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, January 26, 1921

My Lord, I have to inform you that the decision taken by Supreme Council yesterday with reference to summoning of a conference in London on 21st February to discuss settlement of Eastern question.

We have communicated text of this decision to Grand Vizier to-day in a joint note, and have requested him to let us have before the end of the week answer of Turkish Government to invitation to send representatives to said conference. We have also asked Grand Vizier to get into touch with Angora at once on the same subject.

In view of decision of Supreme Council, which we welcome, it will probably be necessary to let Turkish Government settle over their financial difficulties at least until end of February if not longer. (Please see my telegram No. 56 of 25th January.)

Repeated to Paris, No. 3.)

E 1208 1 44

No. 27

Lord Hardinge (unnumbered) to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) and Earl Granville (Athens).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received January 26.)

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Paris, January 26, 1921

My Lord, I have to inform you that Sir E. Crowe, as president of Conference in Paris. You should at once concert with your French and Italian colleagues in executing instructions therein contained:—

As president of Conference in Paris, I request you will inform your British and Italian colleagues of the following instructions which have been agreed by the Conference, and will request them to convey them to the Government to which you are attached, and to request an immediate reply in order that Conference may be in possession of their answers before breaking up at the end of the week.

Text of decisions adopted by Conference of 25th January, 1921:—

1. Conference of Allied representatives, as well as those of Turkish and Greek Governments, have been summoned to meet in London on 21st February to discuss a settlement of the Eastern question.

2. The Conference of Allied representatives, as well as those of Turkish and Greek Governments, have been summoned to meet in London on 21st February to discuss a settlement of the Eastern question.

3. The invitation to Turkish Government shall propose as a condition that [6668]

Mustapha Kemal or qualified representative of Government at Angora should be included in Turkish delegation.

"4. That Greek Government be similarly invited to attend."

"You should leave to Turkish Government task of notifying Angora of Allied decisions and of eliciting an immediate reply.—BRAND."

Above is from Prime Minister

E 1264/1, 44]

No. 28

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 27

(No. 59)

(Telegraphic) D

Constantinople, January 27, 1921

MY telegram No. 57 of 27th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called on my French colleague yesterday evening and communicated to him tenor of note which Turkish Government will address to us to-day in reply to our joint note to Grand Vizier of yesterday's date.

Turkish note will end as follows:— (End of D.)

"La Sublime Porte s'empresse de remercier votre Excellence pour ce que vous lui avez fait savoir et de l'informer qu'elle avisera sans retard au nécessaire pour se rendre à l'invitation qui lui sera adressée par la Conférence."

(D.) Minister for Foreign Affairs added that Turkish Government were telegraphing to Angora immediately.

(Repeated to Paris.)

E 1333 1 44]

No. 29

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 28

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic) D

Athens, January 26, 1921

MY telegram No. 57 of 27th January. I have received from the Turkish Government, copy of note which he has to-day handed to President of the Council containing decision of Supreme Council.

President of the Council has accepted the decision, and announced his intention to proceed himself to Paris and London, arriving at Paris about a week before conference.

E 1266 1, 44,

No. 30

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic) R

Athens, January 27, 1921

PARIS telegram No. 60 of 26th January and my telegram No. 57 of 27th January.

I have called on President of the Council to inform him officially that French Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted the decision of the Conference and Italian Minister proposes to do the same. President of the Council asked me to communicate decision of the Conference to him officially in English as usual, so I am doing so.

President asked me to telegraph that Greek Government accept invitation to London Conference and will be represented by himself, he asked me to add that he had expressed unofficially, and not as a [group undecypherable], his surprise at invitation being extended to Kemal. British Prime Minister had stated publicly that it was not possible to negotiate with Kemal, who was a rebel, and Greek Government were convinced, especially after news just received of defection of Etem Bey and desertion of some 2,000 Turks into Greek lines, that Kemal was a mere bogey.

President of the Council said that he will ask Mr. Poincaré to assist him at conference, hoping that he will accept, as he accepted to represent Greece at Geneva.

(Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.)

E 1270/1, 44]

No. 31

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 39)

(Telegraphic.)

Athens, January 27, 1921.

MY telegram No. 37 of 27th January.

I am informed by Greek journalist that Government are not likely to allow President of the Council to represent them, but will probably send M. Calogeropoulos and possibly MM. Storratiades and Stratos. Another Greek journalist declares that he showed M. Calogeropoulos yesterday evening text of decisions which he had obtained from French Legation. Although French Minister had handed his note to

President of the Council at lunch, M. Calogeropoulos knew nothing of it, and told journalist, who is personal friend of his, that if there was any question of allowing M. Rhalys to go to London alone or of sending M. Gounaris he himself would resign.

(Repeated to Paris.)

E 1334/1, 44]

No. 32

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 60)

(Telegraphic) R

Constantinople, January 28, 1921.

MY telegram No. 59 of 27th January.

Following is a translation of reply to our joint note received to-day from Porte:—

"I have had the honour to acquaint myself with contents of note which your Excellency addressed yesterday, conjointly with their Excellencies the French and Italian High Commissioners, to His Highness the Grand Vizier, transmitting to him text of decision reached by Supreme Council, sitting at Paris, regarding convocation of Imperial Government to conference which will meet in London on 21st February."

"Sublime Porte hastens to thank your Excellency for this communication and to inform you that it will without delay take necessary steps to comply with invitation which will be addressed to it by conference."

E 1417/1, 44]

No. 33

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 31)

(No. 61)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 29, 1921.

MY telegram No. 57 of 26th January.

Decision of Conference, which was published here on 27th January, has naturally caused sensation.

Principal Greek papers regard decision as blow to Hellenism, and point moral that it is first disastrous consequence of betrayal of M. Venizelos by Old Greece.

Turkish papers all welcome decision as marking return of Allies to juster attitude towards Turkey. Those with strongest Nationalist leanings are careful not to prejudge attitude of Angora Government. One of them had leading article on 28th January, [group undecypherable] decision, however gratifying, was only first step, and [group undecypherable] no leading article on 29th January. Another takes for its text "hopeless and doubtful," and, while professing preference for hopeful view of new developments, lays stress on doubts which it must suggest to Turkish minds.

News papers represent your Lordship's initiative in the matter as showing that His Majesty's Government have definitely accepted principle of modification of treaty, thereby coming into line with French and Italians. Great prominence is given to activities of Turkish agents in Europe, arrival of Naby Bey at Paris and numerous politicians now gathered in Rome.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 62)

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 31, 1921

MY telegram No. 62 of 20th January

Present indications show that Mustapha Kemal, elated by invitation to attend forthcoming conference in London, which he no doubt considers a triumph for Nationalist movement, is proving intractable. From information which has reached my colleagues and myself, Mustapha Kemal takes line that his is the only Government in Turkey, and as such should furnish Turkish delegation to conference. He also considers that he should have received an invitation to attend conference direct from Allied Powers, instead of through intermediary of Government of Constantinople. The latter are doing their utmost to persuade him to come into line.

Mustapha Kemal is now at parting of the ways, and must decide whether to grasp the hand held out to him by Allies or throw in his lot with Bolsheviks.

I think it likely that if a proposal were made at present juncture to Turkish Government for immediate constitution of financial commission provided for by treaty, that Government would be unwilling to agree, first, because they probably hope for modification of financial clauses as an outcome of London Conference, and secondly because acceptance would hopelessly compromise it.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, February 1, 1921

MY Italian colleague has communicated to me a translation of telegram from Angora, handed to Italian authorities at Adalia for transmission to British, French and Italian Governments.

Telegram, which is addressed by Achmed Mukhtar Bey, styling himself Minister for National Defence, to British, French and Italian Foreign Ministers, is as follows:—

"Achmed Bey hastens to communicate to said Ministers text of telegram sent by President of National Assembly to Tewfik Pasha in reply to invitation to take part in conference in London on 21st February which was transmitted by Grand Vizier to Angora Government.

National Assembly at Angora, which is based on will of people, is sole authority in Turkey. That Assembly alone can engage in discussions with foreign Powers in name of nation. Political group established at Constantinople has no legal political situation, and has no right to call itself a Government, for such a claim is entirely contrary to rights of sovereignty of people. It follows all the more that this group cannot discuss interests of country with foreign Powers.

"You have patriotic duty regulating your personal conduct by recognising and proclaiming that only legitimate authority having right to speak in name of nation is National Assembly. If Powers really intend to recognise this, in fact, because they consider existence of interior group at Constantinople more useful for their interests.

Angora Government has declared on several occasions that its most lively desire is re-establishment of peace and of tranquillity, but on condition that rights of people are recognised. With these objects in view it declares its readiness to enter into peace negotiations. If Powers really intend to settle Eastern question according to principles of justice and of right, they should address themselves direct to Grand National Assembly. An invitation in this sense will have best reception from us."

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.)

Athens, February 1, 1921

COLONEL PALLIS, Army of Asia Minor, who is in Athens till 3rd February, has told military attaché that from military point of view natural and proper course is to put off further offensive until April on account of climatic conditions; he does not know, however, whether Government may order immediate offensive for political reasons; if so, he declares that army is ready both as regards men and munitions of war and can attack Afium Karahissar or Eskishehr, or both; capture of either would

be a serious blow in two, as Kemal has very little transport and depends on railway. He thinks Turkish troops in Ikonium district would collapse and leave group undecipherable, and Greeks would either leave Kemalists to stew in their own juice at Angora, or they could attack Angora with every chance of success. With loss of Angora, Colonel Pallis thinks that Kemalist movement must collapse altogether for want of supplies, especially munitions of war, and he does not foresee any danger of Kemalists drawing Greeks on and on.

Colonel Pallis states that present actual strength in Asia Minor is 105,000, and there is comparatively little sickness; he declares that moral is high, and leave is only stopped because uncertainty of political situation may force offensive at any moment. He says that Turkish inhabitants' one desire is peace, and that many come behind Greek line to live in discomfort in tents, &c., and that when Greeks returned to Brusa from neighbourhood of Eskishehr the other day, some 10,000 inhabitants, partly Turk and partly Greek, went with them. He confirmed Elem surrender with about 1,000 men.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 17.)

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 72.)

Constantinople, January 26, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Sir Adam Block, recounting the steps taken by the Provisional Financial Commission to obtain the consent of the Turkish Government to the control of the Turkish finances in consideration for the payment to that Government of the balance of the £ T. 2,000,000 (namely, £ T. 1,200,000) authorised on the sale of stocks belonging to this Government. Copies of the letters exchanged between the Provisional Financial Commission and the Minister of Finance are likewise enclosed.

2. In pursuance of the request contained in Sir Adam Block's letter, the three High Commissioners have raised the embargo on the £ T. 252,058 gold at present deposited in the Imperial Ottoman Bank. In the meanwhile, the Provisional Financial Commission have already paid a sum of £ T. 400,000 to the Turkish Government on account, and the balance, namely, £ T. 800,000, will be paid over within the next few days.

3. Sir Adam Block informs me that the Turkish Government will now be able to pay to their officials 75 per cent. of the salaries due to them. This arrangement will relieve to a certain extent the great distress in which these officials now find themselves. Many of these officials have literally sold all they had in order to provide food for their families. Others, again, had raised loans on the strength of an assurance that a portion of their salaries would be forthcoming.

4. The Minister of Finance proved obstructive and obstinate till the very last moment. It will be seen that in his letter of the 20th instant he laid down that the control would end with the expiry of the financial year, i.e., at the end of next month. The Provisional Financial Commission referred this request to the High Commissioners, who at once rejected it, and maintained their point of view that the control should last until the Financial Commission of Control, provided for by the Treaty of Peace, shall have been constituted and shall have begun to function.

5. The Minister of Finance then had to give way, as the Grand Vizier represented that the position was untenable, and that it was absolutely necessary for the Turkish Government to obtain the £ T. 1,200,000 in question. There is also little doubt that

the Sultan intervened in the same sense. I had sent His Majesty a message three days previously to say that I had heard distressing accounts of the straits to which many officials had been reduced owing to the non-payment of their salaries, and that I would be only too glad, for my part, to facilitate the hand over of the £17,000,000 Turkish Government, provided the Minister of Finance demanded. I added that the person of the Minister of Finance was not to be in the way of an arrangement.

Il ne restait plus qu'à obtenir du Ministre la confirmation écrite de cet accord. Je l'ai obtenue le 17 janvier dont vous trouverez ci-joint copie (Annexe 1).

prélèvements sur ce compte seront, d'accord avec la Commission provisoire, effectués au moyen de chèques enregistrés avant paiement par la Mission de Contrôle. Les pièces des dépenses seront, dans les quarante-huit heures, représentées à nos agents.

Votre Excellence a bien voulu m'informer également qu'elle ne voyait pas d'inconvénient à ce que le paiement des dépenses, dont l'état mensuel sera établi d'un commun accord, soit assuré dans l'ordre de priorité suivant : Traitements de la police et de la gendarmerie, dépenses des hôpitaux et prisons, pensions des veuves et orphelins, traitements des agents de perception de la douane et des vilayets.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que nous faisons d'urgence, auprès des Hauts-Commissaires, des démarches en vue d'obtenir la levée du séquestre mis par les Impériaux sur les fonds de la Dette publique ottomane. Cette somme serait mise à la disposition de la Dette publique ottomane en garantie d'une avance de 1,200,000 livres turques papier que cette avance serait déposée au Trésor ottoman. L'intérêt sur cette avance serait au taux de 5 pour cent par an, sans commission, ladite avance complétant le montant de 2,000,000 de livres turques que les Puissances ont autorisé le Gouvernement ottoman à emprunter sur le produit de ces ventes, à mesure que celles-ci s'effectueraient.

Je serais reconnaissant à votre Excellence de me faire connaître si nous sommes bien d'accord sur ces divers points.

Veillez agréer, &c.

SALLANDROUZE DE LAMORNAIX

Annex 2.

Minister of Finance to President of Provisional Financial Commission

M. le Président, Constantinople, le 20 janvier 1921

Je vous prie de vous informer qu'à la suite de notre entretien de ce jour, j'ai été autorisé à accepter les propositions formulées dans votre lettre du 17 courant, avec l'addition du passage suivant que vous aviez proposé :

" Dans le cas où l'enregistrement d'un chèque d'une valeur maxima de 10,000 livres turques n'aurait pas pu avoir lieu, la Banque impériale ottomane serait autorisée à l'acquitter, mais tout paiement ultérieur serait suspendu jusqu'à ce qu'une entente soit intervenue entre le Ministre et la Commission provisoire, ou, en cas de désaccord, entre son Altesse le Grand Vizir et les Hauts-Commissaires alliés."

Cet accord aura une durée finissant avec l'exercice financier en cours, soit fin février 1921.

Je vous prie, &c.

Le Ministre des Finances,
RACHID.

Annex 3

President of Provisional Financial Commission to Minister of Finance.

M. le Ministre, Constantinople, le 22 janvier 1921

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 20 janvier courant.

Nous sommes, mes collègues et moi, d'accord avec vous sur l'addition à faire dans les termes suivants :

" Dans le cas où l'enregistrement d'un chèque d'une valeur maxima de 10,000 livres turques n'aurait pas pu avoir lieu, la Banque ottomane serait autorisée à l'acquitter, mais tout paiement ultérieur serait suspendu jusqu'à ce qu'une entente soit intervenue entre le Ministre et la Commission provisoire, ou, en cas de désaccord, entre son Altesse le Grand Vizir et les Hauts-Commissaires alliés."

Mais il est entendu qu'en conformité de la lettre que nous a été adressée le 29 septembre 1920 par le commissaire impérial de la Dette publique ottomane, d'ordre

du Ministre des Finances, l'accord intervenu avec votre Excellence et la Commission provisoire restera en vigueur " jusqu'à ce que la Commission de Contrôle financier prévue par le Traité de Paix soit constituée et commence à fonctionner "

Veillez agréer, &c.

SALLANDROUZE DE LAMORNAIX.

Annex 4.

Minister of Finance to President of Provisional Financial Commission.

M. le Président,

Constantinople, le 22 janvier 1921

En réponse à votre lettre d'aujourd'hui, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que nous sommes d'accord sur son contenu et sur celui de votre lettre du 17 janvier 1921. J'ai donné les ordres, en conséquence, aux fonctionnaires compétents pour toucher la somme de 1,200,000 livres turques au Trésor dans les conditions indiquées dans votre lettre précitée du 17 janvier 1921.

Veillez agréer, &c.

Le Ministre des Finances,
RACHID.

[E 1536/1/44]

No. 25

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday evening and we had a long conversation about the conference which it is proposed to hold in London on the 21st proximo.

2. I asked Sefa Bey whether he thought that Mustapha Kemal would be willing to be represented at that conference. I should mention incidentally that I am aware that an active exchange of telegrams is proceeding between Constantinople and Angora on the subject. The Minister for Foreign Affairs would not commit himself to an expression of opinion, and said that he had not seen the Grand Vizier in the course of the day, and therefore was not acquainted with the latest developments.

3. Sefa Bey then proceeded to give me his views as to the way in which the treaty might be modified, and I report them because they are an indication of the spirit in which the Turkish Government will go to the conference.

4. As regards territorial questions, the Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that the southern frontier of Turkey in Asia, as drawn in Map 2 annexed to the Treaty of Sèvres, should be modified in favour of Turkey by the inclusion of districts and towns such as Antab, Urfa and Mardin, which, according to his Excellency, are inhabited exclusively by an Ottoman population. Sefa Bey said that the wishes of the inhabitants of Smyrna and the surrounding district with regard to the régime under which they wished to come might be ascertained by means of an enquiry. I said I supposed that Sefa Bey meant a plebiscite, but he replied in the negative, and said that he had in mind a commission of enquiry. As far as I could gather this commission would be apparently similar to that at one time contemplated by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs in connection with the frontier between Poland and Lithuania. With regard to the Turco-Armenian frontier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs was prepared to admit that any districts containing 55 per cent. or more of Armenians should be awarded to Armenia. In order to meet the criticism that the Turks had, by their own actions, purposely diminished the Armenian population in various districts, he was prepared to take as a basis the pre-war statistics of the population in those districts. He thought that it would be manifestly unjust to assign to the Armenian State districts in which there was a majority of Turks. He expressed the opinion that there would be little difficulty about a port for Armenia, and suggested that the railway line leading from Armenia to a Black Sea port should be neutralised, and full facilities given at the port selected as an outlet for Armenian trade. Finally, as regards Thrace, he thought that Turkey should be given the pre-war frontiers, but if this were not possible then, at least, the Enos-Midia line.

5. Sefa Bey then went on to claim that Turkey should not be treated more unfavourably in other matters than the other defeated Powers. By this he meant that

[6668]

K 2

the financial and military clauses, &c. of the treaty should be modified. The regards the Straits Commission, he pointed out that the object of the Allies presumably was to ensure at all times the free passage of the Straits. This could be attained without the Straits Commission necessarily having jurisdiction over the extent of territory indicated in Map I of the annex to the Treaty of Sèvres. It would be quite sufficient if the Allies were to hold the Gallipoli Peninsula and a strip of territory on the Asiatic coast opposite that peninsula. Moreover, other stipulations of the Treaty connected with the Straits Commission, such as the right of requisition in the Straits zone, were unnecessary. As regards the military clauses, he pointed out that the authorised strength of the Turkish army was far too small. Bulgaria, for instance, was, he believed, entitled to an army of 20,000 men, but Turkey, a much larger country with far more extended frontiers, was only entitled to an army of 15,000 men, excluding the Legions, which were to amount to 35,000 men.

6. Sefa Bey then went on to speak of what he called a modification of the Capitulations in an economic sense. By this he meant that States denominated in Turkey should pay exactly similar taxes to those payable by Turkish subjects. I remarked that they already paid taxes on real property. I then

informed him that as far as I knew the great difficulty of applying either full municipal or Imperial taxation in the case of subjects of foreign States had always been the fact that the money raised in this way from those subjects would be misapplied and wasted. The question of municipal taxation was an instance in point. This was a question which had formed the subject of discussion for many years past. It has been impossible to obtain from the Municipality of Constantinople the municipal taxes which the municipality levied. There should be no municipal taxes on foreign subjects.

There should be no municipal taxes on foreign subjects. Imperial taxes levied on foreign subjects should not be wasted? Possibly, however, the Financial Commission provided for by the treaty would, to a certain extent, remedy previous abuses. This led Sefa Bey to remark that the financial clauses were too severe on Turkey and should be modified. Thus the Turkish Government would be prevented from contracting any internal or external loan. Should the Turkish Government require a loan the relevant stipulation would debar them from accepting the lowest tenders. I replied that, in the first

place, Article 231 of the treaty expressly laid down that the Turkish Government should be trusted to contract loans on the cheapest terms. I pointed out that the Allied Powers had no objection to the appointment of M. Deschamps as French representative on the Financial Commission. He said that this gentleman was mixed up with many banks and would approach his task, as Frenchmen were liable to do, mainly from the point of view of the interest of the banks with which he was concerned, the interests of Turkey coming second. He regretted to make this observation, but it was the truth. No one could cast a stone at the British representatives in this respect; in fact, England inspired confidence. I felt, though I did not say so, that there is much force in what Sefa Bey said in this connection.

8. Finally, Sefa Bey said that he would like to do away with the principle of spheres of influence. This system really meant that what was left of the Ottoman Empire would be, in practice, subject to foreign Powers. The Italians and the French, for instance, would probably, in their respected spheres, control appointments and analogous matters. Some friend of his had even said that it was to be foreseen that the remaining territory outside the spheres of influence would in time become the prey of a reconstituted Russia, and then Turkey would have disappeared for good. He objected also to the system under which there would be Italian gendarmerie in the Italian sphere and French gendarmerie in the French sphere. The officers to be supplied by the Allied or neutral Powers for the organisation and training of the gendarmerie should be employed all over Anatolia without regard to nationality or spheres of influence. In other words, though he did not say so, it was obvious that Sefa Bey would like to do away with the Tripartite Agreement.

9. After listening to the foregoing I told Sefa Bey that it would be a great mistake for Turkey to go into the conference with exaggerated pretensions. I reminded him that the conference was to be held on the basis of the Treaty of Sèvres with such modifications as may have been necessitated by passage of events. It would be bad tact from the Turkish point of view to antagonise the Allied Powers by putting forward extravagant demands. Sefa Bey replied that he did not think that the

modifications he had just outlined were extravagant. He repeated that he did not see why Turkey should be treated with greater harshness than the other defeated Powers. She had been sufficiently punished by losing what he described as nine-tenths of her territory.

He thought that there was a disposition on the part of British statesmen to regard Turkey as a potential danger in the future. This was a great mistake. A well-governed Turkey could be of considerable use to England in the future. He thought that British statesmen took much too rigid a view of Turkey, and that the views of the latter left them cold.

10. I replied that he could not in justice say this of your Lordship, who, as he knew, had made a special study of Eastern questions and had spent many years in the East. We had never had a Foreign Minister so conversant with Oriental problems.

11. I pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that there were two things which the British nation could not forget. One was that Turkey had entered the war on the side of our enemies in violation of the long-standing friendship which had existed between our two countries. The other was the Armenian massacre. Sefa Bey admitted the folly which had brought Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Empires, but said that this was due to the action of two or three men, and that the country as a whole was not to blame. He sincerely regretted the Armenian massacre, but pointed out that the Armenians had since been perpetrating atrocities at the expense of the Turks. He thought, in fact, that the Armenians had killed even more Turks than the Turks had killed Armenians. I expressed incredulity at this statement, and said that in making it Sefa Bey evidently did not realise the full extent of the atrocities perpetrated on the Armenian nation.

12. Sefa Bey then went into a long disquisition on the origin of massacres of Christians under Turkish rule. He maintained that the Turks had been very liberal towards Christians of every denomination. He traced the misfortune of Armenia to the action of Russia extending over centuries. Russia had gradually encroached on the Turkish dominions, until finally she had had to fight the Crimean War. He said that the Western Powers ranged on the side of Turkey. She had then decided that she must exploit to the fullest extent any grievances which Christians who were subject to Turkish rule might have against the Turkish Government. By means of agents provocateurs she had stirred up the Christians and had promoted massacres with a view to alienating the sympathy of the Western Powers for the Turks. Sefa Bey said that this was the theme, but I need not trouble your Lordship with his arguments.

13. The Turkish press has unanimously welcomed the proposed conference, and holds high hopes on it. The local European press, however, sounds a warning note to Turkey not to put forward extravagant demands.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

First Commissioner.

E 1622 1 44]

No. 39

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(N. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

(Constantinople, February 4, 1924)

My Italian colleague has shown me a telegram addressed by Ankara Government to the Italian Government, as well as to some of their legislators, in which that Government states that it is the only Government entitled to represent Turkish nation and to speak on its behalf. Understand Ankara Government is sending delegation to London Conference. Delegation is starting immediately furnished with full instructions, and notice will be given of exact date of its departure.

We can only suppose that delegation in question will travel via Adalia and proceed by way of Italy.

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 57 of 26th January

High Commissioner sent dragomans yesterday, 5th February, to Grand Vizier to enquire as to present position between Constantinople Government and Angora, and intentions of former regarding London Conference.

Grand Vizier stated that Angora had made proposal of Supreme Council occasion for raising issues which were wholly internal question. He had replied that present was not a good time for such business and had asked for plain answer as to whether Angora Government would associate their delegates with those of Central Government as contemplated in decision of Supreme Council. Definite answer had been promised and [group undecipherable]. Latest intimation was that it would be sent on afternoon of 5th February.

Grand Vizier said that, whether Angola came into line or not, Central Government proposed to send delegation to London in compliance with invitation addressed to them.

Grand Vizier admitted that Izzet Pasha, with whom he was now for first time in communication, appeared to support views of Kemalists, but he cast doubt on authenticity of telegrams purporting to be signed by Izzet.

Communications were interrupted at hour fixed for answer by unauthorized action of Greek officer at a point beyond Iznid. General Harington took immediate action and communications were restored, but nothing reached Constantinople last evening except copy of telegram addressed by Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, France and Italy. Translation of text is given in my immediately following telegram.

Dragomirov again saw Minister for Foreign Affairs after receipt of this communication. He said he was still not hopeful of understanding which would enable delegations from Constantinople and Angora to fuse in London and present joint statement of Turkish desiderata. He laid great stress on interests of Bolsheviks in preventing an understanding between Turkey and Allies.

There is evidently much division of opinion at Angora, but position there is now held by a man who seems to have replaced firebrand Mukhtar as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Bekir returned only recently from Moscow, and, according to one account, is full of ideas. Moderate counsels are gaining ground at Angora. It is unlikely that Kemalist delegation to London will present other than inaudible demands, at any rate in first instance.

Possibilities of surprise must also not be lost sight of. Leaders at Angora may even now be working in accord with Bolshevika and may be merely playing for time.

They are unmovable up to date in their pretension to be regarded as sole Government of Turkey, and they have been remodelling Constitution on their own lines. It is not impossible that they may attempt some bold coup, like declaring Ahmed-er-Semssi Caliph. Please understand, however, that this paragraph is conjectural and is based on indications for confident interpretation of which much fuller knowledge of situation in interior would be required.

Central Government have made real effort to effect rapprochement with Angola as well as to bring about a settlement of the Angolan problem. The Government has followed developments closely and is much concerned for his own position in the event of Angola creating impossible situation as between Turkey and Africa.

If Central Government are reduced to necessity of acting independently of Angora, their delegation will obviously not comply with condition laid down in third paragraph of decision of Supreme Council. I presume they should nevertheless be allowed to despatch delegation.

It is urgent that I should know your Lordship's views on this point.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 19)

(No. 82)

(Telegraphic) R.

Constantinople, February 6, 1811.

FOLLOWING is translation of text of telegram addressed by Angora Government to French, Italian and British Governments signed by Bekirsami, 1st Secretary of Legation, Turkish Legation, Constantinople, 11th July 1918.

"Delegation which will represent Government of Great National Assembly of Turkey, will leave for Europe via Adala and Brindisi latest on 5th February and will proceed to Europe via Adala and Brindisi.

(Owing to length and difficulty of journey, we fear late arrival of our delegation at its destination may be somewhat delayed. In that case we would be grateful if the Great Powers would be willing to postpone for a few days proposed conference in order to enable our delegation to participate therein).

(Repeated to Athens, No. 20.)

No. 42

(No. 24)

(Telegraphic) R.

Constantinople / 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 104

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called last night to say Government delegation to London Conference would start on 12th February. Delegation would probably be headed by Grand Vizier, and would include Osman Nizami and Mehmed Tahir respectively Turkish representatives at Rome and London. It was expected that Sultan might not be willing to let Grand Vizier go. Delegation would also include at least one secretary with a perfect knowledge of English.

Minister for Foreign Affairs added If Mustafa Kemal permitted in sending delegation independently of Government delegation, as to which point Turkish Government are still awaiting categorical pronouncement from Angola, he supposed that the two delegations would have to come to some understanding in London.

I reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs of exact terms of paragraph 3, decision of Supreme Council, and said that I had thought it well to refer point to your Lordship in view of attitude of Angola Government.

No. 43

(No. 88.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 8, 1921.

GRAND VIZIER called to-day to say that Sultan wished him to go as head of Turkish delegation to London Conference. Sultan has instructed Grand Vizier to ask me whether there would be any objection to this, and whether His Majesty's Government would wish to be consulted about composition of delegation from Central Government.

I replied that I did not think that His Majesty's Government would wish to express any views in this matter, and that composition of delegation must be left to Turkish Government. Grand Vizier said that Minister for Foreign Affairs would be included in delegation, but it was felt that he and Grand Vizier could not be away at the same time. Grand Vizier is a sympathetic personality. Grand Vizier then said that if and when he found himself in the presence of Kemalist delegation in London, he would maintain position he had taken up towards Nationalists in exchange of telegrams with latter, i.e., he would decline to listen to pretensions which were exaggerated. This refers in particular to Nationalists' demand that Sultan should publicly recognise Ankara Government as only legal Government of Turkey.

He indicated that the Nationalist Front was not only a necessary factor, but also to Central Government itself.

[E 1840 1 44]

No. 44

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No. 87)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 10, 1921

PLEASE telegraph any information about persons forming the Angora delegation.

You should also continue to keep us fully informed as to attitude of Constantinople Government towards it.

[E 1872 143 44]

No. 45

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. — (Received February 11)

(No. 91)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 11, 1921

GENERAL HARRINGTON has notified War Office of imminent offensive by Greek army on Nationalist forces, alleged object of which is to forestall a Turkish attack. It is a fact, I understand, that Turkish reinforcements have been brought up, perhaps with a view to resisting Greek offensive, which is doubtless known to be coming off.

Military operations undertaken by whichever side on the eve of London Conference must obviously be intended to influence proceedings at that conference, and are calculated still further to complicate already difficult situation.

[E 1878 1 44]

No. 46

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 91)

(Telegraphic, h.c.)

Foreign Office, February 11, 1921

YOUR telegram No. 82 of 6th February.

His Majesty's Government are unable to postpone date of meeting of Turkish Conference in order to meet convenience of Angora delegation. Latter can only be received in London as part of the Constantinople delegation, having no independent status or title of their own. If they choose to travel by Adalia and Brindisi that is their concern. Their natural course would appear to be proceed via Constantinople. (Repeated to Paris, No. 70, and Rome, No. 43.)

[E 1894 1 44]

No. 47

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. — (Received February 13.)

(No. 93)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 11, 1921.

MY telegram No. 88 of 8th February

Delegation of Central Government leaves for London to-morrow night, 12th February, by Simplon express.

Angora maintains its attitude as regards separate delegation. Central Government are sending Grand Vizier and Osmanlı Nizamı Pasha, now in Rome, as their delegates. Reshid Pasha, being in London, will probably act as third delegate. Large staff of experts includes Sherki Bey, now Minister in Stockholm, who accompanied last delegation and may be expected to play an active rôle. He has great influence with Grand Vizier. Colonel Grogan knows him well. Grand Vizier's son, Ismail Hakkı Bey, also goes as expert. He is Sultan's son-in-law. He also has great influence with his father, and has strong Kemalist sympathies. Delegation as a whole may be expected to lean that way.

Ali Rıza Pasha, former Grand Vizier, has entered Cabinet as Minister of Public Works in order to become Acting Grand Vizier. He is an old-fashioned soldier, and represents middle policy between Kemalists and the Palace.

I have no certain news of composition of Angora delegation. It appears certain that president will be Bekir Sami Bey, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, and that it will include Jamı Bey, who was recently in Rome. Bekir Sami's position since recent return from Moscow is obscure. As against report that he came back disillusioned, others affirm that he has a perfect understanding with them and is going to play their game.

[E 2016 1/44]

No. 48

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. — (Received February 15.)

(No. 139)

Mr. Lord

Constantinople, February 7, 1921

HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR has been so good as to send me a copy of his despatch No. 111 of 27 January on the subject of the conferences which have been taking place in Rome between representatives of Moderate Turkish Nationalists and M. M. R. I have been informed that certain Turkish politicians who have assembled under Achmed Rıza's presidency at Rome had decided to send to the Entente Governments, with a view to drawing their attention to the situation in which the unfortunate population of Constantinople finds itself.

2. I have read this pro-memorandum with interest, and, although some of the statements made in it are exaggerated, it presents, on the whole, a fairly accurate picture of the state of things prevailing in Constantinople at the present day.

3. Amongst the inaccuracies I would draw your Lordship's attention to the fact that over 15,000 Turkish prisoners have been already repatriated to their homes, leaving only a few thousands in this town. Further, it is doubtful whether the British and French troops of occupation number more than 20,000 at the outside.

4. It is an unfortunate fact, for the reasons given in the pro-memorandum, that large portions of the population of Constantinople are reduced to a state of the utmost distress and misery. I understand from an Englishman who has been here for many years that many Turks are literally dying of starvation. An ordinary visitor would be struck in the street mostly appear to be well fed, and have not that pinched look which struck me so much at Warsaw during the winter of 1919-1920. But the Turks do not complain, and those who are reduced to the last extremity remain in their hovels and die. Their distress is not patent to the outside world.

5. A local paper, published in French, describes Constantinople as follows: "The town is a sink of vermin, of misery and of perdition. If only a hundredth or even a thousandth part of the happenings here took place elsewhere, the latter would arouse the attention of the whole world, which would hasten to attempt to purify the place morally. But the East is discreet, and covers itself with a veil." These words describe the situation.

6. The town is crammed with refugees of every description, who have been driven from their homes in Anatolia and Thrace, and impediments have been placed in the way of exports from the territories in the occupation of the Greek troops. Thus supplies of certain necessities of life, such as cheese, are very short, and a fall in the purchasing power of the L.T. makes it still more difficult for the poorer elements of the population to purchase these necessities. The Turkish authorities, numbering many thousands, who are paid very little, if at all, and at irregular intervals, are hard put to it to keep themselves and their families alive.

7. Apart from the great inconvenience caused by the presence of many thousands of Russian refugees, it is now evident that a large number of these refugees should never have left Russia, and are not entitled to any sympathy or relief at all. Many of them are bad characters and gash-birds who managed to get on board the ships at the last minute, and who, since their arrival here, have contributed still further to lower the already low standard of morality prevailing in this town.

8. It is not easy to see how this state of things can be improved until Anatolia is set up, and there can be a steady flow of supplies to Constantinople from that district.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, &c

HUBERT E. RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. (Received February 15.)

(No. 146)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 7, 1921

WITH reference to my telegram No. 81 of the 8th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith certain documents, which contribute to an understanding, however imperfect, of the present political situation at Angora. They are (a) a condensed translation of an interview given by Mustapha Kemal Pasha to a representative of the "United Telegram" press agency, (b) a similar translation of a speech delivered by Mukhtar Bey Nationalist "Commissioner" for Foreign Affairs, before the Grand National Assembly, and (c) a translation of one of the *en clair* telegrams addressed by the Angora Government to the Grand Vizier in the course of the correspondence arising out of the request of the Supreme Council for a Turkish delegation to take part in the proposed London Conference.

2. The first two documents are unfortunately not dated. I have every reason to believe that they are comparatively recent, though, of course, prior to the decision by the Supreme Council on the 25th January. The statement of Mukhtar Bey is evidently intended mainly for internal consumption, as is shown by the entirely false statement that advances have been made to the Angora Government by agents of the British Government. I cannot understand such a statement, except on the assumption that it was deliberately invented to enhance the prestige of the Kemalists in the eyes of hesitant adherents.

3. Mustapha Kemal's statement is addressed to a wider audience. His references to the United States of America, though doubtless inspired by the fact that his interlocutor appears to have been an American press agent, are interesting as indications of a revival of the hope that America may help to redress the balance between the Turkish Nationalists and the Allies. Mustapha Kemal's allegation that massacres on a large scale have been committed by the Armenians is also worthy of attention. Allegations of this kind against Armenians and Greeks, having perhaps a limited foundation in fact, play a considerable part in Turkish propaganda. There is an increasing tendency to combine condemnation of the anti-Christian policy of the Turks during the war with explanations tending almost to justify it, and to make the most of any atrocities which can be laid to the door of Armenians or Greeks as a pretext for foreign Affairs here to place on record language of the same general tendency used by Bekir Bey.

4. The enclosed telegram from Mustapha Kemal to the Grand Vizier has an interest independent of the general correspondence of which it forms part. Turkish political circles here are more than a little exercised by the alleged recent adoption by the Grand National Assembly of a new Constitutional law. According to the accounts current in Constantinople this law was voted by the Assembly on the 20th January. I have not yet been able to procure the text and cannot therefore say for certain whether a law has been voted or merely submitted to the Assembly. It seems almost certain that either a law or a draft is in existence and that it affirms in explicit terms the sovereignty of the people, and the supremacy of the Grand National Assembly. What is still uncertain is whether it attempts any definition of the position of the Sultan in the new order of things. Meanwhile the enclosed telegram puts forward as from the leader of the National movement suggestions which responsible statesmen here, however great their sympathy with the main object of the Nationalists, find disquieting, and which the Sultan justly regards as not only disquieting but insulting.

5. It is noteworthy that the Angora leaders in their recent telegrams have not explicitly rejected the proposal that the Treaty of Sèvres should be made the basis of discussion in London, but have concentrated all their attention on an effort to make their claims to be recognized as the sole Government of Turkey. They have not, however, as yet, explicitly rejected the Treaty of Sèvres, but as Grand Vizier, I am His Highness Tewfik Pasha, Constantinople.

6. The respective positions of leading personages at Angora is also somewhat significant, but one explanation offered is that Bekir Samy, who was certainly Commissioner for Foreign Affairs some months ago, never vacated the post, that Mukhtar was merely acting for him, and that on Bekir Samy's return from Moscow, he resumed the post in the ordinary course. Another matter of uncertainty is the exact position

of Mustapha Kemal himself, in view of the fact that certain telegrams have been signed by *Levent Cakmak*, *Minister of National Defence*, *Head of the executive authority*, or, as it were, *Grand Vizier*. There is no reason to suppose that *Mustapha Kemal* is *Minister of National Defence*, but the fact that he has been *Head of the executive authority* is a *fact* which has been *used* to the *advantage* of the *Angora Government* in the direction of a quasi-republican form of Government.

The question of how the Caliphate was *re-adjusted* to the new position of the Turkish State is obviously a matter of great interest and importance. I can add little to what I said on this subject in my telegram under reference, except that there appears to be a good deal of discussion as to whether the Caliphate might not be vested in a purely spiritual personage surrounded by representatives from Islamic countries and maintaining touch with them through representatives of an ostensibly ecclesiastical character in those countries. I find it difficult to believe that the Angora leaders would think the present moment opportune to challenge Moslem feeling in Turkey itself on so great an issue, but it would not be safe to dismiss the possibility altogether.

8. These are some of the numerous elements of perturbation and uncertainty which made it necessary for me in my telegram under reference to sound a note of warning as to the possibility of surprises in the near future. The readiness of Angora to send any delegation at all to the London Conference is at first sight an encouraging sign, but it would be an obvious device for gaining time, if there should really be some plan for joint action with the Bolsheviks in the coming spring. It is still true that the relations between the Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviks are the crux of the situation, and there are at present no serious signs of a break between them, though causes of tension are not wanting.

9. Some observers go further and suggest that the difference of opinion between Constantinople and Angora is unreal and is merely an elaborate blind intended to conceal complete unity of purpose and plan. I do not share this view. It is possible that some members of the Constantinople Government may be hand in glove with Angora, but I have little doubt that Tewfik Pasha is sincerely anxious to do his best for the Sultan, whose personal and dynastic position is threatened by the extravagances of Angora, and that both Tewfik Pasha and the Sultan see in the proposed London Conference a *danger* to the *Angora Government* which they would rather see wrecked than ever.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Declarations of Mustapha Kemal to the Representatives of the "United Telegram"

Smyrna Question.—Smyrna is an indivisible part of Anatolia and an exclusively Turkish area. This country, which has belonged to the Turks for a thousand years, has been occupied by Greek forces under the pretence of the existence of Greeks who are *not* in the majority. The Greeks have committed massacres and oppressions and pursued a policy of extermination towards the Turkish population, as is confirmed by the report drawn up by the International Commission. The Turkish nation will turn them out sooner or later from their country. Meanwhile she is ready to negotiate for peace provided the country will be immediately evacuated. We do not desire to have direct negotiations with the Greek Government, but accept with pleasure the kind mediation of the United States of America.

Thrace Question.—Thrace is a Turkish area and an exclusively Turkish area. The essential point about these questions is the immediate evacuation of both Smyrna and Thrace. Naturally the rights of the Greek minority will be protected in the manner specified in the Treaty of Saint Germain concerning the protection of minorities.

With regard to Western Thrace, we agree that its destiny should be determined by means of a plebiscite.

Treaty of Sèvres.—We cannot admit the existence of the Treaty of Sèvres which denies our political, juridical, economical and financial independence. Our desire is to conclude a treaty which will assure our independence and sovereignty.

Armenian Question—Basing ourselves on the principle of the right accorded to the nations to determine their own destinies, we have concluded peace with Armenia. The rumours, according to which massacres have been committed upon the Armenians, are without foundation. We readily agree that neutral commissions should make inquiries freely in our country in order to discover the truth. We recommend also the reading of the reports recently prepared by the American Relief Commission for the Near East.

Massacres and atrocities on a large scale have been committed by the Armenians on the Turkish population. Documents to prove these massacres will be produced.

Constantinople Question—Conditions for free passage of the Straits and the Bosphorus can be fixed, under which Constantinople will remain without restriction under Turkish sovereignty as before.

Opinions of the United States of America.—The United States of America is known by the Turkish population as benevolent, humanitarian and the protector of liberty. We hope to profit as much as possible from American sources in our efforts to restore our country.

Future Policy—Our country is destroyed, our population is poor, education is lacking and our economic situation is weak. Our sole desire is to restore peace and tranquillity and to raise the intellectual standard of our country.

Our nation knows its rights and its humanitarian duties and clings to its liberty and independence.

Our nation, which is fighting for its independence and its liberty, leaves its legitimate claims to the appreciation of humanity.

Ahmed Mouhtar, in a speech which he delivered before the National Assembly concerning the relations with the Western Powers, declared that it was naturally not intended to go against the civilised world with their imperfect means. No one with intelligence or wisdom would have such an intention. "For what," he asked, "are we fighting? Why have we decided to resist by force of arms? Naturally, it is not to all such acts. Our demands are not boundless. We demand only political independence within our national limits, and we are ready, from henceforth, to offer our hand to any Power which would accept our demands definitely and without rancour. Such a state of affairs does not yet exist. Perhaps it will soon exist, for, slight as it is, a disposition to accept does exist. Our Government, which follows very closely the course of events in Europe, is convinced that there does not exist in Europe any force which would compel us to accept and ratify the Treaty of Sevres.

This nation will wait until acceptance of our demands seems probable and will only conclude peace, without injury to her Russian ally, when she is convinced that her national ambitions will be satisfied."

Ahmed Mouhtar added that the nation could not regard favourably the unofficial propositions, which have been and are being made from time to time on behalf of the French, British and United States Governments.

After having informed the Assembly of the French proposals for the exchange of prisoners of war, proposed at the Angora Government were ready to accept and to fulfil in accordance with the Convention of Geneva—Ahmed Mouhtar discussed the French proposals and declared that the Turkish Government remains ready to conclude peace with any Entente Power. Such is the position at present.

The British also are endeavouring by repeatedly sending their men to Kerasund, Izmid, &c., to establish contact with us.

Their object is to inform the population that they grant means of existence to Turkey. It is proposed to her to accept peace, but a few days ago she refused to accept.

Concerning the Georgian question, Ahmed Mouhtar declared that after the defeat of the Armenians, the Georgian Government had decided to conclude peace with Turkey, but it had not yet been decided whether it would accept peace with Russia.

As regards Armenia, Ahmed Mouhtar declared that the Russian Soviet Government had proposed a modification of the conditions of peace with Armenia, especially in regard to the delivery of arms, as Armenia had become Bolshevik, but that they are obliged to take their arms in order to prevent possible Armenian attacks in the near future.

In reply to the question put forward by Ahmed Mouhtar regarding the relations of the Turkish Government with the British Government, he declared that he had replied to the British Government and that he did not know the reply given by the British Government to their refusal.

The only agreement was that reached in July last, whereby the British and French Governments agreed not to carry out propaganda or military hostile acts in the country of the other.

With regard to the Commercial Convention, Chicherin declared that a copy of that convention had been sent by post.

As regards Batoum, Ahmed Mouhtar declared that it is essentially Turkish and must belong to Turkey. However, in view of the fact that it is the sole outlet for a population of 13 000 000, he was ready to agree to the internationalisation of the port provided the town itself remained Turkish. The Georgian claims that Batoum and Ardahan should be given to Georgia he characterised as sheer imperialism.

Enclosure 2 in No. 40

Translation of Telegram from Mustapha Kemal Pasha to Grand Vizier

WE reproduce the following summary of proposals set forth in our private and confidential communication to the Grand Vizier, which we have not communicated to the result to us.—

1. His Majesty the Sultan will proclaim by a brief Iradé that he recognises the Caliphate of Turkey, which is the only Islamic Caliphate, and that the Caliphate (in its present form) is constituted, and he will recognise it with all its present powers and faculties. We have no need to add the other details, which would only give rise to confusion of interpretation.

2. His Majesty the Sultan will declare that the Caliphate is a family question, and that our internal situation (which is a family question) is as follows.—

His Majesty the Sultan will reside, as in the past, at Constantinople. The Grand Assembly of Turkey, which has the responsibility and the power, and which possesses all conditions of independence, will sit, for the present, with the Government at Angora. There will naturally remain no longer at Constantinople a directory body under the name of a Ministry, but a Mission invested with the necessary powers by the Grand Assembly will be present with His Majesty on account of the peculiar situation of the town of Constantinople.

3. The details of administrative organisation of the town of Constantinople and its neighbourhood will be drawn up later.

4. Immediately after the acceptance and application of the above proposals the Government will be able to meet the needs of the town of Constantinople, as well as the needs of the provinces, and the Government will be able to make provision in the budget approved by the Grand National Assembly, will be assured and paid by the Government. Our financial resources guarantee this expenditure.

E 2025 1 441

No. 50

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) En clair

PRESIDENT: Bekir Sami Bey. VICE-PRESIDENT: Zekai, Deputy for Adana. Experts and Counsellors: Mahmoud Fasad, Deputy for Smyrna; Vehbi, Deputy for Karassi; Sirri, Deputy for Ismid; Nedjati, Deputy for Erzeroum; Munir, Niazî or Muwaffak Niazî; and perhaps one other.

(No. 141)

(Telegraphic.)

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 15.

Constantinople, February 14, 1921.

MY telegram No. 100 of 14th February gives list of Angora delegation based on statement in local press, which purports to reproduce Kemalist communiqué, and on news just received by my Italian colleague from Adalia. Both versions agree pretty closely.

I have already said what little I can about Bekir Sami. Jani is an intelligent ex-officer who played a rôle in organisation of Smyrna defence movement before occupation of Smyrna. He was for a time member of Angora Government, after which he went to Italy. Yunus Nadi is a particularly poisonous and unscrupulous journalist who both we and French wanted arrested. He edits "Yeni Gazetesi" newspaper at Angora, and was some months ago too extreme for Government there. He was Socialistic, and stood strongly for Bolshevik alliance, though not for introduction of Bolshevism as such.

Other persons are little known here. Nedjati is suspected in connection with deportation. Same applies to Surri if he is the man formerly Governor of Anassara, but identification is not certain. Munir may be legal adviser of Sublime Porte who was at Constantinople. Agha, but this is not certain. If so, he has name of being industrious lawyer and not touch else.

Selection of Yokus may be due to desire to give representation to Extreme Left in Grand National Assembly. Notable feature of delegation as a whole is inclusion of deputies (presumably in Grand National Assembly) from all occupied areas still held by Turks at time of the armistice.

Delegation left Adalia on 13th. February, and is expected to reach Brindisi about 17th February.

Antitropic Government still express hope that two delegations will combine. Acting Grand Vizier nor Minister for Foreign Affairs sounded really confident of this, however, in conversation to-day, 14th February. I communicated to them substance of your telegram No. 91 of 11th February. They of course professed strongest disapproval of attitude of Ankara. Minister for Foreign Affairs, while sympathising with aims of Kemalists, seems genuinely disgusted with their refusal to have anything to do with Central Government, and probably fears they will overreach themselves. Acting Grand Vizier has hardly had time to form views, having been little in touch with affairs for nearly twelve months.

E 2157 1 447

No. 52

Sir G. Buchanan to Karl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) 13.

Rome, February 17, 1921

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister and Lord Curzon from Hankey —

get. He thinks, by Greeks would
in instruction under some nominal
city. Angora delegates are due here this morning. Italian
Government conveyed them in Italian destroyer in order that they might arrive in
time for conference

Count Sforza has promised to send us advance information as to general attitude [group uninterpretable] Angora delegates."

E 2158 1 44]

No. 53

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Home, February 17, 1921

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister and Lord Curzon from Hank

* My immediately preceding telephone

As regards procedure following Paris precedent, representatives of Great Powers should then meet Greeks and Turks separately to talk Turkish Government delegates and Anglo-Greek delegates should then be treated as a single delegation.

E 2159 1 467

No. 54

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Carron.—(Received February 17.)

Home, February 17, 1921.

On 11/11/1944, the Turkish Ambassador designated, called yesterday evening and told London to day to attend conference. After discussing at length the various points of the agreement which would, he declared, reduce Turkey to a state of anarchy, he said the Ankara Government would not permit their delegates to sign in Turkish delegation. Contrary to views expressed by Count Sforza to Sir M. Hankey, he maintained that were two to be invited with as a single delegation Ankara delegates would return home. With a view of Greece from Thrace and Smyrna would be demanded by latter, and on my asking whether there was any hope of a compromise between Greeks and Nationalists, he replied no was objected to as Greeks were systematically exterminating Mussulmans in districts occupied by their troops.

Sir M. Hankey saw President of the Council this morning. Latter takes view that, in spite of above language, there is a close "subterranean" understanding between Angora and Turkish delegates.

E 2244 (1/44)

No. 35

Colonel Spokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 10.,

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tellis (etâ Constantinople), February 12, 1921

IN en clair telegram dated 8th February, from Angora, Bekir Sami Bey, who signs as Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, informs Chicherin of impending departure of delegation from Angora Government for London. He states that failure to obtain satisfaction at conference will expose the west (sic) of the Allies, while success will make beginning of era of peace by which Russia also will profit. Nationalists will not forget at the conference that Russia is their ally, and latter will be kept informed of the course of negotiations. In return, he requests information regarding Krassin negotiations and decisions taken regarding the East. Telegram concludes with complaint that telegraphic communication between Kars and Baku is hindered by Soviet Armenians and commander of the 11th Army in Karabkha area, also that couriers are arrested and their bags seized.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 43, and Commander-in-chief Afyon, No. 15; repeated to India, Bagdad and Tebran.)

Sir H. Humboldt to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 178.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 16, 1921

WITH reference to my telegram No. 102 of the 14th February I have the pleasure to inform you that I have received a letter from Sir Adam Block, giving a short summary of the financial situation of the Turkish Government at the present moment.

I am very glad to hear that Sir Adam Block's report is in accordance with any surprise, in view of the fact that I had already reported to your Lordship that the Turkish Government's financial position would soon be exhausted.

I accordingly asked my colleagues and the other members of the Provisional Financial Control Commission to consider the explanations furnished by Sir Adam Block and his French colleague. The Provisional Financial Control Commission has decided to recommend the following:

- (1) To ensure the proper encashment of the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* duties whilst maintaining the consumption taxes. The High Commission has agreed to both these requests.

I have also to inform you that the Turkish Government should be entrusted to the British firm of Messrs. Makri-Kent and Mr. Barwell, my secretary, will submit a copy of it as soon as it is received. No decision was taken on this question, but I intend to raise it with the High Commissioners on the 18th instant.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 56

Summary of the Financial Situation

THE Turkish Government can no longer pay the salaries of its civil and military

To the 11th February there remained due for salaries —

	£T
Balance for the month of November 1920 ...	850,000
Balance for the month of December 1920 ...	1,637,000
Salaries, January 1921 ...	1,862,000

The salaries for December of the police, gendarmerie and the customs have been paid in full (in the month of January).

The £T 1,200,000 advanced by the Debt Council has been completely utilised

for the payment of the salaries of the civil and military officials. The expenses of an urgent character and not including the February salaries are £T 1,000,000.

On the other hand, the receipts of the customs are failing, and taxes collected are very small. The Turkish Government is now in a very difficult financial position.

I enclose a statement of the financial situation of the Turkish Government for the month of February 1921.

In examining the estimates of expenditure presented by different Departments during the last few days it is quite clear that these Departments refuse to take into consideration the state of penury of the Turkish Treasury. The credits they ask for are as extravagant and exaggerated as heretofore, and there is no serious attempt to reduce expenditure within the limits of the receipts.

I am very glad to hear that the Provisional Commission will make a proposal to the High Commissioners. The arrears of the "property tax" amount to about £T 2,000,000. I enclose a table. The arrears of the "tometti" are also very considerable.

My opinion is that it is of the most urgent necessity that the Turkish Government in collecting these arrears, and it is only with the assistance of the High Commissioners that this can be done.

The only other possible source of revenue is the customs. Means should be found to enable the Turkish Government to raise the "specific duties" so as to make them equivalent to a duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*.

This latter alternative, I think, deserves the early consideration of the High Commissioners. The more so as the discontent is growing daily greater and there will be a very serious crisis before long. The officials and their families are literally starving.

The last point that I must emphasise is that the Sales Commission is working most unsatisfactorily, and the advances of the banks and the Public Debt Council will not under the present conditions, be reimbursed for many long months to come. I am very glad to hear that the Turkish Government has decided to entrust the sale of the goods to Messrs. Makri-Kent and Mr. Barwell, my secretary, will submit a copy of it as soon as it is received. No decision was taken on this question, but I intend to raise it with the High Commissioners on the 18th instant.

The two latter have advanced money on these goods, and they are entitled to demand that the security on which they advanced such large sums should be realised. Were the Turkish Government to refuse to do this, the banks and the Public Debt Council would be forced to liquidate their claims. I am very glad to hear that the Turkish Government has decided to entrust the sale of the goods to Messrs. Makri-Kent and Mr. Barwell, my secretary, will submit a copy of it as soon as it is received. No decision was taken on this question, but I intend to raise it with the High Commissioners on the 18th instant.

ADAM BLOCK.

Constantinople, February 14, 1921

EXPENSES		£
Solde dernier 1 ^{er} de novembre (Traitement gendarmerie (janvier))		18,000
Indemnités (50 pour cent déjà payé pour janvier)		8,000
Salaires (gendarmerie et agents inspecteurs)		76,000
Ministère de la Guerre (à raison de £T. 4,000 pour dix-neuf jours)		8,000
Ministère de la Marine		180,000
Ministère de la Justice (à raison de £T. 40,000 par semaine)		36,000
Ministère de l'Intérieur		10,000
Total		346,000

RECETTES		ET
Solde en banque au 1 ^{er} février	40,000
Recouvrements douanes (dix-huit jours à raison de ET 20,000 par jour)	360,000
Recouvrements villages (dix-huit jours à raison de ET 10,000 par jour)	180,000
		580,000

IMPOT sur la Propriété bâtie.

	Exercice en cours.	Exercices précédents.
Perceptions
Arriérés reportés.
Proportion entre les perceptions et les constatations	50-75 pour cent

TELETYPE.

	Exercice en cours.	Exercices précédents.
Perceptions
Arriérés reportés.	126,277
Proportion entre les perceptions et les constatations

E 2484 1 44

No. 57

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon, — (Received February 24.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 9, 1921.

IMMEDIATELY after my despatch No. 146 of the 7th February was drafted it was brought to my notice that publicity had been given by the Kemalists to a considerable portion of the telegraphic correspondence between Constantinople and Angora, arising out of the invitation to the Turkish Government to attend the London Conference.

2. A polygraphed broad sheet containing the telegrams so published, was distributed through an emissary sent on the morning of the 7th February. The broad sheet is dated from Zimbeldak on the 30th January and contains a statement of the Turkish Government's position in Constantinople with other Kemalist communications for distribution here.

3. The same telegrams were printed on the afternoon of the 7th February in the Constantinople paper "Terakkiyat-ı Hukukî." The Turkish censor made a special point of their being allowed to appear, and the Allied censors, whose general instructions at present are to allow considerable latitude to the Turkish press, acquiesced.

4. The published telegrams consist of the Grand Vizier's original message to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, dated the 28th January, and the reply of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the Grand Vizier on the 28th January. I enclose French translations of the first three. The fourth is the telegram enclosed in my despatch No. 146 of the 7th February, referred to above.

5. On the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs being informally called to this publication, and to the possible danger of circulating in Constantinople documents of such a nature, especially the telegram requesting the Central Government to efface itself, and presenting terms to the Sultan, Sefik Bey explained that the telegrams were already widely known, and that the Acting Minister of the Interior had thought it well to enlighten public opinion fully regarding the extravagance of the Kemalists. He stated that the Government was doing its best to efface the influence of the Government in Angora by way of further enlightenment.

6. I doubt whether the Acting Minister of the Interior will publish anything really calculated to discredit the Nationalists. Unfortunately, Mustafa Arif Bey, a lawyer by profession, and by origin one of the group of Islamised Jews from Salonica, who plays so large a rôle in the Committee of Union and Progress, is perhaps the least trustworthy member of the Cabinet. Whatever his motives for instructing the Turkish censor to press for the publication of the telegrams, the publication assumed a form very little calculated to belittle the Kemalists, for it was illustrated by a photograph of Mustafa Kemal Pasha equal in size to and printed opposite a portrait of the Grand Vizier, together with a picture of the opening of the Grand National Assembly at Angora.

7. The telegrams were submitted to the Council of Ministers on the 7th, and at a moment when only junior Allied representatives were present. The whole incident presents the appearance of a Nationalist coup in the press, such as might be expected to precede an attempt to force the Nationalist point of view on the Sultan and the Central Government. It may seem incredible that the Kemalists should contemplate such an attempt while Constantinople is in Allied occupation, but Constantinople is full of Kemalist sympathisers, the Allied forces are so reduced, and the occupation has interfered so little with the Turkish administration, that the Angora leaders might hope to succeed in achieving their object, not by a coup d'Etat, which would bring their hopes to naught, but by a coup d'Etat, which would bring their hopes to naught. The situation is, however, such that no possible outcome of it should be disregarded.

I am, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 57

(Traduction.)

Tevfik Pasha to Mustafa Kemal Pasha

(Télégraphique.)

LA conférence qui s'est réunie à Paris, le 25 janvier 1921, a décidé qu'une nouvelle conférence, composée des délégués des Puissances alliées et des délégués des Gouvernements ottoman et hellénique, sera convoquée à Londres, le 21 février, en vue de discuter la solution de la question d'Orient. Les modifications qui seront jugées inévitables par suite des circonstances, seront apportées au traité existant. L'invitation adressée au Gouvernement impérial stipule que Mustafa Kemal Pasha, ou bien des délégués munis des pouvoirs nécessaires conférés par Angora, doivent faire partie de la délégation ottomane. Ces décisions nous ont été communiquées par les représentants des Puissances alliées à Constantinople. J'attends votre décision et votre réponse, afin que les délégués nommés par vous puissent se joindre aux personnages que nous nommerons nous-mêmes, et partir ensemble.

Enclosure 2 in No. 57

(Traduction.)

Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Tevfik Pasha.

(Télégraphique.)

LA seule force légitime et indépendante qui, de par la volonté nationale, se trouve entre les mains les destinées de la Turquie est la Grande Assemblée nationale turque siégeant à Angora. C'est le Gouvernement issu de cette Assemblée qui, seul, est chargé de résoudre toutes questions intéressant la Turquie et qui peut, seul, entretenir les relations extérieures. A Constantinople, aucun corps constitué n'a le droit de représenter la Turquie.

M 2

une situation juridique légale. En conséquence, le fait qu'un pareil corps constitué se soit donné le nom de Gouvernement va explicitement à l'encontre des droits de la nation. Les puissances alliées ont décidé de résoudre, suivant la justice et l'équité, les questions qui se posent. Elles ont décidé de reconnaître le Gouvernement intermédiaire pour leur

Le Gouvernement intermédiaire a été reconnu par les puissances alliées. Les puissances alliées ont décidé de résoudre, suivant la justice et l'équité, les questions qui se posent. Elles ont décidé de reconnaître le Gouvernement intermédiaire pour leur

Le 30 mars No. 51.

(Traduction)
Télégraphique)
(Privé)
No. 11.

VOUS qui avez, dans toute votre carrière sans interruption, rendu des services à la patrie et parachever tous vos services antérieurs. Nous voulons agir en parfaite union. Nous sommes persuadés que vous voyez, vous-même, tous les inconvénients qu'il y aurait à ce que deux délégations distinctes représentent le pays à laquelle nous sommes indistinctement convoqués. Le but de notre voyage, le sang qu'il nous coûte, quelle a montré à l'occasion de tant de difficultés tant intérieures qu'extérieures, ont créé la nouvelle situation favorable en présence de la

monde continuant à se développer de façon à confirmer notre indépendance complète, vers laquelle tendent tous les efforts de la nation. Alors que nous défendons nos droits nationaux contre les Gouvernements qui ont voulu nous asservir à l'étranger et à la ruine. Il est de toute nécessité que toutes les communications déjà faites par les représentants des Puissances de l'E.

Les communications déjà faites par les représentants des Puissances de l'E. Les communications déjà faites par les représentants des Puissances de l'E.

Nous vous proposons, en conséquence, en nous appuyant sur le devoir et l'équité, de reconnaître le Gouvernement intermédiaire pour leur

des mêmes principes par nos

notre conflit. Dans le cas où vous accepteriez et exécuteriez ces propositions au lieu de celles que nous faisons dans l'unique intention d'agir en commun et de défendre, avec le maximum de nos forces, la volonté de la nation, la situation de sa Majesté le Sultan et le Califé cessera désormais d'être chancelante. Et nous, en notre qualité de Gouvernement investi de tous les pouvoirs effectifs et juridiques conférés par la volonté nationale, nous nous des maintenant que toute la responsabilité découlant d'un refus éventuel, de votre part, de ces propositions retombera avec ses innombrables conséquences, directement sur sa Majesté le Sultan.

Nous attendons que la conscience de cette situation votre Altesse s'acquiesce de tout son devoir historique et qu'elle nous informe en termes formels et explicites de ce qui aura été fait.

E 2490 1 441

No. 11

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. (Received February 21)

(No. 161)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 12, 1920.

THE delegation from the Constantinople Government to the London Conference leaves to night, with the Grand Vizier at its head. I understand that the Sultan was very insistent that Bekir Fikri should go as the head of the delegation. He is a man of eighty, and it is not easy to determine what measure of authority he exercises over his colleagues at Constantinople. He is an agreeable personality and leaves a pleasant impression.

The Constantinople Government have done their best since they received the invitation to the conference in London to bring Mustapha Kemal to the conference. The whole attitude taken up by Mustapha Kemal regarding the conference is a matter of great importance. I am told that the Nationalists on other grounds. I am told that the Nationalists are likely eventually to meet to his detriment in Anatolia.

3. My Italian colleague informs me that the delegation from Angora should have reached Adana yesterday, the 11th instant, but although he has his representative at that port to telegraph the arrival and camp in the morning, he has not yet sent news up to last night. There is a persistent rumour that the delegation is headed by Bekir Sami Bey, who only recently returned from Moscow. Reports say that Bekir Sami Bey was thoroughly disgusted with what he saw at the Bolshevik capital.

4. It is to be assumed that the delegation from the Central Government will do its utmost to get into touch and come to some agreement with the Nationalist delegation, should the latter reach London in time for the opening of the conference. I am without indication, however, of the view His Majesty's Government will take of the arrival of an independent delegation from Angora.

5. It has been suggested to me that the Nationalists are speculating on a Bolshevik offensive against Poland and Roumania in the spring. They think that such an offensive will absorb all the attention of the Western Powers, and thus render the latter incapable of dealing with the Turkish situation. It is difficult to appreciate, with any accuracy, the present relations between the Nationalists and the Soviet Government, though indications show that the former are much disturbed by the attitude taken up by the Soviet Government as regards the retention by the Nationalists of Kars and Alexandropol.

6. The necessary funds for the expenses connected with the despatch of the Constantinople delegation to London have been forthcoming with great liberality and speed. Sir Adam Black informs me that there will, in consequence, be delay in paying the police, gendarmerie, &c. In fact the Turkish Government are now at the end of their resources, and it will be necessary for the High Commissioners to meet early next week to consider the means of enabling the Administration to continue to function.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOID.

High Commissioner.

E 2693 1 44]

No. 59

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 27, 1921

IN the course of long conversation which I had with Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, the latter expressed the feeling of optimism in Turkish circles as to the future of the country. He assured me that the Turkish Government was not at all discouraged by the recent developments, and that it was fully prepared to meet the demands of the Allies. He also mentioned that the Turkish Government was in communication with the British Government regarding the future of the country.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 27)

E 2611 576 93]

No. 60

Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, February 28, 1921.

I AM to-day presenting to you a note on the subject of economic rights in mandated territories in reply to the note of the 20th November from Mr. Colby, and I beg leave to express to you my regret that it should have been delayed beyond my expectation.

As regards the publication of this note, and of the notes which have preceded it, your letter of the 13th January, I beg to state that His Majesty's Government agree to the simultaneous publication of the whole correspondence in this country, and will assent to any date for this purpose named by your Excellency on receiving three days' notice. In view of the interest that the discussion has awakened, I would express the hope that an early date for this publication may be fixed.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 2866 1 44]

No. 61

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

No. 200.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 2, 1921

HIS Excellency Tewfik Pasha, the Grand Vizier and senior Turkish delegate at the Allied Conference now sitting in London, called on me this week. It was intended that he should have called on me some time ago, but he has been ill for over 80 years of age, has been in poor health ever since his arrival in England (having a feeble appearance at the few sittings which he has attended).

This did not prevent him, however, from developing a political argument which occupied about twenty minutes, and commenced with the delivery of a special message from the Sultan to the effect that His Imperial Majesty was deeply convinced that the only hope for his country and his throne lay in a revival of the old relations between Turkey and Great Britain, to which he was ready to agree in any manner that might be thought best.

I remarked that, pending the conclusion of peace, we could only proceed in close concert with our Allies, and were precluded from taking any independent action. Moreover it was a pity that these considerations had not been present to the mind of the Turkish Government in 1914, when their action in making war upon us had been of a particularly shameful as well as a suicidal nature.

The Grand Vizier deplored the lamentable errors committed by his countrymen at that time, which he had done his best to avert, and for which they were now paying the penalty.

When I asked him whether he was speaking exclusively for the Constantinople

delegation had been one of almost complete subservience to the Ankara delegates, to whom they had invariably ceded the word, the Pasha replied that this had been done for reasons of expediency, but that really there was quite a good understanding between them, and that, in respect of friendship with Great Britain, the sentiments of Bekir Sami Bey were exactly identical with his own. This, indeed, was the feeling of the entire Turkish people.

When I pointed out that it was little difficult to reconcile these inclinations with the known facts—(1) that a representative of the Ankara Government was at this moment sitting at Moscow in close consultation with the Soviet leaders; and (2) that the same Government was trying to come to separate arrangements with the French and Italian Governments behind our backs in London—the Grand Vizier did not appear to be in the least disturbed by these symptoms, which he evidently regarded as conventional moves in the diplomatic game.

The situation described (I believe with absolute truth) as desperate. None of the officials or functionaries had been paid their salaries for many weeks; the Treasury was empty; poverty and destitution were widespread; and unless financial aid were forthcoming the entire State would collapse.

His proposal was that Powers should agree to an increase in the customs duties levied at Constantinople. He seemed to be a little uncertain about his figure, and did not appear to be thoroughly acquainted with the controversy that has recently been going on at Constantinople concerning the *ad valorem* duties.

Upon this subject I was non-committal, though sympathetic, and the Grand Vizier, having discharged his task with the courtesy of an old and experienced diplomat, and received from me the assurance that the Ankara friends to ratify the treaty as quickly as possible, enveloped himself in a heavy overcoat and withdrew.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 2611 576 93]

No. 62

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 2, 1921

WITH reference to your telegram No. 108 of the 24th ultimo relative to the Government on the subject of mandates, and also to Sir Cecil Hurst's letter No. 111 of the same date enquiring whether the answer of His Majesty's Government to the note of the United States Government of the 20th November last concerning oil and the Mesopotamian mandate have been delivered, I transmit to you herewith a copy of reply which has now been sent to the United States Ambassador in answer to Mr. Secretary Colby's note of the 20th November last.

2. In view of the communication which has been received by the Council of the League from the United States Government, it has been felt desirable to avoid in the reply any discussion of the principle and terms of mandates which will no doubt be dealt with by the Council, and, as you will observe, the answer to the United States Government has therefore been confined to an explanation of the exact position of the Turkish Petroleum Company and of the logical consequences which must follow from a full recognition by the mandatory Power of rights validly acquired from the Turkish Government, as well as the reasons for the conclusion of the San Remo Oil Agreement.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 249.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 8, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the accompanying copies of notes which my French and Italian colleagues and myself have addressed to the Allied High Commissioners and the Polish, Roumanian and Russian representatives at Constantinople on the subject of the establishment of local post offices in this city.

As your Lordship will observe, these communications are based on a protest submitted to the Allied High Commissioners by the Ottoman Government against the creation of such offices in Turkey, which, in admitting the re-establishment in Turkey of post offices by those Allied Powers who possessed them before the war, by implication denies this privilege to other countries.

The situation of the Russian post office is not on the same footing as, and is in no way comparable to, that of the other post offices in Turkey. It is a member of the League of Nations, has acceded to the Treaty of Sèvres. Its present position is, however, such that it is impossible for it to be used as a channel for Bolshevik correspondence, and owing to the danger of its being used as a channel for Bolshevik correspondence, cannot be admitted.

4. At the same time, the Turkish Government, on the other hand, likely to induce the Greek High Commissioner to demand to our request on the ground that these offices are necessary for the Turkish Government.

5. The presence of Greek troops in Turkey is, on the other hand, likely to induce the Greek High Commissioner to demand to our request on the ground that these offices are necessary for the Turkish Government.

6. The presence of Greek troops in Turkey is, on the other hand, likely to induce the Greek High Commissioner to demand to our request on the ground that these offices are necessary for the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 63

Allied High Commissioners to Greek High Commissioner.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence M. le Haut-Commissaire de Grèce que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ottoman vient de leur adresser une protestation contre l'établissement de deux bureaux de poste helléniques à Péra et Galata.

L'article 262 du Traité de Sèvres stipule expressément que les Puissances alliées qui avant le 1^{er} août 1914 avaient des bureaux de poste dans l'ancien Empire ottoman auront la faculté de rétablir de tels bureaux en Turquie.

Or, par implication, l'établissement de tels bureaux par des Puissances, autres que celles susvisées, doit être considéré comme étant non moins expressément exclu.

Dans ces circonstances, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ne peuvent que constater le bien-fondé de la réclamation de la Porte à cet égard et ils ont l'honneur en conséquence d'exprimer l'espoir que M. le Haut-Commissaire de Grèce veuille bien faire cesser les opérations des bureaux en question.

Ils auront gré à M. le Haut-Commissaire de Grèce de bien vouloir les aviser en temps utile des mesures prises à cet effet.

Constantinople, le 4 mars 1921.

Enclosure 2 in No. 63.

Allied High Commissioners to Polish Minister, Constantinople.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à M. le Ministre de Pologne que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ottoman vient de leur adresser une protestation contre l'établissement à Péra d'un bureau de poste polonais.

L'article 262 du Traité de Sèvres stipule expressément que les Puissances alliées qui avant le 1^{er} août 1914 avaient des bureaux de poste dans l'ancien Empire ottoman auront la faculté de rétablir de tels bureaux en Turquie.

Or, par implication, l'établissement de tels bureaux par des Puissances, autres que celles susvisées, doit être considéré comme étant non moins expressément exclu.

Dans ces circonstances, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ne peuvent que constater le bien-fondé de la réclamation de la Porte à cet égard et ils ont l'honneur en conséquence d'exprimer l'espoir que M. le Ministre de Pologne ne verra pas d'objections à ce que les ordres nécessaires soient donnés à qui de droit afin de faire cesser les opérations du bureau en question.

Ils auront gré à M. le Ministre de Pologne de bien vouloir les aviser en temps utile des mesures prises à cet effet.

Constantinople, le 4 mars 1921.

Enclosure 3 in No. 63

Allied High Commissioners to Roumanian Minister, Constantinople.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à M. le Ministre de Roumanie que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ottoman vient de leur adresser une protestation contre l'établissement à Galata d'un bureau de poste roumain.

L'article 262 du Traité de Sèvres stipule expressément que les Puissances alliées qui avant le 1^{er} août 1914 avaient des bureaux de poste dans l'ancien Empire ottoman auront la faculté de rétablir de tels bureaux en Turquie.

Or, par implication, l'établissement de tels bureaux par des Puissances, autres que celles susvisées, doit être considéré comme étant non moins expressément exclu.

Dans ces circonstances, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ne peuvent que constater le bien-fondé de la réclamation de la Porte à cet égard et ils ont l'honneur en conséquence d'exprimer l'espoir que M. le Ministre de Roumanie ne verra pas d'objections à ce que les ordres nécessaires soient donnés à qui de droit afin de faire cesser les opérations du bureau en question.

Ils auront gré à M. le Ministre de Roumanie de bien vouloir les aviser en temps utile des mesures prises à cet effet.

Constantinople, le 4 mars 1921.

Enclosure 4 in No. 63

Allied High Commissioners to Russian Representative, Constantinople.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à M. le Représentant diplomatique russe à Constantinople que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ottoman vient de leur adresser une protestation contre l'établissement d'un bureau de poste russe à Péra.

L'article 262 du Traité de Sèvres stipule que les Puissances alliées qui avant le 1^{er} août 1914 avaient des bureaux de poste dans l'ancien Empire ottoman auront la faculté de les rétablir en Turquie.

Or, d'après l'article 438 du même Traité, la Russie n'est admise à accéder à cet acte que lorsqu'elle sera admise comme membre de la Société des Nations.

Dans ces circonstances, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ne peuvent que constater le bien-fondé de la réclamation de la Porte à cet égard.

[6668]

N

Il n'y aura pas d'objections à ce que les ordres nécessaires soient donnés à l'effet de faire cesser les opérations du bureau en question.

Ils sauront gré à M. Neratof de bien vouloir les aviser en temps utile des mesures prises à cet effet.

Constantinople, le 4 mars 1921

E 3301 50 44]

No. 64

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 260.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 9, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

A meeting of the High Commission, which was held at Constantinople, was held at Constantinople after the occupation of the city by the Greek forces. I recently assured a member of my staff that the policy of the High Commission was to conciliate Moslem feeling even at the cost of postponing in some cases the disposal of their property during the period of hostilities. He said that this policy was being continued under the Constantinian régime.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

The result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the High Commission is as follows.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

The result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the High Commission is as follows.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

The result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the High Commission is as follows.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

The result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the High Commission is as follows.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

The result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the High Commission is as follows.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

The result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the High Commission is as follows.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

The result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the High Commission is as follows.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

The result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the High Commission is as follows.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

The result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the High Commission is as follows.

On the 2nd March, 1921, I received from the High Commission a copy of a memorial addressed to you by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding alleged persecutions of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces, more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

* Not printed.

E 3343 1 44

No. 65

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

Foreign Office, March 15, 1921

THE Grand Vizier in much better health, and in greater spirits than on the occasion of his former visit, called upon me at the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to bid good-bye.

His manner on this occasion was assured and his utterance voluble, and there was no doubt on his part of the fact that he was leaving England in a very good mood.

Following up the advance which he had made to me on the previous occasion at the instance of the Sultan, he told me that the latter was exceedingly anxious to fortify the closer co-operation, by a separate alliance or agreement with ourselves. He realised, however, that at a time when we were acting in close concert with the other Great Powers such a solution was impracticable and could not receive favourable consideration.

at our hands. He therefore refrained from putting it forward, but he wished me to know what had been in the mind of his royal master and what was the future situation to which the latter looked forward.

I made no comment upon this suggestion, except to say that the Grand Vizier was quite right in thinking that it was impossible for us to take any step at the present juncture in separation from our allies.

His Excellency, while protesting that he did not want to raise any question of a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres beyond that which had been officially proposed, then proceeded, in contradiction of his own assertion, to put forward a suggestion in respect of Thrace. His argument was really a plea for the Enos-Midia as against the Clatalja line.

I allowed him to develop his case without interruption, but informed him at the end that an essential condition of the modifications that had been proposed was the maintenance of the rest of the Treaty of Sèvres intact, and that it was therefore out of the question that an exception should be made in the case of Thrace. The Turkish Government should bow to the facts of the situation and be grateful for the very substantial concessions that had been made.

The Grand Vizier then went on to give me a rather interesting account of the private relations which had existed between the Ankara delegation and himself. He admitted that they had come to the Conference with some suspicion of each other, and that the relations for the first day or two had been strained. At the end of that time Bekir Sami Bey having shown a very conciliatory spirit, they had acted in close co-operation and he hoped to have established relations with the Ankara delegation which would remain co-operation between the two much easier than had at one time been imagined. The "wild cats of Ankara" had indeed, according to him, become quite tame under his fatherly care.

Tewfik Pasha then proceeded to develop a long argument about the increase in customs duty to which the High Commissioners had agreed at Constantinople. Apparently this particular concession was not in the least what the Turkish Government desired and would not result in any advantage which was the only thing to which they really attached importance. They did not want an ad valorem duty at all, and the 11 per cent., in practice, would mean a realised duty of not more than one-half.

I did not either interrupt or follow the Grand Vizier in this argument, which he continued until he had exhausted the fertility of the vein.

We then parted with hopes—the realisation of which, considering his advanced age, I cannot but doubt—that we might meet again.

I am, &c
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 3296 116 58]

No. 66

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 250.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 8, 1921

THE following information regarding the present situation in the Caucasus has been furnished by the Rev. H. W. Harcourt, who has been the representative of the Lord Mayor of London's Armenian Relief Committee in Erivan and Tiflis for more than a year past, and who arrived in Constantinople on the 2nd instant.

2. Mr Harcourt only left Tiflis on the eve of the occupation of the city by the Soviet forces. Up to the last moment the Georgian Government had been optimistic, and he is of opinion that they had greatly underrated the enemy's strength and efficiency, as well as the scope of his operations. According to Mr Harcourt the Georgian army never had a chance of successful resistance to the Soviet invasion, which he describes as another step in a far-reaching strategic and political scheme, which was at the time of his departure from the Caucasus under the direction from Moscow.

3. Mr Harcourt believes that an armed conflict between the Soviet forces and the Armenian forces is almost inevitable, the country between the Caucasus and the Black Sea of Kars and Alexandropol, and the report that they have occupied Ardahan and Artvin, which have been evacuated by the Georgians and are advancing towards Batumi. If such a conflict takes place, he is convinced that the Soviet forces will have

[6668]

N 2

no difficulty in driving the Turks out of all the occupied territory, and even in pushing on to Trebizond and Erzurum, if the are so inclined.

4. The recent revolution whereby the Greek Party in the Soviet Union was overthrown, Mr. Hancock, in fact, points out that a large proportion of the surviving Armenians in the Caucasus may now perish by starvation and disease.

I have, &c
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

E 3415/1,44]

No. 57

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 112.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatches Nos 93 and 103 of the 1st and 10th instants, I have the honour to report that, since the news reached Athens that the London Conference might decide to revise the Treaty of Sèvres, the Greek and Smyrna were concerned, I have received from all the countries and I understand that similar messages reached in France, Italy, and the United States. Whilst too much importance should not be attached to such messages, it is nevertheless undeniable that the desire to maintain intact the treaty is the one question upon which all parties in Greece and Greater Greece with one exception are agreed.

His Majesty's consular officers at Smyrna, Volo, Patras, Corfu, Zante, Canea and Syra have forwarded to me resolutions from various representative bodies in their respective districts. These resolutions are more or less to the following effect:—

1. To manifest the unshakable resolve to undergo every sacrifice to the struggle of liberation pending the execution of the Treaty of Sèvres.
2. To declare that the army and people have never wavered of the struggle in behalf of their racial ideals and the complete liberation of their country.
3. To express their opposition to the Greek Government's attitude towards the Allies, seeing that Greece, by the mandate of the Allies, has been subjected to such great sacrifices of blood and money ever since the great war ended.

There was, I am informed, a poor attendance at the public meeting at Zante and Volo which adopted the resolutions, but at Volo this may have been due partly to the meeting not having been announced in time and also to the greater excitement caused by the arrival of the British and French troops on the 1st March. At Corfu a crowd of demonstrators with bands played the British National Anthem in front of His Majesty's consulate.

Resolutions of a similar nature have reached me from the Popular Political League (i.e., the Reservist League) of Athens, the Greek League for the Rights of Women, the National Union of Greek Women, the Central Committee of Unredeemed Greeks, the Hellenic League of the Universities, etc.

In this connection I have to state that I have received a copy of a telegram sent to the British High Commissioner by a committee representing the inhabitants of the island of Rhodes, praying that the property of their island which they maintain has been taken from them may be restored.

Strong as may seem the Government press has been daily engaged in trying to

prove that M. Venizelos has been using his influence with the Powers to bring about a revision of the treaty in a spirit hostile to Greece, and any modifications in this sense will no doubt be laid at his door by his enemies.

The one exception, referred to above, to this unity of desire to maintain the treaty is to be found in the Socialist-Communist Party, whose organ, the "Rizospastis," publishes a warning to the following effect:—

On the occasion of the great war there were people who succeeded by force and by fraud, despite the stubborn resistance of the Greek people, in dragging Greece into war. There are people who, taking advantage of the new crisis, want to put Greece again into war in order to sell their services to the Allies, in the hope that their ambitions will be satisfied by the annexation of territories and that they will secure themselves in office. To them we say clearly that the Greek people will secure themselves in office by the only way open to them, by a new war, and we urge the people to this resistance and will

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c
For the Minister,
C. H. BENTINCK

E 3741.1 44]

No. 58

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 20)

N 112,
Mr. Laid.

Athens, March 17, 1921

WITH reference to my despatch No. 95 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that the news of the proposals which the London Conference has now submitted to the Greek and Turkish delegations for a new scheme covering certain modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres, has not been favourably commented upon in the press although it has not created anything like the alarm which was caused a fortnight ago by the suggested Inter-Allied Commission to study ethnical questions in Thrace and Smyrna.

It is pointed out that Turkey was, is, and will always remain the friend of Germany and the enemy of Greece and the Entente Powers, and in any future trouble with a resuscitated Germany, she will always be able to count upon Turkish support. Hence everything which may now be done tending to strengthen Turkey will cause trouble in the future, as soon as Germany is sufficiently recovered to revenge herself upon her enemies. Greece and the Entente must pull together in the future as in the past.

The hostility of Italy to anything tending to strengthen Greece is fully appreciated in this country. The recent attitude of France, who calls upon Great Britain to support her in forcing upon Germany the fulfilment of all the terms of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time, whilst retaining her own rights in Syria, wants British support to enable her to destroy part of the Treaty of Sèvres has evoked very severe criticism in the press and elsewhere. France, it is pointed out, was glad enough to get on the map she possibly could find her way out of the war. Now she has ended and makes peace with Greece's enemy—Kemal. This will not only release extra forces for Kemal to use elsewhere, but it is suggested that France may even hand over to Kemal arms and supplies which he will certainly employ against the Greeks—France's late allies!

All look to Great Britain for support and profess great friendship for her, but how far the majority of Royalists are sincere in their professions is open to doubt. All are convinced that it is in England's interests to see a powerful Greece, but disappointment is expressed that England should have allowed herself to act against her better judgment in order to please France, and that she should have joined Italy and France in repudiating a treaty which she had signed. Some Government papers seek to throw the blame on M. Venizelos for having sided against the common enemy with the Entente, which now leaves Greece in the lurch.

Greece, it is stated, cannot accept the proposals as they stand. MM. Calogeropoulos and Giannaris would never be able to return with such a treaty to present to the

National Assembly. The Assembly, says the "Athenai" (Independent) which is a very strong opinion, it would be voicing the sentiments of the entire nation, which demands that the mandate given to Greece in Asia Minor should be fulfilled. The Assembly writes that the Greek Government should not appoint a Governor whom the Greeks will not appoint; the withdrawal of the menace to Turkey contained in article 36 will leave the Turk free to dispose of his own territory as he sees fit, the one restraining factor having been removed. Greece, according to the "Athenai," will see the dream of Constantinople vanish before her eyes. Greece will have to make a choice between two fronts against both Turks and Bulgars. She does not seek war, but will not hesitate to fight if necessity should arise.

The idea of promptly being able to settle matters with Kemal does not seem to worry anyone. All are convinced of the superiority of the Greek forces both in number, arms, discipline, &c., and a rumour is now current, of which I have been unable to verify, that the Greek Government is already making arrangements for a speedy passage of the Dardanelles.

According to some, however, all the Royalist talk of a "last ditch" fight is only a means of putting all the blame on the backs of the Venizelists. M. Gounaris, organ, the "Proteroussa," contained an article the other day in quite a different strain to those which usually fill the press. In the course of this article, the following passage occurs:—

"The Conference of London will free the Greek people from the night of the Asia Minor campaign, which has neither beginning nor end and no objective."

Those who long after the national achievements of the expelled statesman must not forget that the entanglement of our army in Asia Minor, which threatens to paralyse our natural life, is his work."

In view of criticisms of this paragraph on the part of the Venizelist press, the "Proteroussa" endeavoured to explain it away the next day.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
C. H. BENTINCK

E 3739 1/44)

No. 80

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 916)
My Lord.

DURING the joint meeting of the Senate of the Foreign Affairs Commissions, reported in my despatch No. 917 of to-day's date, M. Briand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced the commissions that the Turks had accepted the procedure of a plebiscite at Smyrna and in Thrace without even requiring as a condition the evacuation of the Greek army.

The attitude of the Greeks was less clear, but as regards Smyrna it appeared that M. Gounaris was disposed to satisfy the Turks.

In their agreement with France, said M. Briand, the Turks were to cede Cilicia with the Gulf of Alexandretta, but not the port. On the other side, the frontier followed a line from Alexandretta to Nizib, leaving the Bagdad railway within French Syria. He added that he expected to bring back to France shortly the troops liberated by the evacuation of Cilicia, while he wished to recall from Syria a certain number of officials and substitute for the present régime there an administration based on an understanding with the local authorities.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
MILNE CHEETHAM

E 3760 1 44

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30)

(No. 202)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 28, 1921

I PAID a long visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 18th instant, and discussed with him the suggestions which have been submitted to the two Turkish delegations in London for certain modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres.

2. I reminded the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the conversation in which he had outlined the modifications of the treaty which the Turkish Government hoped to secure at the London Conference. This conversation was recorded in my despatch No. 108 of the 21st January last. I said that the Turkish Government seemed to have secured the greater part of their desiderata.

3. I then impressed on Sefik Bey the fact that the concessions in question were entirely due to initiative of His Majesty's Government. Their representatives had suggested the concessions in question, and had, indeed, for the most part drafted them. I emphasised the fact that the solution now offered to the Turkish Government was mainly inspired by the sincere desire of His Majesty's Government to satisfy the legitimate claims and susceptibilities of Turkey, in order to facilitate her recovery from the fatal effects of her recent policy.

4. I pointed out that His Majesty's Government had no particular axe to grind in Turkey. They were sincerely anxious to see peace restored in this part of the world and wanted a unified and prosperous Turkey. I said that Sefik Bey must be under no misapprehension on this point as well as regards the rôle played by the British representatives at the recent conference in London.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he was convinced of the truth of the foregoing statements, and declared that the moral and economic support of Great Britain were indispensable to the prosperity of Turkey. The Turkish Government wished to resume their former relations of friendship with England. But we ought not, he said, as in the past, to allow intrigues to prejudice the relations between our two countries. We had not been sufficiently alive in the past to such intrigues which had commenced many years back, long before the Russo-Turkish war. The Russians had then been the principal intriguers against England, and they had been followed by the Germans.

6. As I did not wish Sefik Bey to develop this theme in the sense that we ought to beware of either French or Italian intrigue in the future, I observed that we had been working cordially with our allies, and that I did not see who was going to intrigue against us in the future. I added that intrigue, certainly in the past, seemed to be inherent in the atmosphere of Constantinople.

7. Sefik Bey then turned to the question of the Straits zone of the Bosphorus. He said that he hoped that the League of Nations would not choose a Greek Governor of Smyrna town. I replied that it was impossible to forecast the nationality of the person whom the League of Nations would select for this post. In the case of Danzig, the League of Nations had appointed an Englishman.

8. As regards the former of these questions, he said that he hoped that the League of Nations would not choose a Greek Governor of Smyrna town. I replied that it was impossible to forecast the nationality of the person whom the League of Nations would select for this post. In the case of Danzig, the League of Nations had appointed an Englishman.

9. As regards the Bosphorus, Sefik Bey said that, in his opinion, it would be sufficient if the demilitarised zone began at, or in the neighbourhood of, Buyuk Dere and at a point on the Asiatic shore immediately opposite, leaving Constantinople out of the Straits zone. Sefik Bey made no allusion to Thrace.

10. He then alluded to the arrangement which the Angora delegation is reported to have concluded with the Italians about the Adalia region, and stated that he was afraid the Italians would have been found to have secured a position of such economic preponderance as would seriously hamper the Turks in the development of the region in question. I replied that, whilst I knew nothing whatever about this arrangement, I thought that the Turkish Nationalists would not have given away as much as Sefik Bey feared. He replied that the Nationalist delegation did not include men who were gifted with foresight, but I am inclined to think that Sefik Bey's remarks on this subject are based on a very real degree of anxiety as to the preponderant rôle played by the Angora delegation.

11. Speaking generally, I derive the impression that Sefik Bey is really gratified at the results obtained by the Turkish delegations in London and he gave no

indication that the Constantinople Government would endeavour to raise the question of Thrace and make difficulties generally about the modifications now submitted to them.

I have, &c
HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

E 3765 1 44]

No. 71

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30.)

{No. 300.}

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 23, 1921

WITH reference to my telegram No. 199 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government have received by the Sultan's emissaries a copy of the final Peace Treaty, and that they are aware of the Sultan's intention to inform their particular ally, viz. Germany, of the same. I have the satisfaction of being enabled to present to His Majesty's Government the proposed settlement as presented by the Sultan of the Empire. I therefore propose to the Government to send a copy of the same to His Majesty's Government, and to support the securing the acceptance by Turkey of the settlement now proposed. I desired for my own part also to emphasize the rôle played by His Majesty's Government in the recent negotiations, and the spirit of conciliation which they in particular had shown without seeking any special advantages for themselves.

Mr. Ryan. His Majesty again preferred that no other person should be present. He dismissed his own attendant at the outset of the audience, and asked Mr. Ryan to depart. The S. H. was over the threshold but did not attempt to enter the room. I therefore give a full account of what passed without attempting to follow the exact order of the conversation.

3. I had prepared a memorandum of what I particularly wished to say to His Majesty, and I read this paper at the same time as I was reading Mr. Ryan, after I had stated by way of preface that I considered the moment particularly opportune for an exchange of views with His Majesty, in view of the new turn which events had taken as a result of the London Conference.

[illegible]

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter of the 11th inst. and in reply to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration. I am, Sir, very respectfully,
 Your obedient servant,
 J. M. Smith

G. ... I ...
 ... H. ...
 ...
 ...
 ...

7. The Sultan expressed gratitude for the regard shown for himself and his position. He said, however, that the situation in Asia Minor was this. A handful of Europeans had established complete ascendancy. They were few in number, but they were powerful. Their strength lay in the backing of 16,000 military officers who were concerned for their own future personal interests. He admitted that a man like Bekir Sami Bey was reasonable, but those who had sent him to London were entirely Chauvinistic.

8. I expressed the hope that on the new basis created by the London conversations it would be possible to rally all well disposed elements in the country into a single whole under the guidance of His Majesty.

9. The Sultan said that he agreed as to the main principle, but that he could not agree as regards details. The Angora leaders were men without any real stake in the country, with which they had no connection of blood or anything else. Mustapha Kemal was a Macedonian revolutionary of unknown origin. His blood might be a. . . —Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian, for instance. He looked rather like a Serbian! Bekir Sami was a Circassian. They were all the same, Allahmakin, Circassians and others, but Turkish. There was not a real Turk among them. He said his Government was, nevertheless, powerless before them. The hold was such that there was no access to the real Turks, even by way of propaganda. The real Turks were loyal to the core, but they were intimidated or they were hoodwinked by fantastic misrepresentations like the story of his own captivity. These brigands were the men who sought his submission. They looked for external support and found it in the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were now closing up against the Turkish frontier. The Angora leaders were still playing with them. They might discover and regret too late that they had brought on Turkey the fate of Azerbaijan. Modern Turks could have nothing to do with Bolshevism, for it was incompatible with their religion, but if it were imposed on them by force, what then?

10. I repeated that His Majesty's Government desired unity in Turkey on the line I had indicated. Their desire to see representatives from Angora in the Turkish delegation was based on a wish to bring Angora into touch with realities. A man sitting on the top of a mountain quickly lost touch with the world of fact. His Majesty's Government wished that Angora should see through the eyes of its delegates in a Western milieu what the true situation was.

11. The Sultan said he knew his Mustapha Kemal well. You had not and he in London for twenty or thirty years, replace him on the top of the world in twenty-four hours, and he would at once revert to type. His Majesty had no hope whatsoever that Angora would except the Latins and the Greeks there would prefer to carry on their movement. He quoted the Turkish proverb which says that "The wolf loves the air of a dog." Izzet Pasha and his colleagues had returned from the interior. He had seen the three chief members of Izzet Pasha's Mission collectively. They had been a little shy perhaps of talking quite openly before each other. Nevertheless, the general information they gave was most discouraging. He doubted whether if a mission had been sent to Moscow it would have been treated with so much contumely as Izzet Pasha's Mission had been treated in Angora.

12. The Sultan consulted a short memorandum of five numbered points to which he said he wished to draw my particular attention. They were as follows:—

- (1) The Caliphate was in principle conferred by the procedure called *Ber at* in rendering of homage. It was possible that the Angora leaders would set up a Caliph of their own and compel a semblance of the formal rendering of homage, which was the mark of acceptance by the people.
- (2) The rule of succession in his dynasty invested all the male descendants of the Imperial House with a right to the reversion of the throne. The Angora leaders were capable of taking advantage of that fact to set up some junior member of his House as Sultan.
- (2.) The connection between the Sultanate and the Caliphate was that of two complementary parts of a single whole. The Caliphate was not like the Papacy. Temporal power was an adjunct essential to its completeness. The pretension of the Angora leaders to transfer all temporal power in Turkey to their own Government was likely to be followed by a transference of the Caliphate. It might be vested in some prince set up as Sultan, or, failing that, some sheriff or such like, with a semblance of the qualification of power.

- 4.) The removal of the Caliphate from Constantinople would be fraught with disastrous consequences. He was speaking now of his own position, but of the general interest of Europe. If the Caliphate were taken eastward from a place in which it was under control, it would become an instrument in the hands of uncontrollable elements, "the wolves who loved the air of a fog."
- (5.) The financial situation of the Constantinople Government rendered it completely powerless. Even here the bulk of the people were under the influence of fear or poverty. Officials were flying to the interior from the destitution to which they had been reduced here. Tewfik Pasha reported that your Lordship had shown a benevolent spirit in regard to the financial situation, but had said that a definite result must depend on his (the Grand Vizier's) further conversations in Paris.

13. I noted the Sultan's first four points without discussion. As regards the fifth, I said that my French colleague and I were exerting ourselves equally to bring about a settlement of certain outstanding questions of money claimed by the Turkish Government, notably those with the Tobacco Regie, with the Eastern Telegraph Company, and with the French Government in respect of moneys obtained from the Turkish Treasury in the armistice. I agreed with an interpolation of the Sultan that relief from such claims would be temporary, but observed that a settlement of the customs question would give relief of a more lasting kind. I explained the controversy which was delaying this settlement, and intimated that the ultimate settlement on a basis which the Allies had throughout proposed, namely, a return to the *ad valorem* system.

14. The Sultan was not an expert in finance. There was evidently some misunderstanding about the customs question which could only be cleared up by the Grand Vizier. The fact which impressed him was the poverty which the Government had lost its head. The last Government had lost its head completely. The present Government was no better off and was moreover, subject to occult influences.

15. The Sultan went on to speak more particularly about his personal position. He said that a change of Government might have to be faced on Tewfik Pasha's return. He had no doubt that Tewfik Pasha would be a part with him. Tewfik Pasha was, however, a man who might find his position untenable or he might wish to resign for personal reasons. His Majesty referred to his own position as being one of complete helplessness and isolation, and referred to conversations with my predecessor in which he had foreshadowed such a situation. He was asked to make his submission to a handful of rogues. He was prepared to make any personal sacrifice, but he could not sacrifice his honour. He was prepared to compromise the interests of his throne by a submission to a handful of rogues. He desired unity, but it could only be on the basis of a submission to a handful of rogues. He had lawful authority, and yet he found himself in a position of helplessness.

16. In this part of the conversation the Sultan spoke to me with great frankness and candour. I was able to give him very little comfort. I could only thank him before withdrawing for the great interest he had reposed in me.

I am, Sir,
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner

Enclosure is N 1

Memorandum

SINCE I last had the honour of being received by your Majesty the general situation has very much changed. I therefore suggested to my colleagues that we should wait until you had been informed of the latest developments. I have now the pleasure to inform you that the situation in Turkey is such that we are now in a position to make a submission to your Majesty. We are now in a position to make a submission to your Majesty. We are now in a position to make a submission to your Majesty.

not fail to inform Lord Curzon of this message. In reply he had authorised me to convey to your Majesty an expression of the great sympathy with which His Majesty's Government were following the progress of the Turkish Revolution. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Majesty's message of the 10th inst. and to inform you that I have the pleasure to inform you that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference are now being considered by the British Government. I have the pleasure to inform you that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference are now being considered by the British Government. I have the pleasure to inform you that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference are now being considered by the British Government.

When it was decided that the recent Conference should be held in London, His Majesty's Government were very anxious to have the Turkish Revolution dealt with in a way which would be satisfactory to all the Powers. I have the pleasure to inform you that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference are now being considered by the British Government. I have the pleasure to inform you that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference are now being considered by the British Government. I have the pleasure to inform you that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference are now being considered by the British Government.

His Majesty's Government are now in a position to make a submission to your Majesty. We are now in a position to make a submission to your Majesty. We are now in a position to make a submission to your Majesty. We are now in a position to make a submission to your Majesty. We are now in a position to make a submission to your Majesty.

The proposals recently formulated provide a most favourable opportunity for Turkey. It is all Turks unite under your Majesty to take advantage of the opportunity. There is a strong hope that this country will enter on a new era of prosperity, that the Turkish Revolution will be a success. I have the pleasure to inform you that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference are now being considered by the British Government. I have the pleasure to inform you that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference are now being considered by the British Government. I have the pleasure to inform you that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference are now being considered by the British Government.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE AND SYRIA.

E 351 351 88]

No. 72

Sir R. Graham to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 7)

N 5]

M. Lord,

The Hague, January 3, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the first great Zionist meeting held in this country took place in the concert hall at Amsterdam yesterday afternoon. Dr. Weizmann and M. Katsenelenbogen were the principal speakers.

I had been invited to be present as the representative of the mandatory Power, and in accordance with the authority conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram No. 137 of the 28th ultimo, I attended the meeting.

The great concert hall, where the first Zionist meeting was held, was turned away at the doors. The hall was decorated with the Dutch, British and Zionist flags.

M. A. Ancher, President of the Zionist Council of Amsterdam, was in the chair and in a short speech welcomed the guests present and after which he called upon me to address the meeting.

I received an extremely cordial welcome, and, in thanking the audience, I expressed my confidence towards the Jewish people and their High Commissioner of the Jewish faith in the shape of that distinguished statesman and public servant, Sir H. Samuel, was an earnest of the spirit in which they were approaching their task.

After a reference to the difficulties confronting the Zionists, which could only be overcome by perseverance, patience and united effort, I paid a tribute to the Jewish people and their High Commissioner, and made a reference to the Jewish Legion. After expressing pleasure at the meeting one of the most venerable and distinguished Jews in the world, I wished all success and prosperity to the Jewish national movement.

At the conclusion of this brief address, the audience rose and cheered for me.

I was indeed astonished at the cordiality of my reception, and at the enthusiasm with which every reference to Great Britain and the British Government was met.

A Zionist sitting next to me remarked, "You see that these people really understand how much His Majesty's Government have done, and are doing, for the Zionist cause, and that they are glad to seize an opportunity of showing their gratitude."

M. Jabotinsky in an impassioned speech which was much applauded, appealed for the help of the British Government in the Jewish State, which was loudly cheered.

M. Weizmann, who was very warmly received, delivered an extremely eloquent and stirring speech in which he enumerated the difficulties confronting the administration in Palestine, referred with discretion to the attitude of the French Government and of the Arabs, and pointed out that the British Government, who had already done so much, could not be expected to bear the entire burden, and that the ultimate success of the venture depended upon the support which it received from the British people.

He was received an ovation at the end of his speech.

The meeting terminated with a few words from the chairman, and with the singing of the Zionist hymn.

In conversation this afternoon the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs told me upon the great success that it had been, and said that he thought it rather remarkable that an audience composed of Amsterdam Jews, whose language was generally German and who were supposed to be under German influence, should have given me, and should have cheered all references to His Majesty's Government. I could only agree with his Excellency.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

E 440 144 88]

No. 73

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921)

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

Immigration of Jews into Palestine	1,184
Number endeavouring to enter without passports	1,160
	18
	1

1. All Jewish immigrants entering Palestine under the auspices of the Zionist Organisation are guaranteed by that body for one year from the date of their arrival.
2. The Government are absorbed into the labour of the country under the direction of the Zionist Organisation.

a.) Under the Direct Control of the Zionist Commission.

A certain but as yet small number are employed in agricultural work and in reclaiming the land with a view to establishing new settlements. This work is costly and necessitates considerable capital outlay, and in consequence the number that can be thus employed is for the present small.

b.) On Contract Work with the Public Works Department, Military Authorities and the Palestine Railway.

There is a considerable demand for skilled labour, and those of the immigrants whose capacity is up to the required standard have no difficulty in finding employment with good wages.

Unskilled labourers are drafted by the Jewish Palestinian Labour Organisation. The Zionist Commission becomes the contracting party for the work undertaken. The work undertaken includes the building of roads for the Public Works Department and the army, and the construction and repair work for the Palestine railways.

The number employed by the Palestine Railway will shortly be increased as soon as arrangements can be made for the employment of the Labour Corps by immigrant labour.

No preferential treatment is shown to immigrant labour, which is paid the same as local current rates.

I have, &c.
HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

E 441 35 88

No. 74

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921)

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

M. Lord,

N 5]

Immigration of Jews into Palestine	1,184
Number endeavouring to enter without passports	1,160
	18
	1

1. All Jewish immigrants entering Palestine under the auspices of the Zionist Organisation are guaranteed by that body for one year from the date of their arrival.
2. The Government are absorbed into the labour of the country under the direction of the Zionist Organisation.

a.) Under the Direct Control of the Zionist Commission.

A certain but as yet small number are employed in agricultural work and in reclaiming the land with a view to establishing new settlements. This work is costly and necessitates considerable capital outlay, and in consequence the number that can be thus employed is for the present small.

b.) On Contract Work with the Public Works Department, Military Authorities and the Palestine Railway.

There is a considerable demand for skilled labour, and those of the immigrants whose capacity is up to the required standard have no difficulty in finding employment with good wages.

Unskilled labourers are drafted by the Jewish Palestinian Labour Organisation. The Zionist Commission becomes the contracting party for the work undertaken. The work undertaken includes the building of roads for the Public Works Department and the army, and the construction and repair work for the Palestine railways.

The number employed by the Palestine Railway will shortly be increased as soon as arrangements can be made for the employment of the Labour Corps by immigrant labour.

No preferential treatment is shown to immigrant labour, which is paid the same as local current rates.

I have, &c.
HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

I have the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch No. 137 of the 28th ultimo, and to the Elected Assembly.

The Zionist Executive shall give to the Jewish population in Palestine a share in the control of the affairs of the Central Zionist Organisation in Palestine and in the institutions appertaining to that organisation.

I have, &c.
HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner.

the two officers of the garrison, and they walked in procession to the grotto immediately behind the Patriarch.

The Spanish and Italian consuls were there unofficially.

There were present in the church three French naval officers and about six military officers other than those of the detachment.

December 26, 1920.

[E 500 500 88]

No. 77

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10)

No. 243.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 1, 1921

THE finances of the towns of Palestine are not in a satisfactory state, and their present incomes are not sufficient to enable the many improvements that are necessary and are desired by their inhabitants to be effected.

I therefore appointed a commission, on the 17th September 1920, to examine the existing sources of revenue of municipalities in Palestine and the methods of collection, and to report what changes, if any, were desirable.

2. The report for the Municipality of Jerusalem has now been received and a copy is forwarded herewith. It is a comprehensive and lucid document, drafted by Mr J B Barron, assistant financial secretary, the chairman of the commission.

3. Since municipal taxation throughout Palestine is levied in accordance with Ottoman enactments and regulations issued by the late Military Administration of general application throughout the country, this report may be regarded *mutatis mutandis*, as applicable to all municipalities in Palestine. The special circumstances of each will, however, be made the subject of further investigation, the two Government members of the commission remaining as a permanent nucleus, and the local members being changed as each town is visited in turn.

4. The revenues of municipalities are collected under three authorities—

(1) Ottoman Municipal Tax Law of 1330 (1915)

(2) Various Ottoman laws and decrees authorising the collection of special fees, e.g. lease fees, shooting licences, &c.

(3) Proclamations and notices issued by the late Military Administration which sanction the imposition of a house rate, octroi dues, licensing of trade establishments and sanitary dues.

5. The Ottoman Municipal Tax Law of 1330 (1915) was promulgated during the war, and was enforced after the abolition of the Capitulations by the Turkish Government.

It is in part a consolidating enactment, but in so far as it imposes new taxes which had not already been accepted by the Powers prior to the war, I am advised that the law is only legally valid as regards foreigners during the period in which military law is maintained.

It will, therefore, be necessary for the Government to pass an ordinance legalising new municipal taxation imposed after the abolition of the Capitulations and any additional local taxes sanctioned by the late Military Administration.

6. I attach a copy of the Ottoman Municipal Law of 1330, from which it will be observed that local taxes on immovable property provide for an addition of 10 per cent to the State house tax, the imposition of fees calculated upon the floor space of newly erected buildings, and a tax upon the rental value of public houses and all establishments used for public entertainments. A licence is also required for the occupation of stalls and booths situated on public roads.

Article 25 states that taxes not referred to in the law which are levied in accordance with local custom should continue to be levied as hitherto. In Palestine rates are levied under this article for the purpose of maintaining public security and for watering roads. The late Military Administration in certain towns consolidated these taxes into a house rate, abolishing the 10 per cent addition to the State house tax. This new rate is not in general application throughout all municipalities, but is levied in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza and Tulkeram only.

Besides these rates the Municipal Tax Law provided for licensing fees levied upon combustible liquids, fuel-driven machinery, road transport, hawkers and pedlars, weights and measures, dogs and advertisements. Auction dues are levied upon sales of animals and movable property and for all animals slaughtered within the municipal area there are charges for inspection.

Miscellaneous provisions of the law relate to municipal trading, the division between the State and the municipality of profits gained by public companies, and the levy of "betterment" fees.

The recommendations of the report of the commission involve a consideration of the immunities enjoyed by ecclesiastical communities under the Capitulations and various foreign treaties.

The commission recommends—

"That the rights of immunity from local taxation now exercised by ecclesiastical and certain civil institutions, and persons, i.e., consuls, be examined and abolished wherever possible."

So far as civil institutions and consuls are concerned I submit that no special exemptions should be maintained.

The question of immunity from the general taxation of the country will no doubt receive the consideration of His Majesty's Government, but as regards local taxation I am in full agreement with the view that schools, orphanages, and hospitals as well as places of public worship should continue to enjoy immunity, but that other places of worship which are not used exclusively for charitable objects, such as monasteries and hostels, should be rateable for conservancy services carried out by the municipality, e.g. street watering, drainage, lighting, water supply, &c. and should be assessed at the same rate as the other buildings.

Administration replaced by the British Administration, and it is recommended that buildings used by ecclesiastical institutions should be rated at a reduction of 50 per cent. for purposes of the house rate.

The recommendations concerning the house rate propose to place the burden of the rate upon the owner of the building. Ecclesiastical institutions are large holders of property, and the rate upon them would be passed on to the occupiers. The recommendations also propose to place the burden of the rate upon the occupier of the building. The rate upon the occupier would be passed on to the occupiers. The rate upon the occupier would be passed on to the occupiers.

Property of this nature may be regarded as revenue producing and not charitable in purpose other than for the provision of funds for the institution concerned, and I am inclined to the view that the owners should be assessed to rates on the same footing as lay proprietors.

It may be observed that after the British Administration was established in Cyprus, Law No. XXI of 1920, the collection of a local octroi duty of 1 per cent, *ad valorem* upon all articles whether imported from abroad or of Palestinian origin. The new tax was proposed to replace the *kantar* tax levied under Article 17 of the Municipal Tax Law, which allowed goods to be taxed at a tariff calculated on weight and measurement. In certain cases, however, and the *kantar* duties are being levied, the first upon foreign goods and the second upon home products.

It is recognised that in the present insufficiency of municipal revenues and having regard to the fact that expenditure is likely to increase in the immediate future, it is proposed to abolish the octroi through it is a source of revenue which is not likely to be replaced. The commission recommends that the octroi should be replaced by a municipal addition of 1 per cent to the import duty.

I concur with this proposal which will have the effect of replacing the octroi by a tax upon agricultural produce. The duty is levied at local level and gives rise to abuses in collection, which are not likely to be replaced. The commission recommends that the octroi should be replaced by a municipal addition of 1 per cent to the import duty.

The commission also recommends that the octroi should be replaced by a municipal addition of 1 per cent to the import duty. The commission also recommends that the octroi should be replaced by a municipal addition of 1 per cent to the import duty.

The commission also recommends that the octroi should be replaced by a municipal addition of 1 per cent to the import duty. The commission also recommends that the octroi should be replaced by a municipal addition of 1 per cent to the import duty.

The commission also recommends that the octroi should be replaced by a municipal addition of 1 per cent to the import duty. The commission also recommends that the octroi should be replaced by a municipal addition of 1 per cent to the import duty.

increase in the volume of imports, which may be anticipated may yield a sufficient sum to make good the deficit, without recourse to additional taxation.

9. Under various grants from the Sultans and the Treaty of Maylene of the 6th November 1901, the Municipality of Jerusalem has been enabled to meet its expenses. The Commission has been instructed to consider the question of the payment of the 1 per cent. duty on goods imported into the Municipality of Jerusalem, whether the duty is absorbed into the price paid by the purchaser whether an ecclesiastical person or otherwise.

I agree with the recommendation of the commission that the 1 per cent. additional duty should cover consignments of goods to the Municipality of Jerusalem whether in the enjoyment of rights of immunity from customs or not.

10. With respect to other recommendations of the commission the following modifications are proposed before they are put into operation

- (a.) Page 113, paragraph 15 (6). A uniform rate of 5 per cent. to be substituted for the differential rates proposed.
- (b.) Page 113, paragraph 15 (7). The limitation: not more than twenty rooms to be omitted.
- (c.) Page 114, paragraph 19. The valuation of vacant building land and the imposition of a rate upon its capital value to be postponed for further consideration at a later date.
- (d.) Page 121, paragraph 12 (7). This proposal to be omitted.
- (e.) Page 123, paragraphs 13 (3) (b) (i)-(ii). A single licence to be substituted.
- (f.) Page 124, paragraph 14 (5), and Page 125, paragraph 16. To be considered.
- (g.) Page 125, paragraph 18. It is now intended to abolish all tobacco licences and restrictions on sale.
- (h.) Page 126, paragraph 20. Some minor amendments to be made in the title of the regulation, the scale of fees.
- (i.) Page 130, paragraph 4. To be further considered.
- (j.) Page 132, paragraph 10. It is proposed to constitute a Petty Sessional Court, consisting of honorary Justices of the Peace, rather than to constitute the municipality itself as a court to try cases against municipal bye laws.

11. An ordinance is being prepared to give effect to such recommendations of the commission as call for legislation and to consolidate, amend, and repeal the existing laws of the Municipality of Jerusalem.

I would point out that as many improvements are urgently needed in the Municipality of Jerusalem, which can be paid for only by the Municipality, the matter is one that calls for very early attention.

I have, &c.
HERBERT SAMUEL
High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 77

Report of the Municipal Tax Commission for Jerusalem

NOTE BY CHAIRMAN OF COMMISSION

Your Excellency,
ACCORDING to the instructions contained in the terms of reference, the commission assembled and commenced its sittings in Jerusalem on the 24th October 1920.

The commission in reviewing the revenue of the Municipality of Jerusalem was able in certain instances to render assistance to the Municipality in the management of its affairs within the municipal limits.

At the instance of the District Governor of Jerusalem it was decided to request Mr. C. R. Ashbee, Civic Advisor, Jerusalem, to be in attendance. The report of the commission is appended.

I have, &c.
J. B. BARRON, Chairman

Financial Secretary's Office, Jerusalem
November 20, 1920

TERMS OF REFERENCE

HIS Excellency the High Commissioner has been pleased to appoint the following gentlemen, viz.:

Mr. J. B. Barron, O.B.E., M.C., Chairman
Mr. H. C. Luke, Acting District Secretary
Mr. E. Keith Roach, Assistant District Secretary
Hagheh Bey Nashasboohy, Mayor of Jerusalem
Mr. D. Yellin, M.B.E., Vice-Mayor of Jerusalem
Mr. Y. Farahy, Vice-Mayor of Jerusalem; and
Mr. E. Shelley, Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, Jerusalem.

to be a commission to investigate and report on the following question:

"To examine the existing sources of revenue of the Municipality of Jerusalem and the methods of collection, and to report what changes, if any, are desirable."

1. His Excellency has been pleased to appoint Mr. Barron to be chairman of the commission.
2. It is his Excellency's desire that the commission should assemble and begin its sittings in Jerusalem at the earliest possible date.

W. H. DEEDS, District Secretary

Government House, Jerusalem
September 17, 1920

REPORT

PART I—PRIVILEGES

Introductory

1. The revenues of the Municipality of Jerusalem are collected under powers laid down in the Ottoman Code, and under various public notices, and proclamations issued by the British authorities since the occupation. The different authorities may be summarised as follows:—

- (1.) Ottoman Municipal Tax Law, dated the 15th March, 1380 (see Appendix I) in operation throughout the municipalities of Palestine
- (2.) Ottoman laws and decrees authorising the collection of

Lease fees
Shooting licences
Office tax

- (3.) Proclamations and public notices issued since the occupation of Jerusalem which authorise the collection of

House rate
Octroi
Licensing of unhealthy and dangerous trades
Sanitary fees
Advertisement hoarding tax.

2. The estimated receipts for the current financial year are £ E 38 906 (see Appendix II).

400

Municipal rates and taxes levied on immovable property are thus payable by all persons without regard to their nationality.

It may therefore be necessary for the Government as soon as the Mandate is declared, to pass an enactment legalising municipal taxation.

Military Privileges

[illegible]

3 The commission is of opinion that the question of exemption should receive the earnest consideration of the Government, the more so as it finds that Muslim Wakfs are not subject to, and do not claim, exemption from local taxation

Ecclesiastical Privileges

Roman Catholic institutions under the protection of France from any attacks on real estate and from customs dues which would threaten the continuance of their work.

has resulted in these establishments being converted into hotels. The proprietors are thereby placed at an unfair disadvantage, since he is subject to all State and local taxation.

In Jerusalem the foreign religious establishments pay a tax on the land they occupy, which is levied with the result that the layman bears an extra burden of local taxation to make good the loss in revenue thus sustained.

PART II—RATES ON IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

House Rate and Legality

2 The first of local taxes in natural order is a tax upon land and house property. In Federal territory there is no tax levied upon land (see paragraph 16 at seq.). The municipal taxes for services rendered by the waterworks and fire department were estimated for a rate amounting to one percentum per annum for the year 1910. The new tax must be supported by a law enacted by the Municipal Law Council so that the expenses for maintaining and working would be met from the revenue collected under the Government Water Tax. Article I of the Municipal Tax Law of 1890. The rates to be charged for the waterworks and fire departments and for the maintenance of public security which are not referred to separately will be responsible to be levied either as a special rate or to be met from the general revenue of the Municipality. The former has been

6 The Ottoman Public Debt and the Régie des Tabacs are under the articles of their respective concessions immune from local taxation of all kinds.

Officer stated that the new consanguated rate was not strictly in accord with the provisions of Article 369 of the "Manual of Military Law," but that the Chief Administrator was sufficient. On this decision the Magistrates, or the Courts, were empowered to order distraint on property in the ratepayer question the legislative authority for legalising municipal taxation when Military Law ceases to operate.

Assessment

3. The house rate was assessed by a committee of two persons who estimated the annual rental value of property. No allowance was made for expenditure on the reparation of property, as it was assumed that the total incidence would fall upon the occupier for all forms of house property, i.e., trade premises, warehouses and dwelling houses. The rate is fixed at 5 per cent. of the rental value calculated for a period of 352 days.

The following particulars show the assessment for Jerusalem.

Within the Walls.		Outside the Wall	
Annual Rent.	No. of	Annual Rent.	No. of
£ 1	1	£ 1	1
£ 2	1	£ 2	1
£ 3	1	£ 3	1
£ 4	1	£ 4	1
£ 5	1	£ 5	1
£ 6	1	£ 6	1
£ 7	1	£ 7	1
£ 8	1	£ 8	1
£ 9	1	£ 9	1
£ 10	1	£ 10	1
£ 11	1	£ 11	1
£ 12	1	£ 12	1
£ 13	1	£ 13	1
£ 14	1	£ 14	1
£ 15	1	£ 15	1
£ 16	1	£ 16	1
£ 17	1	£ 17	1
£ 18	1	£ 18	1
£ 19	1	£ 19	1
£ 20	1	£ 20	1
£ 21	1	£ 21	1
£ 22	1	£ 22	1
£ 23	1	£ 23	1
£ 24	1	£ 24	1
£ 25	1	£ 25	1
£ 26	1	£ 26	1
£ 27	1	£ 27	1
£ 28	1	£ 28	1
£ 29	1	£ 29	1
£ 30	1	£ 30	1
£ 31	1	£ 31	1
£ 32	1	£ 32	1
£ 33	1	£ 33	1
£ 34	1	£ 34	1
£ 35	1	£ 35	1
£ 36	1	£ 36	1
£ 37	1	£ 37	1
£ 38	1	£ 38	1
£ 39	1	£ 39	1
£ 40	1	£ 40	1
£ 41	1	£ 41	1
£ 42	1	£ 42	1
£ 43	1	£ 43	1
£ 44	1	£ 44	1
£ 45	1	£ 45	1
£ 46	1	£ 46	1
£ 47	1	£ 47	1
£ 48	1	£ 48	1
£ 49	1	£ 49	1
£ 50	1	£ 50	1
£ 51	1	£ 51	1
£ 52	1	£ 52	1
£ 53	1	£ 53	1
£ 54	1	£ 54	1
£ 55	1	£ 55	1
£ 56	1	£ 56	1
£ 57	1	£ 57	1
£ 58	1	£ 58	1
£ 59	1	£ 59	1
£ 60	1	£ 60	1
£ 61	1	£ 61	1
£ 62	1	£ 62	1
£ 63	1	£ 63	1
£ 64	1	£ 64	1
£ 65	1	£ 65	1
£ 66	1	£ 66	1
£ 67	1	£ 67	1
£ 68	1	£ 68	1
£ 69	1	£ 69	1
£ 70	1	£ 70	1
£ 71	1	£ 71	1
£ 72	1	£ 72	1
£ 73	1	£ 73	1
£ 74	1	£ 74	1
£ 75	1	£ 75	1
£ 76	1	£ 76	1
£ 77	1	£ 77	1
£ 78	1	£ 78	1
£ 79	1	£ 79	1
£ 80	1	£ 80	1
£ 81	1	£ 81	1
£ 82	1	£ 82	1
£ 83	1	£ 83	1
£ 84	1	£ 84	1
£ 85	1	£ 85	1
£ 86	1	£ 86	1
£ 87	1	£ 87	1
£ 88	1	£ 88	1
£ 89	1	£ 89	1
£ 90	1	£ 90	1
£ 91	1	£ 91	1
£ 92	1	£ 92	1
£ 93	1	£ 93	1
£ 94	1	£ 94	1
£ 95	1	£ 95	1
£ 96	1	£ 96	1
£ 97	1	£ 97	1
£ 98	1	£ 98	1
£ 99	1	£ 99	1
£ 100	1	£ 100	1

The rate is levied upon property of which the rental value is £ E. 4 or over. The total annual value of rateable property is therefore £ E. 1,271. This assessment was made previous to the financial year 1919-1920 when it first came into operation.

Collection and its Difficulties

4. For the financial year 1919-1920 the sum of £ E. 2,976 was collected. The estimates for the current year, 1920-1921, are £ E. 4,000. Considerable difficulty is experienced in collecting the rate. The assessment committee did not include in its list of rateable properties the properties of ecclesiastical institutions, hospitals, schools, and other charitable organisations were assessed at an exceedingly low rate. The rental value of these properties is as follows—

Within the walls	£ E
Outside the walls	9,104
	13,006
	22,172

The rate due upon this valuation is £ E. 1,006.

Properties of this category of property would bear an increase of 50 per cent. without such a valuation being in any way excessive.

5. Ecclesiastical communities, hospitals, and schools under the control of foreign subjects have for the most part refused to pay rates, contesting the right of the municipality to impose this tax on them. The Capitulations and various foreign treaties granted them exemption from the "impôt foncier." They, therefore, do not contribute proportionately to the municipal revenue.

The rate is levied upon property of which the rental value is £ E. 4 or over. The total annual value of rateable property is therefore £ E. 1,271. This assessment was made previous to the financial year 1919-1920 when it first came into operation.

provided with such dwellings, are not necessarily indigent. In many instances such persons have refused to acknowledge the legality of the rate.

6. Immunity has been claimed by the personnel of His Majesty's forces, and by Government officials who reside within the municipal area as private individuals. They have exercised against persons residing in the municipal area.

7. Under the Law of 15 Rabi Awal (see Part V, Leases and Fines), lessors are compelled to register leases. As a result of this, it is not possible for tax collecting officials of the municipality to follow the ramifications of sub-letting. No special regulations have been enforced compounding the rate for tenements, &c., and for placing the onus of payment upon the landlord.

8. The municipality has not tested the legality of the house rate in the courts. The municipality has not tested the legality of the house rate in the courts. This has resulted in only 50 per cent. of the total rate being estimated for the current financial year.

9. The commission desires to call the attention of the Government to this unparalleled state of affairs.

Rents (Tenements)

10. The military Administration issued an ordinance on 20 June 1919 and of the 13th June, 1920, which protected tenants against excessive increases in rent. The maximum increases that might be charged to a fixed percentage. The Governor of Jerusalem, under powers conferred upon him by the ordinance, issued an order on 10 June 1920, which provided that the rent should not exceed the previous rent by 7 per cent. in the case of tenements.

The assessment made in 1919 was 10 per cent. in the case of business premises. It was, moreover, hastily carried out, admittedly provisional and subject to revision. It may be generally assumed and no fixed procedure or instructions were laid down. It may be generally assumed that the subsequent increase in rents allowed under the ordinance of 1920 has not been considered in estimating the current year rates, and, with the exception of leases extending over a period of one year, the full advantage of its terms. An average increase of 8½ per cent. upon the 1919 valuation would raise the rateable value to £ E. 201,019, and the annual rate from £ E. 9,200 to £ E. 10,550.

State House and Land Tax

11. State taxes on immovable property consist of a land and house tax, the valuation being made upon the capital value of property. The assessment was carried out some thirty years ago and the registers are therefore completely out of date. It is not obligatory for heirs to re-register on succession, and as a consequence the Government registers cannot be considered as providing accurate data. It may be assumed that the total value of the property is £ E. 1,271.

House tax	£ E
Land tax	5,358
	6,843
	11,601

The rate fixed at 10 per mille for non-tithable lands and for buildings used as business premises or for hire. A comparison of the capital value of central and local valuations gives the following figures—

	Buildings	Lands
	£ E	£ E
State	535,600	664,300
Municipal	3,350,310	—

The local valuation includes the site value of buildings. The site value and the construction value are erected, and accordingly no division is made between the site value and the construction value.

Article I of the Municipal Tax Law of 1930 provided that local authorities should have allocated to them a share of the Government tax on immovable property.

In Jerusalem, where a house rate is in force, this has been cancelled. It would appear, however, that as there is no local rate upon agricultural land the municipality is technically entitled to a share of the land tax.

Law of June 14, 1926 (1906)

12. The Ottoman Government promulgated a law for the taxation of buildings. The procedure as regards the house tax established the principle of a new valuation to be made every five years.

The law cancels the existing State tax with any subsequent amendments and additions and provides that—

The amount of the tax will be determined by the Government, and an additional tax for educational and local purposes may be added to it (Article I).

It therefore maintains the principle already laid down in the old law that the Government is responsible for the collection of the tax, and that it is the duty of local authorities to impose, through the municipality, a local rate.

The new law was not brought into operation in Palestine, and it may further be observed that it recognises the existing immunities granted under special firmans.

Recommendations. Buildings

13. From a consideration of the foregoing paragraphs the commission is inclined to the view that the Government should undertake a new valuation of buildings based upon rental value as outlined in the Law of the 14th June, 1926. The rate of 12½ per cent. on the annual value is high when the present excessive scale of rents is considered.

The increase in rents has more than kept pace with the increased cost of living. The present scale of rents is such that a rate of 12½ per cent. on the annual value would produce the sum of £ E. 16,750 on a total valuation of £ E. 201,010 (see paragraph 10). The division of this amount is as follows:

	£ E
State	9,700
Municipality	7,050
	16,750

The commission is of opinion that a new apportionment would show a considerable increase on these figures. The advantages attached to one State rate and one local rate leads the commission to press this view upon the Government. It is not, however, to be taken as a recommendation for the immediate future. It desires, however, to observe that the Law of the 24th June, 1926, has placed an instrument in the hands of the Government which would enable it to do so.

Equalisation of Rates

14. The introduction of a new method of assessing State and local taxes upon buildings brings forward an important consideration. The equal division of the tax between the State and the municipality is an important one. While the primary incidence in any marked degree it may however remove the burden from the owner to the tenant. The commission is of opinion that the tax being paid by the owner, the more so as an extensive system of sub-letting is prevalent.

15. Assuming that the Government is not in a position to modify immediately the existing regulations of the house tax, the commission records the following recommendations:—

The commission recommends—

- (1) That the municipality should be given authority to increase the house rate up to a maximum duty of 7½ per cent. of the annual value of buildings, as and when the expenditure of the municipality justifies an increase upon the existing percentage.
- (2) That the collection of the rate be undertaken by the Government, who shall make a new valuation in conjunction with the municipality assisted by representatives of ratepayers.
- (3) That the rate include within its valuation, privately owned gardens, adjacent to the building such gardens, &c., not being subject to the land rate.
- (4) That leases should be made for a period of twelve calendar months as opposed to the Hijra year.
- (5) That the rate be payable by all sections of the community without regard to nationality, and that the immunities enjoyed by ecclesiastical and other communities be abrogated.
- (6) That having regard to the power of tenants of business premises to pass on to the public, in the shape of increased fees or prices, the whole or part of the rate the municipal rate upon business premises be fixed at 5½ per cent. and that on dwelling houses at 4½ per cent. for the forthcoming financial year, such rates being assessed on the new valuation.
- (7) That a rebate of 50 per cent. be allowed upon empty buildings, dwelling houses and business premises when containing not more than twenty empty rooms.

Land Rate

16. The municipality has not imposed a rate upon land. Real property within the city area is for the most part "mulk," which is the absolute property of its owner, and can be disposed of by him as he wills, without restrictions, save for such general conditions as are laid down for all classes of land. At present the owner of built-up property is subject to a rate, while the possessor of unoccupied land, often not usable for agricultural purposes, is untaxed though he may be holding up a probable building site for speculation.

The value of land is so much increased by the action of social conditions, that it forms a most suitable mark for local taxation that the wants of urban societies make necessary.

The commission is of opinion that it is highly desirable that a rate should be imposed on land.

17. Land near a growing town, which is still used for agriculture, may yield very little nett rent, and yet be a valuable property. For its future ground rents are anticipated in its capital, and further its ownership is likely to yield an income of satisfaction outside of the money rent received for it. In this case it is apt to be under assessed even when rated at its full rental value, and the question arises whether it should not be assessed at a percentage on its capital value instead of a percentage on its rent.—"Marshall's Principles of Economics—Rates on Site Values."

The above extract supplies an authoritative argument in favour of a land rate being assessed upon capital value and not upon annual value. The city boundaries of Jerusalem include valuable building sites which are at present being utilised as agricultural land and until such a time as the restrictions on land transfers and sales are removed it may be surmised that considerable areas will be retained under single ownership and not divided and offered to the public as building lots. The effect of the present land regulations should theoretically place no bar upon unrestricted sales, but in practice it will be found that in urban areas the selling public is holding up land for speculative purposes, the hope that future regulations may permit of unrestricted transfers at no distant date.

The commission is of opinion that the unoccupied land rate should be divided into two categories—

- (1) A rate upon the annual agricultural value of land.
- (2) A rate upon the capital building value of land, after deducting the agricultural value of the site.

18. The direct result of the imposition of such a rate would be to stimulate the building of more houses. Owners would obtain a financial return from vacant building sites by letting or selling them for building purposes. The amount capable of being raised by a special site-valuation is speculative, but the tax should be regarded in the nature of a local policy tax. It must also be borne in mind that the expenditure of ratepayers' money upon improvements such as new roads, public parks, drainage, lighting, &c., enhances the value of sites although the fortunate owners have not expended capital on such improvements.

Recommendations. Land Rate

19. The Commission recommends—

- (1) That a land rate be imposed upon vacant building and agricultural land within the municipal area;
- (2) That the rate should take the form of
 - (a) A rate of 5 per cent. upon the annual agricultural value of land
 - (b) A special rate upon the difference of the capital agricultural value and the probable capital building value of land
- (3) That the valuation of land and the collection of the rate should be undertaken by the State on behalf of the local authorities
- (4) That gardens, open spaces or lands scheduled in the Town Planning Ordinance, or such open spaces which may be exempted from being built upon in the public interest, shall not be rated above the agricultural rate

20. The Commission is unable to propose a rate of assessment for the proposal outlined in paragraph 19 sub-paragraph 2 (b) as no accurate data are available of the area affected. The last State valuation gives the capital value of land as £ E. 664,300 within the city area. An approximate valuation would result in a large increase on this value, and the commission is inclined to the view that the new rate should include the State tax upon mulk and mirie property. It is of opinion that there will be no financial loss to the general revenues of Palestine should the Government find it desirable to consolidate the State tax and the local rate retaining a share of the revenues accruing from the new valuation.

Town Planning Ordinance

21. Part IV of the Town Planning Ordinance lays down its financial provisions including the institution of a "betterment tax." Where outlay is incurred on behalf of a limited class of owners they may be justly required to pay for the peculiar advantage that they have obtained. The commission desires to record that the administrators and owners of the "bettered" property may form widely different estimates as to the value of the improvements in question and in such cases the latter will not always be mistaken. The proof of benefits bestowed must be clear and well established and the amount diffused over the general community. It would be desirable that special assessments should be payable in instalments.

PART III—OCTROI AND KANTAR TAXES, MARKET FEES

Scope of Enquiry

1. The commission in discussing the question of octroi is unable to approach this subject without extending the scope of its enquiry to Palestine. The local conditions of taxation prevalent in Jerusalem are similar to those of many other towns, affecting the rural population as well as the townsman.

Octroi and Kantar Taxes

2. The total collection of octroi and kantar taxes for the country are estimated to amount to the sum of £ E. 55,840 for the current financial year, and the expenditure upon collection to £ E. 1,500. The low rate of expenditure compared to the receipts is explained by the fact that many municipalities place these taxes out to contract, which terminate on the 31st March, 1921.

3. Octroi dues are collected by fifteen municipalities out of a possible twenty-two. The following are the municipalities which collect octroi: Nazareth, Tiberias, Safed, Jenin, Shefr-Amr, Ludd and Mejdal.

4. Certain towns collect a kantar tax which may be said to be a form of octroi. It is a tax levied under article 17 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1930, on goods chiefly cereals and legumes, calculated upon weight and measurement according to a tariff fixed by the municipality concerned. Under authority No. 618 of 1931 a tariff fixed by the municipality concerned. Under authority No. 618 of 1931 the Administrator was empowered to substitute the kantar tax for a 1 per cent. *ad valorem* octroi on all articles entering the municipal area by road, sea or rail. Such municipalities as do not levy an octroi duty impose a kantar tax. In some instances both taxes are maintained.

Effects

5. The effects of introducing the octroi system in its present form, may be summarised as follows—

- (a) The institution of a customs barrier around towns
- (b) An increase in price of all articles of consumption within town area
- (c) The increase in prices of articles imported from abroad and consigned to rural districts since such articles are commonly offered for sale in towns
- (d) The imposition of a tax upon agricultural products brought in from rural districts
- (e) The octroi is also inconvenient in collection and inequitable in incidence since it falls with severity upon the poor consumers of necessities
- (f) The burden of the tax is not distributed in any degree in proportion to the benefits gained from local expenditure. Briefly the duty may be considered in its present form as being incapable of economic defence.

Octroi Duties in Jerusalem

6. In Jerusalem four road control posts have been established which must be passed by all produce entering the city. It is impossible owing to the large suburban population to impose the tax upon all produce entering the city. Consignments imported by rail are checked at the Railway Custom House, where the municipality maintains an employee.

7. It may be remarked that a constant source of complaint amongst merchants is the fact that they are charged double and treble dues on imported foreign consignments arriving at Haifa or Jaffa. The tax is collected both at these ports and should the consignment be separated into smaller consignments, the tax is collected again. It may conceivably happen that goods are collected in the first instance at Jaffa, then at Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron before the article reaches its final destination at Beersheba, where it is collected a fourth time. The total tax falls on a country inhabitant on whom the total tax falls.

ed 1

figs

100

110

LEA

and

Unit

11 1a

- less

me.

425

1000

the

1457

174

not r
d.

194

SOLD
CTA

QV1C

revo

ncy
1988

בהמשך

THE

borne in mind that no system of collecting octroi dues exists for consignments imported into Palestine from the territory under the control of the Government of Damascus.

Recommendations

14 The commission recommends —

- (1) That the present system of collecting interior octroi and kantar taxes be abolished
- (2) That the Government maintains the additional 1 per cent. *ad valorem* duty upon foreign imports
- (3) That the Government undertakes the collection of the foreign octroi, allocating the proceeds to municipalities, thus relieving the local authorities of the expenses attendant upon collection
- (4) That an additional surtax of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, the proceeds of which will be assigned to municipalities, be placed upon foreign imported wines, spirits, liqueurs and other intoxicating drinks, tobacco, cigarettes, cigars and snuff, perfumery
- (5) That ecclesiastical and charitable institutions be subject to the payment of octroi, since they are interested parties in town improvement schemes

Distribution of Octroi Revenue

The commission has discussed at length the method by which an equitable distribution of the proceeds should be made. It is unable to determine satisfactorily the basis upon which such allocation should be carried out. The more equitable method would seem to be on the proportion of foreign imports received within municipal areas, but we find that there are no statistics of this nature which could be considered as even reasonably accurate. It therefore recommends that the Government should allocate the revenues accruing from foreign octroi according to the receipts of the octroi and kantar duties as the minimum amount payable to each municipality for the forthcoming financial year.

Market Fees

15 The Jerusalem municipality has recently opened two markets, where vegetables and legumes are sold by growers to the public. The sites have been rented for a sum of £ E. 345 per annum, and the collection of fees placed out to contract for the sum of £ E. 600.

The fees sanctioned by the municipality are —

- PT 2 per sack of commodities
- PT 1 per basket or case

A market is also held in the city, where the produce of the surrounding districts is sold. The market is held in the city, where the produce of the surrounding districts is sold. The market is held in the city, where the produce of the surrounding districts is sold.

The market is held in the city, where the produce of the surrounding districts is sold. The market is held in the city, where the produce of the surrounding districts is sold.

Recommendations

The commission recommends —

- (1) That the system of farming out market fees be abolished
- (2) That the municipality undertakes direct collection

Part IV. Taxes

Present System

1. An examination into the subject of licences involves a review of all licences issued by the Government and the local authorities which operate within a municipal area.

2. The system at present in vogue has led to the introduction of a series of vexatious restrictions, many of them obsolete in their purpose, emanating from different Government Departments and local authorities, which are imposed upon the trader to the detriment of his occupation. In many instances the licensee must obtain the permission of three or four Departments before he can carry on his calling.

3. Theoretically, there should be no objection to a considerable share of local revenue being levied through the agency of licences in proportion to the benefits received from an active and judicious local administration. In practice, however, it would appear that extra taxation has been placed upon certain trades through the lack of co-ordination among the fiscal authorities responsible.

4. Certain of the taxes collected in the form of licences under the Municipal Tax Law of 1330 are not strictly economic in character, and are not levied for specific local services: such may be taken to include the inspection and the supervision of dangerous and unhealthy trades, or of factories.

Examination of Various Licensing Fees

5. The commission desires to quote, *in extenso*, a number of taxes on various trades, from which it will be observed that the system of multiplying licences received additions under the fiscal regulations of the late military administration.

6. Establishments where Intoxicating Drinks are Consumed.

a. Ottoman Public Debt Licence—Law of the 27th August, 1867

- (i.) 25 per cent. of the annual rent on the actual premises where intoxicating liquors are consumed; or
- (ii.) 12½ per cent. of the annual rent on the actual premises where liquors are consumed, and other articles sold; or
- (iii.) 6½ per cent. of the annual rent on the actual premises where small quantities of intoxicating liquors are sold

(N.B.—None of Class (iii) exist in Jerusalem. It may be observed that the rental value of rooms only in which intoxicating liquors are sold, are assessed, and not the entire premises, as provided in article 11 of the law.)

(b.) Municipal licences:—

(i.) Registration of unhealthy trades, imposed under the direction of the Department of Public Health:—

Grade 1, item 21 —

Hotels 1st class	£ E. 2 per annum
Hotels 2nd class	£ E. 1
Hotels 3rd class	£ E. 0.50

Grade 1, item 26

Restaurants	PT. 50
-------------	--------

(ii.) Under article 3 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330:—

- 5 per cent. on the annual rental value
- 2½ per cent. on the annual rental value when other articles are sold.

(c.) Other municipal taxes:—

- (i.) House rate 5 per cent. of the annual rental value
- (ii.) Octroi 1 per cent. *ad valorem*.

It will be observed that the levy on the annual rental value of a 1st class establishment may amount to 35 per cent. in addition to other State and local taxes.

7. Places of Public Amusement.

(a.) Stamp duties (Government)—Public notice, No. 78, dated 15th November, 1915

On tickets for theatres, cinematographs, &c., 5 m.m.

(b.) Ottoman Public Debt—Stamp law, dated 1906 (1321), article 9, clause 113.—

Theatre, concert and ball-room tickets of values from—

PT. 10 to 40	...	PT. 1
Above PT. 40	...	PT. 2
Tickets with no indication of value	...	PT. 2

(c.) Municipal licences under article 4—

- (i.) An annual licence (not collected in Jerusalem)
- (ii.) A charge of PT. 10 per diem when a public performance is given
- (iii.) An extra tax for every hour when performances continue after midnight (not collected in Jerusalem)

8. Factories and Industrial Establishments

(a.) Stamp duty (Government)—Public notice, No. 78, dated 15th November, 1918—

Annual licensing fee of PT. 200

(b.) Ottoman Public Debt—Stamp Law of 1906 (1321) Article 9, clause 10.—

Permit on construction, PT. 100

(c.) Municipal—

- (i.) Registration of unhealthy trades—
from PT. 50 to £ E. 2 on certain specified trades and on "all industries employing ..."
- (ii.) Under article 10 of Municipal Tax Law—
A graduated tax of from £ E. 2 to £ F. 10 on fee ... to be collected on erection only, and not ann ...
- (iii.) Under article 2 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330—
Building permits calculated on floor space ...
Building licences

The commission is unable to determine the reason for the imposition of a State licence with a stamp duty on ... factories carried out such as the English Factory and Workshop Acts provide for

9. Advertisements, Signs and Notices.

These may be divided in—fixed notices and signs, and sheets for distribution
Fixed notices and signs—

- (a.) Ottoman Public Debt—Stamp Law of 1906 (1321), article 94
On fixed shop signs according to meterage from PT. 1 to PT. 5
On advertisements affixed to hoardings or sandwich boards, PT. 1
- (b.) Municipal

- (i.) Under article 10 of ...
PT. 2 ...
- (ii.) Under ...
July, 1920, a tax of 1 millime for every square centimetres of space occupied upon specified hoardings

Advertisements which may be distributed—

- (a.) Ottoman Public Debt—Stamp Law of 1906 (1321), article 91.
Business advertisements, programmes, 1/2 millime.

10. Shooting Permits and Gun Licences.

(a.) In conformity with the Ottoman Law on Game, dated 1902, article 33,
... shooting is chargeable as follows—

- PT. 10 per licence,
- PT. 20 per licence, within the kaza of Jerusalem.

The proceeds are credited to the O.P.D.A. and the municipality in equal proportion the collection of the fee being undertaken by the Delta.

(b.) Government Public Notice No. 112, dated the 9th December, 1919, states—

"a fee of PT. 50 shall be charged on account of each weapon for which a licence is granted."

The licensing authority is the Police, and the proceeds are credited to State revenues

General Remarks.

11. The commission finds that the duplication of licensing fees and the number of issuing authorities requires a remodelling of such licences, whereby a greater degree of co-ordination may be practised among the authorities responsible. Where possible one form of licence should be granted containing the sanction of one authority, who shall have obtained, previous to issue, the approval of the officer concerned.

Certain duties which embrace in their application rural as well as city areas should be collected by the Government as a single tax for central and local purposes: a proportionate allotment being made to municipalities. Other duties would appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the regulations for the registration of unhealthy and dangerous trades which are controlled by the principal medical officers attached to districts.

A third category of licences, such as dog licences, would be more efficiently supervised by the local authorities themselves. In every case, whoever the issuing authority may be, it is essential that the licensee should be put to no little inconvenience as possible in complying with Government and local regulations. In this connection the Commission desires to record that some uncertainty exists among the public as to the procedure to be followed. It ascribes this in part to the lack of co-ordination already mentioned, and to the doubts expressed to us by witnesses as to which Ottoman regulations dealing with this subject remain in force.

The Commission records its recommendations below, having given due consideration to the fact that licences issued for the privilege of carrying on certain industries or for selling certain goods (beer, spirits, tobacco, &c.), ultimately resemble in their effects and general incidence a tax upon the articles themselves, while they also tend to restrict the number of producers and dealers. It is that they provide a registration of the persons engaged in these employments, and that local authorities provide a central and inspection of such employments in the interests of the public, and as a safeguard to public security.

General Recommendations.

12. The commission recommends—

- (1.) That the closest co-operation be maintained by the different Government and local bodies issuing licences;
- (2.) That the procedure for application be made known to the public;
- (3.) That, where possible, one form of licence be granted which should include the endorsement of the different Departments concerned;
- (4.) That contravention against the licensing regulations, both Government and municipal, be triable before the municipal bench (see Finances);
- (5.) That the factory stamp duty authorised under Public Notice No. 78, item 18, dated the 15th November, 1918, be abolished;
- (6.) That the Ottoman Stamp Law of 1906 should be examined and reported upon, as it duplicates in many instances Government and municipal dues;
- (7.) That the municipality be given powers to impose licensing regulations upon arts, crafts, industries and professions, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner;
- (8.) That the following articles of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330 be abolished as serving no useful or economic purpose:—

- (a.) Article 5. A licence must be obtained from the municipality in order to occupy stalls or premises, and use shop-blinds, awnings and partitions on pavements, streets or open places, whether they are profitable or otherwise.

A tax in proportion with and not exceeding one-fourth of the daily, weekly or monthly rent of the said premises will be levied.

A licence fee to be fixed by the municipality, not exceeding 1 per cent of the rent as above, will be levied on shop-blinds, covers and partitions. Partitions the breadth of which does not exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ metre will be exempt from the tax.

b.) Article 10. A single licence fee will be levied, as under, on all steam-boilers and motor engines, except those used for agricultural purposes and those exempted under special ordinances—

	£ F
5 horse-power	2
5-10 horse-power	5
Over 10 horse-power	10

Article 12. A tax in accordance with a tariff to be fixed by the municipality will be levied on spring water carried for sale in special vessels. The water is subject to inspection by the municipality, and a mark indicating the spring from which it is must be stamped on the vessel.

Regarding article 5, it may be remarked that the building (paragraph 21 below) should serve as a means of controlling the building of overhead structures and partitions, and that the erection of booths of a temporary nature is included under the "Hawkers and Pedlars" (see paragraph 16 below).

Article 10 would appear to be a direct impediment on the introduction of fuel-driven machinery, which is subject to municipal octroi dues upon importation if of foreign origin.

Article 12 is a matter for inclusion in the regulations of the Department of Public Health.

and Sale of Intoxicating Liquors

It is stated that the tax collected under this heading tends to give rise to fraudulent declaration. The present system is based upon a valuation of the annual rent or upon the actual rent paid by the occupiers, and is assessed only upon the value of space occupied. It is suggested that a system of assessment be introduced, or escaped payment through the want of one central body being responsible for registration.

An important class of traders, i.e., wholesale dealers, are not included in the medium of the Public Health requirements who charge a registration fee of 1/4 50.

The commission recommends—

- (1.) That licences for the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors be collected by the Government as a single tax, the Government crediting the Municipality with the proceeds of such licences collected within the municipal area;
- (2.) That adequate legislation be promulgated giving effect to the principle outlined in sub-paragraph 1, such legislation providing penal clauses for offences against the ordinance triable by a municipal bench when contravention takes place within the area under their jurisdiction;
- (3.) That in the interests of traders a separate scale of licences be introduced to cover—

- (a.) Manufacturers and distillers;
- (b.) Wholesale sellers;
- (c.) Retail sellers.

The commission recommends that as regards sub-paragraph 3—

- (a.) Manufacturers and distillers, who are taxable under the excise duties, a licence of PT. 200 should be collected for municipal services.
- (b.) Wholesale dealers in intoxicating liquors should be divided into two categories—

(i.) Dealers in imported foreign intoxicating liquors.

The duty payable should be—

Premises whose annual rental value is £ E. 50 and over,
£ E. 6 per annum
Premises whose annual rental value is under £ E. 50,
£ E. 4 per annum.

(ii.) Dealers of liquors manufactured in the country

The duty payable should be a licensing fee of £ E. 4 per annum.

The form of licence set out below is recommended—

Wholesale Wine and Spirit Licence

Not including permission for the consumption of intoxicating liquors upon the premises of the licensee

Available to
Registered No.
Name
If shop or otherwise.
Situation and No.
Rental value
Amount paid.
Endorsed by public security.
Endorsed by Public Health Office.

On category (c) retail sellers—

For every hotel, or premises occupied by a club, restaurant or other place used for the sale of intoxicating liquors by retail, being consumed upon the premises, an annual percentage on the rental or yearly value of the premises so used, at the rate of 30 per cent.; but that—

- (a.) The licence duty of an hotel shall not exceed £ E. 50 per annum;
- (b.) A club-house £ E. 25 per annum;
- (c.) Other premises £ E. 20 per annum;

with a minimum duty of £ E. 4 for (a), (b) or (c) respectively.

For selling by retail in any tent or booth or in the open air, thirty pence per diem.

The commission proposes the use, with the necessary amendments, of the licence form given above, and on the reverse of the licence, the penalties for contravention.

(N.B.—Alternative methods of assessment based upon the ratio of receipts from the sale of intoxicants to the total receipts in the case of hotels, and a direct tax based upon sales in the case of clubs, were considered. It is agreed that such systems though being in theory more equitable to the licensee, are in practice difficult to operate.)

- (4.) That the licensing duties above specified should be inclusive of all other fees now payable to different government and local authorities.

Taxes upon Places of Entertainment.

14. The stamp duties imposed by the Government and the Ottoman Public Debt already enumerated in paragraph 6, Licences, cause considerable inconvenience to proprietors. The incidence falls upon the buyer and not upon the proprietor, who makes an additional charge to the public to cover these duties.

The method of caucation which is compulsory under the law, is imperfect. In many instances it is the custom of the house to collect the tickets sold when the public are shown to their seats.

The abuses attendant upon affixing adhesive stamps are so great, that it is recommended that the duties should be abolished and replaced by another form of tax.

Recommendations

The commission recommends —

- (1) That an annual licence be collected by the municipality from proprietors of cinematograph establishments, as follows:—

From 1 to 100, PT. 50 per mensem
101 to 200
201 and over .. 2

The lessees of cinematograph establishments when exhibiting shows by theatrical companies will be charged the following rates:—

PT. 1 per night for the first three nights
£ E. 1 per night for every entertainment after the third night

At places of public amusement, such as theatres, and at charitable concerts and charitable entertainments be exempted.

- (4) That the taxes imposed under article 4 of the Municipal Tax Law be abolished. In the event of the Government imposing a general amusement tax, a proportion of the proceeds collected within the city area should be allocated to the municipality.
- (5) That strolling players and itinerant actors be registered under the "Hawkers and Pedlars" Licence (see paragraph 16) and that such licences be collected only once at the place of registration.

Advertisements, Notices and Signboards

The commission recommends that the law relating to advertisements, notices and signboards be revised. The commission, however, is not empowered to propose any amendments, which would appear to require adjustment.

It views with concern the increase in the number of fixed signs placed on shop fronts and recommends that the law should be amended to place a prohibitive tariff upon such signs and recommends:—

Recommendations

The commission recommends —

- (1.) That shop signs projecting over the street be taxed as follows

From 1 to 2 metres in length	PT. 100
From 2 to 3 metres in length	PT. 200
Over 3 metres	PT. 300

- (2.) That article 19 of the Municipal Law of 1330 be retained with present rates now charged, i.e. —

PT. 20 per metre or fraction thereof
PT. 40 from 1 metre and upwards

- (4.) That the duties enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 be collected by the municipality.

Hawkers and Pedlars

Article 15 of the Municipal Tax Law provides for the registration of hawkers and pedlars occupying booths on the public highway or in bazaars, exhibition grounds, racecourses and auction stands.

The municipality have, however, extended this to include a registration of all itinerant hawkers and pedlars, charging a fee varying from PT. 5 to PT. 100 per mensem. The Public Health authorities also charge an annual fee of PT. 5 for the inspection of the articles sold to the public.

Recommendations

The commission recommends:—

- 1.) That an annual licence be charged by the Public Health Office at the following rates:—

(a.) Itinerant hawkers and pedlars	PT. 60 per annum.
(b.) Occupiers of booths	£ E. 1 per annum

- (2.) That the licence be collected once only at the place of registration and available for all Palestine.
- (3.) That the form of licence should satisfy the requirements of the Department of Public Security.

Auctioneers' Licence

17. As far as the commission can ascertain, there is no law regulating the responsibility of auctioneers in regard to the auctioneer being held liable for the conversion of goods which he has sold upon the instructions of a person whom he believed to be the owner, but who in fact may have no legal right to dispose of them. In the interests of the public it inclines to the view that auctioneers should be registered locally, and that, if necessary, a financial guarantee should be required.

Recommendations

The commission recommends:—

- (1) That article 8 of the Municipal Law be abolished, whereby a tax of 1 per cent. upon auction sales is levied.
- (2) That auctioneers be registered locally on the payment of an annual fee of PT. 100.

Cigars and Persian Tobacco

18. (a.) A licence is collected by the Ottoman Régie des Tabacs of £ T. 1 per shop selling tobacco, cigarettes, &c. — Monopoly Law of 1914.

(ii.) The Ottoman Public Debt imposes an additional duty of from PT. 12½ to PT. 187 on establishments selling Persian tobacco. No special licence beyond the general licence to sell tobacco is required in the case of home-grown tobacco. — Tobacco Convention dated 1891 and Annex dated 1897.

Recommendations

- (1.) That the Government revise the system of licensing as carried out by the Régie des Tabacs at the earliest opportunity, increasing the licence to £ E. 2 per annum.
- (2.) That the Government undertake the administration of the licensing regulations.
- (3.) That a partial allocation of the proceeds of this licence, as in the case of wines, spirits and liquors, &c., be credited to the municipality for licences granted within the city area.

4. That the tumbeki licence be abolished at the earliest possible opportunity
 5. That the sundry stamp duties additional to the licensing fee, amounting to PT 9½ per licence, be abolished

Gun and Game Licences

19. In view of the special conditions prevalent in Palestine and the fact that the shooting of game is carried out over rural areas, it inclines to the view that the issue of game licences should be controlled directly by the Government, as is the case when permits are issued sanctioning the possession of firearms. (Puh) dated the 9th December, 1919

It does not consider that the municipality is entitled to any share of the proceeds of this licence, as it would appear that the allocation of the revenues accruing should be made by the Government to the rural authorities.

It desires to draw the attention of the Government to the small sum required by the Public Debt for the issue of a game licence

Recommendations

The commission recommends:-

1. That the whole proceeds of the game licence be paid to the Government.
- (2.) That the administration of the gun licence be transferred to the Government.

Dog Licence

20. Article 18 of the Municipal Law of 1330 lays down that a licence will be levied upon dogs, whether kept for sporting purposes or otherwise.

The administration of this tax is not strictly enforced in Jerusalem, and is capable of wide expansion financially.

The commission recommends:-

- (1) That the present licence be retained and administered by the municipality.
- (2.) That dogs under six months of age, and those kept solely for the purpose of tending sheep or cattle, or by shepherds, or by blind persons for their guidance, be exempt.

Building Licences

21. The Municipal Tax Law, article 2, gives the municipality powers to levy certain fees calculated upon the floor space of the building to be erected.

Recommendations

- (1) That a licence fee be charged by the surveyor's office of the municipality calculated on the cubic value of the building work to be done, and that the rate chargeable be fixed at ½ per cent with a minimum fee of PT. 50 and a maximum fee of £ E. 100.
- (2) That compulsory structural alterations and additions carried out by the Public Health office be exempted from the payment of a fee, and from the supervision of the surveyor's office. The provisions of the Municipal Ordinance shall be applied to such alterations.
- (3) That the reconstruction of buildings shall be exempted from the control of the surveyor's office, but that the provisions of the Antiquities Ordinance shall apply.

Registration of Dangerous and Unhealthy Trades.

22. The Department of Public Health under cover of their memorandum No. 17, dated the 7th January, 1919, and published in "Official Gazette," No. 23, dated the 10th June, 1920, reimposed the provisions of article 257 of the Law of 19 Jamad Awwal 1332. This law with the departmental instructions accompanying it gives to the Public Health Department wide powers involving the control and inspection of unhealthy and dangerous trades. A scale of fees is attached to the memorandum referred to above, from which it will be observed that the scale varies from PT. 5 to PT. 200 per annum according to the class of employment. The

application for licence is received at the office of principal medical officer of the Department of Public Health. When the application is received, the principal medical officer issues a licence, and the applicant pays the fee and endorsement therein. The functions of the municipality are, therefore, confined to the collection of fees.

It may be remarked that an order of closure is carried out direct by the District Governor on the recommendation of the Public Health Department.

The present regulations afford a basis for future legislation.

Recommendations

The commission recommends:-

- (1) That the regulations in force should be retained as serving the essential interests of health in town areas.
- (2) That the scale of fees be increased as set out below; and that the licensing fees charged under the regulations of the Department of Public Health

Scale of Fees

	per annum, per annum
1. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
2. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
3. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
4. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
5. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
6. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
7. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
8. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
9. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
10. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
11. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
12. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
13. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
14. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
15. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
16. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
17. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
18. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
19. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
20. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
21. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
22. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
23. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
24. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
25. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
26. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
27. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
28. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
29. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
30. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
31. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
32. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
33. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
34. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
35. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
36. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
37. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
38. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
39. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
40. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
41. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
42. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
43. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
44. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
45. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
46. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
47. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
48. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
49. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
50. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
51. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
52. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
53. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
54. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
55. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
56. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
57. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
58. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
59. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
60. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
61. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
62. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
63. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
64. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
65. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
66. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
67. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
68. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
69. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
70. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
71. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
72. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
73. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
74. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
75. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
76. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
77. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
78. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
79. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
80. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
81. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
82. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
83. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
84. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
85. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
86. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
87. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
88. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
89. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
90. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
91. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
92. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
93. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
94. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
95. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
96. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
97. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
98. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
99. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17
100. Licence for the use of mineral and other water	See para. 17

	Proposed
	per annum
1. Groceries when not selling intoxicating liquors ..	25
2. Groceries when selling intoxicating liquors ..	25
3. Flour and wheat stores ..	25
4. Licensed vendors of milk, fish, vegetables, and fruit, meat products and ..	20
5. ..	20
6. ..	20
7. ..	20
8. ..	20
9. ..	20
10. ..	20
11. ..	20
12. ..	20
13. ..	20
14. ..	20
15. ..	20
16. ..	20
17. ..	20
18. ..	20
19. ..	20
20. ..	20
21. ..	20
22. ..	20
23. ..	20
24. ..	20
25. ..	20
26. ..	20
27. ..	20
28. ..	20
29. ..	20
30. ..	20
31. ..	20
32. ..	20
33. ..	20
34. ..	20
35. ..	20
36. ..	20
37. ..	20
38. ..	20
39. ..	20
40. ..	20
41. ..	20
42. ..	20
43. ..	20
44. ..	20
45. ..	20
46. ..	20
47. ..	20
48. ..	20
49. ..	20
50. ..	20
51. ..	20
52. ..	20
53. ..	20
54. ..	20
55. ..	20
56. ..	20
57. ..	20
58. ..	20
59. ..	20
60. ..	20
61. ..	20
62. ..	20
63. ..	20
64. ..	20
65. ..	20
66. ..	20
67. ..	20
68. ..	20
69. ..	20
70. ..	20
71. ..	20
72. ..	20
73. ..	20
74. ..	20
75. ..	20
76. ..	20
77. ..	20
78. ..	20
79. ..	20
80. ..	20
81. ..	20
82. ..	20
83. ..	20
84. ..	20
85. ..	20
86. ..	20
87. ..	20
88. ..	20
89. ..	20
90. ..	20
91. ..	20
92. ..	20
93. ..	20
94. ..	20
95. ..	20
96. ..	20
97. ..	20
98. ..	20
99. ..	20
100. ..	20

- (3.) That contraventions against the regulations be triable before the municipal bench.
- (4.) That the act of closure be applied through the medium of the municipal bench.

Petition Writer's Licence

23. Under public notice No. 132, dated the 26th August 1919, every person carrying on the calling of a petition writer is requested to obtain an annual licence from the District Governor. A registration fee of PT 25 is charged. The contravention of this notice is punishable on conviction with a fine not exceeding £ 100 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one week.

Where a licence is issued, the fee should be payable to the municipality, who should be credited with the receipts.

Road Transport Licence.

24. The Commission finds that there are two separate taxes imposed upon road transport. The Government regulations are embodied in Public Notices 117, dated 19th August, 1920, and No. 135, dated the 16th September, 1919.

Under article 13 of the Municipal Tax Law the rates which may be imposed by a municipality are fixed.

The taxes payable per vehicle are as follows:—

	Per Annum	Per Annum	Per Annum
1. Hackney carriages—			
drawn by 2 animals ..	10	10	10
drawn by 4 animals ..	20	20	20
drawn by 6 animals ..	30	30	30
drawn by 8 animals ..	40	40	40
drawn by 10 animals ..	50	50	50
drawn by 12 animals ..	60	60	60
drawn by 14 animals ..	70	70	70
drawn by 16 animals ..	80	80	80
drawn by 18 animals ..	90	90	90
drawn by 20 animals ..	100	100	100
drawn by 22 animals ..	110	110	110
drawn by 24 animals ..	120	120	120
drawn by 26 animals ..	130	130	130
drawn by 28 animals ..	140	140	140
drawn by 30 animals ..	150	150	150
drawn by 32 animals ..	160	160	160
drawn by 34 animals ..	170	170	170
drawn by 36 animals ..	180	180	180
drawn by 38 animals ..	190	190	190
drawn by 40 animals ..	200	200	200
drawn by 42 animals ..	210	210	210
drawn by 44 animals ..	220	220	220
drawn by 46 animals ..	230	230	230
drawn by 48 animals ..	240	240	240
drawn by 50 animals ..	250	250	250
drawn by 52 animals ..	260	260	260
drawn by 54 animals ..	270	270	270
drawn by 56 animals ..	280	280	280
drawn by 58 animals ..	290	290	290
drawn by 60 animals ..	300	300	300
drawn by 62 animals ..	310	310	310
drawn by 64 animals ..	320	320	320
drawn by 66 animals ..	330	330	330
drawn by 68 animals ..	340	340	340
drawn by 70 animals ..	350	350	350
drawn by 72 animals ..	360	360	360
drawn by 74 animals ..	370	370	370
drawn by 76 animals ..	380	380	380
drawn by 78 animals ..	390	390	390
drawn by 80 animals ..	400	400	400
drawn by 82 animals ..	410	410	410
drawn by 84 animals ..	420	420	420
drawn by 86 animals ..	430	430	430
drawn by 88 animals ..	440	440	440
drawn by 90 animals ..	450	450	450
drawn by 92 animals ..	460	460	460
drawn by 94 animals ..	470	470	470
drawn by 96 animals ..	480	480	480
drawn by 98 animals ..	490	490	490
drawn by 100 animals ..	500	500	500

25. Mechanically-propelled vehicles and hackney carriages.

The registration of road transport is carried out by the applicant to the municipality for the payment of

the municipal charges. In practice, it is found that this duplication of licensing has led to a financial loss on the part of the municipality. Private owners have, in many instances, escaped the payment of taxes through lack of adequate inspection and control.

26. It is obvious that if roads are to be repaired and improved, the users of the roads should be made to contribute towards the cost of such repairs and improvements. It is a principle to place any special tax upon transport agencies which is passed forward in higher rates of fare or charge. The Commission, therefore, considers that the taxes as they stand are reasonable and should not be unduly increased.

27. The alternative method of a special tax upon petrol consumed by transport vehicles, although it might be adopted, is not recommended. The reason of its being an approximate measure of the cost of the use of the vehicle, the members are convinced that any such system of duties is impracticable as against the advantages of a single tax system.

Recommendations

28. It is recommended:—

- That a single tax based on the vehicle in accordance with the scale of duties set out below be adopted, all licences expiring on fixed dates.
- That the collection of the proposed single tax should be the sole levy for State and municipal purposes.
- That the tax be levied and controlled by the Local Tax Board, who should pay to the municipality 75 per cent. of the proceeds of the tax levied within the municipal area.
- That the fee for a driver's licence be PT. 50, payable to the drivers of mechanically propelled vehicles and other vehicles. The proceeds of this licence to be allocated as in sub-paragraph (c) above.
- That foreign visitors bringing their own vehicles for a period not exceeding four months should be liable to the payment of the annual driver's licence only.

Proposed Scales of Duty.

Class	Rate suggested per annum £ s. d.
I. Motor Cycles, private and commercial:—	
Motor cycles—	
Including motor-assisted cycles ..	1,000
With right to draw trailer or side car ..	1,000
II. Motor Cars:—	
(a.) Hackney and private motor-cars—	
Seating capacity 1-5 ..	1,000
6-12 ..	1,500
over 12 ..	2,000
(b.) Motor commercial goods vehicle—	
Carrying capacity not exceeding 10 cwt. ..	1,000
11 to 14 cwt. ..	1,500
15 to 20 cwt. ..	2,000
over 20 cwt. ..	2,500
III. Hackney Carriages	
Seating capacity 1-5 ..	3,000
6-12 ..	4,000
over 12 ..	5,000
IV. Private Carriages, as in section III above.	
[6668]	

v. Non-Mechanically drawn Commercial Goods Vehicles:—

	Scale	Rate suggested £ L. Williams
Carrying capacity not exceeding 1 ton	...	3,000
" " " " " "	" " " " " "	4,000
" " " " " "	" " " " " "	5,000
Trailers or road trucks drawn by fuel power	...	5,000
Agricultural wagons, carts or other agricultural horse vehicles	...	1,000
Hand-drawn vehicles	...	500

VI, *Draper's Licence*

for all forms of road transport, excepting agricultural horse-drawn vehicles
Government and army drivers

Government Transport Licenses

Article 9, Government cars are free of all transport taxation, and

Government. The above remark should be taken to include officers and used in part for army purposes. The registration should be carried out according to the procedure applicable to civilians. A driver's licence, at the full rate, will be charged.

PART V. LEASES AND EASES

4. Under the provisions of the law relating to the leasing of immovable property dated 28 Jan 42 (Law 1), a fee of 10 per cent for every P.T. 100 on the total amount of the rent agreed upon in the lease is authorised as a municipal fee, chargeable in the form of special contract plan.

2. In view of the additional expenditure which the municipalities would incur under the provisions of the proposed town planning ordinance, may be estimated as follows:

3. It may be observed that section 4 (new) of the "Industrial Insurance Schedule of Plans" provides for a maximum of less than three years.

Recommendations

1. The commission recommends—

- a.) That the registration of leases at the office of the municipality (or such place as it may appoint) be compulsory and definitely stated to be such in
- (b.) That article 20 of the law on leases be amended, causing the municipal stamps to be held at the office of the municipality or
- c. That the fees payable be increased from 2 per cent. to 4 per cent. on leases not exceeding three years in duration, having regard to the fact that the
- d.) That the penalties enumerated in article 22 be increased from per cent.
- e.) That the Ottoman Public Debt and H. J. Z. stamp duties be in a separate order
- f.) That the Ottoman Public Debt and H. J. Z. stamp duties be in a separate order

For a rent up to Rs. 2,000, reckoned in accordance with the duration of the lease

the duration of the lease		
Above Pa.	2,000 to 1 st	5,000
		10,000
	1 000	1 500
		2 000
	2 000	2 500
		3 000
	3 000	3 500
		4 000
	4 000	4 500
		5 000
	5 000	5 500
		6 000
	6 000	6 500
		7 000
	7 000	7 500
		8 000
	8 000	8 500
		9 000
	9 000	9 500
		10 000
	10 000	10 500
		11 000
	11 000	11 500
		12 000
	12 000	12 500
		13 000
	13 000	13 500
		14 000
	14 000	14 500
		15 000
	15 000	15 500
		16 000
	16 000	16 500
		17 000
	17 000	17 500
		18 000
	18 000	18 500
		19 000
	19 000	19 500
		20 000
	20 000	20 500
		21 000
	21 000	21 500
		22 000
	22 000	22 500
		23 000
	23 000	23 500
		24 000
	24 000	24 500
		25 000
	25 000	25 500
		26 000
	26 000	26 500
		27 000
	27 000	27 500
		28 000
	28 000	28 500
		29 000
	29 000	29 500
		30 000
	30 000	30 500
		31 000
	31 000	31 500
		32 000
	32 000	32 500
		33 000
	33 000	33 500
		34 000
	34 000	34 500
		35 000
	35 000	35 500
		36 000
	36 000	36 500
		37 000
	37 000	37 500
		38 000
	38 000	38 500
		39 000
	39 000	39 500
		40 000
	40 000	40 500
		41 000
	41 000	41 500
		42 000
	42 000	42 500
		43 000
	43 000	43 500
		44 000
	44 000	44 500
		45 000
	45 000	45 500
		46 000
	46 000	46 500
		47 000
	47 000	47 500
		48 000
	48 000	48 500
		49 000
	49 000	49 500
		50 000
	50 000	50 500
		51 000
	51 000	51 500
		52 000
	52 000	52 500
		53 000
	53 000	53 500
		54 000
	54 000	54 500
		55 000
	55 000	55 500
		56 000
	56 000	56 500
		57 000
	57 000	57 500
		58 000
	58 000	58 500
		59 000
	59 000	59 500
		60 000
	60 000	60 500
		61 000
	61 000	61 500
		62 000
	62 000	62 500
		63 000
	63 000	63 500
		64 000
	64 000	64 500
		65 000
	65 000	65 500
		66 000
	66 000	66 500
		67 000
	67 000	67 500
		68 000
	68 000	68 500
		69 000
	69 000	69 500
		70 000
	70 000	70 500
		71 000
	71 000	71 500
		72 000
	72 000	72 500
		73 000
	73 000	73 500
		74 000
	74 000	74 500
		75 000
	75 000	75 500
		76 000
	76 000	76 500
		77 000
	77 000	77 500
		78 000
	78 000	78 500
		79 000
	79 000	79 500
		80 000
	80 000	80 500
		81 000
	81 000	81 500
		82 000
	82 000	82 500
		83 000
	83 000	83 500
		84 000
	84 000	84 500
		85 000
	85 000	85 500
		86 000
	86 000	86 500
		87 000
	87 000	87 500
		88 000
	88 000	88 500
		89 000
	89 000	89 500
		90 000
	90 000	90 500
		91 000
	91 000	91 500
		92 000
	92 000	92 500
		93 000
	93 000	93 500
		94 000
	94 000	94 500
		95 000
	95 000	95 500
		96 000
	96 000	96 500
		97 000
	97 000	97 500
		98 000
	98 000	98 500
		99 000
	99 000	99 500
		100 000

The Government duties (H.J.Z. stamp duties) are as follows (Public Notice No. 7 dated the 15th November, 1919, article #1): -

17. 1 per 1,000, with a minimum of payment of 17.2

(N.B.—The fees set forth in "Palestine Land Registries, Schedule of Fees," section 4, would appear to cancel the debt and H.J. % duties upon leases of more than three years.)

5. The Commission is of opinion that the greatest publicity should be given to the compulsory registration of leases in the office of the municipality as it would appear that the existing law is in general disregarded by lessors, who in many cases make out no written form of contract.

6. The lease fees are estimated for the current year at \$10,000.00, which, at the present scale of charges, would give the gross revenue of \$10,000.00. It would therefore appear that the municipality is losing a lucrative source of revenue.

Government Leave.

7. The accommodation available in Jerusalem must for some time to come be limited to those who are members of the apical community. The lack of suitable housing is such that it is impossible for anyone else to acquire property or take up residence there. It is therefore suggested that the Government should consider the possibility of exempting ecclesiastical communities, who, as owners of property are subject to the law of immovable property, and thus to the lease law and its provisions as to contract fees,

4. 11. 2.

[illegible]

municipality has resulted in a very considerable reduction in the work of the court. Fines imposed by the court for the contravention of bye-laws are credited to the municipality.)

Further, the contravention of bye-laws dealing with public nuisances and of the regulations of the Public Health require a speedy settlement in the interests of the local community, who are affected by the existence of nuisances while the case is being referred to a magistrate's court.

10. The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That an ordinance be promulgated constituting the Municipal Council (under the presidency of the mayor or deputy-mayor) with the powers of a court of summary jurisdiction to try contraventions of bye-laws.
- (2.) That the powers to be delegated to the magisterial bench above mentioned should not be less than those now exercised by second-class magistrates.

The contraventions triable by second-class magistrates, who are Palestinian inspectors, include "contraventions of the orders of the municipality" (vide circular No. L/4101/506, dated the 5th October, 1920). It would appear that such powers should in equity be exercised by the municipal council.

- (3.) That the power of applying for revision of sentence be granted to offenders, but not the right of appeal before another court.
- (4.) Article 20 of the Town Planning Ordinance states:—

"Any person carrying out any work within a town planning area in connection with the street, or building without having obtained a permit or otherwise than in accordance with any bye laws made as above mentioned, may upon conviction thereof by a magistrate's court be condemned to pay a fine not exceeding £ E. 200, and shall at the same time be required to demolish the work or pay the cost of demolition."

The commission is of opinion that the proposed municipal bench should be given powers to deal with contraventions of the ordinances, imposing a fine on conviction not exceeding the sum of £ E. 50. Since the financial resources of the municipality are limited, and the expenditure necessary to operate a town-planning scheme are likely to prove a heavy burden upon the municipal revenues, the commission further recommends that fines imposed by the magistrate's court should be credited to the municipality (or local commission), and set aside to meet expenditure incurred upon the operation of the ordinance.

PART VI.—MISCELLANEOUS TAXES AND FEES.

Tenettu Tax.

1. Article 7 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330, states:—

"An additional municipal tax of 10 per cent. on the net profits of all trades and professions, and collected by the manager of the Finance Department, shall be paid to the treasury of the municipality."

This article establishes the principle of an allocation of a share of the *tenettu* to municipalities, which, in effect, is a share of a tax upon trades, arts, crafts and professions resembling an income tax in its incidence. The taxing of a person on a salary or profit is likely to be evaded. Local authorities have not at their disposal efficient machinery to control or to assist in the collection of such a tax.

The Government do not levy *tenettu*.

The commission recommends: That article 7 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330 be abolished.

Storage Fees on Combustible Liquids.

2. Article 9 states:—

"A maximum tax which may be reduced by municipal councils will be levied on the undermentioned liquids consumed in any city:—

	Per unit.
"Per kilog. of petrol or 'bacora'"	5
" " alcohol	40
" " benzine or any other liquids used for lighting purposes	10

A monthly storage tax of 5 paras will be levied on each tin of petroleum, or on every 25 kilog. of liquids used for illuminating purposes deposited in municipal depots."

The rates actually levied upon the above commodities are:—

- 1.) Octroi at the rate of 1 per cent. *ad valorem*.
- 2.) A flat rate of 5 millimes per tin. The estimated receipts under (2) are £ E. 200.

The storage fee of 5 millimes per tin is a legitimate charge provided that the municipal store, and have not paid rent or compensation in lieu thereof. The commission recommends:—

- 1.) That the rates per kilog. on combustible liquids, enumerated in the first paragraph of article 7 be abolished.
- 2.) That storage fees be maintained on condition that accommodation is provided.

Slaughter Fees.

3. Article 14 states:—

"Until public slaughter-houses are established by the municipalities, the following slaughter tax per head will be levied:—

"Slaughtered head of sheep or goat ...	11
" " lamb or kid	12
" " ox or cow	1
" " camel or buffalo	1

"The taxes collected under this article will, in accordance with the usual rates, be divided into two equal parts, one-half to be paid to the municipality. The General Council will be allowed to reduce one-third of this tax."

The municipality will shortly be in possession of a new slaughter house.

The tax on offal. The municipality was authorised by the Ottoman Government to regard as its property the intestines of all animals slaughtered within the municipal area.

The offal was sold by public auction. This procedure was discontinued during the war. The municipality has requested approval to continue this practice, but the butchers are contesting the right of the municipality to reimpose it.

The estimated yield is £ E. 150 per annum.

The commission recommends: That the tax on offal be abolished, and might be increased without placing an additional burden upon the consumer, providing the municipality is authorised to do so.

The Ottoman Government has authorised the municipalities to levy a tax on offal in order to provide funds for educational purposes. There is no record of this increase having been applied in Palestine.

The commission recommends:—

- 1.) That the tax on offal be abolished.
- (2.) That the rates for the slaughter tax be increased as follows:—

	Present.	Proposed.
Per slaughtered head of sheep or goat ...		1
" " lamb or kid	1	2
" " heifer		2
" " ox or cow	1	1
" " camel or buffalo	15	1

- (3.) That the whole tax be a municipal revenue, and not divided between the State and municipalities.

(N.B.—In Jerusalem the whole proceeds are credited to municipal funds.)

Sale of Livestock.

4. Article 11 states:—

"An *ad valorem* tax of 2½ per cent., payable by sellers, will be levied on the price of camels, buffaloes, horses, mules, donkeys and cattle sold at fairs in public places or bazars. Sales carried out through brokers in any part of a district are exempt from this tax."

The estimated receipts are £ E. 900.

The commission recommends—

- (1.) That this tax be retained.
- (2.) That the municipality undertakes direct collection.

Weights and Measures.

5. Article 16 states:—

"All weights and measures and control measures shall be subject to a tax. This tax will only be levied once. An annual tax of 20 paras will be levied for inspecting weights and measures. Pedlars are subject to half the tax."

We understand that the Government has under consideration the publication of a Weights and Measures Act, which will provide for the certain legal standards. It is preferable for the Government to undertake the administration of the new Act within the city area.

The estimated receipts for the present financial year are £ E. 50.

The commission recommends that article 16 be abolished as a municipal measure.

Monopoly Receipts.

6. Article 21 states:—

"A share of the profits levied by the Government on monopolies established for public services in towns or cities will be due to municipalities. The share of profits due to the Government by monopoly companies now in existence will be due to the municipalities as from the beginning of the year 1331."

The commission recommends that article 21 be retained.

Municipal Trading.

7. Article 22 states:—

"The municipalities are permitted to construct in their own names and on their account, casinos, baths, racing institutions, hotels, theatres and other places of amusement. Municipalities can collect the incomes or transfer the right to collect them to private persons."

The commission recommends that article 22 be retained.

Improvement (Shurajish) Tax.

8. Article 23 states:—

"A person who constructs a new building on a plot of ground is obliged to make a pavement on the roadside of his house not exceeding 12 metres in width. Pavements, which exceed 12 metres in breadth, are to be covered by the municipality after the occupier has paid for the 12 metres."

Article 24 states:—

"Half of the expenses incurred for a new pavement or gutter made by the municipality in any street will, after the construction is completed, be paid in instalments by the proprietors of houses."

"The distribution of the amount, as well as the instalments to be paid, will be fixed by the municipality. Nothing will be collected by municipalities from owners for repairs. If the street is more than 9 metres in breadth the extra incurred for paving will be covered by the municipality."

The municipality has not enforced article 23, but has, in some instances, collected receipts under article 24. The receipts for the current financial year are estimated at £ E. 100, which do not represent the total cost of pavement construction, &c. It is recommended that articles 23 and 24 be retained.

Sanitary Services.

1. Municipal Sanitary Office charges fees for services rendered. They are:—
 - (1) For the cleaning of cesspits—PT. 100-PT. 200 per cubic metre of matter removed.
 - (2) For the emptying of latrines—a monthly fee of PT. 125-PT. 275 per latrine.
- The expenditure incurred is covered by the receipts, which would appear to be somewhat high for the nature of the services rendered. No fees are charged for the removal of refuse from private houses.

Disinfection Tax.

10. Article 6 states:—

"Excepting in cases of epidemic a disinfection tax will be levied according to a special tariff. The expenses of transportation of articles to be disinfected will be covered by the parties concerned."

This article serves no useful purpose, and the commission therefore recommends that it be cancelled.

Charges under this heading should not be covered by the institution of a special tax.

PART VII.—CONTROL IN LOCAL FINANCE

Estimates.

1. The Financial Adviser's office of the late military administration circulated, under cover of letter No. 10824 FM, dated the 15th January, 1920, instructions regarding the preparation of municipal estimates. It is a matter of national importance that the Government should secure unity of idea and some uniformity in method, while permitting elasticity in local administration. The powers of a municipality are, legally, the result of a delegation, and it may be compelled by the process of law to account for its proceedings in regard to expenditure, levy of taxation, or borrowing. The first essential to an effective control of local expenditure is the preparation of estimates. The commission considers that a more detailed formula is required differentiating between capital and recurrent expenditure.

Audit.

2. Whatever be the safeguard that enlightened local opinion may provide, it is necessary for control and audit by external authority. The most effective safeguard is the institution of making members of the local government liable for any illegal expenditure that they may have sanctioned.

The necessity for a proper audit becomes more apparent if loans are to be negotiated. The system of obtaining loans encourages public outlay upon improvements which cannot be obtained. The danger is that it renders extravagance easy, and by placing the burden of repayment upon the municipality, it tends to encourage the tendency on the part of local authorities to embark upon enterprises which involve heavy charges being imposed for the repayment of capital and interest.

As far as can be ascertained, there has been no audit of the municipal accounts since the British occupation.

3. The responsibility of the Government to the ratepayer demands that the State should lay down a system of municipal accountancy. It is considered that the introduction of a simple system such as is now in force in district finance sections would enable more effective control to be practised.

Recommendations

4. The commission recommends:
 - (1.) That detailed instructions be issued regarding the preparation of municipal budgets;
 - (2.) That an effective system of audit and accountancy be introduced;
 - (3.) That the inspecting officials be given the fullest powers of investigation, including the production of any books and papers and the attendance of any persons accountable;
 - (4.) That the method of "surcharge" be applied by the Courts or by official auditors, thus making the members of the local government liable for any illegal expenditure that they have sanctioned;
 - (5.) That the municipal budgets be published for the information of the public, and that at stated periods an official statement of receipts and expenditure be published in the "Official Gazette."

J. B. BARRON (Chairman),
E. KEITH ROACH
H. C. LUK
Y. FARRAD
F. G. AR SHELLBY.
DAVID YELLIN

Jerusalem,
November 20, 1920

APPENDIX I

MUNICIPAL TAX LAW

(24 Rabie 1333—February 20, 1330—March 10, 1915.)

Chapter I.—Taxes on Immovable Property.

Article 1. An additional tax of 25 per cent. in Constantinople and 10 per cent. in the provinces on the present building tax will be levied as a sweeping and lighting and building tax. This tax will be levied in addition to the taxes levied on buildings within municipalities. The latter tax of 10 per cent. levied on the provinces may at the discretion of municipal authorities and councils be raised to 25 per cent. The tax, together with the building tax, will be collected by the mamours of the Finance Department, and no fee will be paid for the collection. The amount will be paid over to the municipalities. The said additional tax will be levied on Min and Wakf property which are productive of revenue.

Art. 2. In accordance with the schedule below, a licence tax to be levied only once will be paid on every square metre of ground for every storey of a building according to the approximate ground value of the plot on which the building and parts thereof are to be constructed.

Where the price of the plot falls between any two ground values set forth in the schedule, the tax will be levied on the lower value. Grounds of less than 2 metres in height which above the ground is 2 metres, will not be reckoned as storeys. Half the licence tax will be levied for rooms on the ground floor 2 or more metres in height. A double tax per square metre will be levied on all balconies, outside balustrades, platforms, galleries or portees which open on a street. Half of this double tax will be levied in the provinces. This tax will also be levied on Wakf and Min buildings.

Schedule.

Ground Value.	Tax Levied per Square Metre on each Storey.	Paragraph	Ground Value.	Tax Levied per Square Metre on each Storey.	Paragraph
10,000	1	1	100,000	1	1
15,000	1	1	110,000	1	1
20,000	1	1	120,000	1	1
25,000	1	1	130,000	1	1
30,000	1	1	140,000	1	1
35,000	1	1	150,000	1	1
40,000	1	1	160,000	1	1
45,000	1	1	170,000	1	1
50,000	1	1	180,000	1	1
55,000	1	1	190,000	1	1
60,000	1	1	200,000	1	1
65,000	1	1	210,000	1	1
70,000	1	1	220,000	1	1
75,000	1	1	230,000	1	1
80,000	1	1	240,000	1	1
85,000	1	1	250,000	1	1
90,000	1	1	260,000	1	1
95,000	1	1	270,000	1	1
100,000	1	1	280,000	1	1
105,000	1	1	290,000	1	1
110,000	1	1	300,000	1	1
115,000	1	1	310,000	1	1
120,000	1	1	320,000	1	1
125,000	1	1	330,000	1	1
130,000	1	1	340,000	1	1
135,000	1	1	350,000	1	1
140,000	1	1	360,000	1	1
145,000	1	1	370,000	1	1
150,000	1	1	380,000	1	1
155,000	1	1	390,000	1	1
160,000	1	1	400,000	1	1
165,000	1	1	410,000	1	1
170,000	1	1	420,000	1	1
175,000	1	1	430,000	1	1
180,000	1	1	440,000	1	1
185,000	1	1	450,000	1	1
190,000	1	1	460,000	1	1
195,000	1	1	470,000	1	1
200,000	1	1	480,000	1	1
205,000	1	1	490,000	1	1
210,000	1	1	500,000	1	1
215,000	1	1	510,000	1	1
220,000	1	1	520,000	1	1
225,000	1	1	530,000	1	1
230,000	1	1	540,000	1	1
235,000	1	1	550,000	1	1
240,000	1	1	560,000	1	1
245,000	1	1	570,000	1	1
250,000	1	1	580,000	1	1
255,000	1	1	590,000	1	1
260,000	1	1	600,000	1	1
265,000	1	1	610,000	1	1
270,000	1	1	620,000	1	1
275,000	1	1	630,000	1	1
280,000	1	1	640,000	1	1
285,000	1	1	650,000	1	1
290,000	1	1	660,000	1	1
295,000	1	1	670,000	1	1
300,000	1	1	680,000	1	1
305,000	1	1	690,000	1	1
310,000	1	1	700,000	1	1
315,000	1	1	710,000	1	1
320,000	1	1	720,000	1	1
325,000	1	1	730,000	1	1
330,000	1	1	740,000	1	1
335,000	1	1	750,000	1	1
340,000	1	1	760,000	1	1
345,000	1	1	770,000	1	1
350,000	1	1	780,000	1	1
355,000	1	1	790,000	1	1
360,000	1	1	800,000	1	1
365,000	1	1	810,000	1	1
370,000	1	1	820,000	1	1
375,000	1	1	830,000	1	1
380,000	1	1	840,000	1	1
385,000	1	1	850,000	1	1
390,000	1	1	860,000	1	1
395,000	1	1	870,000	1	1
400,000	1	1	880,000	1	1
405,000	1	1	890,000	1	1
410,000	1	1	900,000	1	1
415,000	1	1	910,000	1	1
420,000	1	1	920,000	1	1
425,000	1	1	930,000	1	1
430,000	1	1	940,000	1	1
435,000	1	1	950,000	1	1
440,000	1	1	960,000	1	1
445,000	1	1	970,000	1	1
450,000	1	1	980,000	1	1
455,000	1	1	990,000	1	1
460,000	1	1	1,000,000	1	1

On ground values exceeding this amount a tax of PT. 20 will be levied on every square metre of ground in each storey.

Art. 3. A tax of 5 per cent. on the total fixed or approximate annual rent of liquor casinos, beer houses and public houses will be levied by the municipality.

Art. 4. A licence must be obtained from the municipality and taxes will be levied upon all establishments used for public entertainment where an entrance fee is charged or refreshments sold, such as punch and jolly shows, theatres and juggling shows, skating rinks, "Luna parks," cinemas and similar places of public entertainment. In addition to all clubs and casinos and hotels having public baths, concerts, balls, horse races or other public meetings and on establishments connected with fortune telling, panoramas, phreic seances, bars and "cafes chantants" are liable to a similar tax.

The licence fee, together with the permanent, daily, monthly or yearly tax, will be paid to the municipality, will be paid in accordance with a tariff to be drawn up by the municipal authorities. In drawing up the tariff the location and status, as well as the degree of popularity of such establishments, will be taken into consideration.

An extra tax per hour, to be fixed by the municipality, will be levied on all "cafes chantants" kept open after midnight.

Art. 5. A licence must be obtained from the municipality in order to occupy stalls or premises and for the use of overhead covers and partitions on pavements, streets or open places, whether these be for profit or otherwise.

A daily, weekly or monthly tax not exceeding one-quarter of the daily, weekly or monthly rent of the said premises will be levied.

A licence tax to be fixed by the municipality not exceeding 1 per cent. of the rent as above will be levied on overhead covers and partitions. Partitions of 1-metre or less width will be exempt from the tax.

Art. 6. Excepting in cases of epidemic, a disinfection tax will be levied to the amount to be fixed according to a special tariff.

The expense of removal of articles to be disinfected will be covered by the parties concerned.

Chapter II.—Taxes on Movable Property.

Art. 7. An additional municipal tax of 10 per cent. of the "tenuttah" tax will be levied and collected by the mamours of the finance department and paid into the treasury of the municipality.

Art. 8. An additional tax of 2½ per cent. on the prices of all articles sold by public auction will be paid to the municipality. The tax is payable by the purchaser at the auction to the special tax collector.

Sales for auction in private places are forbidden unless written notice is previously forwarded to the municipality and approved.

Haberdashery of trifling value is exempt from this tax.

The local municipal councils in the provinces will fix the rate of this tax. The legal taxes on auctions which are held by Government departments belong to the municipalities. The auctioneers will be appointed by the municipalities.

Art. 9. A maximum tax, which may be reduced by local municipal councils, will be levied on the under-mentioned liquids consumed in any city —

Paras	
Per kilog. of petrol or "bacora"	
alcohol ..	40
benzine or any other liquid used for lighting purposes	10

A monthly storage tax of 5 paras will be levied on every 25 kilog. of liquids used for illuminating purposes deposited in municipal depots.

Art. 10. A licence tax, to be paid only once, will be levied as under on all steam-engines and motors, excepting those used for agricultural purposes, and those exempted under special ordinances. —

Paras	£ s.
Less than 5 horse power	2
5 to 10 horse power	5
Over 10 horse-power	10

Art. 11. An *ad valorem* tax of 2½ per cent payable by the vendor will be levied on the sale of horses, mules, donkeys and cattle sold at fairs, in public markets or in bazaars. Sales carried out through brokers in any part of a city are not exempt from this tax.

Art. 12. A tax in accordance with a tariff to be fixed by the municipality will be levied on spring water carried for sale in special vessels. The water must be inspected by the municipality, and a mark indicating the spring from which it comes must be stamped on the vessel.

Art. 13. A monthly tax on means of transport will be levied as follows: —

Paras	PT.
Carriage plying for hire—	
Two animals	40
One animal	15
Carts drawn by buffaloes or oxen	10
Carts with two animals	10
Carts with one animal	5
Every animal kept for hire for riding or burden purposes	5
Every donkey kept for hire for riding or burden purposes	2½

In levying this tax the number of animals and not the number of carts or carriages will be taken into consideration.

Military officers who are entitled to keep a certain number of horses for riding are exempt from the tax.

A monthly tax as under will be levied on motor-cars and all kinds of motor vehicles as follows: —

Paras	PT.
Up to 12 horse-power	50
12 to 20 horse-power	100
Over 20 horse-power	150

The following are also subject to the tax levied on motor-cars, carriages, and animals plying for hire.

Private carriages and motor-cars. Riding animals, vehicles of every description used for transport and belonging to any company or firm.

The above taxes may be levied by the municipality quarterly, half-yearly or annually.

Taxes will be levied in accordance with a tariff to be fixed by municipal councils upon steamers and other vessels lying upon the water.

Taxes will be levied in accordance with the tariff to be fixed by municipal councils upon steamers and other vessels lying upon the water.

The taxes set forth in this article may be reduced in the provinces at the discretion of the municipal councils.

Art. 14. Until public slaughter-houses are established the following slaughter tax per head will be levied:

Slaughtered head of sheep	1
lamb or kid	1
beef	1
or buffalo	1

The taxes collected under this article will, in accordance with the general rules be divided into halves, one of which will go to the "vilayet" and the other to the municipality.

The general council will be allowed to reduce one-third of this tax.

Art. 15. A tax to be fixed by the local municipalities will be levied on every square pique (roughly about a square yard) of ground occupied by traders or dealers when bazaars, exhibitions, race meetings and auctions are held.

Art. 16. All weights and measures and grain measures must be stamped by municipalities and a tax of 2 piastres for each weight or measure will be levied thereon. This tax will only be levied once. An annual tax of 20 paras will be levied for inspecting weights and measures.

Peddlers are subject to half the tax.

Art. 17. Articles which are sold by weight or measure and are brought to any city to be sold from depots must be weighed and measured by municipal weights and measures. Taxes for such weighing and measuring will be fixed by a tariff to be fixed by municipal councils. In transactions carried out among merchants, and sales in public places of goods which are sold by lot, the parties may choose whether the transactions be carried out in accordance with the municipal weights and measures or otherwise. Fuel sold by sack or stackyard must be weighed.

Art. 18. A tax of PT. 25 will be levied on dogs whether they be kept for hunting or otherwise. This tax will be fixed in the provinces by the municipal councils in accordance with the circumstances prevailing in the district.

Art. 19. A tax will be levied in accordance with the tariff to be fixed by the municipal councils on any notices, plaques, writings and signs, except such notices, writings or signs on glass doors, store rooms or factories which state the names and addresses of the proprietors.

Chapter III — Taxes relating to Persons and Government Employees.

Art. 20. The share of profits levied by the Government from the monopoly companies established for public services will be divided equally between the vilayet and the municipality.

The share of profits due to the Government from the monopoly companies in existence will be due to municipalities from the year 1901.

Art. 22. Municipalities are permitted to collect taxes on the following: their account, casinos, baths and race courses of similar nature. Municipalities collect the revenues or transfer them to companies.

Gambling is forbidden in such establishments.

Chapter IV — Miscellaneous Articles.

Art. 23. Any person having erected a new building on a plot of ground to make a pavement on the side of the road nearest his building not exceeding 1½ metres and of the length of his frontage, and in the manner suggested by the municipality. The cost for pavements which exceed 1½ metres in width are to be defrayed by the municipalities, after the owner has paid for the paving of his share of 1½ metres.

Art. 24. Half of the expenses incurred for a new pavement or gutter made by the municipality in any street will, after the construction is completed, be paid in instalments by the proprietors of the houses. The distribution of the amount as well as the instalments to be paid, will be fixed by the municipality. Nothing will be collected by the municipalities from house-owners for repairs.

If the street is 9 or more metres wide, all the expenses incurred for paving will be borne by the municipality, except such expenses incurred as defined in article 23.

Art. 2. The law shall come into force from the date of its publication.

Revenues derived from powers granted by the municipal taxes of Constantinople, the supplement of the law of 13th Rabi I 1331 and 31st March 1329; the provision of the law of 13th Rabi I 1332 and 4th February 1329 amending article 16 of the said law; the provisional law of vilayet municipal taxes of 15th Jumada II 1332 and 28th April 1330; the law of 13th Rabi I 1332 and 4th February 1329 as well as its supplement of 28th Rabi II 1332, and article contains "Rights of Reserve" dated 4th Jumada II, 1332 and 17th April 1330.

Taxes not referred to in this law but levied by municipalities in accordance with law or custom will be levied as hitherto.

Art. 26. The law shall come into force from the date of its publication.

APPENDIX II

STATEMENT of Estimated Receipts for the Year ending March 31, 1921

Receipts

1. Revenues derived under the authority of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330.—

Article	1. Slabs of Work	
	Building permits	100
	Licences	100
	Commercial fuel-driven	100
	Sales of animals	100
	Water carriers' licence	100
	Kantai tax	100
	Other	100
	Total	1,000

2. Revenues derived from various Ottoman decrees.—

	1. Sale of contract forms	100
	2. Official sales	100
	3. Game licences	100
	Total	300

1. Revenues derived from powers granted by the municipal administration.—

1.1. Streets	100
1.2. House	100
1.3. Sanitary services	100
Total	300

1. Revenues from municipal property, &c. :—

(1) Rents	100
(2) Compensation for drainage	100
(3) Sundry	100
Total	300

2. Surplus balance from previous year

STATEMENT of Estimated Expenditure for the Year ending March 31, 1921

Expenditure.

1. General administration and collection charges	100
2. Public services—	
Lighting	100
Public security	100
Public health	100
Public works	100
Relief services	100
Interest of loans	100
Miscellaneous	100
Total	1,000

APPENDIX III

Extracts from the Law relating to Lease of Immovable Property dated 28 Jamad Awal 1299, as amended by the Subsequent Ordinance dated 18 Rabi Awal 1332.

Article 1. In leases of immovable property such as a house, shop or a warehouse, it shall be the duty of the lessor to draw up a written contract of lease between him and the lessee.

Article 6. A registration fee at the rate of one per ten of the value of the special contract shall be collected by the Court on any contract of lease required to be approved by the Court and this fee shall be recorded on the back of the contract and signed and sealed.

Article 10 (as amended by the law of 13 Rabi Awal 1332). The fee on a contract of lease shall be at the rate of 10 paras per every PT. 100 on the total amount of the rent and shall be paid by the lessor in the form of special contract stamps. In addition, the stamp law as amended by the law of 13 Rabi Awal 1332 shall be paid by the lessor. The stamp under the Stamp Law shall be paid by the persons by whom the copies of the contract are taken.

Article 11 Special contract stamps have been designed of various grades, and divided into two parts. Each municipality shall have a supply of special contract forms bearing its own number.

Article 12 (as amended by the law of 16 Rabi Awal 1332). A fee of 10 paras for every PT 100 on the total amount of the rent for the period agreed upon in the lease shall be charged in the form of special contract stamps, to be affixed through the municipality of the district within which the property is situated. Each stamp will be divided into two halves, one half to be affixed to the lessor's copy of the contract and the other to the lessee's copy. Where the property is held in joint ownership or where the lessees are numerous and each of them or of the joint owners requires a copy of the contract no further stamps shall, after the production of the original copies, be affixed to the additional copies required. The additional copies shall be subject to a fee of 10 paras for every PT 100 of the amount of the rent. When the fees paid for the original copies are less than PT 5, the same fee shall be charged for certifying each of the additional copies. The certification of the additional copies shall take place in the office where the originals were made.

Article 16. These regulations are also applicable to all contracts of lease concluded with the Government Department.

Article 17 (as amended by the law of 16 Rabi Awal 1332). Where a lessee desires to assign his lease to another he shall make a note to this effect at the foot of his contract of lease. This note shall be signed or sealed and the assignment shall be subject to an additional 5 paras special contract stamp to be affixed thereto. Should the lessee let the property for a rent higher than the rent paid by him the extra amount of rent shall be subject to an additional fee of 10 paras for every PT 100 in the form of a special contract stamp to be affixed thereto.

The death of one of the parties to a contract of lease does not dissolve the contract. The terms of the contract remain valid and no further fees are payable.

Article 20 (as amended by the law of 16 Rabi Awal 1332). Where, in the case of a contract of lease conforming with the law as regards the affixing of stamps, one of the parties applies to the magistrate, or to the Court of 1st Instance if there is no magistrate, claiming execution of the terms of the contract, the president of the Court or the magistrate shall warn the defendant that unless he complies with the terms of the contract within ten days he will be compelled to do so by the police. On the expiration of the term of the lease the property let shall be vacated in accordance with the Notary Public Law and shall be delivered to the lessor, even without waiting to see the result of the action which may be pending between the parties to the contract.

Where in the case of a contract of lease not conforming with the law as regards the affixing of stamps, one of the parties thereto applies to the magistrate or to the Court claiming execution of the terms of the contract, he shall not have the benefit of the above mentioned privileges unless the fine according to this law is paid by him to the municipality.

The contract stamps will be supplied and cancelled by the Notary Public who will, after retaining 5 per cent. according to Article 29 of the Notary Public Law, hand the balance in cash to the municipality.

Article 22 (as amended by the law of 16 Rabi Awal 1332). The lessor who fails to make a contract of lease for the property let by him shall, in addition to the payment of a fine of 3 per cent. of the amount of the rent of the property for the previous year, be bound to pay a fee of 80 paras for every PT 100 in the form of special contract stamps, which will be cancelled in his presence.

Article 23 (as amended by the law of 16 Rabi Awal 1332). Where a contract of lease shall have been reduced before any Court or Government Department and stamps according to the law have not been affixed thereto or when affixed have not been cancelled in accordance with Article 14 hereof, a fee of 10 paras for every PT 100 of the amount of the contract shall be collected in the form of contract stamps to be affixed on the contract, in addition to a fine of 1½ per cent. of the amount of the contract. If the stamps affixed are less than the amount required by law, or if after a contract of lease has been signed, the period of lease and the amount of rent are altered by a note at the foot of the contract to higher rent and no stamps are affixed to cover the additional rent, a fee of 10 paras for every PT 100 of the deficient amount shall be collected in the form of contract stamps to be affixed to the lease, in addition to a fine of 1½ per cent. of the amount of the contract.

Article 25. Fines imposed by the municipality shall be collected in the same way as other municipality taxes are collected.

Article 27 All dealings connected with contract stamps will be under municipality control and supervision, and Government and Municipality officials are required to take all necessary measures for the purpose of strictly carrying out the provisions of this law.

Translations of Ottoman Laws,
June 1919

SCHEDULE OF HAJZ STAMP DUTIES

	Fixed Duty.	PT	Millahat
1. Tickets of theatres, cinematographs, &c.			
2. Cheques, bills of exchange and promissory notes payable on demand, and receipts of all descriptions (up to any amount)		5	
3. Copies of petitions			
4. All documents presented to the courts			
5. All registration papers connected with the enumeration and control of animals coming under the "annual tax"			
6. Receipts issued by the customs officers			
7. All documents issued by notary public			
8. Petitions addressed to the authorities			
9. Bills of lading (each copy)			
10. Insurance policies			
11. All petitions and declarations connected with the transfer or mortgage of immovable property		5	0
12. Licences for the publication of books and printed matters		20	0
13. Deeds of attorney (containing no indication of value).			
14. Documents of guarantee of security (containing no indication of value)			
15. Brokers' licences		100	0
16. Factory licences		200	0

Proportional Duty.

17. Bills of exchange and promissory notes not payable on demand:—

Up to 100	10
100 to 1,000	20
Over 1,000	30

18. Documents of guarantee of security, movable or immovable

19. Licences required by the Government or for goods to be sold by the Government

20. Deeds of attorney

21. Documents of guarantee of security.

22. Title deeds.

23. Licences of limited liability companies (on capital subscribed).

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10)

(No 244)

My Lord.

Jerusalem, January 1, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the political situation for the month of December.

The report on the economic, financial and administrative position will be sent by the next bag.

I have &c.

(For High Commissioner).

E KEITH ROACH

Enclosure 1 in No. 78

Political Report for December

THE political situation in Palestine continues, on the whole, satisfactory.

1 The events which have occurred in Transjordan during the last few weeks have not passed unobserved in Palestine. Exaggerated rumours have been current as to a movement, instigated by King Hussein and conducted by Emir Abdullah, against the French, and as to the establishment in Amman of a Hedjaz Government. When, however, the truth of the recent events and their sequence becomes known in Palestine it should, on the whole, redound to the advantage of the British Government and of its representatives in Transjordan.

2 The rumours regarding affairs in Transjordan were undoubtedly of some service to those members of the Christian Moslem Society who met during the middle of the month in conference at Haifa. The conference was composed of all those who call themselves "delegates" of the societies in question. It should, however, be observed that these societies, of which the number in June last was forty-three, and the membership alleged to be about 3,000 (but it is probable that most have fallen into abeyance), cannot rightly be regarded as representative (in a European sense) of the views of the whole population. At the same time there is reason to believe that certain of the views expressed are passively shared by some sections of the population.

The conference at Haifa passed off without untoward incident. It is not yet evident what effect, if any, will be given to their resolutions.

These resolutions were embodied in the form of a memorandum which was presented by Muna Kazim Pasha al Husseini (the president of the conference) to his Excellency the High Commissioner.

A copy of this memorandum, together with a copy of the reply sent thereto, is attached. (Marked (A) and (B).)

As Muna Kazim Pasha's memorandum was published in the Arabic press, the reply of the High Commissioner has also been published. It is probable that the articles in a certain section of the British press were the occasion, if not indirectly the cause, of the recent recrudescence of political discussion in the local press, and to a limited extent, in the country.

A communiqué issued by the Government on the 16th December is herewith attached. (Marked (C).)

Information has been received since the assembling of the conference that the same has been received by the High Commissioner. It is also probable that the High Commissioner has been in touch with persons holding similar views in Egypt, Syria, and further north. It is probable that the High Commissioner has been in touch with persons holding similar views in Egypt, Syria, and further north.

3 A few days prior to the meeting of the conference above referred to, a general meeting of the four parties representing Jewish workmen took place at Haifa. The object of the conference was to discuss the question of the establishment of a Jewish labour union. The number of delegates was eighty-seven. A copy of the statutes agreed to at the conference is attached. (Marked (D).)

4 There has also been during the course of the month a little labour unrest in Jaffa. At a sweet and confectionery establishment in that town a strike had been in progress for a considerable time, and although the number of the workmen and the

size of the industry is inconsiderable, the strike was regarded by the workmen as a test case from which to deduce the Government's probable action in future labour disputes. The point of interest turned, not unnaturally, on the Government's attitude towards picketing. In a communiqué dated the 20th December, and given to the press (copy attached marked (E)), the Government made it known, amongst other things, that it was not prepared to interfere with the exercise of the rights of their legitimate rights. A few days before, on the 17th December, a party of workmen broke into the premises of a wood merchant and damaged the machinery. Upon the police attempting to arrest the leaders of the party, an affray ensued resulting in injuries of varying gravity to upwards of ten persons.

5. At first sight it might appear that, in the present condition of labour and industry in the country, these disputes can be regarded as of minor moment. But since their political effect upon other elements of the population is appreciable, and since they involve questions of principle respecting the relative spheres of action—capital, labour, and of the Government, an importance which they would not otherwise deserve must be attached to them.

6 The 9th December (the anniversary of the entry into Jerusalem of the British army) was celebrated in Jerusalem by a parade of the garrison. A service was held in St. George's Cathedral in the morning and in the afternoon the acting District Governor of Jerusalem held a reception at the Governorate. The service was attended by his Excellency the High Commissioner and the senior members of the civil Administration and the garrison, together with the religious and secular heads of all sections of the community with the exception of the Latin Church. The service was most impressive. Great care had been exercised by Bishop MacLennan in the choice of portions of the Scripture and Prayer Book suitable to the occasion and to the congregation. Selections from the Scriptures were read in Arabic, Hebrew and English throughout by a spirit of cordial friendship.

7 On Sunday the 19th December, a service was held by the Orthodox Church at the Holy Sepulchre to celebrate the return to Greece of ex King Constantine. This service took place at the request of the Greek consul who, having previously posed as a zealous Venizelist, has now become an equally zealous Constantinist. The consul attended the service in uniform, but none of the other consuls were present, although it is understood that they had been invited by the Greek consul. A letter from the Greek consul (marked (F)) was received by the acting District Governor, Jerusalem, and it is understood that letters in the same sense were addressed to all consular representatives, and that they were requested to hoist their flags. This request was not complied with indeed the French consul general who usually hoists his flag on Sundays, refrained on this occasion from so doing in order that it should not be taken as an endorsement of the Constantinist movement.

8 On the 20th December the capture of Ramallah by British troops was celebrated in that place. His Excellency the High Commissioner and Lady Samuel attended, and speeches were made by the mayor and a number of leading residents of the town, expressing the deepest gratitude for the establishment of a British Administration, and satisfaction with the present situation in the country.

9 Before terminating the political section of this report, allusion should be made to the increasing harmony which characterises the meetings of the Advisory Council. There are some grounds for hoping not only that the spirit now prevailing at this round table conference of all three communities under the presidency of the High Commissioner may eventually spread amongst the rest of the population of Palestine, but also that the proceedings may be taken by them as an example in mutual work and co-operation.

December 31 1920

Enclosure 2 in No. 78.

(A)

Memorandum presented to the High Commissioner

THIS third Palestinian Arab Congress, legally representative of all the classes and communities of the Palestinian Arab people meeting at the town of Haifa since the 13th December 1920 referring to the covenant contracted by Great Britain

with her ally His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz in the year 1915, to the statements of the British Prime Minister at Glasgow on the 23rd June, 1917, and to the declarations of the rest of the heads of the Allied Governments and their statesmen confirming the necessity of granting the liberated people, severed from the Turkish Empire, the right of choosing their future and the form of Government that may meet with their satisfaction—this congress, in the name of the honour of Great Powers and that of humanity, and in the name of the two religions of Islam and Christianity, appeals to Great Britain for the justice of immediately proceeding to form a native Government to be responsible towards a Legislative Assembly representative of, and elected by, the Arabic-speaking population living in Palestine up to the beginning of the war—such step being the realisation of Great Britain's sublime principles already in the process of application in the two Arabic-speaking regions of Mesopotamia and Transjordan, and to the solidification and confirmation of the deep-rooted friendship existing between her and the Arab nation in general.

It is the sincere wish of the congress that the British Government should, with the best intention and readiness, and that the hesitation of according it amounts to the continuance of the unnecessary and unavoidable discontent of the Arab people, and the burdening of the British people with too heavy an expense for the sake of internal and external peace (restfulness), as this congress, speaking in the name of the people, is unsatisfied with the present Administration, which is contrary to the people's wishes and rights, for reasons the main of which are:—

1. Its adoption of the competence to enact laws by itself in the absence of any representative and elected Legislative Assembly, and before the issue of the final decision of the League of Nations.
2. Its recognition of the Zionist Commission as an official body.
3. Its proceeding to fulfil the Zionist ambitions by introducing Zionist emigrants, using Hebrew as an official language, and keeping silent over the existence of a Zionist flag.
4. Its formation of an Advisory Council nominated by it *faisant semblant* of the existence in Palestine of a Legislative Assembly representing the population.
5. The existence in the highest of its positions of Zionist leaders notwithstanding the fact that Palestine is the very Holy Land of the two Moslem and Christian worlds, and that its destiny may not pass into other than Moslem and Christian hands.

It is the sincere wish of the congress that the British Government should, with the best intention and readiness, and that the hesitation of according it amounts to the continuance of the unnecessary and unavoidable discontent of the Arab people, and the burdening of the British people with too heavy an expense for the sake of internal and external peace (restfulness), as this congress, speaking in the name of the people, is unsatisfied with the present Administration, which is contrary to the people's wishes and rights, for reasons the main of which are:—

M. KASIM EL HUSSEINI
President of Congress

December 18, 1920

Enclosure 3 in No. 7

(B) High Commissioner to Musa Kasim Pasha

December 21, 1920

I AM, Sir, in receipt of your letter of the 18th inst. and in reply to inform you that the High Commissioner notes that the memorandum asserts at the outset that the congress was "legally representative of all the classes and communities of the Palestinian Arab people."

The information in the possession of the Government, on the contrary, is to the effect that the members of the congress were appointed by small groups, and are by no means representative of the population.

Before taking into consideration, therefore, the resolutions which were passed, his Excellency would be obliged if he could be informed—

1. By what societies the representatives were appointed
2. What number of members of each society participated in the choice of the representatives

I have, &c.
W. H. DEEDES,
Civil Secretary.

Enclosure 4 in No. 7

(C)

Communiqué issued by the Government, December 10.

It has been observed that certain persons are engaging in a movement having as its object a change of the present policy of the British Government with regard to Palestine.

It appears that this movement has been stimulated by some articles that have appeared in a section of the London press. The High Commissioner desires to state that there has not been, and will not be, any change in the policy of His Majesty's Government, as announced by him in his inaugural address in the month of July. That policy fully safeguards the rights and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine in relation to the Holy Places, to the ownership and cultivation of land, and to all other matters in accordance with the dictates of justice.

Enclosure 5 in No. 7

(D)

Statutes agreed to at the Conference at Haifa, December 13, 1920

Paragraph 1.—The conference of the Palestine workmen creates a communal organisation of the Hebrew workmen in Palestine. (Confederation of Labour)

Paragraph 2.—The confederation unites all the workers and wage-earners of the country who live on their work, and are not employing others, in order to organise a permanent communal and educational affairs of all the Palestine workers, and to build a Hebrew working community in Palestine.

Paragraph 3.—Speaks of self-governing institutions, and was deferred to the "organisation" clause.

Paragraph 4.—The confederation is embodied from trade organisations who organise their members according to their trades.

Paragraph 5.—The confederation is the only representative of the workers' community in all settlement, communal and educational affairs, within and without

Enclosure 6 in No. 7

(E)

Official Communiqué to the Press

In the event of a labour dispute officers of the Government will—

- (a.) Preserve an attitude of impartiality on the economic questions that are in dispute, and endeavour to bring the parties to an arbitration.
- (b.) Preserve order.
- (c.) Maintain freedom of access to the premises where the dispute has occurred.
- (d.) Not deny to the workmen or their representatives the opportunity of stating their case to any work-people whom the employer may bring to take their places, provided that this right of "peaceful persuasion" does not in fact degenerate into violence. Workmen cannot, however, be allowed by violence, or the threat of violence, to prevent the employers carrying on their business, whether with their own labour or with the labour of other work-people whom they may be able to employ.

Enclosure 7 in No. 7

(F)

Greek Consul to the Acting Governor-General, Jerusalem

M. le Gouverneur.

Jerusalem, le 12 décembre 1920

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que Sa Majesté le Roi Constantin, mon auguste Souverain constitutionnel, arrivera au Phalère, dimanche prochain, 19 courant, pour reprendre l'exercice de ses fonctions royales.

A l'occasion de ce deuil Royal sera surmonté sur le drapeau de ce consulat général sera arboré.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
S. G. LIATIS

C 2

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 87.)

My Lord,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 3821 of the 20th December. In a note from the Foreign Office, dated 10th January 1921, I have indicated towards the conferment of the mandates for Syria, Palestine,

from my despatches No. 4157 of the 29th December, 1920, and No. 4158 of the 30th December, 1920, that I have already refused to accept the Italian Government's proposals in this matter, and have informed the French Minister here of the reasons therefor. You should refer the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to this correspondence. I have also referred to the Italian Government's representations to the Italian Government on this matter. The result of those referred to above.

Your Excellency should be aware that the French Government's Government agree regarding the necessary measures, which cannot be taken with the terms of the draft mandatories, which are in the language of the spirit of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. His Majesty's Government have not yet decided upon the method of government for the territories in question, and the Council of the League of Nations, which is alone competent to make such decisions, would appear to be no reason why the Council should not at once proceed to decide upon the conditions in which these territories are to be administered.

It is, however, that this line of argument can, as suggested in the note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, be pressed so far as to establish that on the issue of mandates by the Council the legal position of the mandatory will be complete. Territories placed under these mandates are still in law under Turkish sovereignty, and Turkey is not at present bound either by the Covenant or by the decision of the Supreme Council at San Remo conferring the mandates, the necessary steps to divest her of sovereignty and thus to complete the legal position of the mandatory have not been taken. If, however, the Council is prepared to issue the mandates at its next meeting, the only further step to be taken would be to secure Turkey's adhesion to the arrangement by the deposit of ratifications of the Turkish Treaty. If, moreover, the Council could be induced to combine its issue of the mandates with a declaration of the propriety of the administration of the mandated territories being placed in accordance with the terms of the Turkish Treaty, the position of the mandatory would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be rendered more stable from the legal point of view.

The note from the French Government and the views of His Majesty's Government, as set forth above, are being communicated to the British representative on the Council. If they agree with these views, they should also be communicated to the French representative on the Council.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Foreign Office to Sir M. Hankey.

Sir,

WITH reference to the correspondence with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires and French Minister here, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris regarding "A" mandates.

* See Part IV, Nos. 312, 320, 329 and 339, and No. 79, ante.

2. I am to request that these papers and, in particular, the views expressed in the despatch to Lord Hardinge may be brought to the attention of Mr. Balfour for his consideration at the meeting of the Council at which the question of the "A" mandates is to be discussed.

I am, &c

LANCÉLOT OLIPHANT

War Office to Foreign Office. — (Received January 11)

Sir,

War Office, January 10, 1921

AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 20th December, 1920, and enclosures.

Paragraph 2 of your letter, I am to inform you that the present system of communication between the British and French military authorities on military matters is by means of a British liaison officer at General Headquarters, Cairo, and a French liaison officer at General Headquarters, Cairo.

I am to say that, while agreeing generally with Lord Curzon's views as regards questions involving the use of troops for political purposes, the Army Council consider that, since Syria and Palestine are both potential theatres of military operations, the existing system should continue for the present for the purpose of interchanging information of a purely military nature.

A copy of your letter has been forwarded to the India Office.

I am, &c

Sir H. Samuel to Sir J. Tilley. — (Received January 12, 1921.)

Dear Sir John Tilley,

Jerusalem, December 24, 1920.

I SHOULD be obliged if you would read the enclosed correspondence with Sir Alfred Mond, and the cables from him and Dr. Weizmann, copies of which are also enclosed.

As it is desirable that the Foreign Office should be fully acquainted with any step taken, such as that proposed by Sir Alfred Mond, I send you herewith a letter which I have written to Sir Alfred Mond to-day, in order that you may forward it to him, in the event of your having no comments to make with regard to it.

Yours sincerely,

HERBERT SAMUEL

Enclosure 1 in No. 82

Sir H. Samuel to Sir A. Mond

Dear Sir Alfred Mond,

Jerusalem, November 29, 1920

I HAVE received your letter of the 18th November relating to the Economic Council, and Dr. Weizmann's views upon the subject. I do not know precisely what the relations now are between the Economic Council and the Zionist Organization, and I should not like to take any step which may appear to the latter to be derogatory to its status. I have, however, written to Dr. Weizmann to-day, in order that you may forward it to him, in the event of your having no comments to make with regard to it. Should you be of opinion, however, that the latter would be likely to complicate the situation please return to me, with your suggestions as to the best course to pursue. If, on the other hand, you should be of opinion that the Economic Council should be informed of the steps taken, I will then write in the terms that you suggest.

I think, however, that the Foreign Office should be informed of the steps taken, and I would propose to answer your letter through them. The situation is governed

by the fact that the draft mandate contemplates an official Jewish agency which shall co-operate with the Administration of Palestine, and that pending the final constitution of a fully representative body the Zionist Organisation should fulfil that function.

Yours very sincerely
HERBERT SAMUEL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 82

Sir A. Mond to Sir H. Samuel.

Dear Sir Herbert Samuel,

I HAVE been requested to communicate with you with reference to the organisation of an Economic Council for the development of Palestine, which, as you are aware, held its first sitting on the 21st ultimo.

The members of the Council are very anxious to do their best to assist in the economic development of Palestine. The idea at present is that they should both individually and by suitable experts study the various economic and industrial problems which are awaiting solution, both with a view to giving advice to the Government of Palestine, if required, and also as to the formulation in a practical form of schemes which may likewise have to be organised financial and technical. They may likewise have to organise financial and technical schemes which gain their approval as being of a sound character. A further step will be by combined representation of the existing organisations, such as the I.C.A. and other bodies, to endeavour to prevent overlapping and the dissipation both of time and funds.

The first difficulty encountered by the Council was how to create for it some kind of authoritative standing. At present it is merely a body of gentlemen who have come together on my initiative. The suggestion, therefore, which I have been asked to submit to you is whether you could officially express to me your desire that such a body should be called into existence, and indicate that in your opinion it would be of help to you in your task of reconstructing Palestine. We are quite aware of the fact that in the course of our contact with your Government there is every desire to avoid all possible friction with the Zionist Organisation, who are equally disposed to work in harmony with us. In fact, it is agreed that the Zionist Organisation should be represented on the Economic Council, and that these two bodies should work together in the most friendly co-operation and harmony.

In order to meet the difficulty referred to it appears to us that it would be necessary for the Zionist Organisation, with your concurrence, to transfer to the Economic Council certain of its own functions where economic and financial problems are involved. If you agree with this view I think it will be possible for us to arrange the details here with the Zionist Organisation. Some preliminary discussions have already taken place on the subject.

You will readily understand some of the difficulties in getting to this preliminary stage, but I can assure you that the spirit is very good and is improving, and that the desire among Jews of all sections to co-operate in the reconstruction of the national home is very manifest. I have little doubt that as matters proceed and practical work is being done greater progress will be made, and that the present Council will develop into a more formal and juristic body. In fact this is already under consideration.

I sincerely trust you will be able to give us the amount of recognition which is necessary to enable us to carry out our proposed functions with the greatest possible measure of success.

Yours sincerely
ALFRED MOND

Enclosure 3 in No. 82

Sir A. Mond to Sir H. Samuel

ALFRED MOND cabling you concerning my letter 18th November to you. Trust you will now write me necessary letter as very anxious to proceed.

Enclosure 4 in No. 82

Dr. Weizmann to Sir H. Samuel.

(Telegraphic)

FULLY concur Mond's letter 18th November

London, December 18

Enclosure 5 in No. 82

Sir H. Samuel to Sir A. Mond.

(Telegraphic)

LETTER suggested sent to Foreign Office.

Jerusalem, December 24 1920

Enclosure 6 in No. 82

Sir H. Samuel to Sir A. Mond

Dear Sir Alfred Mond,

Jerusalem, December 24, 1920.

I AM greatly interested to hear that you have been asked to concur in the formation of an Economic Council to assist the development of Palestine. I write to express the hope that such a Council may be formally constituted, and may play an active part in promoting the economic progress of the country. I have already had an opportunity of indicating to the principal members of the Government, such a Council could most usefully assist at the present time, and there can be no doubt that other measures will present themselves as the reconstruction of the country proceeds. I am sure that the formation of such a Council, on a comprehensive and authoritative basis, is likely to prove of the greatest value and importance, and would cordially welcome its co-operation.

Believe me, yours sincerely,
HERBERT SAMUEL.

E 365 290 88)

No. 83

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

NO. 83

Foreign Office, January 12, 1921

I HAVE received your despatch No. 186 of the 10th December relative to holidays in the State of Palestine Government.

2. The Majesty of the King is regarded as a holiday for all creeds, and I concur in your proposals with regard to the eight holidays each for Moslems, Christians and Jews.

3. Empire day should not be included.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Contal Fontana to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 13, 1921.)

No. 117. (Confidential.)

My Lord,

Beirut, December 21, 1920

I HAVE the honour to submit the following short report upon the present situation in the Grand Lebanon, and in the region comprised in the vilayet of Aleppo as it existed before the war.

In the late summer of 1913 the Lebanon mountains were visited by a great swarm of locusts, which ravaged the whole district and consumed every green thing. In 1918 the people of the Lebanon, which was then occupied by a Turkish division, began to feel the pinch of hunger, and in 1917 and 1918 famine desolated the whole region. Supplies of grain were sent by the Turkish Government to be distributed for the relief of the people, but these supplies were so manipulated by Mutesarrifs, kaimakams, and others, who in many cases sold the grain at exorbitant prices, that the relief afforded was entirely insufficient. Over one-third of the inhabitants of the Lebanon died of famine during those years, and in 1918 hundreds of people died of starvation in the streets of Beirut and other towns of the littoral. After the British occupation a great number of Lebanese who possessed the means to travel emigrated to America, so that not more than one-third of the original inhabitants of the Lebanon now remain in the country. I have visited various villages in the mountains which before the war were prosperous and full of life, but their present aspect is most desolate. The few inhabitants remaining live mostly upon money received from relatives in America and there is very little sign of husbandry or activity of any kind. In every village there are a number of deserted and roofless houses, the owners of which before perishing demolished their roofing in order to sell the timber with which it was constructed to buy bread. Many other houses, although still intact, stand empty or deserted, and buildings commenced shortly before the war still remain in the condition in which they were left when work was abandoned. Labour is so scarce and expensive that the work of construction cannot be carried on, but would be emigrants have no great difficulty in evading the regulation by bribery.

At Beirut the economic situation is by no means good. There is a quantity of cloth and piece goods on the market for which there is now little demand, and of which the importers are eager to dispose even at a heavy sacrifice. The banks are reluctant to grant credit, and trade with the interior is at a standstill. The fluctuation and fall in the value of the Syrian piastre, the only currency now recognized as legal tender, tends to hamper both local and foreign trade. The Beirut custom-house is described as corrupt from top to bottom, and importers are submitted not only to monetary extortion but frequently even to distribution of a portion of the goods received among the customs officials. Civil functionaries and the middle-classes generally are suffering from the high cost of living, and venality among the former when Syrian appears to be the rule rather than the exception. Certain French officers and officials are also accused of receiving and expecting liberal presents for services rendered by them.

In the Aleppo region the military situation is as follows: There is a large concentration of Turkish troops at Onrfa under command of Mustafa Kemal P., whose headquarters are or are to be, at Diarbekir. One Turkish division is in Aleppo. A French division is operating between Aintab and Kilis. A French division is beleaguering Aintab, but the town does not appear to be cut off from communication with outside. Another French detachment "volant" is said to be moving in the Aintab district. Idlip has been raided by Kemalists who killed some French soldiers, and carried off a considerable sum in gold from the Konak. In the Antioch region one Ibrahim Hannano has risen against the French and collected a large band of followers. He is acting in unison with the Kemalists, and on the 2nd instant marched from Harim and seized Djisr ash-Shogour (where he installed a Nationalist kaimakam), after defeating a force of gendarmes sent from Aleppo to arrest him, who suffered severe losses. A company and a-half of French troops were assailed and almost surrounded in a defile east of Ain Cherkia by a force of Alawites, but managed to withdraw with a loss of several killed and wounded. In the Alawite

territory generally the situation is at present unfavourable for the French, the chiefs having thrown in their lot with the Komalists.

At Aleppo itself there are very few French troops, and the chetias are active to the north and east of the town. People refuse to go for business to villages only 10 miles distant, through fear of the bands. A French camel caravan which started recently from El Bab for Aleppo was obliged to return when only two hours out, the chetias being seen scouring the countryside. At Tel Ahmar the "shah-tours," or ferry boats have been seized by the rebels. I have talked with two Englishmen who returned a few days ago from Aleppo, one of whom has passed many years in the country, and also with a third who returned from there later. They all state that the general opinion at Aleppo is that Mustapha Kemal can take the town when he pleases, but is holding back until the worst of the rains are over. The opinion remains that as with the in Hama and that he is declared that he will blow up the railway between there and Beirut before the end of February. The inhabitants of Aleppo, both Christian and Moslem, are bitter against the French and would almost welcome the return of the Turks. The Administration is very weak and corrupt, the Governor-General senile and a mere puppet of the French. His relative, Muhamed Bey Shayef, has been appointed Mutessarif of Aleppo, and another of his family is director of the post and telegraph office, having formerly been employed there and dismissed for breach of trust. The high administrative posts have been divided between members of the Shayef and Koutai families, all of whom are mere instruments in the hands of the mandatory Power. The post office is in great confusion, letters are opened and replaced in wrong envelopes, or lost, correspondence is greatly retarded and much inconvenience caused to business, especially those corresponding with abroad. Telegrams also are incessantly delayed to Constantinople. Great credit is given to the French officers in the Administration as well as among native officials. According to the statement of a firm of Aleppo bankers, a French officer left Aleppo after some months residence with 50,000 fr., which had accumulated in the bank during that period. Three other officers also left with large fortunes, having apparently none on their arrival.

The three sons of the late Ibrahim Pasha arrived in Aleppo towards the end of November, fugitives from the Turks, after, it is said, cutting off the noses of certain Turkish officers at Veran Shahr. They applied to the French for money and troops to fight the Kemalists, and were well received.

Muchhem Bey returned to Aleppo in November from his disastrous expedition to Rakka and Der Zor. He travelled by the desert road, as he was unable to pass through Rakka, which was under British occupation. He found the country with Turkish troops everywhere, and the Aleppo Government determined to eject the French. On his return, Muchhem applied for a strong force of troops to eject his cousin and the Turks from Rakka, and impose his authority at Der Zor, where the inhabitants are either pro-Turk, pro-British, or in favour of decentralisation. But no attention was paid to his representations, and he is now living incognito at Aleppo.

There is marked and general dissatisfaction with French mandatory rule both at Beirut and in the Lebanon as a whole. Even the Maronite community, the largest of the various Christian sects, and considering themselves as Catholics to all intents and purposes, are dissatisfied with the French Government's policy in Syria and many people say that they were better off under the Turks than now. Various causes have combined to produce this public dissatisfaction. The one is that the French Government, after the enormous sacrifices and expenditure of the war, are unable to sink money in Syria as lavishly as the inhabitants expected. This the Syrians resented and so more so the increase of taxation in the old Lebanon, where taxes were formerly very low. It is calculated that more than half the population of the Lebanon live on less than £10 per annum. No doubt the French Government has been forced to raise taxes because their expenditures have been very low. The French authorities have been too busy trying to bring about peace and the detriment of the Syrians. Another cause of dissatisfaction is the representation of French "conseillers" to every municipal council. At present there are five appointed by the French Government and three elected by the Syrian community. These representatives are not very popular among the Syrians. The French Government has also been accused of having expelled many Syrians who have had to leave their homes.

larger than before the war. And the fact of certain French officers and officials being venal is so magnified as to elicit sweeping condemnation of local French officialdom. A third pretext for dissatisfaction is the defective lighting of Beirut, and relative paralysis in public works in the town itself, the malcontents overlooking the fact that they themselves loudly deprecate the increase of taxation necessary to render such works possible. French officers, moreover, have for some reason rendered themselves temporarily unpopular among ladies belonging to the higher native class at Beirut, and the existence of a large lay school under French masters which is largely attended by Jews, is looked upon askance by high native ecclesiastics. The French are accused of looking down upon the Syrians, and the words *sala Syria* or *sala Syria*, dropped by individual Frenchmen, are resented as a national insult.

The French, on their side, are embarrassed by the great military expenditure called for owing to the unsettled state of Syria and Cilicia, and by the comparatively

in the Administration which would be better occupied by French civil functionaries of experience, whose number is wholly inadequate to meet the requirements of the

intended ultimately to be filled by French officials. The French functionaries, moreover, besides being relatively few, have not always been wisely selected. The secret of the acting High Commissioner told me that M. de Caix, when in France last year, and his utmost to recruit competent officials, with or without colonial experience in Syria, but the gaps left by the war and disinclination to accept service in the Near East rendered his efforts almost fruitless. The lack of higher education among the Syrians, and the ignorance of any but Turkish methods of administration unfit them at present, in the opinion of the French, for administrative posts without foreign supervision, and thus the system of "councillors," against whose decision appeal can only be made to the High Commissioner, has been evolved as a "temporary measure" to remain in force until the Syrians have acquired the art of self government. Unfortunately, for the reason I have indicated, these "councillors" do not always possess the tact and ability requisite for their functions. The sensitive vanity of the educated native, and his proclivity to intrigue and peroration rather than to action, call for more indulgence and patience than the average French official is likely to possess.

The sacrifices made by the French in blood and money for the pacification of Syria, and the excellent carriage roads suitable for motor traffic constraining

throughout the greater part of the Great Lebanon and elsewhere in Syria seems to elicit no word of appreciation from the Syrians themselves. Damascus is now accessible by motor in four hours from Beirut, and Aleppo in ten hours. Hundreds of motor cars and lorries now exist where none existed before. But the Syrian in general disinclined to sustained action other than commercial, and

setting above all things wealth, in whatever way acquired, is naturally prone to criticism of western methods dissimilar to his own, however beneficial they may ultimately prove, and to impatience, under a foreign mandate of any but the shortest road leading to his own aggrandisement and affluence. It is therefore safe, perhaps, to discount a large percentage of Syrian dissatisfaction with the French mandate, as likely to have evinced itself even under other and far more favourable conditions. Still it is to be feared that if General Gouraud's budget is disapproved of, and any serious retrenchment in Syria is insisted upon by the French Government, the military situation may get entirely out of hand and the Christians join with the Moslems in anti-French demonstrations. In local French circles it is surmised that the return of ex-King Constantine to the Throne of Greece may lead to the restitution of Smyrna to the Turks, and to an understanding with Mustapha Kemal Pasha whereby he shall cease military operations against the French in Syria and in Cilicia.

In view of rumours which have been prevalent in native circles as to the intention of the French to withdraw from Syria, a notice has been issued and published by the acting High Commissioner a copy of which is annexed hereto.

I have, &c.

R. A. FONTANA

to transmit copies of this despatch for transmission, should your Lordship judge expedient, to His Majesty's High Commissioners in Egypt, Palestine, and

[E 265 265 88]

No 85

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome)

(No. 17)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 13, 1921

YOUR telegram No. 7 of 5th January. Italian guard detachment in Province of French detachment is contrary to decision of San Remo. System of religious protection, of which implies that Italian Government were as anxious as we that it should be regarded as having ceased altogether.

In any case Italian Government will doubtless admit that as soon as the mandate is in force we as mandatory will be solely responsible for order and guardianship of Holy Places, and as Italian Government will therefore be forced to withdraw detachment after entry into force of mandate, their inaction on maintenance until that date seems discourteous.

Authority and responsibility and is liable to be misunderstood by His Majesty's Government as at a time when they never preferred when Turkish authorities administered Jerusalem.

Copy of note to French Ambassador here renewing representations regarding French detachment follows by bag. Please inform Count de Sals.

E 570 570 88

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem)

(No. 2)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 13, 1921

YOUR letter to Sir John Tilley of 24th December.

Provided Zionist organisation agree and will co-operate closely with council, which is assumed from correspondence enclosed in your letter to be the case, no difficulty seems likely to arise from article 4 of the mandate, and we entirely approve.

Since Sir A. Mond and S. Weizmann left for Palestine before receipt of your letter, we are not posting letter to Sir A. Mond here and assume that you will give him signed copy of letter on arrival.

E 829 35 88

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. — (Received January 18.)

No. 1.

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 4, 1921

IN continuation of my despatch No. 244 of the 1st January, 1921, I have the honour to transmit herewith the December monthly administrative report.

I have, &c.

For High Commissioner
W. H. DEEDS

Enclosure in No. 8

Palestine Administrative Report for December 1920.

Agriculture.

General

districts, and early planted crops are suffering. A hundred mules, sent by the army, thereof has been met by agricultural loans to the purchasers.

Arabs are ploughing a larger area than has hitherto been brought under cultivation.

60181

X 2

Forest Service.

Commission are offering some two million trees from their nurseries, made available from a curtailment of their planting programme.

Veterinary Service.

Contagious disease in live-stock has been limited to a few isolated and sporadic cases. Quarantine arrangements for the reception of sheep and small stock are completed at Haifa.

Antiquities.

Excavations.

The work of excavating the site of the 4th Century Basilica in the Garden of Gethsemane has been successfully concluded.

Museum.

The classification of the remains of the old Ottoman Palestine Museum has been initiated and is proceeding satisfactorily.

The sum of 100£ has been contributed by the department towards the repairs of the Hippicus Tower, Jerusalem.

Societies.

The French Republic has appointed the Ecole technique de Saint Etienne.

Pro-Jerusalem Society have lately been curtailed owing to lack of funds. The technical education branch of this society is progressing. Eighteen apprentices are at work in the society's loom and over a hundred boys in the

A society entitled "Pro Carmel" has been formed at Haifa, organised on similar lines to the Pro-Jerusalem Society.

Commerce and Industry.

Retail merchants were holding on to their stocks in the hope of liquidating

Tanks for the supply of bulk oil for fuel have been erected in Jerusalem, and the companies are considering suitable sites in Jaffa and Haifa.

Supplies of wood are still not equal to demand, but there is some hope of large quantities shortly being available from Anatolia.

The banks are still pursuing a policy of restricting credits and calling in loans.

The Shemen Oil Company and the Jaffa Tile and Brick

A building construction company has been formed in Nablus with a capital of £ E. 50,000, 10 per cent. paid up.

Transportation continues difficult and expensive, and the lack of ploughing animals is hampering agriculture.

Education.

The Government's new elementary educational scheme, agreed to by the advisory

It is also hoped to provide educational facilities for the nomad tribes in Southern Palestine, and arrangements are being made to provide a boarding school for the sons of Beduin sheikhs.

Finance.

Customs.

The value of imports for the month of November is £ E. 581,030, which is an increase of £ E. 21,886 over the corresponding

The value of exports for November shows a drop of £ E. 22,745 over the same month for the year 1919.

Agricultural Loans.

The sum of £ E. 61,600 has been disbursed as agricultural loans during November, making a total of £ E. 298,600 to date.

Treasury.

The accounts of the Palestine Railway and Posts and Telegraphs Department were taken over on the 1st October, 1920, and will be incorporated in the Government

A scheme has been put forward and approved for the decentralisation of the Government stores, whereby each department will be responsible for the care and issue of stores to that department.

The general supervision of stores will be under the controller of stores, and the Central Teachers Board will be responsible under him for the placing of tenders and purchases.

Legal.

The principal case tried during the month of December was that of a gang of armed highway robbers who had infested the country between Jerusalem and Jaffa. These were sentenced to penal servitude for life, and a number of the other members of the gang to short terms of penal servitude.

A question has been raised by the American consul concerning the jurisdiction of the Palestine Courts over American subjects. During the two and a half years that the Courts have been re-established under the British Administration no attempt has been made by the foreign Powers to assert any capitulatory rights. This claim, put forward just before the mandate is declared, has been referred to the Foreign Office.

Mr Anton Bertram, Chief Justice of Ceylon, has arrived to preside over a special

An ordinance has been drafted defining the powers of such commissions of inquiry.

Steps have been taken to assist the Government of Transjordan to establish a Court of Appeal which shall serve the Courts of that region. They were hitherto dependent on the Court of Cassation and Court of Appeal in Damascus.

The ordinance to enable land in Palestine to be expropriated on behalf of the British army has been brought into force and a permanent Arbitration Board to assess the value of land is being established.

Medical.

General Health.

The general health of the country is good, and no abnormal epidemics have occurred during the month.

Malaria.

The high incidence of malaria resulting from the collections of water remaining from the abnormal rainfall and snow of the previous winter has now fallen and few new cases are occurring.

Arrangements have been made for the granting of loans to villagers for the development of pure water supplies. The establishment of these water supplies will prove of great value as an antimalarial measure. The villagers in the Acre district are taking a keen interest in the antimalarial campaign.

Control of Practice of Pharmacy.

Public Health Ordinance No. 4, controlling the practice of pharmacy and the trade in drugs and poisons, was discussed by the Advisory Council.

Posts and Telegraphs

The principal item of note during the month has been the establishment of a direct mail service from Germany to Palestine. At present the volume of correspondence is not sufficiently great to justify the making up of a direct mail in the opposite direction.

Public Security.

Recruiting of fifty men for a camel police detachment to take the place of Indian troops at Beersheba has commenced, and the men are to be trained by the army.

Thirty one cases of heinous crimes were reported, an increase of nine on the previous month, twenty were detected.

The number of prisoners in custody in Palestine gaols for the month was 950.

Arrangements have been made for a complete company of gaol labourers to commence work in the new year with the railway.

Public Works.

During the month the consolidation of roads has been in active operation. The extension of the customs quay at Haifa shows considerable progress, a of 30 metres having been constructed during December.

E 909 909 88]

No. 88

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

J.usalem, January 17, 1921.

Your despatch No. 493 of 24th December

Following are my proposals:—

1. That Council of Four be elected by Moslem community without interference from Government.

2. A Wakfs policy to be determined by Council of Four while Government estimates and audits annual accounts.

3. Nominations of Wakfs officials, khalis and muftis to be made by Council.

4. That above scheme be subject to review after four years. Should be glad of

E 803 268 88]

No. 89

Earl Curzon to Comte de Saint Aulaire.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, January 19, 1921

I HAVE the honour to refer to my note of the 23rd October regarding the maintenance of the French and Italian guard detachments in the Holy Places at Jerusalem.

2. His Majesty's Government sincerely regret that the French Government have withdrawn their detachment. The French Government will readily agree that His Majesty's Government as mandatory for Palestine are now de facto more responsible for the maintenance of order throughout Palestine and of free access to the Holy Places.

3. In M. de Fleurbaey's note of the 15th October he stated that the French and Italian as Catholic Powers cannot renounce marking their special position by the presence at important ceremonies of the Holy Places of small detachments of their arms. I venture, however, to point out that the French Government never put forward

such a claim when the Turkish authorities were administering Jerusalem. Secondly, the preferment of such a claim at this stage does not appear to harmonise with the engagement entered into by the French Government at San Remo regarding the renunciation of their religious protectorate, an engagement with which the maintenance of a French military detachment at the important ceremonies of the Holy Places would hardly seem compatible.

4. In reply to their representations to the Italian Government regarding the withdrawal of the Italian detachment His Majesty's Government have received a communication indicating that the maintenance of this detachment is dependent on that of the French detachment. Previous communications from your Excellency's predecessor indicate that the attitude of France is largely guided by that of Italy, and it seems to follow that even from the point of view of the French and Italian Governments there is now nothing to prevent the simultaneous departure of both detachments. I therefore trust that the French Government will now find it possible to issue forthwith the necessary instructions to it.

5. I am making a similar suggestion to the Italian Government.

I have, Sir,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 16216 15211/44]

No. 90

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 69.)

Foreign Office, January 19, 1921

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 201 of the 17th December, regarding the desirability of some arrangement between Palestine and Syria and Palestine and Egypt as to extradition.

As you are aware, there are clauses in the draft mandates for Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia providing for the application to these countries of the extradition treaties between the mandatory of each country and foreign Powers, pending arrangements for each mandated State. I am

convinced that the extradition treaties between British territory, and when the mandate has been approved by the Council of the League extradition between Palestine and States members of the League with which His Majesty's Government have extradition treaties will be governed by those treaties, pending any special arrangements being made. An exchange of notes will probably, however, be required as between His Majesty's Government and the French Government to make it quite clear that the combined effect of the provision in the Palestine mandate regarding extradition and the corresponding provision in the Syrian mandate is to

I am,

3. It will also be necessary for legislation to be introduced eventually in Palestine on the lines of the British Extradition Acts with a view to enabling the provisions of the Palestine mandate to be put into force.

4. If you think it really essential that, pending the entry into force of the mandate and before the above exchange of notes has been effected, some temporary extradition arrangement should be made, you are authorised to arrange direct with the French High Commissioner for Syria for the putting into force of the draft rules, enclosed in your despatch under reference, as a temporary measure. You should report by telegraph any action which you may take in this sense.

5. I should also be glad to learn what arrangement you would propose to govern extradition between Palestine and Egypt which will not be covered by the provision in the Palestine mandate regarding the application of extradition treaties between the mandatory and States members of the League of Nations.

6. A copy of this correspondence is being sent to His Majesty's representative at Cairo.

I am, Sir,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 15695 15695 44]

No. 91

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 77)

Sir,

THE question of the right of Palestinians to the Mixed Courts raised in your despatch No. 149 has been given careful consideration.

2. It would seem likely to prove so difficult to draw a satisfactory and indisputable distinction between those Palestinians to whom this privilege should or should not be accorded that I consider it preferable to retain the existing conditions, with the modifications introduced by the terms of the mandate, when the latter come into force.

3. The question of the position of Palestinians of Western origin or civilisation will be borne in mind when the provisions as to the Mixed Courts in the mandate come to be drafted.

I am, Sir,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 909 909 88]

No. 92

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 48.)

T

YOUR telegram No. 21 of the 2nd December, 1920, concerning the Wakfs of Jerusalem, has been received. I have been instructed to reply to you as follows:

[E 1061 909 88]

No. 93

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 7, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 158 of the 29th November, 1920, concerning the Wakfs of Jerusalem, I have the honour to inform you that I have transmitted, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the resolutions reached at a meeting of the Committee on Wakfs, held on the 2nd December, 1920.

1. It is to be noted that the Committee on Wakfs, which was appointed by the High Commissioner, has brought about by the war necessary changes in the administrative machinery to replace the Awkaf Ministry, the Sheikh-ul-Islam. Resolutions Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 refer to this question. A provisional arrangement, I have already set out in my despatch No. 158 of the 29th November, 1920, has been made for the interim administration of the Moslem Council of Four, and I await the instructions of His Majesty's Government upon their proposals.

2. It will be observed that reference is made to the Central Wakf Council. This body was instituted by the late Military Administration to replace the Ottoman Ministry of Awkaf in the actual management of Wakf revenues. In general, the control exercised by this council is financial, and among its functions is the preparation of estimates, which are submitted to the Government for approval.

3. The Ottoman Government had confiscated for general purposes the revenues from certain Wakfs, and this revenue was consequently not available for the purposes for which the Wakfs were originally founded. To make them so available would appear to be an act of justice, and with this object resolutions Nos. 1, 4 and 5 were passed.

4. Among the original objects of some of the Wakfs was the furtherance of the education of the Moslems. It is proposed that the revenues which will now accrue for this purpose should be applied to the same end.

5. The acceptance of these proposals would, it is thought, have a beneficial effect

on Moslem opinion, not only in Palestine and Transjordan, but also in the world of Islam in general, in that it should afford evidence of the desire of His Majesty's Government to do all that is possible for the welfare of Islam in Palestine.

It is also worth noting that the desire to set up a new Moslem body for the supervision of Wakfs is but a local expression of developments that have occurred elsewhere during the long process of disintegration through which the Ottoman Empire has passed. For instance, in Egypt the Egyptian Administration instituted a Ministry of Awkaf; in Bosnia and Herzegovina also the Austrian Government found it necessary to constitute a Central Council at Sarajevo to administer local Wakfs, and in Cyprus similar action was taken.

It does not appear to be a precedent for investing the power of appointing and dismissing judges of the Religious Courts (that remain in the hands of the Courts), in an elected Moslem body, but the circumstances in Palestine and the natural desire of the Moslem community to exercise autonomy in their religious affairs appear to justify this new departure. It is to be remembered also that a safeguard is provided in the condition that all such appointments must have received the prior approval of the Government.

I should be glad if your Lordship would communicate to me the decision of His Majesty's Government respecting these resolutions.

I have, Sir,

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

Enclosed in No. 93

Resolutions of the Committee on Awkaf, &c.

1. A COMMITTEE was convened at Government House, under the presidency of his Excellency the High Commissioner, on the 2nd December, 1920. The following members were present:

Mr. W. H. Deedes, Civil Secretary.
Mr. H. A. Smallwood, Financial Secretary.
Mr. N. Bentwich, Legal Secretary.
Mr. H. E. Bowman, Director of Education.
Mr. H. C. Luke, Acting District Governor of Jerusalem.
Mr. R. J. Legge, Assistant Director of Education.
Mr. J. B. Barron, Assistant Financial Secretary.
Khalil Effendi Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem.
Abdulla, the Mufti of Acre.
Muhammad Murad, the Mufti of Haifa.
Raghib Bey Nashashueby, Mayor of Jerusalem.
Ghann Zaita, Mayor of Nablus.
Munir Hanud, Mayor of Wakfa, Nablus.
Said Effendi, Shawa, Gaza.

2. The following resolutions were agreed to:—

Finance

- (1.) That the revenues for the Khazn Sultan Wakf, less charges for collection, be retained by the Wakf and administered by the Central Wakf Council.
- (2.) That in consideration of (1) the Central Wakf Council undertake the maintenance of Moslem orphans and Moslem relief and charity, now undertaken by the Government.
 - (a.) That the revenues of the Mudarassah Wakfs be collected by the Government and be paid to the Central Wakf Council.
- (3.) That the Mudarassah Wakfs be administered and controlled by the Central Wakf Council, after deducting the expenses of collection.
- (4.) That the revenues of the Mudarassah and any other expropriated Wakfs be further examined into and reported upon. In regard to "other expropriated Wakfs," exclusive of Mudarassah Wakfs and the Khazn Sultan Wakf, no decision is arrived at pending further examination.

Constitution of a Central Modern Authority

- (7.) That there should be a Council of Four, consisting of four Moslem who should be elected in the manner proposed in the memorandum to the Moslem Committee.
- (8.) That the functions of the Council of Four be—
 - (a.) To nominate and dismiss the emirs of the Moslem Religious and the members of the Moslem Court of Appeal and the local directors of Awkaf after consultation with the Govt.
 - (b.) To supervise the administration of the Awkaf by the Central Wakf Council.
- (9.) That the Moslem Court of Appeal should remain the highest Court for Shari'ah cases, and that the Council of Four should not act as a Court of Cases.
- (10.) That the Council of Four, if in receipt of salaries from the Government, should receive only a modest honorarium for the exercise of their functions, nominating two Moslem officers, and that it should be for the Wakf to decide whether they should be given a grant from Wakf funds for the work of supervising the administration of the Central Wakf Council.
- (11.) That no action be taken pending the receipt of the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.
- (12.) That ad interim appointments to the Council be made in consultation with the Court of Directors, and that no decision be signed by the Inspector General of the Local Secretary.

Resolutions Passed on November 8, 1930.

1. That Moslem Awkaf should be under the control of the Government, and that

2. At Mudarrisin, or teachers of Moslem religion, should be a charge upon Government funds, subject of the following —

(a.) The Government of Palestine will continue the practice of the Mudarrisin as are now performing the functions of their office. All Mudarrisin as are now performing the functions of their office shall receive the same emoluments as those they were in receipt of at the time of the British occupation, and when the present holders of these appointments retire or become deceased the vacancies thus created shall not be filled by the Government.

(c.) No new appointments will be made by the Government. The Mudarrisin as are now performing the functions of their office shall become employees of the Central Wakf Council, and will be maintained from Wakf funds.

194

No. 11)
My Lord

My Lord,
AFTER six months' experience of the administrative conditions of Palestine I am now in a position to submit a general appreciation of the finances of the country, particularly in relation to the cost of defence.

2. The revenues of the current financial year are likely fully to realise the estimates. If the present tranquillity continues to prevail, and if the anticipations of economic development in many directions that may reasonably be entertained are realised, the revenue should show a steady and considerable expansion in the next 3 or 4 years. An exchequer in the hands of part at least of the proceeds of the Government loan which it is proposed to issue in 1948, and which may be raised by Zionist organisations, would assist in promoting production and trade, and thereby help to swell the revenue.

3 Information which has now, after much delay, been furnished from Constantinople indicates that the annuity payable by Palestine under the terms of the Treaty of Peace in respect of the Ottoman Pre-War Debt will not exceed £E 200,000, and may be less. The revenues formerly collected by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, which now fall into the Palestine Exchequer, will yield, under the better management that now prevails, over £E 300,000 a year.

4 The abolition of the tobacco monopoly will probably involve the payment to the Régie of some compensation during the eight years that their concession has still to run. The materials are not available on which an estimate of the amount of that compensation can be based, but it may be assumed that the yield of customs and excise taxation on tobacco will more than defray it, and at the end of eight years the whole yield of such taxation will accrue to the Exchequer.

5 There now stands to the credit of the accounts opened for the O.P.D.A. revenues a sum of £E. 630,000 being the accumulated revenues from the occupation until the 30th November 1920. From this sum the amount of approximately £E. 146,250 must be deducted in respect of the Pre-War Ottoman Debt Annuity, which begins to be payable as from the 1st March, 1920. There is left a sum of £E. 483,750.

8 These favourable aspects of the situation are subject, however, to some important qualifications:—

(1) The general fall in values which is now taking place will have a considerable effect upon the revenue of Palestine, since that revenue is mainly derived from *ad valorem* taxes—the tithe and the customs. Against this must be set any consequent economies, e.g., in the cost of coal for the railways. And if the fall in the cost of living proves to be large, the question of reducing the allowances to the administrative staff will need to be considered. It is possible, however, that savings in these directions will fall short of the shrinkage of revenue due to the deflation of prices.

(2) The country is ill-equipped with harbours, roads, railway rolling stock, administrative buildings, and many other essentials. The capital expenditure which is contemplated will go some distance to making good these deficiencies, but it will be only a small return, while the charges for interest and sinking fund on the loan that is necessary must be met from the outset.

(3) Even more serious is the lack of adequate provision for general education, agricultural instruction, water supplies, sanitation, and other requirements of a well ordered State. Some progress has been made since the occupation towards making good these deficiencies, but financial restrictions have prevented many things being done that are obviously necessary. This must continue to be the case, in Palestine as elsewhere. There are, however, certain minimum requirements that cannot be postponed. For example, of the 134,000 children of school age in Palestine, 100,000 have no opportunity of education of any kind whatever. This fact is a source of complaint frequently expressed by the spokesmen of the people throughout the country, and it is impossible under a British administration to allow such a state of things to continue.

A scheme of educational improvement has therefore been adopted, on the basis of a minimum expenditure and spread over a series of years, which will gradually make good these defects. It is impossible to avoid a charge upon the budget for this and for some other urgent measures of reform, although primary education is the only case, as at present foreseen, in which the sum involved is at all considerable.

- (4.) The yield of the existing taxes has shown, and is likely to show, a large increase, but it does not appear practicable to raise the rates of the taxes themselves or to impose new ones of any considerable yield. The conditions of the country do not allow the assessment and the collection of an income tax. The agricultural population already pay a tax of one-eighth, not of their incomes, but of the gross yield of their lands. There is a small house and land tax in addition. All classes of the population pay in customs duties 11 per cent. on the value of almost all imports. Municipal revenues have to be furnished as well. Moreover, nothing could be more inexpedient politically, in a country newly occupied after a war, and administered by an unfamiliar Government, than any marked increase in the rates of taxation imposed under the previous régime. Already the greater efficiency of collection does, in fact, in many cases, impose upon the people a heavier burden, even when allowance is made for the stoppage of the system of bribes to officials.
- (5.) Part of the customs revenue collected in Palestine is levied upon goods consumed in Transjordan. Pending a settlement of the status of Transjordan, it has been arranged, with your Lordship's approval, to endeavour to arrive at an estimate of the revenue in question, and to carry the amount to the credit of a Transjordan account. Against this account would be charged any annuity in respect of the Ottoman Pre War Debt which Transjordan may be made liable to pay, expenses incurred on behalf of that territory by the Government of Palestine. The figures on which an estimate may be based are being collected. It is possible that a sum in the neighbourhood of £E. 20,000 a year may have to be deducted under this head from the revenues at the disposal of the Palestine Government for Palestine purposes.

7. The railway system has been transferred from the military authorities to the Administration on the 1st October, 1920. It was found that it was being conducted at a loss, largely owing to the great rise in the price of coal. Steps were immediately taken to remedy this situation, and passenger fares were raised as from the 1st November, 1920, by an average of nearly 50 per cent. The railways are very badly supplied with rolling stock and buildings. Works of some magnitude are needed for the reconstruction of the system, which was neglected during the war, and planned only with a view to meeting the exigencies of

request by three of the principal officers of the Egyptian State Railways. Their reports confirm the advice of the general manager of the Palestine railways that a

for the service of this debt, the railways will be required to pay some annuity to the French company which built and owned the Jerusalem Jaffa line and no doubt an annual payment will also be necessary in respect of the capital provided for the construction of that part of the Hedjaz Railway which lies within the boundaries of Palestine, namely the line from Haifa to Semakh. The railways have not hitherto been debited with any of these charges. In these circumstances, while I am hopeful that the railways will be made to pay their own way, and not to be a burden upon the general finances of Palestine I do not anticipate that, in the near future at all events, they will furnish any surplus to assist those finances.

8. I believe I can truly claim that the Administration in general is conducted with a very careful regard for economy. The Finance Department exercises a close supervision on expenditure, which his long experience in the colonial service renders fully effective. The Treasury is conducted with great efficiency, and is strict in the suppression of waste. The Stores Department which was less satisfactory has now been placed under a controller of wide experience and much activity, who is already bringing it to a proper standard. No opportunity will be missed to effect savings. It is unlikely, however, that these savings will prove to be more than a

small offset to the increases of expenditure, which, in view of the starved condition of many of the public services, are inevitable.

9. Such is a brief survey of the financial position of Palestine as it presents itself to those on the spot. At the same time, Palestine appears to His Majesty's Government and to British public opinion—as far as questions purely of finance are concerned—as a source of considerable expense to the British tax payer from which ought to be relieved as speedily as may be. The cost of its garrison is large, and in view of the immense expenditure that devolves upon the people of Great Britain your Lordship urges that Palestine should at once assume part of the cost of its own defence and that measures should be taken calculated to transfer the whole after no long interval of time. To this demand I do not in any way demur. It is evidently true that the people of Palestine should bear forthwith as much of the cost of their own defence as the conditions allow. If Palestine is to provide a national home for the Jewish people, I can see no reason why the British tax payer should be permanently charged with the cost of its defence, and I am convinced that this view is generally held by Jewish opinion throughout the world.

10. The troops, however, which are stationed in Palestine are not available only for local defence. They are close at hand if, in any emergency, military action is needed for the defence of British interests on the Suez Canal and in Egypt. At the same time, it is true that the garrison of the Canal might be available, at need, for assistance in Palestine, and I do not advance these considerations as more than a minor factor which should not be forgotten when the whole situation is under review.

11. It is my earnest desire that His Majesty's Government should be in a position to assure the British public, not only that the civil Government of Palestine costs nothing to the British taxpayer, and that even on the morrow of the war it asks for no grant in aid for its finances, and not only that it does not expect even the contingent advantage of a British Treasury guarantee for its loans, but also that it has already taken the first steps to provide for the cost of its own garrison, and will continue on that path until the British Exchequer is relieved from the whole of the charge which it now bears.

12. To this end I propose that there should be devoted to the cost of defence, first, the whole of the difference between the former revenues of the O.P.D.A. in Palestine and the annuity payable by Palestine in respect of the Ottoman Pre War Debt, now amounting to over £E. 100,000 a year, secondly, the £E. 483,000 of accumulations of the O.P.D.A. revenues, and thirdly, the major part of any future surplus of revenue over expenditure.

13. I propose also that the maximum value should be obtained from this expenditure by devoting it, not to the maintenance of a comparatively small strength of professional soldiers, but to the maintenance of a militia as numerous as the funds will allow. The duties which will fall to a Palestine defence force are not such as to render indispensable the training of the men up to the standard of European armies, however desirable that might be in itself. A training of six months, followed by six months' service in their stations, and then periods of three months in each of the three following years, should suffice to provide a militia efficient enough for its purpose, and numerous in proportion to its cost. Since the men would probably be quite young when they undertook their first year of service, and since the three months during which they would be called up in the subsequent years could be arranged so as to interfere as little as possible with their ordinary avocations, it may be anticipated that numbers would be ready to serve, from

the Palestine Government should be able to maintain a considerably larger force than His Majesty's Government would be in a position to provide for the same period of years after their militia service was over. I am considering in consultation with the Commander in Chief, Egypt, the details of the organisation and the cost of such a militia. It is possible that some modifications of these suggestions may therefore be found to be necessary, and I will communicate further with your Lordship in due course.

I would add that it is proposed that the militia should be trained by the British military authorities, be under the command of G.O.C. the troops in Palestine, and form an integral part of the garrison.

14. Since it is the intention of the Palestine Administration to assume a continuing and increasing responsibility for the cost of defence up to the limit of the funds

available, until the burden upon the British Exchequer is altogether discharged, I venture to submit that it should not be expected to contribute to the expenditure that has been incurred by the army in the construction of railways, roads and minor public works in Palestine. In support of this submission, the following considerations are advanced —

- (i.) Any charge upon the revenues of Palestine for such contributions would leave so much the less for defence. Assuming that the number of the troops to be maintained in Palestine is fixed in accordance with the necessities of the case, a lessened expenditure by Palestine on defence would leave a larger expenditure devolving upon His Majesty's Government. There would therefore be no saving in the long run, while it may be that less difficulty would be caused to His Majesty's Government by writing off capital expenditure already incurred as part of the cost of the war, than by including an equivalent sum in the estimates presented to Parliament.
- (ii.) The greater part of the expenditure in question would not have been undertaken by Palestine in its present stage of development. Apart from the very high cost of the construction of these roads and railways due to war conditions (which would, I presume, in any event have been allowed for) this country would not have been able to afford such works as a railway from Rafah to Haifa, or a share in the cost of a railway from Rafah to Kantarah, or the widening of the line from Ludd to Jerusalem, or roads of a high grade of construction such as have been built by the army in various parts of Palestine. All these works are undoubtedly of great utility to the people of Palestine and will promote largely the economic prosperity of the country. But had a British civil Administration existed in Palestine prior to the war and subsequently, it is doubtful whether any of these works would have been undertaken by it at the cost of the very limited funds available locally.
- (iii.) It will be necessary to lay next year's budget before the Advisory Council and the principal items will certainly form the subject of public discussion. The country looks for large material benefits from the British and the policy of substituting the Palestinian taxpayer for the British taxpayer, as the person by whom the cost of defence is to be met, will come as a painful surprise. It would be a political advantage if it could be announced at the same time that the British authorities had been generous enough not to claim repayment for the works constructed, but on accepting the mandate for the administration of Palestine had conferred them upon the people to help them to inaugurate the regeneration of their country.

15. With respect to the size of the garrison of Palestine, the point to which it would be safe to reduce it depends upon two main factors. I assume that the situation is substantially in this respect, either through the evacuation of Syria by the French or through the evacuation of Palestine by the British. Any such change is not likely to be sudden, and there would be time to adopt any new measures that might be necessary. The two factors to which I refer are the internal political situation and the influence of Transjordan.

16. The political situation at present is satisfactory, and there are no signs that the complete tranquillity which now prevails throughout the country is likely soon to be disturbed. To ensure the contentment of the people with their Government is an obvious condition for the continuance of this tranquillity. It would be a short-sighted policy, therefore, to stop all activity in education, in public works, and in other departments, in order to devote the whole expenditure so avoided to the cost of defence. The result would inevitably be the alienation of public opinion, and in the long run a larger force and larger expenditure would be needed than would otherwise be necessary. Given an Administration which shows concrete results in measures that directly benefit the people, and which treats all sections with sympathy and with complete impartiality, I see no reason why the internal condition of Palestine should call for the presence, in a year or two from now, of more than a very moderate military force. But it is too soon yet to arrive at a final opinion in this regard. The present favourable appearances may be deceptive. There is more than one quarter

outside Palestine, where political trouble here would be regarded without dissatisfaction, and inside Palestine, as in all Eastern countries, there are elements which would be ready to respond to propaganda from abroad.

17. The question of Transjordan is hardly less important. It may perhaps not be fully realised in London—I certainly did not fully realise until I had been some time in Palestine—how close are the relations between this country and Transjordan. Many of the land-owning families of the one own property in the other. There are tribes of Arabs who occupy the two sides of the Jordan valley. Merchants continually pass from the one to the other. The food supplies have been very largely and freely drawn from the extensive and fertile districts on the highlands across the river. The boundary between the two territories has been no more real a barrier than that between two English counties, and the differences to be noted as one passes from one to the other do not resemble in the least degree the differences that are evident on either side of a frontier between two States. (Nor, in fact, has the Jordan ever been the frontier of Palestine throughout all the many vicissitudes of its long history.)

18. Under these conditions events in Transjordan have an immediate influence upon Palestine. If there is no effective administration there, if lawless bands are allowed to roam at will, and life and property are insecure, the effects will straightway be felt here. The raids which have been launched from that quarter periodically will recommence. The supplies of food will be curtailed or cease, and the people of Palestine will become aggrieved at the higher cost of living that will result. The whole territory having been placed under British influence, such a state of affairs will discredit British administration, and the prestige which, without need of a large force, makes the government of Palestine a comparatively easy task will be undermined.

19. But if, as an alternative, an Administration dependent upon some foreign State is established in Transjordan, the position might well prove even worse. The conditions that actually prevailed in the earlier months of last year were not far removed from those that have just been indicated. In addition, Transjordan would now furnish the Cave of Adullam for all political malcontents which was once found in the foot hills of Judaea. It would become a centre for any propaganda hostile to the present régime.

20. It is on account of these considerations, which are very patent to everyone who sees the situation close at hand that I have ventured so often to urge the vital importance to Palestine of a satisfactory settlement in Transjordan. I do not suggest, and have at no time suggested, that the territory should be brought under the same administration. That is not necessary, and is not at present desired by the majority of the inhabitants. But in my judgment the definite establishment of British influence in Transjordan, and the maintenance of orderly government there, are essential to the peaceful progress of Palestine. They are a prior condition to the reduction of the garrison to the modest scale which is all that the local revenues are able to afford.

So important are these considerations that I have not hesitated to make, from Palestinian funds, the advances that were necessary to enable an efficient gendarmerie and central reserve force to be organised in the neighbouring territory. By their means, and only by their means, is it possible for the local authorities to collect their revenues, and out of those revenues it may be hoped that the advances may be repaid. But even if they were not repaid, a preventive expenditure of £ E. 30 000 on the other side of the Jordan may well save Palestine from an expenditure of £ E. 100 000 for defence on this. In the same way the presence of 500 men of the British army at Amman would be calculated so to influence the situation as to obviate the necessity for stationing a much larger number along the Jordan valley and as a reserve in the central parts of Palestine.

21. For the excessive length of this despatch the excuse must be found in the importance to the future of this country of the matters with which it deals. I would conclude it with a summary of its contents.

1. The present financial situation of Palestine is favourable. The revenue will fully realise the estimates in the current year and is likely to increase.
2. An additional sum of not less than £ E. 100 000 a year will be made available through the annuity payable in respect of the Ottoman Pre-War Debt being less than the revenues collected for the Debt Administration by that amount.

3. There is also a sum of £ E 483,000 in hand from the accumulations of O.P.D.A. revenue since the occupation.
4. On the other hand the fall of values that is now taking place is likely to result in a set-off to the anticipated increase of the revenue. A considerable capital expenditure, and some additional annual expenditure, are unavoidable. To impose heavier taxation upon the people is not practicable. Some deduction must be made from the revenue collected in Palestine in respect of customs duties levied on goods consumed in Transjordan.
5. The railways are likely to be conducted without loss, but cannot be expected to provide a net contribution to the general revenues in the immediate future.
6. The Administration of Palestine does not ask for any grant-in-aid from His Majesty's Government, nor for any Treasury guarantee for its loans.
7. It is prepared to assume the whole cost of the defence of the country as soon as its finances enable it to do so and to begin the transfer in the coming financial year.
8. There can be devoted to this purpose the sums of £ E. 100,000 a year and £ E. 483,000 mentioned above, together with the greater part of any future surpluses of revenue.
9. These sums would be devoted to the maintenance of a militia which should be under the command of the G.O.C. Troops in Palestine and form an integral part of the garrison.
10. For the reasons stated in paragraph 14 it is submitted that Palestine should not be required to repay expenditure by the army, during the campaign and the occupation on railways or other public works.
11. The internal political situation is likely to allow a large reduction in the garrison in the near future.
12. But the situation is dominated by the relations with Transjordan, and without a satisfactory settlement there such a reduction would be unsafe.

I have, &c.
HERBERT SAMUEL
High Commissioner

E 1064 31 88

N. 9

Sir H. Samuel to Lord Curzon — (Received January 24)

(No. 13)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 7, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information two general reports dealing with the Ajloun and Belka (Salt-Amman) areas of Transjordan.

These reports have been prepared from information received from the British representatives in these districts. It is hoped subsequently to forward a similar report dealing with the Kerak area.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner).

W. H. DFFDEN

Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

General Report on Ajloun Area

THE total area of Ajloun is about 1,000 square miles, with a population of about 100,000, of whom 70,000 are peasants and the remainder cultivating Bedouins consisting chiefly of the Beni Hasan and the Bedouins of the Jordan valley.

The peasants live in 130 villages, none of which contains over 3,000 inhabitants. The northern half of the district and the Beni Hasan country are of a mountainous character, flat in parts, but generally rugged and comparatively treeless, although oak scrub exists in places.

The Kura and Jebel Ajlun districts are extremely rugged, and to a large extent covered with forests of oak, pine, &c.

Products.

Animals.—The Beni Hasan keep large flocks of sheep and goats, which for half the year are pastured east of the railway, and the traders, Damascus and Nablus, who live at Jerash, Medwar, &c., do a large trade in skins, wool, &c.

The peasants keep a fair number of cattle, sheep and goats, but little of their produce is exported.

The Beni Hasan and the peasants of the Beni Obeid and Beni Juhma districts own a large number of camels, elsewhere trade, harvesting, &c., is carried on almost entirely by means of donkeys.

Crops.—The chief crops are:—

Wheat and barley, northern half of the district and Beni Hasan.

Barley, southern half of the district.

Olives, western half of the district.

Grapes, Jebel Ajlun.

Tobacco, Beni Hasan.

figs and pomegranates are also grown considerably, except by the Beni Hasan but are not much exported.

Charcoal is exported from Kura, Jebel Ajlun, and the slopes of the Yarmuk valley.

Trade.—Trade in the district is fairly flourishing. The traders at Irbid, Jerash and elsewhere are doing satisfactory business, and the bi-weekly animal market at Irbid is well attended.

Trade goods are almost entirely brought from Damascus.

This is due to—

1. Most of the traders are Damascenes.
2. Goods are to be bought at Damascus cheaper and in greater variety.
3. The trade of Ajloun is carried out entirely in Turkish currency. The notes, though their value has now risen to 7½ medjities, do not form a part of the currency, and there is no Egyptian silver in circulation at all. The trade of Damascus is also still carried on in Turkish currency.
4. Better communications.

Manufactures.—The people of the district are almost entirely occupied in agriculture. A certain amount of mat-making is carried on, and at Irbid, Jerash, &c., boots, saddles, woollen mattresses, &c. are made, but chiefly by outsiders.

The people of Mezar export wooden ploughs to Hauran.

Political Situation

The uncertainty as to the frontier and the future form of Government, the Shercofian movement, and the various agitations going on in adjacent districts have combined to prevent Ajloun from settling down, but on the whole, as far as political agitation is concerned, it compares favourably with most other parts of the country. This is due to the broken nature of the country, which tends to confine the interest of the inhabitants to their own groups of villages. The people as a whole are contented with the present state of affairs, which if not ideal is at any rate better than what they have been accustomed to and from the point of view of the peasant, compares favourably with that of Palestine.

A serious problem is afforded by the immigrants from the north. They are of all descriptions, extreme nationalists, persons condemned by the French, discharged officers and officials, adventurers and criminals. Many have moved on south, but many remain, and as they are mostly penniless their presence is both a burden and a danger.

Administration

Kaza of Irbid.—This kaza consists of sixty villages plus a still indefinite number of the Bedouins of the Yarmuk and Jordan valleys, with a total population of about 30,000. The state of administration is good.

Kaza of Mezar.—This kaza which consists of thirty-three villages with a population of about 22,000 has been formally abolished.

Kaza of Jebel Ajlun.—Consists of twenty-six villages and the Belauna tribe of the Ghor, with a population of about 20,000. The administration is fairly satisfactory but the revenue is insufficient to support the kaza.

Kaza of Jerash.—Consists of eight villages and Beni Hasan tribe, total about 25,000. The administration is very unsatisfactory.

Finance

The total revenue of Ajloun is £ E. 60 000 but it could easily be increased with

The collection of taxes in Irbid kaza, though some difficulties have been experienced, is proceeding satisfactorily.

In Mezar and Jebel Ajloun kazas a fair amount of money has been collected. In

In none of the kazas except Irbid is the revenue collected more than barely. If Ajloun is to have schools and roads, and pay its share of the Central Trans-Jordanian Government it will have to be reduced to two kazas.

Crime

There is very little in the way of professional crime. What crime there is is chiefly due to feuds, land disputes, family quarrels, &c.

Gendarmerie

The gendarmerie consists of nine officers and about 170 men. If two of the nine officers are local men, three with no experience. Many of the men are friends and relatives of the officers.

Justice

There is a court of justice in each of the kazas, but no appeal court. The sheikhs who are hereditary judges under tribal law, who take regular fees and from whose judgments there is no appeal.

Posts

There are posts twice a week to Deraa and Semakh, and once a week to Jerash.

Health

The only hospital in the district is that at Irbid, which belongs to Dr. S. They are not very efficient. A doctor at Jerash is urgently needed as malaria is very bad there.

The health of the people is good.

There is a good deal of tuberculosis and in a few villages malaria.

Infectious diseases are rare.

There is no sanitation, but diseases arising from the lack of it do not occur.

The chief place of interest is Jerash. When I was there recently I noticed that the ruins are in a very good state of preservation. I suggest that a representative of the Archaeological Department make a tour of the district.

Education

Ten schools have been opened in the Irbid kaza and more will be opened when the budget is passed. In the other kazas there are only a few schools, but at most villages the Khatib teaches the boys reading, writing and the Qur'an.

There is a C. M. S. school at Hama and a Roman Catholic Mission school at Hama and Ajloun.

Ajloun, December 31, 1920

Enclosure 2 in No. 9

General Report on the Mutessariflik of the Belka

1 Administration

The administrative areas remain as they were before the arrival of the British representative in August. The mutessariflik is divided into three parts. Under him are kaimakams at Amman and Zizia. Temporarily Madeba takes the place of Zizia

as the residence of the kaimakam on account of the activities of the Beni Sakhr. In the budget for the coming year provision is made for kaimakams at Amman and Zizia with Mudirs at Madeba, Wadi Sir, Diban, Zerka and Na'ur. Diban is the centre for the Beni Hamaideh tribe. Most of this tribe lives to the north of the Mopb, and part of it lives to the south of the Kerak area. They are at feud with Kerak and wish to come into the Belka. A new council has recently been elected but is not yet convened, and the budget must be passed by this council before any administrative changes for the new year can be effected. Meanwhile the old administrative council of the mutessarif continues to act. The new council more fairly represents the whole area than its predecessor. All its members (except the Bedouins, who are appointed by the mutessarif with the British representative's approval) are elected. There are no Bedouin members on the old council. For the new council there will be two: these will be either Sultan Majed for the Adwan and Belka tribes, and Mashur for the Beni Sakhr and the Beni Hamaideh. The new council will be convened as soon as the budget and other matters are ready for presentation.

2 Agriculture

The chief products of the country are wheat, barley, grapes, raisins, and live stock. The early and plentiful rains of November make the prospects for the new year unusually good and larger areas than in former years are now being ploughed. With the abolition of the Regie it would be possible to cultivate the land to great advantage.

3 Antiquities

There are many antiquities in this area notably at Amman, Madeba and Zizia. Every possible effort to prevent damage is made, though no Antiquities Administration can be formed until there is sufficient money to spare after the pressing needs for roads, schools, and courts have been provided.

4 Investigation of Crime

No elaborate method for the investigation of crime exists. The police and public prosecutor act together, and very effectively unless the criminals happen to belong to a tribe too large for the existing forces to deal with. Very little is spent on secret service, nor is it necessary to spend more. To live among the people is to know what is going on.

5 Commerce and Industry

Deposits of phosphate are found near Salt on the Amman road. Coal of poor quality is said to exist between Madeba and Zizia. If this coal should prove no poorer in quality than the coal found in Germany illuminating and lubricating oils might be made of it. Lack of transport to a large extent handicaps commerce, especially at the present time when all animals are being used for ploughing. Supplies by rail from Damascus have been cut off by recent political disturbances. The main trade routes of this zone are likely to be railway Damascus-Deraa-Amman and Haifa-Damascus-Amman, unless of course prohibitive custom duties are established at Amman or other point of entry, or unless transport facilities to Palestine are improved. It might be practicable to construct a narrow gauge electric railway to Jerusalem by means of water power in the Wadi Kelt near Jericho, and at the Jordan Bridge and the Shaib (on the road to Salt). At a future date it may prove worth while to consult expert opinion on this matter.

6 Education

Government education in the Belka is almost non-existent. The Government schools that do exist are poorly staffed but are free. The best schools are those of the Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Latin and Protestant communities. The new budget provides for an extension of educational work, and it is hoped that continued progress may be made at a future date. It is hoped that when provision for agricultural education is made in Palestine opportunity will be given for a few pupils to enter Transjordan should they be willing to do so.

7 Finance

The monthly rate of expenditure since the 1st September has been about £ E. 6,000 and the local treasury now contains about that amount. Total collections

for the four months from the 1st August to the 1st December have been about £ 25,000. At the end of the year there should be a small surplus of about £ 1,000 in the treasury. The main difficulty has been in the collection of taxes from the Beni Sakhr who have not paid anything for five or six years. It has not been ascertained. Next year's expenditure, will, if the reserve force is to be charged to this area, amount to £ E. 100,000, and the expected revenue to about £ E. 80,000. The estimated expenditure represents the minimum requirements in respect of salaries, justice, public security, education and communications. If custom-houses become necessary between here and Syria another £ E. 10,000 would probably be added to the receipts of this zone. With the abolition of the Regie a further increase can be expected that might be sufficient to meet requirements. With a strong reserve force and gendarmerie it may prove possible to collect a further £ E. 10,000 from the Beni Sakhr and Beni Hamaiden.

8. Health

The health of the country is good usually, but unusually cold weather early in the year caused many deaths through pneumonia. In the Jordan valley and at Amman malaria is prevalent. There are no prostitutes. Venereal disease is almost unknown. The cases that have been reported occurred after visits to Jerusalem or Damascus. There is a Government doctor at Salt and one at Amman and Dr. Alexander of the C.M.S. and Miss Fisher are in charge of a hospital and dispensary at Salt. Miss Purnell, an English lady, practices at Amman and maintains a dispensary there. There are a few other private practitioners in Salt with no very high qualifications. The country produces enough food for all and the people are very hospitable. Sanitation does not exist.

9. Justice

The organisation of the law courts leaves much to be desired, but the officials do their best under the circumstances. A combined Appeal and Supreme Court, a circuit Court of First Instance, and magistrates and kadis in the most important centres are provided for in next year's budget. If persons in the Kerak and Ajloun areas desire to make use of the Appeal Court it may be possible to make some satisfactory arrangements to enable them to do so.

10. Political

Since the message from the Emir Faisal was received the political situation has improved. Sherref Ali is still at Amman, and Captain Kirkbride hears that he intends to remain there until he hears the results of the negotiations now proceeding in Europe. Sherref Ali is reported to have said "If the results are not satisfactory then the sword shall be the only policy of the Arabs, and I shall use it." It is hoped that Amir Abdullah will recall Sherref Ali from this area. He is young and under the influence of Said Khair, Mithgal and various outlaws from the French zone.

11. Posts

There is a bi-weekly postal service with Jerusalem. Gendarmes take the post once a week to Madeba, Zerka, Jerash, Ajloun and Irbid. From Amman to Salt and Jerusalem the telegraph line is working and a new line to Madeba from Amman is being laid. The telephone is working from Amman to Salt and from Salt to Jerusalem. Prior to the arrival of Amir Abdullah's emissaries, the telegraph line was working from Amman to Deraa. A number of old German telephones and two exchanges have been repaired. A telegraph line is being constructed from Madeba to Zerka and from Zerka to Wadi Musa. The line from Wadi Musa to Irbid is also being laid. Arrangements are being made for the training of some in Jerusalem. In order to increase the postal revenue it is suggested that the higher value of Egyptian Expeditionary Force stamps be overprinted for disposal to collectors. Two collectors are known who are prepared to spend more than 100/ each on these stamps. It is thought that more than 1,000 of stamps of the Expeditionary Force were overprinted.

12. Public Security

Public security in the towns and on the main road from the Jordan Bridge to Amman via Salt, continues excellent. The main difficulty still comes from the Beni Sakhr encroachments on the farms of Salt landowners whose property is adjacent

to the lands of the Beni Sakhr. The land question between the people of Madeba and the Belka is not settled, and cannot very well be settled until a proper system of courts is established. The new town police, the presence of many of the Arabs in the Jordan valley, and the ploughing season all account for the temporary improvement in public security. The Arabs have an increasing respect for the gendarmerie and reserve force. An increase in the reserve force is necessary.

13. Works

The Deraa, which was partially destroyed during the war is being slowly repaired. The Salt-Jordan Bridge Road is being repaired and it is likely to remain so unless there are very heavy rains this winter. The biggest piece of work done by the Government has been the construction of the railway from Salt to the Jordan Bridge, and from Amman to Madeba. The lines have not been very well constructed, and are badly in need of insulators which will be brought from Damascus as soon as the railway is working again. The new budget provides for an engineer whose chief work will be looking after roads and buildings.

14. General Conclusion

The whole future of this area depends on public security. The chief dangers are Hedjaz emissaries and outlaws from the French zone, and the Beni Sakhr within the zone. The former can be dealt with only by a just settlement of the Arab question, the latter only by the reserve force. The activities of the former would almost certainly result in very little harm if a central reserve force of at least 300 of all the arms were created. With it, there is every hope of maintaining public security so far as internal conditions and considerations are concerned, and of collecting all the taxes and thus obtaining the necessary revenues.

Es Salt December 21, 1920

£ 1061 909 88

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel

No. 98.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 27, 1921

I HAVE received your despatch No. 10 of the 7th January, regarding the control of wakf funds in Palestine and the nomination of a council of four Moslems.

2. I would reply, in reply, to my telegram No. 48 of the 22nd January, expressing approval of the proposals on this subject summarised in your telegram No. 20 of the 17th January.

3. I approve the resolutions of the committee which you convened on the subject of the wakf funds.

I am, Sir,

Yours faithfully,
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

£ 1269 29 88

No. 87

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem)

No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 20, 1921.

YOCOR despatch No. 145 of 22nd November: Pay of officials of Palestine Government, and your telegram No. 471 of 31st December.

2. Your proposals for the three secretaries are accepted.

3. See my telegram No. 49 of 24th January.

4 and 5. We must insist that the five grades already sanctioned should be retained.

We consider that grade 1 should contain only five heads of major Departments and five District Governors, but we are prepared to regard the Chief Justice as outside the authorised numbers of grade 1. Assuming that Public Works and Railways, when on a normal footing, will each contain one grade 1 post, we think the other grade 1 heads of Departments should be reduced to three. Of the four posts, Education, Agriculture, Public Health and Public Security, we still think that either two should be combined or one reduced to grade 2, while heads of other Departments, such as

Director of Posts and Telegraphs, should all be grade 2 or below. We suggest that the Chief Justice should be the only judge paid a salary equal to grade 1 scale, and should be glad to learn your proposals as to grading of other judges.

We are inclined to think that generally too many grade 2 appointments may have been made, and that, while it may be necessary to have especially good men at the head of Departments in the present stage of affairs, these specially selected officials, who will formulate and initiate policy should be assisted by young and keen juniors, and not by men of more or less the same age, experience and

Your argument regarding Treasurer and Deputy Head of Treasury does not seem cogent. Should not Financial Secretary be able in fact to act as Head of Treasury in a country the size of Palestine?

We are inclined to think that absence of opportunity to advance may be partially due to over-staffing and partially due to the fact that, owing to difficulties of recruitment, there may be a large proportion of officials not suitable for advance beyond maximum of grade 2. It is impossible to contemplate grade 1 posts being available for the majority of the present staff, but as the administration develops there should be some corresponding development of departmental staffs and greater opportunities for promotion.

8. Objections to creating an interval between scales for grades 4 and 5 would be that scale for grade 4 would have to be £F. 400 to £F. 500, which is open to objections raised in your paragraph 7. Scales should therefore remain fixed as in paragraph 7 of my despatch N.

9. Entertainment allowances of £F. 910 are accepted, subject to a report at the end of the year as to extent of entertaining necessary and expenditure actually incurred.

10. Fixed percentage deduction seems better than continuously variable rate. You should report what rates you ultimately propose and whether they are to vary with each rank or geographically. If you decide upon definite percentages, they should not be permanently fixed, but subject to revision at definite periods in relation to the actual rates obtaining. Generally, percentage reduction should bear relation to the cost of housing in Palestine and not to the percentage reduction in the quite different case of the Sudan.

All emoluments hitherto fixed, except where specific sanction obtained for individuals, must be regarded as provisional, pending settlement of permanent rates and as carrying no claim to continued remuneration at these rates.

Apart from question of judges, you should carry out regarding in accordance with the scales now sanctioned as soon as possible, and at any rate not later than the commencement of the next financial year.

E 1391 522 88]

No. 98

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received January 31)

Sir,

Board of Trade, January 29, 1921

WITH reference to your letter of the 13th January on the subject of the extension of Imperial preference to Palestine, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state that they concur generally in the draft letter that Lord Curzon proposes to address to the Law Officers of the Crown, but that they would venture to suggest that it might be useful to take the opportunity of securing the opinion of the Law Officers not only in regard to the case of Palestine, but also in regard to the extension of Imperial preference to mandated territories generally.

Should Lord Curzon concur in this suggestion the last sentence of paragraph 5 of the draft letter should be amended in the following sense:—

6. The question at issue has been considered with special reference to Palestine, because a definite proposal for the extension of Imperial preference to that country has been made by the High Commissioner, but a similar question will no doubt arise in connection with other mandated territories. Lord Curzon will accordingly be glad to be favoured with any general observations which you may be good enough to offer on the extension of Imperial preference to mandated territories, having regard to the most-favoured-nation clauses in commercial treaties and on the considerations which will have to be taken into account in determining whether, without infringing those treaties, some classes of mandated territories could be accorded preferential customs

175

duties whilst other could not, if in your opinion it is possible in some cases to do so. I have taken among the several classes of mandated territories provided for in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, a copy of which is enclosed (Paper 1).

I am, &c.

H. F. CURZON

E 964 334 88

No. 99

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

Foreign Office, January 31, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 4075 of the 18th December last, I should be glad to hear from your Excellency would now propose to the French Government that direct communications between His Majesty's High Commissioners for Mesopotamia and Syria and the French High Commissioner for Syria should be regulated as follows:—

2. Communications should take place direct, or through the consular officers at Damascus and Jerusalem and Bagdad respectively, regarding matters of purely local interest of a non-political character, e.g., commercial and customs questions, matters in the regulation of which consular officers have functions recognised by treaty and usage, and administrative questions of relative unimportance.

3. As a general rule no direct communications would take place on questions with a political or politico-military character except for urgent communication of information regarding matters of fact. In the latter case, the High Commissioners for Palestine and Mesopotamia would communicate direct with the High Commissioner for Syria and vice versa except when it may be necessary to telegraph in cypher, when the consular channel would be employed.

4. Otherwise, unless direct communications were expressly authorised on particular subjects by the French and British Governments in agreement, all communications should take place through Paris and London, except in very occasional cases of real emergency where it might be imperative for the High Commissioners to discuss direct between themselves a question involving matters of policy.

5. The existing military arrangements for the exchange of information of a purely military nature would remain unaffected.

6. His Majesty's Government feel that a regular and agreed procedure on these lines is best calculated to ensure that harmonious co-operation between the three High Commissioners and between His Majesty's Government and the French Government on matters of common interest in Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine, which is essential to the peace and progress of the Middle East.

7. I should be glad if you would enquire whether the French Government agree to these proposals, and if so whether they will instruct the High Commissioner for Syria accordingly.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 1577 36 88]

No. 100

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 16, 1921

I HAVE the honour to submit for your consideration an ordinance dealing with the constitution and functions of benches of local magistrates. The Commission on Municipal Administration, which was set up by the British Government in No. 243, recommended that the municipalities should be invested again, as they were under the Ottoman system, with magisterial powers to try contraventions of municipal bye-laws. I was not prepared to accept that recommendation, because it seemed to me undesirable that the members of the municipality who were interested in the result of the prosecution should be judges. On the other hand, it would, I think, be desirable to enlist the services of leading citizens in the chief towns of Palestine for minor judicial work.

There are a number of men well fitted to exercise functions like those of the

* Not printed.

Justice of Peace in England, and who would be willing to act in an honorary capacity. It is proposed in the ordinance that the city benches should try contraventions of municipal regulations as well as contraventions against the penal code and any other laws. The sentences which may be imposed are limited to fifteen days' imprisonment, and an application for revision may be made to the High Commissioner.

I believe the institution of honorary magistrates will be popular, and will at once make for the prompt disposal of petty offences and relieve the civil magistrate's court of a large amount of work. It is proposed to try the system in the kind at Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa. If the experiment works well, the system could be extended to other towns.

I should be grateful if you will let me know, by telegraph, whether the draft ordinance has your approval.

I have, &c

HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 100

Ordinance

WHEREAS the Ottoman Law of Municipalities, dated the 27th Ramadan, 1300, provided that contraventions of municipal regulations might be judged by a bench of the municipality, and

And whereas it is now desirable to institute in certain cities of Palestine a bench of magistrates who shall have power to try contraventions committed within a municipal area,

Be it enacted by the High Commissioner, after consultation with the Advisory Council, that

- (1.) The High Commissioner after consultation with the district governor, may appoint by warrant in such places as he thinks fit citizens of education and standing to be honorary magistrates.
- (2.) The magistrates so appointed will form a court known as the city court. The bench shall consist of not less than three members and shall decide by a majority of voices. The High Commissioner shall appoint a chairman of the bench, and in his absence the magistrate senior in age shall preside over the court.
- (3.) The court shall sit in such places and at such times as may be fixed by the district governor. A record of all cases tried shall be kept in the form laid down by any rules published under the provisions of this ordinance.
- (4.) The jurisdiction of the city court shall extend to all contraventions either of the penal code or of the provisions of any ordinance issued by the Palestine Government or of any municipal regulations, committed within a municipal area, provided the maximum penalty for the contravention does not exceed the limit of jurisdiction of the court. The court shall be entitled to pass a sentence not exceeding a fine of £ E. 5 or fifteen days' imprisonment or both these penalties.
- (5.) The court shall have the same powers as the civil magistrate's court in regard to the summoning of witnesses, the arrest of the accused persons, and any other matter concerned with the hearing of a criminal case. Any fine imposed by the court shall be recovered in the same way as a fine imposed by the civil magistrate.
- (6.) There shall be no appeal from the judgment of the court, but any person sentenced either to fine or imprisonment shall have the right to apply for revision to the president of the district court on the same terms as a person sentenced by the court of the civil magistrate.
- (7.) The court may order that a person convicted of an offence shall pay the costs of the proceedings, such costs to be assessed at the same rate as in the court of the civil magistrate and to be recoverable by the same means.
- (8.) No person shall sit as a member of a city court who has any interest in the case or who is related to any of the accused persons.

- 9.) The legal secretary, with the sanction of the High Commissioner, may issue rules regulating the procedure and administration of the court. Such rules shall be published in the "Official Gazette."

High Commissioner.

Government House, Jerusalem, January 1921

E 1579 1579 88]

No. 101

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. (Received February 4.)

(No. 20)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 12 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of the minutes of the fourth meeting of the Advisory Council, which was held at Government House on the 4th January, 1921.

Yours faithfully,

KEITH ROACH

Enclosure in No. 101.

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Advisory Council

THE fourth meeting of the Advisory Council took place on Tuesday, the 4th January, 1921, under the presidency of his Excellency the High Commissioner.

The following were present: Mr J. L. Barron, Mr M. Deront, M. A. Bentwich, Mr I. Ben Zvi, Mr H. E. Bowman, Mr P. Bramley, Lieut.-Colonel C. Cox, Mr W. H. Deedes, Mr. R. B. Harari, Colonel G. Heron, Ismail Bey Hussein, Mr H. M. Kalvarisky, Sheikh Abdel Hady-el Khutib, Mr. H. C. Luke, Sheikh Freich Abu Muddien, Suleiman Bey Nassif, Dr. Habib Saleh, Mr E. R. Sawyer, Mr H. A. Smallwood, Suleiman Abdul Razzak Tukan Bey, Mr D. Yellin.

MAX AT ROCK, Secretary, Advisory Council.

PART I OF THE PROCEEDINGS, JANUARY 4, 1921

In response to a question from Ismail Bey Hussein, his Excellency the High Commissioner made the following statement regarding the tobacco monopoly:—

"I am now in the position to make a definite statement with respect to the limitations on the cultivation and importation of tobacco, which have resulted from the concessions granted by the Turkish Government to the Régie des Tabacs by the Convention of 1913.

The limitations are undoubtedly injurious to the people of Palestine, and I propose to discontinue immediately and entirely the operation in Palestine of the tobacco monopoly.

All restrictions on the cultivation and on the sale of tobacco are henceforth abolished throughout Palestine.

"New customs regulations will be necessary, and it must be some little time before these can be prepared.

The present customs duty and surtax on imported tobacco and cigarettes will be replaced by a fixed tariff, which will, it is hoped, come into force on the 1st March, 1921. Till then the Régie will continue to collect its dues on imported tobacco.

"It is intended to impose a tax on all tobacco grown in the country, on whatever kind of land. I should be glad to have the observations of members of the Council on this question of taxation.

"Notice has been sent to the Régie in accordance with the terms of this announcement, and the Government is prepared to recognise a claim, if any, which can be established by the Régie in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty with Turkey.

"The Government anticipates that the taxation that will be imposed here, as in other countries, upon tobacco, will be willingly paid by the people in consideration of the freedom and relief that will be obtained by the abolition of the monopoly."

[6668]

2 A

Mr. Salim, on behalf of all the members of the Council and of the people of Palestine in general, expressed thanks to the High Commissioner for all that he had done for the benefit of this country and for that statement. He requested his Excellency to have this statement translated and published in all parts of the country, so that the people may understand that the Government takes an interest in all that will benefit the people of the country. His Excellency replied that this would be done at once, and said he would be glad to have the opinion of the members as to the future taxation of tobacco. On this point discussion was postponed until the following day.

His Excellency announced that as the desired reduction in foodstuffs had been effected partly as a result of the Government's prohibition of the export of cereals, it had been decided to modify that prohibition so as to allow the export of up to one-half of all stocks of barley of 20 tons and upward held on the 10th January. Certificates would be issued by District Governors to facilitate such export. A public notice to this effect would be issued at once.

Tukan Bey, while thanking his Excellency for the new order, asked that the concession be extended also to durra, of which there was an unsaleable surplus in the country and of no use to the present holders.

Dr. Salim agreed, and suggested that permission be given for a quantity only to be exported as a trial, to see what, if any, effect on the price of cereals it would have.

With reference to the terms of the public notice (copy attached) *Mr. Berouti* said it would be preferable to obtain the certificates of export from Chambers of Commerce. In order that the markets in the countries to which the barley is exported (Iraq and Syria) should not be affected, the export should take place by degrees, weekly or monthly, and not all at one time, which would cause a great decrease in price in the foreign markets.

Mr. Harari said that public notice 183 prohibited the export of durra until after the winter, approximately the 1st March, and the question could come up at the next meeting of Council. The durra crop is harvested after the barley crop, and it seems rather premature to raise the export restrictions on both at present, particularly as durra is food for both human beings and animals, and if we have been too generous in the export of barley it would be possible in the future to make good that generosity in durra. The figures for durra are not considerable, the total crop being only 28,000 tons. It is very largely consumed by the fellahs, and if small holders were permitted to export, it would have a very bad effect on price. The Government was of opinion that it would be possible and desirable to release a portion of the surplus of barley in the country, if such existed, and by limiting export licences to holders of quantities of 20 tons and more, the Government hopes that the quantities held by the small holders would be retained, as they are extremely important to agriculture. Indeed, as a result of the existence of these small stocks, the Director of Agriculture reports that the condition of the animal population this year is considerably better than it was last year.

Imam Bey Hussini drew attention to the fact that if export were allowed it would react on home prices, and emphasised the present high cost of essential commodities as compared to pre-war prices. Much of this increase was due to the action of agents, who bought quantities from the farmers and then held stocks and so controlled the selling prices.

His Excellency said that owing to the war prices all over the world were increased, and the measures the Administration had taken with regard to export of cereals were calculated to reduce prices, and have undoubtedly contributed to that result, for prices have fallen in Palestine during the last few months. The fact that many people were anxious to export barley shows that the prices obtaining elsewhere are higher than in Palestine. Any measures that can be adopted which would reduce prices still further would certainly be considered by the Government. There are, indeed, profiteering tribunals at work, and in several cases fines have been imposed.

Mr. Yellin also complained of high prices. Although it is true that prices all over the world are higher, now that normal conditions are returning steps should be taken against prices being five or six times higher than before the war. 200 per cent. or 300 per cent. increase might be necessary, but he was of opinion that the Administration must intervene and fix maximum rates for various foodstuffs. He

did not think it was merely a question of profiteering on the part of agents, but also of profiteering on the part of cultivators.

Sheikh Freikh Abu Hiddien recommended that the cost of labour be controlled. Other members advanced suggestions for the regulation of the prices of petrol, coal, wood, &c.

Mr. Harari was of opinion that a tariff on all goods and vegetables would be detrimental. Where introduced it resulted in an increase of prices or the removal of the commodity from the market altogether. No regulation was needed, as prices would drop naturally.

Mr. Berouti thought that the importation of coal from England would reduce prices in general.

Mr. Harari said that the remarks made by various members about the high cost of living were very true. It was likewise true that the situation was at present abnormal, but tending towards the normal. *Dr. Salim* had very ably pointed out the disadvantage of a tariff of prices. During the early days of the occupation such a tariff was imposed, but resulted as being unnecessary and harmful. It would have to vary from district to district, and would impose innumerable and vexatious restrictions. It was hoped that the fall in the world prices will react upon Palestine and will result in a very large fall in prices here.

As regards meat the Administration had been in communication with the Sudan Government with regard to the importation of Sudan slaughter-cattle into Palestine. The necessary arrangements had been completed, and representative butchers are now actually in Cairo to arrange for a trial consignment of 100 head of Sudan cattle to be imported into Palestine. The Administration had likewise endeavoured to obtain sheep from Cyprus, and although informed that export was prohibited, was still trying to obtain at least a limited importation. An endeavour was further being made to arrange for importation of sheep and goats.

For meat in order to obtain the largest possible supplies for the people of Palestine. With reference to the question of fuel, kerosene had recently risen in price because kerosene supplies, being drawn from America, are sold here in Egyptian currency which must later be remitted to America in dollars, and as the exchange is more and more unfavourable so the price in muntzas increases. The Administration, however, hoped to achieve a considerable

reduction in Jerusalem by one oil company, which had placed an order in Egypt for 20 per cent. in price. Tanks were also to be constructed in Jaffa and Haifa.

The price of coal was likewise falling. The railways had been able to supply small quantities of coal to those who required it, and it was hoped that merchants who needed coal would themselves take the necessary steps to import it, as on the importation of coal and other necessary articles no restriction whatever existed.

His Excellency said that the Government would note all the observations that had been made by members. There was reason to hope that the decline in prices which had manifested itself recently would continue and be accelerated.

His Excellency read the subjoined telegram from Lord Allenby in reply to one sent on the occasion of the celebrations upon the anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem. From it the members would realise how greatly appreciated would be the gift from the people of Palestine of the sites for soldiers' graveyards which the Council had resolved upon at its last meeting.

I have the honour to thank you for your telegram informing me of the solemn and impressive celebration of the anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem. I am deeply touched by your kind reference to myself in connection with the splendid army I had the honour to lead to Jerusalem. On behalf of that army I would express to you and your community our warm appreciation of the generous manner in which you have paid tribute to those who fell for the Holy Land. No fitter memorial could be theirs.

Various amendments to the Pharmacy and the Police Ordinances, as proposed at the last meeting of Council, were approved.

Public Notice

Whereas Ordinance No. 153 of the 24th September, 1920, prohibited the export of barley, durra and wheat, and whereas it is now desirable to allow the export of barley under certain conditions

Notice is hereby given that

1 The export from Palestine of barley shall be allowed until further notice as from the 10th January, 1921, under the following conditions. —

- (a) Any person holding in any one place on the 10th January 1921, a stock of 20 tons or more of barley will be granted by the competent District Governor, and free of charge, a licence to export a quantity of barley equal to half the amount of his holding upon producing a certificate from the District Governor certifying the amount of his holding at the date specified.
- (b) Where no banks are available a District Governor will issue the certificate certifying himself as to the stock held.
- (c) The decision of the District Governor shall be final in all disputes arising in connection with the issue and use of licences issued under this public notice.

2. The restriction upon the export of durra and wheat will remain as stated in Ordinance No. 183, dated the 24th September, 1920

HERBERT SAMI EI

High Commissioner for Palestine

Government House Jerusalem
January 4, 1921

PART II (JANUARY 4, 1921)

The following note on Village Water Supply Loans was read by Mr. Barron —

Application for loans have been received from villages requiring financial assistance in order to lay down water systems. Many villages have springs in their vicinity, but do not possess any means by which water can be brought from the spring to the village, thus compelling the villagers to go considerable distances daily for their water supply.

Arrangements have been made whereby loans up to £E. 400 can now be granted by the Government on the collective guarantee of the mukhtars and leading members of the village community, who will be severally and jointly responsible for the repayment.

The loans will be repayable in a short term of years, three to five, with interest at 6 per cent.

Dr. Salim thought that 400£ would be insufficient in some instances for bringing water from one place to another. If an engineer found that 600£ or 800£ were necessary how would this sum be obtained? Will the villagers or the Government have to pay? He hoped that District Governors would be instructed to take this matter into consideration.

Imad Bey Hussein, who agreed with the previous speakers, added that closing rain water cisterns and wells would help to abolish malaria throughout the country, and, emphasising the value of village water-supplies from a health point of view, asked that the Administration should deal as generously with this as it was with other matters.

His Excellency said that when visiting villages this question had been mentioned to him. In some cases, with a comparatively small expenditure, a good supply of water can be brought into the village. The water may come from a spring that is perhaps only 300 or 400 metres away, and all that is needed is a length of pipe to bring it to the village itself. The village can obtain the required amount up to 400£ upon application to the District Governor on giving proper security for repayment and interest. It is not expected that this will impose any cost on the budget, and consequently there need be no limit to the number of villages which make application. The repayment and interest will be collected by the Government at the same time as the taxes. Labour will, as a general rule, be supplied by the

village itself, and consequently the work can be done at a smaller cost than if it were done by the Government or a contractor. In some cases the medical authorities may be able to take some steps at the same time to improve sanitary and health conditions.

The suggestions of Dr. Salim and Imad Bey Hussein will be borne in mind.

Cases where more than 400£ are required would be considered in relations to the security which is offered and special sanction would be necessary. It is hoped, however, that the majority of cases will fall within the 400£ limit.

Port Dues Ordinance

With regard to paragraph (b) of article 1, which reads —

If a vessel has paid dues at one port in Palestine, half only of the above-mentioned dues, with a maximum of £E. 10, shall be payable at any other port in Palestine on the same voyage.

Tukan Bey asked why it should be necessary for a ship to pay dues again after paying at one Palestinian port. It was explained that the dues were reduced to half at the second port.

Colonel Heron asked whether paragraph (c) in article 1 which reads —

In the case of a vessel arriving at any port in Palestine from a foreign country or from another port in Palestine, and leaving without having taken on cargo and without having landed or taken on board any passengers, only one half of the dues shall be charged that would otherwise be payable.

would apply to vessels bringing mails only.

Mr. Bentwich said that this point was covered and it would not apply.

Dr. Salim asked whether the provisions of the ordinance were permanent, as the ports of Palestine were not yet decided, and no doubt the dues would be changed when proper ports were made.

Mr. Bentwich stated that laws and ordinances were designed to meet the needs of the present and were subject to change when conditions changed.

Suleiman Bey Nassif asked whether steamers which ply only between ports of Palestine were entitled to lower payments.

Mr. Bentwich replied that the reduction covered only coasting vessels registered in Palestine.

In reply to a further question from Suleiman Bey Nassif whether ships which call each week at Palestinian ports from Beirut or Alexandria would have to pay the same dues as those which call once a month or once a year, Mr. Bentwich pointed out that it would be difficult to draw a distinction between vessels which called weekly or otherwise.

Major Jeune, Controller of Ports and Lights, stated that ships calling at Palestinian ports were already paying these dues, and in fact the procedure was customary.

Mr. Berouti suggested that if a certificate had to be obtained before a steamer could leave he feared it would delay the departure of the boat, but Major Jeune replied that this was the rule all over the world.

Mr. Berouti thought that the drawing up of a tariff of charges should not be decided by the Government alone. The advice of the Chambers of Commerce and merchants should be taken.

His Excellency said that this would certainly be done.

With regard to article 2 which reads —

... the dues at any port of Palestine shall be deemed to have been validly imposed.

Mr. Salim asked why, as no law is deemed to be retrospective, it should be so in this case?

Mr. Bentwich said that as these dues were already being paid, this point had to be made clear.

A question by *Dr. Salim* as to whether the new regulations would apply to *Ursarua* was answered by *Major Jeune* in the affirmative.

Suleiman Bey Nassif and *Mr. Berouti* complained that dues should be exacted for the lighthouses at Haifa and Gaza which were in bad repair and of no utility.

His Excellency explained that the dues were paid to a French company which had been given a concession by the Turkish Government, whereupon *Suleiman Bey Nassif* asked if a communication might be sent to the company requesting that the lighthouses be repaired.

His Excellency said that this matter was already being dealt with.

Commissions of Enquiry Ordinance

Mr. Bentwick having read the note on the draft ordinance —

It has already been found desirable to appoint commissions of enquiry to investigate important questions in a judicial manner, such as the commissions as to municipal taxation, increment of land, credit banks &c. These commissions require power to hear witnesses on oath, to call for the production of documents, and generally to exercise the powers of a court. It is desirable that these powers should be defined and the ordinance which has been drafted deals with their constitution, their powers and their remuneration.

Several members asked for information as to the extent of the powers that would be wielded by such commissions.

His Excellency said that a commission constituted under this ordinance would make investigations according to its terms of reference, and submit its recommendations to the Government for enactment if deemed desirable, in a draft ordinance, which in its turn would be submitted to the Advisory Council for discussion and approval.

Commissions of enquiry under this ordinance would not be the same as the Administrative Councils which existed under the Turkish régime, necessarily sit in Jerusalem, but in any place according to the exigency of the matter into which enquiry was being made.

The ordinance was approved.

Mawat Lands

The ordinance before the council proposed to amend the last paragraph of Article 103 of the Turkish Land Code with regard to Mawat lands, which reads —

"But if anyone has broken up and cultivated land of this kind without leave there shall be exacted from him payment of the tapu value of the piece of land which he has cultivated, and it shall be granted to him by the issue of a title deed."

so as to ensure that no persons shall occupy Mawat land without first obtaining permission from the Government.

Isma'il Bey Hammad asked whether the action of this amendment would be retrospective.

Mr. Bentwick replied that the new clause would only be operative in the future.

His Excellency suggested that it might be desirable to add an article to that effect that persons who had already cultivated such waste lands must immediately apply to the District Governor for the title deeds.

Dr. Salim asked whether waste land which had been held for a long period without cultivation but which the holder with financial assistance could now cultivate, could be claimed by another person who could work it at once.

Mr. Bentwick replied that this clause dealt with land not in the possession of anyone.

Mr. Ben Zvi asked for an explanation of the term "offence by trespass," and was told that it meant a person who had cultivated

some land. Could the land be taken from him, or would he remain in possession of the land?

Mr. Bentwick replied that trespass was the offence of entering on property to which the person had no right. The penalty was five days' imprisonment and a fine of £1 50. The position with regard to land that had been cultivated without permission would be that he could be turned off it.

At this stage the sitting was adjourned.

PART III (JANUARY 5, 1921)

His Excellency, in calling upon the Director of Agriculture, *Mr. Sawyer*, to read his statement on agriculture, said that it might interest the members to hear from time to time statements from the heads of Departments as to the work which is being done, and if they desired it, he would ask for such statements to be prepared.

After *Mr. Sawyer* had read his statement (which will be published separately for the members of the Council) *His Excellency* asked that the statement be printed and distributed to all parts of Palestine.

Dr. Salim drew the attention of *Mr. Sawyer* to three points: (1) In Palestine now one saw only bare mountains, whereas in the Lebanon the mountains are covered with trees, which are not only beautiful, but also produce healthy conditions. The present Government did not take care of forests. The Department of Agriculture should endeavour to effect an amelioration in the state of afforestation. (2) The Department of Agriculture should keep cultivators acquainted with what has been done and what it is intended to do in the future, it should forward them communications in simple, comprehensive language so that action would result. (3) Was the Director of Agriculture able to reduce taxation on plantation of new trees in order to encourage planting? For example, orange trees pay a good deal in taxes. Cotton has not yet been cultivated. Was it possible in order to encourage the cultivation of these crops to reduce the present taxes, in view of the many experiments required before results are obtained? With regard to the selection of places in the neighbourhood of Jaffa, Nablus, Jerusalem and Galilee be selected for experimental tobacco cultivation. The villagers could be instructed, and in two or three years good results could be obtained throughout the country.

Mr. Yellin mentioned that under the previous régime, when it was desired to encourage the growth of a particular American vine, this vine was exempted from tithes for five years after bearing fruit. He hoped that this point would be remembered when the subject of tithes was being dealt with. With regard to the distribution of information to villagers, *Mr. Yellin* suggested that suitable articles be reprinted from the local press.

Mr. Berouti considered that the statement as a whole and the instructions it contained to cultivators were very good, but he drew attention to the fact that the operation of tithes was harmful for the development of fruit growing.

A discussion ensued upon the question of tithes, but *His Excellency* said that while the remarks of the members would be taken into consideration, the whole question could not be fully gone into at this juncture.

Mr. Sawyer then read a statement on the question of afforestation, and mentioned stations for tobacco growing. With regard to the publication of a journal by the Department of Agriculture, the cost of printing a paper in three, or even two, languages would be very high. It was thought that a wider publicity would result from sending articles to the general press in Palestine, and it was proposed to obtain reprints, with perhaps simple illustrations, for distribution in the villages. With regard to the question of forests raised by *Dr. Salim*, this matter was receiving consideration by the Department of Agriculture, and it was proposed that for purposes of afforestation, all unsuitable lands for arable cultivation, including sand dunes, should be reserved.

Mr. Barron pointed out that fruit trees did not become titheable until they bore a crop. With regard to cotton, there was but a small area under cultivation, but in view of the importance to Palestine of cotton growing, the Government would

consider the matter carefully before making regulations regarding taxes. At present, however, there was no duty on cotton, and a definite statement could not be made about the future. In answer to Mr. Berouti's point that the Turkish Government had imposed a war land tax, Mr. Barron said that in March 1914 the Turkish Government had imposed an addition of 50 per cent to the land tax. This addition was approved by the Ministry of Finance in Constantinople, but the first collection was not made prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. It was therefore to be considered as a war tax. In addition to this increase the Turkish Government in 1917 imposed a 66 per cent addition to the land tax, but this addition was not maintained or collected by us. Mr. Barron further stated that a proclamation had recently been published exempting American vines from the duty for a period of ten years from the date at which they were planted.

Tukan Bey thought that Mr. Barron's statement showed a lack of understanding of the agricultural conditions of the country. He drew his attention to the question of the travelling assistants. He did not think the best results were being obtained from those employed. Assistants should be selected who had had experience in agricultural matters, so that they could help the cultivators—not merely travel and make reports. Improved methods of agriculture should be made known to the cultivators, and he too considered that in order to encourage the cultivation of new crops a certain freedom from taxation should be granted in these cases.

Colonel Bramley made several suggestions which he thought public or private agriculture. One was the establishment of district stud farms, another the holding of exhibitions and agricultural shows, accompanied by horse and motor shows and perhaps horse-racing. All these would bring people together on common ground, and Mr. Sawyer could take advantage of these gatherings to disseminate the view of his Department in a pleasant manner. A further suggestion was the improvement of the fishing industry and also the preservation of game in forests.

Mr. Bowman promised that with respect to the dissemination of instruction in agriculture among the villages the Education Department would collaborate with the Department of Agriculture in issuing simple pamphlets on agricultural subjects suitable for the children in the village schools. In this way, the children in the village schools would rapidly and easily pick up the rudiments of agricultural education.

Mr. Ben Zwi said that mention had been made in the statement of the need of agricultural instruments in Palestine. He wished to emphasise this need. It was most desirable to facilitate the import of agricultural machinery, particularly when purchased by small farmers. He suggested that the Government should consider the introduction of new plantations. It was important, in this connection, to discriminate between settlements of workers who live of their work and investors who wish to make profits. This country is keenly interested in the development of industry, but the population should live on its industry. It was not enough to create a large industrial development if the workers were not paid a living wage. This was especially important in connection with cotton production, which should not be conducted on the system of landlords and capitalism, but that of a colonisation of workers.

Dr. Salim said that though Palestine was a purely agricultural and not a commercial country, in every city there was a Chamber of Commerce, but not a single Chamber of Agriculture, of which there was great need. The Government should consider the establishment of such chambers, which would be useful for the education of cultivators, and the Government could come to an understanding with farmers on many different matters.

His Excellency thought this was a very interesting suggestion, which merits consideration. He suggested that the Government should consider the establishment of such chambers, which would be useful for the education of cultivators, and the Government could come to an understanding with farmers on many different matters.

Mr. Sawyer said he would give, at a later date, a considered reply to the various points raised.

Amendments to Town Planning Ordinance

The legal secretary said that the Town Planning Ordinance had been submitted for consideration to His Majesty's Government in London. A reply had now been received which made it desirable to bring forward some few amendments on the lines suggested by His Majesty's Government. All the amendments are matters of detail and do not affect the general principles which have been adopted.

Amendments to Town Planning Ordinance

Article 3. "The limits of a town planning area shall be fixed by the Central Town Planning Commission and shall be stated in the order mentioned in Article 2."

Article 17 shall read as follows: "Upon the approval of the scheme by the High Commissioner, notification thereof shall be posted at the Municipality Office of the scheme, in each part of a Municipality district or if no part of such district is included at some public office within the area, and shall be published in the 'Official Gazette'. Copies of the scheme and of the plans as amended shall be deposited and be open for inspection at the office of the local commission, and the notice of such deposit shall likewise be published in the 'Gazette'."

"The scheme shall come into force fifteen days after the publication of such notice in the 'Gazette' unless some other date be fixed in the order of approval."

Article 20. The words "a sum not exceeding 100 of the pre-war value" shall be substituted by the words "a sum not exceeding 100 per cent". The following provisions shall be added to the article. In assessing compensation, the arbitrators shall have regard to the following provisions:—

- No allowance shall be made on account of the acquisition being compulsory.
- No allowance shall be made on account of the adaptability of the land for the purpose for which it is acquired.
- The arbitrators may order that the costs of any party in the proceedings before the arbitration tribunal shall be paid by the other party or parties.

Article 21. The words "and widening" shall be added after "construction". Article 28 shall read: "Provided that the High Commissioner certifies that such provisions are reasonable, property shall not be deemed to be injuriously affected as a consequence of the scheme." The following shall be inserted therein which prescribe the space about buildings to be erected or prescribed the height or construction of buildings.

Article 22. The words "and widening" shall be added after "construction". The amendments were approved.

Miscellaneous Land Ordinance

A revised draft, prepared by the legal secretary, was submitted.

"Whereas the Government intends to use for closer settlement all dead and waste land in Palestine, and whereas it is necessary to amend the provisions of article 103 of the Ottoman Land Law

"It is hereby ordered as follows:—

"(a) The following paragraph shall be substituted for the last paragraph of the said Article 103:

"Any person who, without the consent of the Administration, breaks up or cultivates any waste land shall obtain no right to a title-deed for such land, and further will be liable to be prosecuted for trespass."

"High Commissioner"

The ordinance was then approved

it required study and consideration. It was also necessary to get some definite information on the subject.

Mr. Harter stated that in 1919 150 tons of tobacco had been imported and in

The Council approving the recommendation of Ismail Bey Hussein, was adopted. Ismail Bey Hussein, Mr. Kalvarisky and Suleiman Bey Nassar were appointed to serve on the committee, in addition to officials of the Administration concerned with the matter.

1. *Hardwork in Palestine*

[illegible]

Dr. Sulim asked that all GLADIATOR nests be left to hatch and

Mr. Deedes said that the Government entirely associated itself with this view as was evidenced by the figures given by his Excellency at the first meeting of the Council. It was, however, very regrettable that it was absolutely under the control of the High Commissioner and his staff, and that they were not allowed to do whatever was required by the Government to make use of the services of Palestinians who were familiar with the country. It was, however, the first time that the Government had been able to know people of local conditions and peoples.

Dr. Salim raised the question of giving greater latitude to judges to accept hearsay or similar evidence. At present it often happened that a criminal escaped punishment because such evidence was not allowed.

4 Police Wage

Mr. Deedes agreed that the rates of pay were low in relation to what had been the cost of living. There were two ways of ~~meeting their cost~~ ^{meeting their cost} by increasing the total number of police, and the other by an increase in taxation. The addition suggested by Mr. Kalyanaky would require about 80,000 per annum. It was out of the question to raise this sum by taxation at the present time. He looked rather to the slight ~~increase in the~~ ^{increase in the} ~~cost of living~~ ^{cost of living} of the police and the general fall in prices which was confidently expected to compensate the men. The police were, at any rate, paid regularly now, which was not the case under the Turkish régime.

Ismail Bey Hüssini asked for greater freedom with respect to transactions of mortgages on properties, particularly of properties that were mortgaged previously on definite sale, and dwelt on the latitude given to such transactions under the Turkish régime.

6. Land and Property in Cities

Mr. Bentrich stated that the sales of land in cities was permitted but it was necessary to check speculation in urban land as well as in agricultural land. No difficulty was put in the way of purchasing any area of land in the city, provided the buyer proved intention to build or develop the land at once: it would be against the interests of the people to allow the purchase of large areas of urban land which would then remain undeveloped.

Ismael H. H. ... has led the peasantry to the idea of a credit bank in the country, which should not draw its capital from capitalists.

His Excellency said that the Government regarded the matter of land credit banks for agricultural and other purposes as of the highest importance, but the present economic condition throughout the world rendered it difficult to obtain money for such ~~banks~~ banks and other institutions were seeking rather to contract their credits than enlarge them, and so far, therefore, it had been difficult to establish a land credit bank in Palestine.

With respect to the sources of revenue which Ismail Bey suggested, it should be remembered that Palestine under the Peace Treaty will have to pay a large sum every year in respect of the interest and sinking fund of the National Debt of Turkey

before the war. Part of the guarantee for that interest and sinking fund was the 8 per cent on customs duties mentioned, and that 8 per cent could not in consequence be devoted to the formation of a bank. With respect to the 50 per cent Torka this would only yield about 12,000l a year. There was an additional 4 per cent on the tithes which was imposed by the Turkish Government for the purpose of the land banks, and which now brought in about 15,000l a year. There was also available the loans issued by the Ottoman Agricultural Bank in Palestine, which the present Government had now taken over. As these loans fell due, this Government would collect them and devote to the purposes for which they were intended—namely, the furtherance of agriculture. In the meantime until the bank could be founded, the Government was making loans at the rate of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, which was less than any banking firm would consent to accept, directly to agriculturists. Up to the present these loans amounted to no less than 300,000l, so that the Government was already lending as much as the yield of the $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent on tithes during twenty years and, indeed, he believed much more than the Ottoman Agricultural Bank ever lent. He would continue his efforts to arrange the formation of a bank for making loans both to agriculturists and others, and in the meantime this process of direct loans by the Government would continue.

8. Registration of Properties in English Language

Ismail Bey Hürvini commented upon the disadvantages and difficulties of the registration of properties in English in the Land Registry.

Mr. Bentwick replied that the language of the Land Registry Department had hitherto been Turkish. English had been adopted in the reformed registries because one language must be used and English is the most convenient of the three official languages for record. The title-deeds are drawn up in the language desired by the parties and a translation of the Kishan in Arabic or Hebrew, according to the mother tongue of the person to whom issued, is inserted free of cost.

Where official translations of documents issued out of the Land Registry Office are required they may be furnished in Arabic or Hebrew on payment.

9. Labour Gangs outside Prisons

Ismail Bey Hürvini objected to the employment of prisoners in labour gangs outside the prisons on the ground that this sort of treatment only produced hardened criminals. The prisons should endeavour to educate the prisoners to a realization of the error of their ways.

Mr. Deedes said that he could claim to have some experience with Turkish prisoners, and on the whole he thought everyone would agree that the present condition of prisoners here was far better than it used to be. With regard to their employment outside the prison, in the old Turkish days prisons were inhabited by ~~thousands of prisoners~~. He thought it only right that they should be employed, and so in some small measure make a return for the conditions under which they are permitted to live.

10. Standardized Weights and Measures

Suleiman Bey Nassif urged the adoption of a standard system of weights and measures, preferably metric, in Palestine. Many different standards existed at present, and they varied confusedly from district to district. He suggested the appointment of a commission to enquire into this subject.

His Excellency said that the Government had anticipated *Suleiman Bey Nassif* in this respect, and a commission had already enquired into the matter and had made certain recommendations based on the metric system. Before taking action on that report he would like to know how far the introduction of so radical a change would meet with popular approval. When a new Government was established in a country, it was perhaps a mistake to make many new changes at once. People became quite certain that the present confusion of weights and measures in different parts of the country caused much inconvenience. The members might give the question due consideration and it would be discussed at a future meeting.

Mr. Yellin was opinion that the change could be made without creating dissatisfaction. He instanced the introduction of Egyptian currency all over the country, which displaced many currencies, yet had been accepted uncomplainingly by the entire population.

11. Cotton.

Suleiman Bey Nassif raised the question of the promotion and cultivation of cotton in Palestine. He suggested that the Government should take the part of Mr. Sawyer as to the establishment of special conditions for the encouragement of cotton cultivation, but he suggested exemption of cotton crops from tithes.

His Excellency said that at present cotton was exempt from tithes, and the Government was considering what steps should be taken in the future. *Suleiman Bey Nassif's* observations would be borne in mind.

Mr. Sawyer made the following statement—

We have satisfactory evidence that good cotton can be grown in Palestine both as an irrigated and dry land crop. Samples from last season's experiments were forwarded both to the British Cotton Growing Association and the Fine Cotton Spinners' Association, who reported favourably on the Sakajeridia, and less favourably on the Ahis types. American varieties may prove relatively satisfactory for dry land cultivation. A power ginnery has been re-equipped

Three principal obstacles to extended cultivation are found in the cotton boll worm, the scarcity of skilled labour and the present low prices for lint. The worm seriously affected both yields and quality last year, and concerted and sustained action by all growers will be necessary to its control. A circular explaining approved methods for destroying the pest was sent to all growers, who are asked to co-operate and assist the Department's efforts. An application for skilled Egyptian labour was received too late in the season to permit of completion of the formalities required by the Egyptian Government. It is hoped that earlier action will be rendered possible this year.

The market for cotton has always been subject to extraordinary and unforeseen fluctuations. The wise man plants cotton when prices are at their lowest, for reaction from a temporary slump is inevitable, in view of a world shortage of cotton.

A petition from growers asking that the ~~cotton crop~~ may be exempt from taxation for a number of years is receiving the careful consideration of the Government.

Mr. Sawyer further stated that he would call a meeting of cotton cultivators at Haifa at an early date to discuss the more technical aspects of the question, and, if possible, he would arrange for it to coincide with the inauguration of a Chamber of Agriculture.

Dr. Salim said that he had been requested to raise the question of the necessity of establishing a station at Afla, a village between Massudieh and Tulkeram.

His Excellency said it would have been better to have had notice of the question, but he would communicate with the general manager of railways.

The meeting then adjourned.

The next meeting was fixed to take place on Wednesday the 6th and Thursday the 10th February, 1921.

E 1538 40 88]

No. 102

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon. (Received February 4.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 30, 1921

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 490 of the 24th December, and to inform you that the abolition of the Régie monopoly was duly announced at the last meeting of the Advisory Council. It met with the unanimous approval of the non-official members, and has been warmly welcomed throughout the country. The political effect of this measure is likely to be considerable.

2. With reference to the question of the validity of the Régie concession of 1913, I would point out that the Palestine Administration has an interest in this matter distinct from that of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, the Turkish Government and the Financial Commission under the Turkish Treaty—the bodies

mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 in the despatch under reply. If the concession should prove to be invalid, this Government will gain through being exempted from the necessity to pay compensation; while those authorities may not have any reason to raise the question, since the existence of the Régie brings them revenue. It would appear therefore that only when the Régie is able to show that it does in fact possess an asset for which it is entitled to be compensated should the Government of Palestine consent to meet its claim. This point has been strongly pressed by a member of the Advisory Council who claims to speak with special knowledge. His view is supported by an ex-member of the Turkish Parliament who took part in the discussions on this matter. Should compensation be paid without the right to it being clearly established there would probably be considerable local criticism.

3. As regards paragraph 6 of your Lordship's despatch under reply, it is not possible to develop in Palestine a tobacco industry for export as well as for local consumption.

I am informed by experts that some regions in Palestine are particularly suited for the growth of fine tobacco, and one of them has already cabled for the necessary seed, and has ordered machinery which when erected will give occupation to over 100 persons.

It may well be that this country will be able to add largely to its wealth and revenue from the cultivation and manufacture of tobacco.

Every practicable step will be taken to stop at the source any attempted smuggling of Palestine-grown tobacco into neighbouring countries.

I have appointed a committee of official and non-official members of the Advisory Council to consider what rates of taxation shall be levied on production and on import. It is hoped that the committee will be in a position to render a report for the consideration of the Advisory Council at its next meeting on the 9th February.

I transmit herewith a copy of the *Regie* and a copy of their reply.

E. KEITH ROACH

Enclosure in No. 102.

Financial Secretary, High Commission, to Société de la Régie

Sir,

Jerusalem, January 3, 1921

I AM directed by his Excellency the High Commissioner to inform you that, after careful consideration of the circumstances, the Palestine Government in the interests of the people of the country has resolved to suspend immediately the operation in Palestine of the monopoly of tobacco granted by the Ottoman Government to the Régie cointéressée des Tabacs, as set out in the convention dated the 4th August, 1913, and the provisional law dated the 15th August, 1914.

The public notice dated the 11th June, 1918, in which the *Chief Amman* of O.E.T.A. in Palestine recognised the principle of the monopoly, and the provisional law above mentioned were reissued for the time being and should be deemed to be in force until further notice. The Palestine Government is convinced that the maintenance of the monopoly would be contrary to the public interest; and it therefore proposes to announce immediately that the cultivation of tobacco in Palestine is free.

Further, it proposes to replace the present customs duty and surtax on imported tobacco in Palestine, and to consignments already ordered, and the Régie will be entitled to carry on the business of manufacturing cigarettes.

The Government of Palestine proposes to establish a tobacco factory, which can be established by the Régie under the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey on account of the revocation of the concession, but at the same time it reserves to itself the right of contesting the authority of the Provisional Law of 1914 on the ground that it was never adopted by the Ottoman Parliament, and is expressed to be subject to that adoption.

I have, &c.

H. A. SMALLWOOD, Financial Secretary

Enclosure 2 in No. 102

Société de la Régie to Financial Secretary, High Commission.

Monsieur,

Jerusalem, le 4 janvier 1921

VOUS avez reçu en date de ce jour votre honorée lettre du 3 janvier concernant le fait que la Régie de la Tabac en Palestine ne peut pas fonctionner.

Nous en avons transmis une copie à nos chefs, et nous nous faisons le devoir de vous en faire part par la présente lettre. Nous réservons à notre administration le droit de faire valoir ses prérogatives et ses privilèges, et nous nous réservons le droit de faire valoir ses droits et pour toute perte qui lui seront causées par les mesures prises dans votre susdite lettre.

Nous avons l'honneur, &c.

Régie cointéressée des Tabacs,
Merkez Maanet de Jerusalem,
Le Merkez Mudir

E 1596 144 88]

No. 103

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 25, 1921

IN accordance with instructions contained in your telegram No. 248, dated the 16th November, 1920, I have the honour to submit the following report on the number of Jewish immigrants that have entered Palestine during the month of December:—

(a.) Total immigration of Jews to Palestine	1,112
(b.) Number arriving with sanction of Zionist Commission	1,135
(c.) Number arriving without sanction of Zionist Commission	307
(d.) Number endeavouring to enter without passport	17

In the case of (d) permission to enter Palestine was refused in each case.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner.

E 1577/36 88]

No. 104

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem)

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 7, 1921

YOUR despatch No. 18 of 16th January: Ordinance regarding benches of local magistrates.

Position of foreigners in relation to these courts does not appear to have been considered. It may not prove necessary to give them any special privileges as regards such minor courts, but if a permanent system is to be established, as suggested down in section 6 will probably be necessary. Please telegraph your views.

In any case question of this Ordinance raises whole question of permanent system of courts in Palestine in relation to foreigners as well as natives, and it would seem best to defer issue, pending entry into force of mandate and treaty.

E 1577 36 88]

No. 105

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 8, 1921.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 31st January, I am directed by Earl Curzon to inform you that a copy of the Ordinance regarding benches of local magistrates has been sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine regarding a permanent system of courts in Palestine, and to the High Commissioner for the Levant regarding a permanent system of courts in the Levant.

• See Nos. 104 and 104

2. Lord Curzon would be glad to be furnished with the views of your Department on the ordinance proposed by Sir H. Samuel in the light of experience gained in British colonies from similar local judicial bodies, on the supposition that the precedents for such bodies exist in colonies.

I am, Sir,
D. G. OSBORNE

[E 1962 37 88]

No. 108

*French Delegate to Sir E. Drummond. (Communicated to Foreign Office
February 14, 1921)*

*League of Nations Assembly
Geneva, December 1, 1920*

Sir,

IN accordance with instructions from my Government, I have the honour to communicate to you the enclosed text of the mandate which the French Republic has accepted for Syria and Lebanon, and I beg you to deposit it with the Bureau of the Council of the League of Nations.

In conformity with the spirit of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Government of the French Republic has prepared this text after an exchange of views and in complete agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government. The French Government ventures to hope that the Council, after examining the draft, will consider it to be drawn up in conformity with the principles laid down in article 22 of the Covenant, and will give it its approval.

I would add that, in the interests of the populations of Syria and Lebanon themselves, and with a view to ensuring to them as soon as possible the benefits of a government based on the terms of the Covenant, the Government of the Republic ventures to call the attention of the Council to the advantage of putting an end to the present temporary regime.

I have, Sir,
JEAN GOUT

Enclosure in No. 108.

Draft Resolution approving the Terms of the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon

THE Council of the League of Nations,

Whereas, by article 132 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Sévres on the 10th August, 1920, Turkey renounced in favour of the principal Allied Powers all rights and title over the territories of the former Ottoman Empire situated to the south of the southern frontier of Turkey as fixed in this treaty;

And whereas, by article 94 of the said treaty, the high contracting parties agreed that part of the above-mentioned territories known as Syria should, in accordance with the terms of article 22, paragraph 4, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, be constituted an independent State, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance of a mandatory Power, until such time as it is able to stand alone;

And whereas the principal Allied Powers have decided that the mandate for these territories comprising Syria and Lebanon should be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it;

And whereas the terms of this mandate, which are also defined in the articles below, have been accepted by the Government of the French Republic;

And whereas the Government of the French Republic has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, in conformity with the following provisions

Hereby approves the terms of the mandate for Syria and Lebanon as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The mandatory will frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and Lebanon. This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population inhabiting the mandated territory. The mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development

of Syria and Lebanon as independent States. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the government of Syria and Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The mandatory Power shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ARTICLE 2.

The mandatory may maintain his troops in the mandated territories for the defence of the territory. He shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, he may organise such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory, and employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the territories under the mandate.

The said militia shall thereafter be under local authorities, subject to the control which the mandatory shall retain over these forces.

The mandatory shall prevent the employment of the militia for other purposes than those mentioned above. Nothing shall preclude Syria and Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the mandatory stationed in their territory.

The mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and munitions.

ARTICLE 3.

The mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and Lebanon and with the right to issue exequaturs to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers, nationals of Syria and Lebanon, living outside the limits of these territories, shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the mandatory.

ARTICLE 4.

The mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria or Lebanon shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

ARTICLE 5.

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are definitely abrogated in Syria and Lebanon.

At the same time, foreign consular tribunals shall continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organisation provided for in article 6.

ARTICLE 6.

The mandatory shall establish in Syria and Lebanon a legal system which shall assure to natives, as well as to foreigners, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the mandatory shall exercise the administration of the Wakfs in complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 7.

Pending the making of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the mandatory shall apply within the territories of Syria and Lebanon.

ARTICLE 8.

The mandatory will ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals. It will be the duty of the mandatory to see that the extradition treaties in force between foreign Powers and the mandatory are observed in the territories of Syria and Lebanon. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

The mandatory shall encourage public instruction which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territories of Syria and Lebanon.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may not be denied or impaired.

ARTICLE 9.

The mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the "conseils de fa'oude" or in the management of religious communities, shrines belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

ARTICLE 10.

The supervision exercised by the mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and Lebanon, the activities of those religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall the nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

ARTICLE 11.

The mandatory must see that there is no discrimination in Syria or Lebanon against the nationals (including societies and associations) of any State member of the League of Nations, as compared with its own nationals (including societies and associations) or with the nationals of any other foreign State, in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, and of navigation, or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly there shall be no discrimination against goods originating in or destined for any of the States members of the League of Nations, and there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the territory.

Nevertheless, the mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local authorities such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, on the same conditions it may take, or cause to be taken, such steps as it may think best to assure the development of the natural resources of the mandated territory and to safeguard the interests of the population.

Nothing in this article shall prevent the mandatory, or the local authority acting in agreement with an adjoining country.

ARTICLE 12.

The mandatory shall adhere on behalf of Syria and Lebanon to any general international agreements as already existing or that may be concluded hereafter with the consent of the League of Nations, especially in respect of the following: slave traffic, drugs, traffic in arms and munitions, commerce.

ARTICLE 13.

The mandatory shall, in accordance with the conditions of Syria and Lebanon, so far as social, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be required for the health, safety and well-being of the population, and for the prevention of animal or plant diseases.

ARTICLE 14.

The mandatory will draw up and put into force in the year following the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace concluded between the Allied Powers and Turkey, measures to assure equal treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to all States members of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 15.

Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in article 1 an arrangement shall be made for the reimbursement by the latter for all expenses incurred by the mandatory in

organising the administration, developing local resources and carrying out permanent public works, the benefit of which the country would retain. Such arrangements shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 16.

Arabic and French shall be the official languages of Syria and Lebanon.

ARTICLE 17.

The mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate.

Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be communicated in the report.

ARTICLE 18.

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the present mandate. In case of any modification proposed by the mandatory, such consent may be given by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 19.

Any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations concerning the interpretation or the application of the provisions of this mandate shall be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, or to the Council of the League of Nations.

A copy of the present mandate shall be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and a certified copy shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General to the Government of Turkey, signatory to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

B 1922 35 881

No. 107

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the political portion of the monthly report for the month of January.

The administrative portion will be forwarded to your Lordship by the next bag.

(For High Commissioner)

W. B. DE B.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Political Report for the month of January 1921

AMONG the enclosures which accompanied my last report was a copy of a letter dated the 18th December, 1920, received from Musa Kasim Pasha el-Husseini, President of the recent Haifa Conference, and also a copy of the reply dated the 21st December sent by me.

The promoters of the Conference at Haifa held in December thereupon felt called upon to vindicate its representative character, and shortly afterwards the Government received several telegrams signed by various groups in different parts of Palestine affirming the representative character of the Congress.

On the 8th January a public meeting was held at Nablus. The rain fell heavily. From 2,500 to 3,500 people were present. These included very few peasants. No disturbance took place but, as a precautionary measure, two troops of the 8th Cavalry were standing by in their barracks with their horses saddled. The object of the meeting was to emphasise the leader's contention that this town's delegates at the Haifa Conference represented the people of Nablus. The meeting lasted about 15 minutes.

2 C 2

After an interview between the Governor and one of the chief notables of the town, the latter informed the crowd that the Governor had promised to submit their case to the High Commissioner and requested them to return quietly to their homes.

At Gaza the Governor was asked to sanction a similar demonstration. The suggestion was not encouraged and no meetings took place. In Jerusalem leaflets were circulated declaring that the Haifa Congress was representative of the Arabs in Palestine.

These events not unnaturally gave rise to a number of rumours, particularly in Jerusalem, and the following steps were taken with a view to allaying apprehensions.

(January) steps were taken with a view to allaying apprehensions. A luncheon party, given by a leading member of the Muslim community, was the occasion of a short and friendly conversation between the High Commissioner and Musa Kasim Pasha. During this conversation it was arranged that the Pasha and five of his friends should come to Government House on the following Sunday (10th) and should there discuss with the High Commissioner the questions about which their minds were exercised. It was stipulated that they should be received in a private capacity, and that no communication should be made to the press.

The meeting took place on Sunday, 10th January, at 12 noon. The Pasha, on behalf of the community, expressed the fears of the community regarding the proposed immigration. He also mentioned the fact that the High Commissioner in the course of his reply stated that it was his duty to maintain the policy laid down by His Majesty's Government.

His declaration as a whole, giving no less importance to the second part of the declaration than to the first, and that the question of the election of municipalities was already receiving his close attention. In the discussion which followed, one of the speakers pressed for an elected assembly as even more important than the present time was not a favourable one for such an election.

But he added that he was prepared to receive any proposal representing any important section of the community. He gave recognition to the Jewish National Assembly, and pointed out that in recognizing that assembly he had made it a condition that no resolutions should be adopted or submitted that were contrary to the conditions of the mandate.

Musa Kasim Pasha and his friends stated that they were grateful for this. The High Commissioner proposed that he should embody it in a letter. The High Commissioner took the opportunity of emphasizing not only the part played by the Jewish National Assembly, but also the responsibility in this regard which necessarily falls upon the members of all communities.

Although it has not been possible hitherto to come to an agreement with Musa Kasim Pasha and his friends as to the exact terms in which the letter above mentioned should be couched, it is hoped and believed that the discussion has been beneficial.

The attitude of the people of Nablus continues to be unsympathetic towards the Jews. Hence the delay and the arrival of Jewish immigrants is still the chief text of anti-Zionist propaganda.

The bulk of the population has been quiet. The rains promise to be sufficient. The people on the whole show as yet no inclination to devote their time or energy to giving any active backing to the political agitators of the Effendi or property owning class.

On the 14th, Dr. Weizmann and Sir Alfred Mond arrived in Jerusalem. On the 15th a meeting took place to welcome them at the Zionist Assembly rooms. A reception was held also on the 17th at the Vaad Hayir, Jewish City Council.

Sir Alfred Mond, in his address, emphasized his belief that there is room in Palestine, not only for a Jewish national home, but also for a flourishing Arab community. For the 25th, the National Jewish Council has called a special meeting in honour of Sir Alfred Mond and Dr. Weizmann.

The commission appointed to enquire into the affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate has completed its enquiries previously made by Sir Anton Bertram. A preliminary meeting was held on the 15th. At this meeting the Rev. Archimandrite Timotheus Thamelis intimated that his official position as chief secretary to

the Orthodox Patriarchate rendered it difficult for him to sit as an assessor with the commission. He was, however, fully prepared to supply all evidence in his power, and called as a witness. The president of the Court considered that the Archimandrite would be a free agent if appearing only in such a capacity, and he agreed that he should withdraw from the position of assessor.

Mr. Mackintosh and those with them had not found it possible to nominate an assessor. It is felt that a convenient ground for a charge against the commission of partiality will be thus removed.

Mr. Mackintosh, His Majesty's vice-consul at Beyrouth, and the British military liaison officers at Beyrouth and Damascus respectively, paid a visit on the 23rd instant to Jerusalem and had conversations with his Excellency the High Commissioner, with the object of discussing various questions and of establishing close touch with our officers.

It is satisfactory to be able to report that British police and junior administrative officers stationed along the northern frontier of Palestine have established cordial relations with French officers on the other side of the frontier.

Transjordania.—Some account of the conditions in Transjordan may properly be added here, because the administrative, economic and financial state of the country is of great importance to Palestine. Public security continues to be good in the main, although the Beni Sakur tribe and their more important chief, Mithgal, are inclined to respect the authority of Sherref Ali Ibn Husam (who is still at Amman) rather than that of the local Government at Salt. Mithgal even went so far recently as to detain Kasnakam Pasha, who was on a visit to him, with the object of settling a land dispute between him and a neighbour. Kasnakam Pasha was, however, released on the intervention of other sheikhs and of Sherref Ali Ibn Husam. Amir Abdullah in a letter to Sherref Ali, blamed him for the incident. He also mentioned the fact that Kasnakam Pasha, since his visit, is generally regarded to be in disgrace. Kasnakam Pasha reports having seen a petition to be presented to Ali Ibn Husam at Amman, and asking him to separate Amman from Salt.

The new Council of the Belka met on the 20th, after the return from Jerusalem of the Mutessarif, Mithar Bey. The Council, has since gone to Ajloun.

question of joining the Mutessariflik of the Belka. In the Ajloun district the population is still divided into three kazas, while the agitation against the suppression of the fourth kaza (that of Mezari) still continues. Tax collecting in the Ajloun district is slow and returns are small. Hence, though all is quiet outwardly, no real progress can be made.

Conditions in the Belka are less satisfactory. Although some success has been achieved, 40,000 are still overdue for this year. The Government is barely able to maintain itself. Rasafat, Pasha, on a visit from Kerak to the Belka, has been unable to maintain law and order in the present circumstances adequately to maintain law and order, and is ensuring the continuance of open communications between Jerusalem and the Belka. Rasafat's position is admittedly difficult. He is doubtful as to the turn events may take, as there are many pro-Sherrefian sympathizers in his district.

At the same time, the reserve force continues in Kerak, as elsewhere, to afford, albeit to a limited degree, some moral support to the local Government, though not sufficient, as in the Belka, to enable the collection of revenue to the extent needed to support functionaries.

In conclusion, it may be said of Transjordan that no Government can be expected to assert its authority, much less to introduce reforms, so long as the country remains a prey to the agitation of political adventurers, and so long as the more important people remain in doubt as to the Power towards which they must ultimately look for support. These people not unnaturally attempt to shape their conduct in such a manner as to avoid the personal mishaps which might occur in the future to those who showed in too marked a manner the direction of their sympathies.

The political situation in Transjordan cannot, as already observed, but affect Palestine, and while there is at present no dangerous collaboration between the agitators across the Jordan and the malcontents on this side, yet the possibility of common cause being made cannot altogether be dismissed from the mind.

The danger that would arise from any such combination requires no emphasis.

E 2131 35 88]

No. 108

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—Received February 17

(No. 66.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 4, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the January monthly administrative report.

I have, &c
 (For High Commissioner)
 E. KEITH ROACH

Enclosure in No. 108

Palestine Administrative Report for the month of January 1921

Agriculture

General.

THE rainfall has been most favourable in all districts—with the exception of Galilee, where there is a shortage—and, on the whole, splendid harvests may be expected.

Barley, lentils, kormannah, vegetables and other earlier crops are doing well, and wheat also shows every promise. No crop diseases of great importance have been reported, and the lemon tree disease previously reported from Jericho has now disappeared. The arrival of sulphuric acid for the manufacture of kormannah is awaited, and until its arrival no progress can be reported on in sunnat.

General satisfaction is expressed from all districts at the abolition of the tobacco monopoly. Many demands for tobacco seeds have been received. Experimental work in tobacco growing will be undertaken. Meetings have been held in various towns with a view to establishing the industry on a large scale.

The orange export trade is satisfactory, and good profits were made out of the first shipment to Liverpool.

Veterinary.

The following contagious diseases cases have been reported in the course of the month: Anthrax, 2; epizootic lymphangitis, 2; mange, 2; and sheep pox, 2.

There is a proposal to establish a stock-breeding society at Gaza, which is being considered by the chief veterinary officer.

Forestry.

The Forest Demarcation Commissions are now at work, but difficulties are experienced in determining boundaries.

Fishery.

The scientific work of the fishery department is being carried on. A fishery units is being considered, fishing logs and daily market reports are analysed and recorded, and the Departmental fishery biologist has enquired into and reported on the fishing industry of the Sea of Tiberias, with a view to its improvement.

Antiquities

General.

The Director of Antiquities, now in England, hopes to arrange a meeting between the British and Turkish Governments to reach an agreement on the subject of the antiquities services of Palestine and Syria.

Jerusalem.

The work of restoration on the Damascus Gate, one of the principal entrances to the city, is now nearly completed. The stone pinnacles which were missing have been replaced. The restoration of the Roman mosaic in the citadel walls is nearing completion.

Circles—Jerusalem.

Plans for the creation of the Dabdet Et Rish Park have been approved. The site contains a number of old Jewish and Græco-Roman tombs, which will be cleared of rubbish and planted round with trees, and the roads linked up to the places of interest.

A Street-naming Committee has definitely fixed twelve names to Jerusalem streets in the three languages. A commission is being formed to investigate and report on the dangerous condition of some of the old houses and streets of Jerusalem.

Commerce and Industry

The commercial situation is still difficult, but there are signs of a gradual, if slow, improvement. Retail prices are moving in sympathy with the fall in world wholesale prices, although local markets are very small, and it is often possible for merchants on the spot to "squeeze" consumers through lack of competition.

Banks continue to charge 9 per cent, and commissions amounting to some 3 per cent. per annum on advances, and are most sparing in their credits.

The prohibition of the export of gold was rescinded on the 1st January, without any apparent effect on the economic situation of the country.

The export of barley under licence was permitted as from the 10th January, but so far little has left the country.

The unrestricted export of durra (millet) was permitted from the 29th January.

Prices for local produce are still comparatively high, prices for imported commodities have fallen.

A system has been instituted whereby the Palestine railways sell coal under certain conditions to the public at cost price plus expenses. The price of fuel wood, which rose to over £ E 6 a ton at the beginning of the month, has now dropped to £ E 7 in Jerusalem.

The Chamber of Commerce held their third half yearly meeting on the 10th January, and reported excellent work, and in a sound financial position.

Special rates have been granted by the railways for the transport of cereals. Endeavours are being made to promote a regular motor-lorry service between Nazareth and Afulah.

The mother-of-pearl trade at Bethlehem is paralysed owing to the high rate of wages and of exchange and the lack of tourists. Many orders have been declined.

The Hamel Publishing Company, the proprietors of several newspapers in Palestine, have a modern printing establishment.

Customs.

The value of imports for the month of December is £ E 559,384, an increase of £ E 181,156 over the corresponding month of 1919.

The value of exports is £ E 67,795, which also shows an increase of £ E 1,000 over the corresponding month of 1919.

The Palestine customs-house at Kantara East Station was removed from Egyptian territory to Ludd on the 10th January, inspection of passengers' baggage being conducted on the train en route.

Agricultural Loans

The sum of £ E 21,120 has been disbursed in agricultural loans during January, making a total of £ E 319,720 to date.

Currency.

Under the authority of public notice No. 73 A, dated the 12th December, 1918, the Field-Marshal Commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force declared as legal tender the currencies then in general use by the Allied troops and the public. It has become impossible to insist on their acceptance at their legal value as expressed in the public notice. Furthermore, the Government lays itself open to serious financial loss should speculators introduce this depreciated currency into Palestine.

A paper currency has now been issued denoting Egyptian £1 notes and a 1 nickel as legal tender. The British sovereign is also declared legal tender at the rate of 97.50 Egyptian piastres to the pound.

Ottoman Regie des Tabacs

The abolition of the tobacco monopoly was announced to the Advisory Council on the 4th January. The planting of tobacco may be undertaken forthwith, which will enable growers to cultivate seedlings during February and March. The super-tax upon imported tobacco, cigarettes, cigars and snuff will be removed on the 1st March, 1921, and replaced by a modified tariff.

The customs and excise duties are now being considered.

The measure has proved extremely popular, and is welcomed as another step towards the reform of the numerous and vexatious imposts imposed under the regulations of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.

Education

Out of thirty-two candidates examined for the training college for men, twenty-seven have been accepted and will begin work on the 1st February. Arrangements are being made to strengthen the teaching staff of the training college.

It is hoped to make arrangements at an early date for pamphlets on subjects of local interest, e.g., agriculture, hygiene, communications, &c., to be printed in the three official languages and distributed to all schools. Lectures on similar subjects, illustrated by lantern slides or cinematograph, are also contemplated.

A grant of £ E. 300 has been made to the tile-making industry in Jerusalem, and apprentices are indentured on the same terms as in the school for weaving.

A preliminary meeting of representatives from various Boy Scout organisations was held at Government House under the presidency of the High Commissioner and discussed the question of closer co-operation. The High Commissioner has been asked to accept the post of Chief Scout for Palestine.

The matriculation examination of London University was held in Jerusalem. Five candidates presented themselves.

Health

A system has been approved whereby at Jaffa all immigrants, pilgrims, &c., will be disembarked in a sheltered bay to the south of the town, and quarantine procedure, disinfection and medical examination will be effected there; also the procedure required by the Government Immigration Department and Zionist Commission.

Influenza of a mild type has been widespread throughout the country, and caused a number of deaths in villages where the population was already debilitated through malaria. Medical work in these villages is being carried out.

A case of typhus was imported by an immigrant from Russia.

Immigration and Travel

During the month 589 immigrants arrived, of whom 458 were recommended by the Zionist Commission and 151 were independent immigrants.

The number of tourists travelling in Palestine shows an increase over that of last month of about eighty.

305 German pre-war residents returned to Palestine during the month.

Legal

The most important criminal trial of the month was a case of murder heard by the Court of Jerusalem, in which three persons were convicted and sentenced to death. The case is now before the Court of Appeal.

A committee has been appointed to consider what amendments will be necessary to the Ottoman Penal Code in order to adapt it to the conditions of Palestine. It is felt that the Ottoman Penal Code is not adequate, and it requires so much amendment to make it suitable that it seems better to adapt a modern scientific statement of the criminal law.

Transactions in land show a steady increase, and dealings in land are now taking place in all parts of the country, the great majority are for small areas.

The legal classes have completed their first term of work, and examinations have been held. The Ministry of Education has been lent by the Egyptian Government to the Palestine Administration for six months, and has taken over the direction of the classes.

Posts and Telegraphs

Agreements have been signed by the Postmaster-General and the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, Salt, Transjordan, for the exchange of telegrams, money orders and parcels between Palestine and Transjordan. This should result in improved commercial relations between the two countries.

There is a general demand throughout the country for the provision of telephone facilities. Difficulty is experienced in making this owing to the world-wide shortage of apparatus and material.

Public Security

The Galilee and Ajloun district police captured five more members of the Madineh gang on the 22nd January.

Agreements have been signed by the High Commissioner and the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, Salt, Transjordan, for the exchange of telegrams, money orders and parcels between Palestine and Transjordan. This should result in improved commercial relations between the two countries.

Twenty cases of heinous crimes were reported for the month of January, and twelve cases were detected. Crime shows a steady decrease during the last three months.

The gaol labour company of the 140 men commenced work on earthworks on the railways at Khuderia on the 11th January.

On Sunday, the 16th instant, a mutiny broke out in the Jerusalem central gaol during the early morning, and some fifty long-sentence prisoners attacked the warders, overpowered them, and eighteen made their escape. A special court of enquiry is being held.

Public Works

Road construction and repair operations are progressing satisfactorily. In spite of the heavy rains in the first fortnight of the month communications have been uninterrupted.

The Jerusalem and Haifa projected water supplies have been carefully studied, and preliminary steps taken towards obtaining the necessary pumping plants.

Satisfactory progress is noted in the Haifa breakwater extension, the present length of completed work being 50 metres.

Repairs to Government offices, hospitals, prisons, &c., all over the country, have given employment to a large number of men.

Railways

The rebuilding and strengthening of the bridges on the Jerusalem line is now in hand, and when completed it will be possible to improve the service on this line by the use of heavier locomotives.

The survey of the Petach-Tikvah line is completed, and work will shortly begin.

A new station is being opened at Zichron Jacob.

Using the railway as a means of transport, the High Commissioner has endeavoured to persuade the merchants at Beersheba to use the railway, and it is hoped to get 4,000 tons transported to Haifa in the near future.

The revenue of the railway shows signs of increasing.

Ports and Lights

Steamers arriving at the ports, 78.

Tonnage of registered shipping, 86,600.

Sports

Under the presidency of the High Commissioner a sports club for Jerusalem has been inaugurated. Membership will be open to all residents of Palestine, official and unofficial.

(No. 67.)

Jerusalem, February 4, 1921.

A large part of the cost of development must devolve upon private enterprise. Not only is this the case with respect to ordinary industrial and agricultural businesses but large schemes of land reclamation and colonisation must be left to public utility bodies, such as the Zionist Organisation, or to individual effort. The cost would be too great for the Administration to assume in addition to the many

3. For the assistance of agriculture, industry and commerce the establishment of one or more banks for giving long term credits on mortgage is one of the most urgent needs of the country. There is no subject to which reference is more frequently made at conferences with the notables of the various districts. There is no allocation of capital which is more likely to increase the productivity of the country and to assist the expansion of its revenue.

Meanwhile, the late military administration established a system of agricultural credit in Egypt on a very liberal basis. The Egyptian Bank at 6 per cent. About 300,000 £ has been lent in this way and the scheme has gone far to save the agricultural situation in Palestine. The cultivators who had lost most of their working cattle and other essentials during the war were obliged to replace them. Seed and manure were bought, and the large expansion of the tillage revenue is undoubtedly due in some measure to these loans. But the amount lent is far short of the need, and the system that had to be adopted, in default of a better, is not a satisfactory one. It is not advisable that the Government should find itself in the direct relationship of creditor to debtor with large numbers of individual cultivators, nor has it the machinery for dealing rapidly and efficiently with a multitude of small cases.

4 Palestine has no harbours, and the fact that shipping can only anchor in open bays is a great disadvantage to the country. If there were harbours at Jaffa and Haifa, and, if it were possible to construct harbours at both places, the country would greatly benefit. Jaffa would serve, as now, as the port for Jerusalem and all Southern Palestine and Southern Transjordan; Haifa would serve Northern Palestine and Northern Transjordan, the Hauran and Damascus. If there were through railway communication with Mesopotamia the connection might be made with either port.

on which a definite scheme could be based. It remains to be seen whether private capital will be willing to undertake one or both of these enterprises. Meantime, I do not contemplate the allocation of any sum to these objects from the proceeds of any Government loan.

In addition to the purposes included in these estimates, it will probably be found desirable in the near future to construct a narrow gauge railway from Semakh to Tiberias, and perhaps northwards to Metulleh. Such a line would develop a rich agricultural district and would also be of considerable strategic value. The cost is roughly estimated at £ E 20,000.

	£ F.
For buildings	277,190 (approximately)
For roads	221,750 (approximately)
For other purposes	229,575 (approximately)

7. In addition there are various works urgently needed in the 101 towns of Palestine, which can only be undertaken by the help of municipal loans. The provision of adequate water supplies for Jerusalem and Haifa is urgent, and there are many other works which must not be postponed. It would greatly facilitate the improvement and development of the towns if the Government were in a position to lend them the funds that they need, on the security of the local revenues. A sum of perhaps £ E 60,000 would be needed in the immediate future for this

perhaps ££ 200,000 would be required under this item
of Accounts for 1961-1962 for the development of posts, telegraphs and telephones. The principal items are set out in
Annex III. It is estimated that a further £60,000 will be
required later.

10. A cadastral survey is indispensable to the agricultural progress of Palestine. It will be a costly undertaking. A preliminary estimate indicates a sum of £ E 400,000 spread over a period of possibly eight years. In addition, there is the work of a Land Settlement Court costing perhaps 20,000/.

11 Afforestation anti-malarial work and a number of minor purposes will involve an expenditure which is rather to be measured by the funds that may be made available than by the amount that could usefully be employed. A figure of £ E 150 000 may be allocated to these heads.

12. We therefore reach the following totals in round figures —

	£ E
Railways	1,914,000
Sennakh-Tiberias Railway	20,000
Public works	728,000
Municipal loans	60,000
Currency	200,000
Posts and telegraphs	170,000
Cadastral survey	400,000
Land Settlement Court	20,000
Afforestation, anti-malarial and minor purposes	150,000
Total	3,671,000

13. Fortunately by far the greater part of these amounts are not in the nature of dead-weight debt.

(1) Of the railway expenditure, £ E. 336,000 is for the purchase of rolling-stock. But the Palestine railways are now paying £ E. 69,500 per annum for the hire of rolling stock, the whole of which would be saved as the new stock that is to be purchased will be paid for out of the sinking fund on nearly £ E. 1,000,000 of new capital. The service of half of the proposed railway debt can therefore be met without imposing any additional charge. The other half of this debt, particularly since the traffic is now largely restricted through the absence of a sufficient quantity of good rolling-stock

(2) Against the annual charge in respect of the capital cost of new Government buildings are to be set off sums of approximately £ E. 16,000 now paid for the hire of buildings that will be surrendered.

(3) The municipalities will themselves pay the interest and sinking fund on the money borrowed by the Government and lent again to them. It is proposed that a large part of these revenues should be paid to the municipalities (see the despatch No. 248 on the reform of the finances of the municipality of Jerusalem). There will therefore be ample security against the possibility of default.

(4) The funds employed as deposit against the issue of Palestine currency notes will be invested in securities bearing interest. That interest might be at a somewhat lower rate than that which would be payable on a Palestine Government loan. But the difference between the rates of interest received and interest paid on the capital sum in question would involve a loss to the Palestine Government of a very small sum.

(5) The Palestine Post Office is conducted at a profit, and there is no reason to doubt that the proposed investment in additional telegraph and telephone plant will be remunerative.

(6) The cadastral survey will bring a new revenue from survey fees. It is estimated that, when the work is fully developed, this will amount to £ E. 20,000 a year.

(7) Should it be found necessary to provide any capital for a land or mortgage bank, the same would be provided out of the sinking fund.

14. There remain the following heads of capital expenditure against which no specific amount of revenue can be credited —

	£ E
Public works	300,000
(Not including a proportion of the cost of buildings, which would be covered by savings in rentals.)	
Cadastral survey and Land Settlement Court	260,000
(Not covered by fees.)	
Afforestation, anti-malarial and minor purposes	150,000
Total	910,000

15. The question then remains to be decided how much of this capital expenditure will be met by the sinking fund and how much by the Government.

despatch (paragraph 16) the reasons were given why it would be inadvisable to devote the whole of any future surplus to the sinking fund. It is clear that though it is that Palestine should undertake, at the earliest moment that the conditions allow, the cost of her own defence. To stop all expenditure upon the development of education, of public works and of other departments would give rise to a popular discontent, which would in the long run entail an increase in military expenditure. Moreover, a careful expenditure upon roads, agricultural development and other similar objects, although no particular return in revenue can be allocated to them, do yield an indirect return and tend to pay for themselves.

16. In the estimates for 1921-22, a sum of only £ E. 15,000 has been included in respect of new debt, other than for railway purposes. In view of the expansion of general revenue which is proceeding and which may confidently be expected to continue, it would be no imprudence to contemplate allocating in 1922-23 and future years a further sum of £ E. 55,000 to interest and sinking fund upon debt incurred for purposes that do not yield a direct return in revenue. The total sum of £ E. 70,000 would suffice to pay interest and sinking fund charges at 7 per cent upon £ E. 1,000,000.

17. The expenditure of this amount would be distributed among those objects, not directly remunerative, that are the most urgent among those that have been specified.

18. The total amount needed for capital expenditure in Palestine was stated in paragraph 12 to be £ E. 3,671,000. Of this, all but £ E. 910,000 will be spent upon purposes which will yield their own revenues, sufficient to cover interest and sinking fund charges. These charges upon the remaining £ E. 910,000 will be covered by an allocation of £ E. 70,000 which can be made from general revenue. It is to be hoped that some reduction can be made upon the estimate of expenditure, particularly in the case of the sinking fund, in view of the probable decline in prices. It will be observed that nothing is included in respect to a contribution to the capital of a mortgage bank, that question not being ripe for decision.

19. A considerable part of this expenditure would be spread over two or three years.

20. The loan which is contemplated should therefore be for an amount of £ E. 3,500,000. It would be convenient if the money could be received in instalments spread over two years, should such an arrangement be found practicable. The rate of interest and the period of repayment would be a matter for discussion with the financial houses that would issue the loan.

21. A British Government guarantee, while it would no doubt be very welcome to those houses, and would be of advantage to the Administration of Palestine, it is understood not contemplated by His Majesty's Government. Nor, in my opinion, is it necessary. The interests of lenders would be adequately secured by a charge upon the general revenues of Palestine, which now amount, including railways, to over £ E. 2,200,000 a year, the only prior charge being the annuity in respect of the Ottoman Pre-War Debt, which will not exceed £ E. 200,000, and may be considerably less. They are further safeguarded by the following provision in article 27 of the draft mandate for Palestine: "In the event of the termination of the mandate conferred upon the mandatory by this declaration, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations, legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate."

22. Your Lordship will no doubt agree that, although preliminary arrangements can, and should be made, there can be no question of the actual issue of the loan until the mandate is formally conferred. So serious a matter as the incurring of a large financial obligation for a long term of years cannot be undertaken until the position of the Palestine Government is definitely regularised. Since, however, it is very possible that several months may still elapse before the mandate is issued, the question arises what course should be pursued meanwhile.

23. This is a matter of great importance to Palestine. In ordinary circumstances, the natural course would be to postpone all capital expenditure until the mandate is conferred and the loan issued. But under present conditions, such a policy would be open to grave objection.

In the first place, there is a considerable Jewish immigration into Palestine now proceeding. To stop it would have serious political disadvantages. It would

be a great discouragement to Zionists throughout the world. It would be especially resented by Zionists in Palestine. It would give the impression that the policy of creating a Jewish National Home was being minimised, if not abandoned. But if the policy of finding employment. Land settlement takes time. The growth of new industries must also be gradual. Employment upon public works is a suitable temporary resource, and at the present time many hundreds of young immigrants are, in fact, being employed on road-making and railway reconstruction work, with quite satisfactory results. If capital expenditure were to stop during the next few months, or indeed if it were not to be expanded, the effect with respect to immigration would be most serious.

Secondly, the population of Palestine at large have been assured that the advent of a British civil Administration would mean a large and rapid economic development of the country. Important sections of them look to this development as a compensation for certain results of the British occupation which they dislike, particularly the fact that the interests of the Jewish immigrant population are being subordinated to those of the Arab population. If the Administration were compelled to mark time during the next few months, the discontent among the Jewish population would be at least equalled by the discontent among the other elements.

24. In these circumstances I desire, with your Lordship's approval, to proceed with the works proposed in this despatch.

(a) An additional water supply for Jerusalem is essential. The supply brought in by the army has proved quite inadequate even for the present population, and it allows no margin for future growth. If new hotels, or other buildings, or the garden suburb which it is intended to construct at once, were built, they could not be supplied with water.

Works Department utilising some ancient reservoirs, which will cost about £ E. 40,000. The sale of water would, from the beginning, cover the greater part of the annual charges for the capital and the cost of working, and in two or three years it is expected that the scheme would be self-supporting. It is contemplated using for this purpose some of the engines employed for the pipe-line from Kantara to Jerusalem. The scheme would be regarded as a great boon by the people of Jerusalem, the work would give a considerable amount of direct employment, it would enable various building enterprises to proceed. I am anxious to place funds at the disposal of the Municipality which will allow this scheme to be undertaken at once.

(b) There are certain roads which urgently need reconstruction, and which ought to be undertaken without delay.

(c) The provision of additional rolling stock for the railways is imperative, and although this will not furnish employment in Palestine, it would do so in the country of origin.

It will be some time before the orders can be completed, but they should be placed immediately. As already mentioned, as fast as the new rolling stock comes forward that which is at present being hired can be returned, and the financial result will be not an increase of expenditure, but a saving.

(d) The railways need further strengthening in several places to prevent wash-outs, and this is work which would furnish a considerable volume of employment.

(e) The railway administration is put to heavy expense through its workshops being situated in so inconvenient a place as Kantara. The general manager is most anxious to remove them to Haifa as soon as possible. A preliminary is the filling up of certain derelict land at the proposed site at Haifa. This can be done economically by combining it with some dredging work that is needed in Haifa harbour.

(f) The building of houses for officials in certain places is another urgent need. We have been in all the places, and it is only when fresh building is undertaken that they can be released.

(g) The staff for the cadastral survey is being rapidly collected, and their work should begin at once.

(h) There are some minor works of comparatively small cost which would be of

great public utility, would conduce to the contentment of the people, and would give a considerable amount of employment. For instance, the expenditure of £ E. 5,000 upon the construction of a jetty at Gaza would enable the coasting trade to develop there, and would revive the local fishing industry. It would also be a great encouragement to the people, whose town was destroyed in the war.

25. The course which I propose for providing the funds needed for such purposes is as follows:—There is a sum of nearly £ E. 500,000, being revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, which has been accumulated during the occupation, but has not been allocated by the Treaty of Sevres to the Turkish debt (see my previous despatch, paragraph 5). This sum is proposed, and still proposed, should be used for purposes of defence. It is intended to employ it partly in equipping a Palestine Defence Force, and partly in meeting the deficit, during the first few years, caused by the cost of that force being in excess of the sum which it is possible to allocate to it from annual revenue. Only a small proportion of the accumulated sum would, however, be needed for these purposes this year. It has already been drawn upon for certain urgent railway works and telegraph and telephone expenditure. I propose to utilise it further for the purposes already mentioned, it being clearly understood that all these advances should be repaid when loan money becomes available, and that the allocation of the whole of the accumulated Ottoman Public Debt Administration revenues to defence remains unaffected.

26. The question of the amount and terms of the loan will no doubt require time for full consideration. I venture to suggest that the decision of the urgent matters in the foregoing paragraphs 22-24 should not be postponed until the larger question has been settled. The works that would be undertaken prior to the issue of the loan would be kept to the minimum that the circumstances demanded, and on that understanding, I should be glad to receive, at an early date, your Lordship's approval of the measure proposed.

I have &c.
HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner

APPENDIX I

Palestine Railways

Summary of Capital Estimates, 1922

	Amount to be raised by loan
(A) Construction of line, remodeling of station yards and installation of interlocking system, survey; provision of western electric telephone and telegraph instruments; removal, &c., of locomotive workshops and stores from Kantara to Haifa; new carriage and wagon sheds at Haifa; provision of turn-tables, weigh-bridges, coal stages; purchase of wooden sleepers; purchase of printing machine, and expropriation of land	£ E. 1,000,000
(B) Staff accommodation, provision of station buildings	50,000
(C) Purchase of rolling-stock	1,000,000
Total	2,050,000

(A)

Item	Total Estimated Cost	Amount to be Spent during 1921-22
1. Clearing drains, widening cuts and banks and ditching ..	2,000	2,000
2. New bridge openings, spans from 120 feet to 20 feet	4,000	4,000
3. New bridges required to replace present temporary bridges	1,000	1,000
4. Work on steep pitching to banks, average height 3 metres	1,000	1,000
5. Re-laying present second-hand track from Kilometre 315 to Haifa with new 72-lb rails and gravel sleepers, 30 kilom., available at £ K. 100 per kilometre = £ K. 3,000	1,000	1,000
6. 30 kilom. to be picked up from Kantara-Haifa section and retold at a cost of £ K. 250 per kilometre = £ K. 12,500	13,000	13,000
7. Stone ballasting track, Haifa to Haifa, 215 kilom., plus 47 kilom. at 60 kilom. at £ K. 300 per kilometre	17,500	17,500
8. Re-laying up sidings and installation of ..	8,000	8,000
9. Survey, future development ..	4,000	4,000
10. Provision of western electric telephone system complete, with wires set at Haifa, operating Akra, Samakh, Nablu, Tulkaram lines, also continuation of existing system, Ludd-Haifa	1,000	1,000
11. Ludd-Haifa section with headquarters set at Ludd	1,000	1,000
12. 16 electric staff instruments complete with batteries, ..	1,000	1,000
13. 16 all staff stations on the standard and narrow gauge systems not already provided for	1,000	1,000
14. Taking down locomotive workshops and stores and power house at Kantara East, removing to Haifa, and re-erecting and ..	1,000	1,000
15. 16 new	1,000	1,000
16. 6 weight-bridges at £ K. 2,000 each ..	12,000	12,000
17. Erection of 5 chimneys at £ K. 1,000 each	5,000	5,000
18. Purchase of 100,000 wooden sleepers at £ K. 1 each	100,000	100,000
19. Purchase of printing machines, complete	1,000	1,000
20. Appropriation of land required for erection of future buildings, railway development, &c.	1,000	1,000

(B.)—STAFF Accommodation, Provision of Station Buildings and Goods Sheds

Item	Total Estimated Cost	Amount to be Spent during 1921-22
1. Housing senior staff ..	42,000	42,000
2. Housing	1,000	1,000
3. Housing	1,000	1,000
4. Housing	1,000	1,000
5. Housing	1,000	1,000
6. Housing	1,000	1,000
7. Housing	1,000	1,000
8. Housing	1,000	1,000
9. Housing	1,000	1,000
10. Housing	1,000	1,000
11. Housing	1,000	1,000
12. Housing	1,000	1,000
13. Housing	1,000	1,000
14. Housing	1,000	1,000
15. Housing	1,000	1,000
16. Housing	1,000	1,000
17. Housing	1,000	1,000
18. Housing	1,000	1,000
19. Housing	1,000	1,000
20. Housing	1,000	1,000

(C.)—PURCHASE of Broad Gauge Rolling Stock

Item	Number of Vehicles required	Type	Estimated Cost	Amount to be Spent during 1921-22
1. 1st class passenger coaches—	1	1st class, at £ K. 6,000 each	6,000	6,000
2. 2nd class, at £ K. 7,000 each	1	2nd class, at £ K. 7,000 each	7,000	7,000
3. Composite, 1st and 2nd class at £ K. 10 each	1	Composite, 1st and 2nd class at £ K. 10 each	10,000	10,000
4. 3rd class, at £ K. 5,000 each	1	3rd class, at £ K. 5,000 each	5,000	5,000
5. 1st class passenger vans—	1	For baggage, parcels and luggage, at £ K. 3,000 each	3,000	3,000
6. For mail sorting at £ K. 5,000 each	1	For mail sorting at £ K. 5,000 each	5,000	5,000
7. 6-wheeled saloons at £ K. 500 to be purchased from ..	1	6-wheeled saloons at £ K. 500 to be purchased from ..	500	500
8. converted at an extra cost of £ K. 200 each	1	converted at an extra cost of £ K. 200 each	200	200
9. 1st class, special type, for Jerusalem line at £ K. 12,000	1	1st class, special type, for Jerusalem line at £ K. 12,000	12,000	12,000
10. (15-ton) open flat waggon for vehicle ..	1	(15-ton) open flat waggon for vehicle ..	1,000	1,000
11. (11-ton) covered animal trucks at £ K. 1,000 each	1	(11-ton) covered animal trucks at £ K. 1,000 each	1,000	1,000
12. (15-ton) steel bogie covered goods ..	1	(15-ton) steel bogie covered goods ..	1,000	1,000
13. each	1	each	1,000	1,000
14. Purchase of narrow gauge rolling stock ..	1	Purchase of narrow gauge rolling stock ..	78,000	78,000
15. Total	1	Total	206,500	206,500

It is not intended to place this latter stock (item 13) on order until such time as a definite decision is reached concerning the ownership of Hejaz Railway rolling stock.

APPENDIX II

Public Works—Extraordinary

Item	Estimated Cost	Amount to be Spent during 1921-22
1. Construction of	1,000	1,000
2.	1,000	1,000
3.	1,000	1,000
4.	1,000	1,000
5.	1,000	1,000
6.	1,000	1,000
7.	1,000	1,000
8.	1,000	1,000
9.	1,000	1,000
10.	1,000	1,000
11.	1,000	1,000
12.	1,000	1,000
13.	1,000	1,000
14.	1,000	1,000
15.	1,000	1,000
16.	1,000	1,000
17.	1,000	1,000
18.	1,000	1,000
19.	1,000	1,000
20.	1,000	1,000

	£ E	L F
1 mast, Jaffa	125	
Improvement in port facilities, Jaffa ..	40	
1 dock office and 1 store room, Haifa ..	250	
Provision of gunnery lights, buoys, &c., ..		
Fishing craft, 4		
red iron sheds, customs, Jaffa ..	1,000	
Bait-El-gan-Belvoeth road	24,000	
Bridge, Aya, 20-metre span, Ferrieh ..	750	
" " 60-metre span, Sheikh Mansour ..	2,500	
Railway-Zion K. T, Belvoeth station to ..	10,000	
Belvoeth	8,000	
Wm and station roads, Zimzaph ..	10,000	
Hama-Sheikh Abu Akre road	15,000	
Bridge, Hafa-Jenna road	15,000	
Haifa-Reersbehn road	2,000	
Nethlehem-Hebbron road	2,000	
Jerusalem-Jordan road		
by bridges and culverts		
Survey southern road		
Latroon Wash Sarara road		
Eight 10-ton rollers		
Stone breakers		
Road plant, cauldrons, boilers, concrete ..		
mixers		
General and quarry plant		
Dumville trucks and rails		
Jerusalem water supply		
Haifa water supply		
Electricity supply		
Extension of Haifa jetty		
Widening of existing jetty		
Walls to foreshore reclamation		
Water and water supply to quarters and ..		
forest stations		
Construction		
Administrative buildings		
Haifa-Samaroth road		
Tarabous-Zamakh road		

APPENDIX III

Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones. Estimates 1921

CAPITAL Expenditure

4. Transferring wires from "AA" route to new railway route Kafa-Izdi
5. New magnetic telephone exchange, Jerusalem including installation
6. New magnetic telephone exchange, Jaffa
7. Six new magnetic telephone exchanges for small offices (including subscribers)

E 2209 522 88

No. 110

Law Officers to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)

My Lord, Law Officers' Department,
Royal Courts of Justice, February 18, 1921
WE were honoured with your Lordship's commands, signified to us in Mr. D. J. Osborne's letter of the 8th instant, requesting us to advise your Lordship whether, in view of the commercial treaties to which this country is a party, Imperial preference could be granted to Palestine.

We have taken the matter in our consideration, and in obedience to your Lordship's command have the honour to—

Report

That in our opinion it is impossible, in view of the commercial treaties with Italy and Portugal and of other treaties in similar terms, to extend to Palestine the preference to goods grown, produced, or manufactured in the British Empire.

Palestine would appear to fall within paragraph 4 of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and not within paragraph 6, and we think that Great Britain as a mandatory is in the position of a trustee of the League.

We have, &c

GORDON HEWART
ERNEST M. POLLOCK

[E 2351, 36 88]

No 111

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 22)

(No. 75)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 7, 1921

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 48 concerning the composition of the courts in Palestine for the trial of foreign subjects, and to enclose a copy of Rules of Criminal Procedure which have been drafted concerning the special treatment of foreign subjects in criminal cases. These proposals amplify the provisions contained in the Rules of Court issued by the Military Administration in regard to foreign subjects, of which I enclosed copies in the despatch under reference.

I should be grateful if you would inform me as soon as possible whether three draft regulations are approved, as it is desired to introduce a new Code of Criminal Procedure as soon as the promulgation of the mandate makes that step possible. The draft of the code will be sent to you in due course.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner).

E. KEITH ROACH II

Enclosure in No 111

Rules of Criminal Procedure

14 FEB 55 - 234.5 N

Note—The term "European subject" will be defined as follows:

" The expression ' European subject ' means any person who is the subject or citizen of a European State, and shall include all such subjects or citizens who, at the date of the coming into force of the Convention, are in the possession of the dominions of a European State, but shall not include—

1. Subjects of a State or Government protected by or administered under a mandate granted to a European State
2. Ottoman subjects
3. Persons who were formerly Ottoman subjects and were then protected by a European State, unless such persons have since become subjects or citizens of a European State

" Provided that subjects or citizens of an American State or of Japan shall be entitled to the like treatment and privileges as are by these regulations provided for or granted to European-"

"The term 'subject or citizen of a State' shall include corporations established in, and institutions wholly or mainly composed of the subjects or citizens of such State

- (2) Nevertheless, if in the course of the execution of a search warrant not issued by a magistrate or investigating officer of British nationality the person against whom the search is being made claims to be a person of British nationality and there appears to the person executing the warrant to be serious doubt whether such claim is well-founded he may proceed with the execution of the warrant.

"The Imperial War Graves Commission record their very deep appreciation of the generosity of the people of Palestine in presenting the permanent resting places of British dead, fallen in the war, the sites of British war cemeteries in that country."

Mr. Yellin suggested in this connection that a committee be formed, on which perhaps some members of Council might be willing to serve, to take charge of the interests of war graves in Palestine.

His Excellency said that the Government would bear this suggestion in mind.

A memorandum (copy attached) by Colonel Holmes on the Palestine railways was then read to the Council.

Tukan Bey pointed out that fares were recently increased because of the high cost of coal. The people of Palestine did not like this increase, and were now in many cases using carts for transport of goods, and preferred themselves to travel by automobiles which were cheaper than railways. Railway rates before the war were 2 millimes per kilom., they were now 5 millimes, and in view of the fact that the price of coal had decreased, the Administration should reduce railway rates to the previous level.

Tukan Bey also asked that the railway line between Messudieh and Nablus, and Nablus and Haifa should be put into better order. The trains used between these places were in a very bad condition, the carriages had no windows, and during cold and rainy weather passengers were exposed to the elements; the carriages were without lamps, and travelling by night was very inconvenient. Particularly uncomfortable were the various stations where passengers had no waiting rooms, and often had to stand for hours in the rain and cold.

He suggested that 1st and 2nd class carriages be introduced, as at present between Messudieh and Nablus there was only one class of carriage. He also asked that if possible a statement be made as to how many Palestinians were engaged as engineers and in other capacities on the railways, as he had heard that there were very few Palestinians so employed.

Mr. Herouti raised three points.

There were at present three large administrative departments at Haifa, at Ludd and Kantara. Would it not be possible to concentrate the three into one department at Jerusalem? Secondly, contracts were being given out without notice to, or knowledge of, the inhabitants of Palestine. All tenders for the railways should be given out through District Governors at least one or two months in advance.

Fares were very high, for instance the return 1st class fare between Jaffa and Jerusalem was 208 piastres, whereas under the old régime it was only 76 piastres. Goods transported from Egypt to Palestine cost half the rates charged upon goods sent from Palestine to Egypt. Furthermore, when the rates were increased the price of coal was 18l. a ton, but it was now 5l. per ton.

Mr. Yellin said that from the statement it was clear that the Administration was doing its best to improve the railways. Trains, however, should be made more comfortable, buffets, such as have already been opened on an inadequate scale at Ludd, opened at other stations, and dining cars attached to trains requested to cater for the special culinary needs of Moslems and Jews. The deplorable congestion at booking offices might be obviated by issuing 1st and 2nd class tickets from one office, instead of issuing 2nd and 3rd class tickets from the same office, as at present, if it was not possible to provide three separate booking offices.

Ludd was the junction of the Palestine railways, yet there were provided no sign posts indicating the various platforms from which trains left for all parts of Palestine, a defect which caused confusion to travellers.

There were no signs at Ludd in Hebrew.

Mr. Yellin said that the Administration was doing its best to improve the railways. Trains, however, should be made more comfortable, buffets, such as have already been opened on an inadequate scale at Ludd, opened at other stations, and dining cars attached to trains requested to cater for the special culinary needs of Moslems and Jews. The deplorable congestion at booking offices might be obviated by issuing 1st and 2nd class tickets from one office, instead of issuing 2nd and 3rd class tickets from the same office, as at present, if it was not possible to provide three separate booking offices.

Mr. Yellin said that the Administration was doing its best to improve the railways. Trains, however, should be made more comfortable, buffets, such as have already been opened on an inadequate scale at Ludd, opened at other stations, and dining cars attached to trains requested to cater for the special culinary needs of Moslems and Jews. The deplorable congestion at booking offices might be obviated by issuing 1st and 2nd class tickets from one office, instead of issuing 2nd and 3rd class tickets from the same office, as at present, if it was not possible to provide three separate booking offices.

The Administration was doing its best to improve the railways.

Could it be arranged to run a train from Haifa, at least two or three times a week, to meet the Jaffa-Jerusalem train at Ludd, and thus enable passengers moving between Haifa and Jerusalem and Jaffa to do so during daytime?

were the various points raised. Passenger rates had been increased to meet the actual running expenses of the railway, and were not any higher than the rates prevalent in Europe. The railway, judging by the revenue for January, would barely cover its expenses, and an immediate reduction in fares could not therefore be promised, but as soon as the effect of the reduced price of coal became perceptible every effort would be made to reduce them.

The statement that the majority of travellers used motor transport was not borne out by the figures of the latest returns, which show that passenger traffic had increased. The increased cost of running the railways was not only due to the cost of coal but also to the cost of living and the increased wages now being paid, and labour was three times denser now than before the war.

With regard to the question of the Nablus-Messudieh line, which had been dealt with in the memorandum, there was undoubtedly much room for improvement. It was difficult to supply lighting for the carriages on that line as the globes for the lamps had been made in Germany and Austria, and it had not been possible so far to obtain a fresh supply. An effort was now being made to secure a stock through the Crown Agents, and a consignment was expected shortly. All the stations of the Palestine railways had been badly damaged during the war, and the military authorities would not sanction the repair of these buildings. The High Commissioner had now approved certain capital expenditure, and repair to old stations as well as the building of new stations would now proceed.

It was not correct to say that the railways had large administrative offices in three centres. All railways must have district offices. However, the workshops at Kantara were now to be removed to Haifa, where all administrative work of the railways was being concentrated. It was always necessary to have the workshops at a port and not at such a mountainous place as Jerusalem.

All contracts of any importance had always been published in the press in Palestine and Egypt.

A buffet had just been opened at Jerusalem station, and a large buffet and restaurant are included in the new plans for Ludd station. It was also proposed to open a buffet and rest room at Haifa in order to deal with travellers coming from Syria.

The list of the names of the stations in Arabic and Hebrew was still under the consideration of the Government, and until it was approved they could not be put up.

Restaurant cars were run by a private company. Three new restaurant cars were on order, and would be ready at an early date. It was intended to put one on each through train and one on the Jerusalem service. Mr. Yellin's suggestion would be submitted to the company.

It was not quite correct to say that there was no goods station at Bechovoth. There was a siding specially erected at the request of the colony for goods traffic. It was the very best that could be done at the time.

The receipts from Bechovoth station in October were only 240l., in November 516l., in December 1,535l., in January 1,042l. When it was noted that the receipts were increasing the question of a station was considered, but the management of the railways must wait some little time to see if these receipts were merely due to the orange trade before it could ask the Administration to sanction the cost of building a station, which would be 5,000l.

With regard to the question of Palestinian labour on the railways, the figures could not be stated off hand.

Mr. Kalvarisky said that the promise made by Colonel Holmes that daylight trains would leave three times a week from Haifa, beginning on the 1st March, would be hailed with great pleasure by those using the railway.

He asked whether it would not be possible for people to take goods from the principal stations, which was a source of great inconvenience and expense.

Mr. Ben Zwi asked what was the condition of the workers employed on the railways, and what wages they received in the various grades. The memorandum of Colonel Holmes mentioned the difficulty of securing skilled workmen and experts, and it was known that formerly there were accidents which happily had not been repeated. The development and progress of these technical branches of the railway administration depended on a suitable wage being paid to the workmen.

Colonel Holmes said that there was no difficulty in sending consignments of goods

from any one station in Palestine to another, but passengers could not expect to convey freight by passenger train.

In answer to Mr. Ben Zwi, Colonel Holmes said that casual labourers employed on the railways received 15 piastres per day, and skilled labourers up to 90 piastres per day. The clerical staff was paid at the same rate as in other Government departments.

With regard to the question raised at the end of the last meeting of the Advisory Council by Dr. Habib Salim that a station be provided at Anebt, Colonel Holmes stated that since the 1st of January an arrangement was in force whereby the train stopped to pick up and put down passengers at this village.

In conclusion, Colonel Holmes said that he wished members would inform the public that the railway administration would always be glad to receive any complaints they have to make, and every effort would be made to deal with and remedy such complaints.

Mr. Berouti asked what had been the result of the efforts which his Excellency had made to improve the railway. His Excellency said:

"Palestine being in need of considerable capital expenditure to promote its development, the issue of a Government loan is contemplated to provide the funds that are required. The loan will not be issued, however, until the mandate for the development of railways, postal telegraph and telephone improvements, the building of roads, the improvement of harbours (large and costly harbour schemes must be dealt with separately), the cadastral survey, the erection of buildings for Government purposes, and the provision of funds to municipalities for water supplies, road construction and other town improvements. Most of this expenditure will bring its own direct revenue, from which interest and sinking fund on the loan will be paid. The remainder of the expenditure, which will bring in no revenue directly, will nevertheless, increase the general revenue in the country through promoting its development and prosperity. It is anticipated that interest and sinking fund can be paid on the whole of the loan without the necessity of imposing any fresh taxation upon the country."

The amount and terms of the loan are under discussion. All sections of the population of Palestine will be given an opportunity of contributing.

The provision of the large sums which this loan will make available is the first condition of the economic revival of the country. From this revival, every portion of the community will benefit."

The Council then discussed, in private, the question of the rates of taxation to be imposed upon home-grown and imported tobacco. A statement on this subject will be published in due course.

Sheikh Fereh Abu Muddien said he had been requested by the Bedouins of the district of Beersheba to ask the High Commissioner the following questions:

1. Whether the Bedouins were expected to pay the same taxes as the fellahs?
2. Whether the Bedouin custom which did not permit the appearance of women in a court of law would be observed?
3. Whether the Bedouins were expected to alter their customs?

His Excellency said that three weeks ago, he then stated to a gathering of all the Sheikhs that the Government had no intention of interfering with the ancient customs of the Bedouin people, and to that statement he adhered. He was not aware that Bedouin women had been summoned to magistrates' courts. Nor was the legal secretary aware of this fact. At the same time, it would be hard to deny admission to women who wished to enter the courts. The District Governor would be asked for a report on the matter.

With regard to the collection of taxes, the Administration recognised that different methods had to be adopted in different parts of Palestine, owing to different conditions, and no doubt the Revenue Department would bear these distinctions in mind with respect to the Bedouin population. The Administration much appreciated the part played by the Sheikhs of Beersheba in assisting the Government and they had been pleased, in response to the strongly urged requests of the District Governor,

to make them a better financial acknowledgement of their services than heretofore, particularly in view of the extent of the areas they had to administer.

Sheikh Fereh said they were very grateful to the Government for the financial assistance, but Bedouins did not value money, but the maintenance of their honour. The meeting then adjourned.

The next meeting was fixed to take place on Tuesday, the 8th March, 1921.

Enclosure 2 in No. 112

Memorandum on the Palestine Railways.

IN consequence of the efforts of the Turkish forces to reach the Suez Canal in the earlier part of the recent campaign, the employment of a considerable number of British troops became necessary, and owing to the lack of proper roads transport difficulties east of Kantara became insurmountable.

It was therefore decided to construct a standard gauge railway from the east bank of the Canal in the direction of Romani for the purpose of ensuring the regular despatch of supplies as well as to enable troops to be moved quickly to the forward area in the case of emergency.

The construction of the line began early in 1916, and fairly rapid progress was made as far as Romani (41 kilom.), which was reached in July.

On the 4th August, the Turks carried out an attack on the British forces near Romani, but had to retreat with heavy losses. This action delayed the laying of the line, but as soon as it was considered safe for the construction parties to go out again, the work continued without much interruption, and El Arish station (155 kilom. from Kantara) was opened in January, Rafa (200 kilom.) in March, and Belah (210 kilom.) in June 1917.

The determined resistance put up by the Turks at Gaza resulted in the construction of the line being held up for several months, and in the meantime the line from Rafa to Shalal was built for strategical reasons and was eventually extended to Beersheba.

When the line was extended to Beersheba, the line was quickly pushed forward to Ludd, and when the final rout of the Turkish forces took place in the latter end of 1918 it was decided to make Haifa the terminus of the railway.

Haifa (412 kilom. from Kantara), was opened for traffic in January 1919, and it has generally been accepted that the rapid construction of the railway was an exceptionally fine feat. In addition the line had been doubled between Kantara and Rafa.

The narrow gauge between Jaffa and Ludd had been pulled up by the Turks for the purpose of using the rails for the transport of supplies for the British forces. The line from Ludd to Jerusalem was also destroyed in several places and the bridges were blown up. In addition considerable damage was done to the rolling stock and other plant belonging to the old French railway company.

In consequence of the heavy military demands, it was found that the narrow gauge line, after it has been thoroughly repaired, could not cope with the traffic to be handled, and it was decided to extend the broad gauge line from Ludd to Jerusalem, and this work was completed in a very short time.

It will be seen from the foregoing remarks that the railway was built at tremendous speed, and although it sufficed for military purposes, it could not be considered as fit for permanent civilian traffic.

The severe winter of 1919-1920 sorely tested its strength, and it will be remembered that communications with Egypt were practically cut off for a period of three weeks. It became apparent that to make the line fit to handle the traffic of Palestine it would be necessary to consider a very large programme of reconstruction. This included the building of bridges and culverts, the lifting of the line over a large area, widening of cuttings, clearing of drains, and stone ballasting of the line throughout.

Estimates were got out for this work but no money was forthcoming until the arrival of the High Commissioner, who, immediately he arrived, sanctioned a sum of 100,000 to cover the initial expense of protecting the line from further washouts in the principal areas and the extension of the broad gauge line to Jaffa.

This work was immediately put in hand and I am glad to say twelve bridges

and twelve culverts have been built, and 37 kilom. of track well ballasted, also considerable quantities of earth have been handled in widening cuttings and clearing drains and raising banks above flood level, and it is hoped the line will withstand this winter's rains.

Prior to the armistice in 1918 it was practically impossible to undertake the handling of civilian traffic owing to the heavy military demands on the railway.

Subsequent to the armistice, however, through booked goods consignments were accepted in unlimited quantities.

It must be borne in mind that before the end of 1918 the line was operated practically throughout by soldier personnel, who became available for demobilisation within a short period after the cessation of hostilities, and in consequence of instructions issued by the War Office, were due for early return to the United Kingdom, as the railways in England were badly in need of their staff who had joined up for service. It became necessary therefore for the soldier personnel to be replaced by civilians, and great difficulty was experienced in obtaining men who had had previous railway knowledge.

There was a certain amount of material offering but it unfortunately meant that the majority of the staff engaged, although decidedly willing, had to be taught the work, and this proved to be a serious drawback to the progress of the railway.

In the interim, it was not possible to obtain the services of highly technical personnel from other railways, as the Military Administration was not prepared to

enable men to leave other permanent employment and accept temporary positions with this railway.

The lack of proper passenger rolling stock has been realised all through, and in December 1919 the War Office was requested to authorise two complete hospital trains, consisting of twenty-three coaches all told, to be converted into passenger coaches.

Sixteen of these coaches have already been placed in service, and the work on the remaining coaches, which has been held up owing to the scarcity of fittings, &c., is now in course of completion.

As the rolling stock, it has been necessary to retain a number of Egyptian State Railway coaches which were supplied during the war for the movement of troops and are of an old type.

The conversion of the Ludd-Jaffa section to standard gauge has proved to be of considerable benefit in the handling of goods consigned to and from Jaffa.

The ballasting of this section will be sufficiently completed within the next three or four months to allow of an acceleration in the time table.

Jerusalem station is now three times the size it was prior to the war, and apart from increased booking facilities being provided, modern lavatory arrangements and electric lighting are being installed.

The work of strengthening the bridges on the Jerusalem line to carry a heavier type of locomotive is now in progress, and it is anticipated that, after the end of February, it will be no longer necessary to have to change engines at Artuf, and that a great reduction in the time taken for the journey between Ludd and Jerusalem will be possible.

A standard gauge line is being laid from a point off the Jaffa line to the site of the Surafend Cantonment for the purpose of handling the army traffic for the troops that will be stationed there in the future.

A short line will be constructed in the immediate future from Kafr Jinnis to Beit Nabala for the purpose of conveying stone from the quarries at Beit Nabala for rebuilding the roads.

A line will also be constructed from Ras-el-Ain to Petach Tikvah to serve the requirements of the colony there, the cost being provided from private sources. It is also intended to lay a short line from Mejdol to Askalon in connection with the work of the Antiquities Department, and also to cater for the future tourist traffic.

As the railway is a passenger railway, it is essential that the country gets properly opened up.

Six locomotives of a special type have been ordered for work on the Jerusalem line on account of the heavy gradients and the sharp curves.

In February of last year a service of dining and sleeping cars was inaugurated, and these cars proved to be a great acquisition to the comfort of the travelling public.

A daily train service was instituted between Palestine and Egypt in November last, and it is intended as soon as further stock becomes available and if the traffic justifies the expense, to run an extra train later in the day on three days a week from Haifa to Ludd, and vice versa, in order to avoid passengers for Jaffa and Jerusalem lines having to pass the night at Kantara.

An arrangement has been made with the International Sleeping Car Company to provide a further number of dining and sleeping cars, and this will permit of the extra passenger train, which was put on in November last, having a dining and sleeping car attached to it, and if it is found that the traffic on the Jaffa-Jerusalem line warrants it a dining car will be put on to this service.

It is also expected that next winter the railway will be in a position to cater for the tourist traffic in far greater numbers than has been possible this year.

Considerable alterations are being made to the Ludd station in the shape of the construction of two island platforms with overhead cover.

There has been a shortage of first-class accommodation on the narrow gauge lines, and this has been entirely due to the fact that the passenger coaches captured from the Turks were in a very bad state of repair, and it has been extremely difficult to obtain the necessary material for their repair. It is expected, however, that first-class coaches will be available for both the Acre and Nablus services within the next few weeks.

In order to promote the exportation of oranges from Palestine to Egypt a considerable reduction has been made in the freightage rates.

The El Hersh railway bridge at Kantara was taken out of use at the end of December as the Egyptian State Railway was unable to handle the traffic of booked consignments have been handled by means of the truck transporter which is satisfactorily coping with the traffic.

Consequently upon the completion of the removal of the railway bridge it became necessary to build a new passenger station on the east bank of the Canal, and this involved the laying of 3 kilom. of line.

Although the fate of the bridge was not finally known until the end of November, the new station was brought into use on the 30th December, and is within 2 minutes' walk of the Egyptian State Railways' station at Kantara West.

The length of track operated by the Palestine railways (including the Kantara-Rafa section which is being operated on behalf of the army), is approximately 1,000 kilom.

The sections are as follows:—

Kantara-Haifa
Rafa-Beersheba
Jaffa-Jerusalem
Haifa-Acre
Haifa-El Hanime
Afula-Tulkarem
Mersudieh-Nablus

In order to economise in cost, arrangements are being made to discharge all colliers for the railway at Haifa and local labour is being employed as far as possible.

It is intended to move the locomotive workshops and stores from Kantara to Haifa in the near future, and this should afford considerable employment to Palestinians.

The provision of proper station buildings and goods sheds and accommodation for the staff is also being considered, and the necessary rolling stock is being ordered for sufficient passenger rolling stock to meet future requirements.

[E 2354 35 88]

No. 113

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 22)

(No. 83.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 12, 1921

I BEG to enclose herewith, for your information, the notes of a conversation I have had to-day with Auni Abdul Hadi, who was one of the Emir Feisal's principal officers in the Damascus Government.

I have &c

HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner

Report of Interview with Auni Abdul Hadi

I MET this morning Auni Abdul Hadi, who was the Emir Feisal's nephew, and who has lately been living in Egypt, and from there has been making a tour of the Arab cause in Syria, Palestine and elsewhere. He is now proposing to go to Transjordan to see Abdullah. It became apparent in the course of a long conversation that he was not at all in favour of the movement in Transjordan against the French, and that he was in fact, and I think rightly, disapproved by the British Government, as was stated in a proclamation we had issued to the people of Transjordan, moreover, I thought that if it resulted in an attack sufficiently numerous to repel such attack as would be made upon them in the south, and I therefore gave him friendly advice not to pursue it further. Abdul Hadi expressed deep disappointment of the Arabs generally, and the Sherrefian family in particular, that, after the part they had played in the war, the results were so unsatisfactory. The French had divided Syria into a number of separate States, and they had appointed very unsuitable local people to the principal posts of the Administration. It was impossible for the leaders of the Arab movement to sit still and accept the present situation. He expressed the hope that I would represent to His Majesty's Government the very strong feelings which they entertained in this matter, and that Great Britain would use her influence with the French to secure a change of the existing régime in Syria—which they could not possibly accept as a final solution. I expressed my sympathy for the Arab cause, and my own in desiring the welfare of the population of Syria, but in regard to Syria they had no such feelings and no such faith. I said that it was not a question only of the policy of His Majesty's Government, but that the French Government pursued an independent course, and that we could not be held responsible for the situation in Syria. I personally had always desired, and still desired, that there should be a friendly settlement between the French Government and the Arab nationalists, and I felt sure that His Majesty's Government would desire nothing better than to see such an arrangement, but it had to arise from the fact that the French Government was not prepared to do so.

We discussed subsequently the present situation in Palestine, and I explained the events with reference to my recent conversations with the members of the Arab Nationalist Conference that had met at Hama, with regard to which he had received information from them. He was of opinion that the political difficulties were largely arising from a misunderstanding on the part of the Arabs of the meaning of the term "Jewish National Home." Translated into Arabic the phrase really meant that Palestine was to be a Jewish National Fatherland, and the people consequently were convinced that the Arab population would be obliged to go elsewhere. He was personally of opinion that every effort should be made to enable Arabs and Jews to work in harmony, and that the desirable course would be to enable them to co-operate in practical measures. He had had a conversation in Egypt with Sir Alfred Mond, and the views which he had expressed on Zionism were unfounded. I said I would be glad to receive suggestions from him as to particular measures which he thought might be carried out with advantage in Palestine, and he said that he would be glad to write to me on the subject.

With reference to Transjordan, I pointed out the disadvantages that had resulted from the activities of Sherref Ali-bin Hussein at Amman and now at Salt. Before his arrival local Governments had been established and were working not unsatisfactorily, with the assistance of a small number of British advisers. A gendarmerie and a reserve force had been established, taxes were collected and progress was being effected in many directions. I had advanced substantial sums for the payment of the gendarmerie and the reserve force from Palestinian funds. Now, however, the presence of Emir Abdullah at Ma'an, and Sherref Ali as his representative at Amman and

had introduced confusion into the minds of the people. The tribes were refusing to acknowledge the authority of the local Governments was diminished, the number, nor was I disposed to continue making advances of money from Palestine funds for police and military forces which might be induced to take part in the movement against our Allies. Abdul Hadi said he was convinced that the Emir Abdullah was determined to do nothing which would be displeasing to the British Government, on whose approval and support he recognised that everything depended. He asked what steps I thought advisable to improve the present unsatisfactory position, and I said that if Sherref Ali withdrew to Ma'an I should view it without any dissatisfaction. He replied to this that the withdrawal of Sherref Ali would diminish the prestige of the Emir in that district, but possibly he might be withdrawn and someone else substituted. He would discuss the matter with the Emir, and in any case he would strongly urge that nothing should be done in Transjordan which would affect the authority of the local Governments. I would come and see me again on his return from Ma'an.

E 3102 117 89

N 114

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—Received March 10.

(No. 4.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 19, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that the French now appear to be seriously considering a modified unification of Syria.

As at present discussed, the project would entail the unification upon lines of a federation of Aleppo, Hama, Hama, Damascus, the town of Beirut, the Alawid district round Lattakia, and part of the Hauran.

It is at present proposed to leave the "Grand Liban," the Jebel Druze and the Druze Hauran outside this federation. Beirut would be the port of Syria, the eventual capital Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus and Baalbek (although the last is now in the "Grand Liban"), each has its partisans.

The "Grand Liban" would presumably be more nearly assimilated to a French colony than the federated States; and this policy would appear to involve a number of appointments of French officials to administrative posts in the federated States.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER

E 3105 117 44

No. 115.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 21, 1921.

WITH reference to the second and last paragraphs of my despatch No. 2 of the 18th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter addressed to G.S.I., Jerusalem and Cairo, by the British liaison officer here. I am too short handed here to have it copied.

As I have only instructions to forward his reports to G.S.I., I am sending only one of these latter would telegraph to G.S.I.

The French did not actually stop the caravan from leaving, but merely succeeded in frightening one man into staying behind, and the others into deciding to reach Kabeuse by a roundabout route. Both these changes of plan sound suspicious.

As a result, the guns, which probably are not a myth, were sent on to a rendezvous ahead, so that a formal search of the caravan here must prove fruitless.

Colonel Easton's attempts to telegraph south or telephone to Beyrouth were met by the statement that no wires were working, and the same reply was given to-day. As a similar inopportune break-down has occurred before, the coincidence struck me as

curious. I offered to send word to Beyrouth by special messenger, in the hope that Mr. Satow could get a message through to Haifa; for the information seemed so circumstantial as to call for some immediate action here.

Finally Colonel Easton decided to motor down to our wireless station at Haifa, and attempt to get through to Bagdad from there. He left at 2 P.M. to-day. He returned here, however, at 5 P.M., finding the roads too bad to proceed.

I had just heard previous to his return that the bridge south of Deraa had been blown up by Arabs, and that the train for the south had returned here. The line via Beyrouth is also reported down.

Under the circumstances I trust it will meet with your Lordship's approval that I should send a telegram in the hope that Mr. Satow can get word to Haifa in time. Should any future caravan attempt to leave, I consider it would be better not to ask for French intervention, but to appear ignorant of its intended departure, and try to inform Bagdad in time for the necessary measures to be taken from there.

Returning to Colonel Easton's report, while agreeing that it is useless to expect a Transjordanian remains the asylum for anti-French intrigues and worse, I must confess to some disappointment that the transfer of Major Somerset, their special *bête noire*, from Irbid to a district further removed from their frontier, has not had a more pronounced effect upon their attitude. Of course, I am not yet aware of what real grounds they have for their many vague accusations, e.g., that they have captured papers proving our complicity in attacks on them. If such documents are only of the ground. But it will not be easy to convince local French officials that the insertion of words such as "The English are in accord with us" is entirely irresponsible and unauthorized.

such a measure would be incurred equally by the French take this risk as easily as we can.

Note: The caravan is expected to take about fifteen days on the journey. It left on the 18th.

I have, &c

C. E. S. PALMER.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Report on the Situation in Damascus

THERE appears to be a renewal of Mesopotamian activities in Damascus. On the 18th, I was informed by Ibrahim Munir, of Bagdad, and Ibrahim Dulul, of Damascus. The following were reported as accompanying these: Diemil Medfahy (who brought the proceeds of the raid on Tel Afar to Kusa), Neji Suedi (one time Governor of Aleppo) and fourteen ex-Shereefian officers.

I asked for confirmation from the French Mission, and on the 15th heard that the caravans were due to leave, and that Medfahy, finding that his departure was known, was staying, but that Suedi and the officers were still going.

Eventually, on the 18th, the following left with the two caravans: officers, Neji Suedi, Abdullab Daleuny, Abdulattif Faishi, his brother Mohamed, Husayn Hashemy and brother, Ibrahim Shawry, Yusef Walby, Mohamed Saleh, Ali Mey'd, Captain Tawfic, Captain Ismail Sabri, who left the train of Mesopotamian officers for repatriation at the last minute and was one of the men whom Bagdad marked "not to be repatriated free."

ammunition. Rifles cost from £ T. 5-7 (gold), ammunition, 45 mugshehs (£ E. 7, per 1,000 rounds).

the principal agent for these arms is Yusef Hassamini, brother of Mond Pasha Hassamini, who procures the arms from the Kurdish quarter. These arms were, I found

out later, sent on with part of the caravan on the 13th to Dimeir, 60 kilom. east of Damascus, where they would await the arrival of the rest of the caravan on the 19th, so that although I asked the French to search the caravan, which they readily consented to do, it is doubtful whether they found more than the fifteen rifles for which I had

been issued a permit.

Munir, the above-mentioned camel-driver, told me a certain amount of a great number of lies, and he strictly denied the presence of any arms in the caravan, though he himself was carrying a Turkish 1914 rifle which had apparently been issued from store and which he had bought here.

The caravan carried a certain amount of propaganda, it is said, counselling acts hostile to the British, and letters for Abdel-el-Razak Bey, Ibn Fahd Pasha Sadat, brother of Ajumy Sadoun.

There are also at present in Damascus Yusef Suedi and El-Sayed-el-Sadr, a man of some influence with lower classes, who are said to be trying to organize a deputation to the British, and to be trying to organize a deputation to the British.

There are also at present in Damascus Yusef Suedi and El-Sayed-el-Sadr, a man of some influence with lower classes, who are said to be trying to organize a deputation to the British, and to be trying to organize a deputation to the British.

There are also at present in Damascus Yusef Suedi and El-Sayed-el-Sadr, a man of some influence with lower classes, who are said to be trying to organize a deputation to the British, and to be trying to organize a deputation to the British.

There are also at present in Damascus Yusef Suedi and El-Sayed-el-Sadr, a man of some influence with lower classes, who are said to be trying to organize a deputation to the British, and to be trying to organize a deputation to the British.

There are also at present in Damascus Yusef Suedi and El-Sayed-el-Sadr, a man of some influence with lower classes, who are said to be trying to organize a deputation to the British, and to be trying to organize a deputation to the British.

There are also at present in Damascus Yusef Suedi and El-Sayed-el-Sadr, a man of some influence with lower classes, who are said to be trying to organize a deputation to the British, and to be trying to organize a deputation to the British.

There are also at present in Damascus Yusef Suedi and El-Sayed-el-Sadr, a man of some influence with lower classes, who are said to be trying to organize a deputation to the British, and to be trying to organize a deputation to the British.

Agents in Bagdad are said to be: Fakhr Bey, of Hendar Khan quarter; Shair Said, brother of Abdel Wahab; Captain Hasan Fahmi, Mousir-el-Shahab, all of Buz-el Kerat quarter; Haj Abdel Razak, of Nouraba quarter; and Rashed-el-Sufiuk, Kadoun-el-Haddad and Abraham Argrouni.

As regards Damascus, the gun-running is supposed to be done by Ukeil Bedouni under the direction of Mohd Yusef Hassamini and Nour-el-Rumayh. The French are trying to collect arms and are imposing heavy fines on those without permits, therefore obviously to the advantage of those who have buried arms to save them from 60 or 70 rather than risk detection and death, or heavy fines.

It is not rational to expect the French to risk not only the lives of their men, but also attracting the hate of the Arab still more, by interfering with the export of arms, merely for the benefit of the British, who do nothing to give any hope of a better future. The French have the French camel corps to police the desert even if they wished to.

In Transjordan the British allow propaganda stating that the Arab is to attack the French, that the British are in agreement, and that large stocks of arms are hidden in Damascus to be used at the critical moment, whereas at the same time the British authorities expect the French to stop these arms leaving Damascus. The less arms in Damascus the more pleased the French will be, and with the best will in the world they cannot be expected to create special police and make special raids to prove it rather than against themselves, when the French can procure no satisfaction as regards the proper administration and control of Transjordan. A subject of much discussion at present is that of the unity of Syria. The French appear to have come to the conclusion that their policy of decentralization into vilayet administrations is not a success, and that a very strong central government is necessary. There are, however, no lack of candidates for such a position, and it is not clear which will be the capital, Damascus, Aleppo or some entirely new and unsuggested town.

It is fairly certain that the Grand Liban will remain outside this confederacy.

which lends colour to the belief that the French may eventually decide, once they have formed the "United Syria," only to lend military support to the Lebanon if the cry for economy in France proves too strong for them. The cry of "United Syria" will also be useful to them in turning the people's thoughts towards Palestine just at a season when racial troubles may be expected there.

The fall of Aintab has not had a strong moral effect here, the people believing that the French attitude towards me and any request I have to make continues to be most thoroughly cordial, and when sounded as to whether my further presence here after the arrival of Mr. Palmer, I have received assurances to the contrary, though naturally enquiries were made from an entirely unofficial point of view.

Communication remains unsatisfactory, on the 15th I tried to wire or telephone without success, again on the 19th I was unable to wire, and B.L.O., Beirut, was unable to hear me on the telephone, I therefore handed in my wire K. 52 to the French mess for transmission, though it is quite likely that this had to be sent by post as well.

N. EASTON, Lieutenant Colonel,
British Liaison Office

Damascus, February 20, 1921.

E 3108 117 89]

No. 116

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 23, 1921

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 21st instant, I have the

between the stations of Zetoun and Makarin on the Mezzeib-Haifa line east of Tiberias. The Arabs, who are said to have been some of Sherif Abdul's men, attacked them, and even some French troops sent later.

The bridge is a stone one, and one arch out of the three has been destroyed.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER

E 3109 117 89]

No. 117

Consul Satoru to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 33.)

My Lord,

Beirut, February 24, 1921

With reference to Consul Palmer's despatch No. 4 of the 19th February* from Damascus, I venture to express doubt whether it is at present in any way possible to forecast what will be done in this direction. The cry of a united Syria is so dissimilar that it is hard

It is of course certain that the recently created "Great Lebanon" (see Mr. Palmer's despatch No. 7 of the 19th February) is a new creation, with a view to retaining as much of its old privileges as possible. According to which the budgets of the Customs and certain departments of the Great Lebanon would be unified and henceforth dependent on the French Administration.

The present administrative division of Syria is Great Lebanon, State of Damascus, autonomous territory of the Alawites (from north of Latakia to Nahr-el-Kebir), and the Government of Aleppo. To these there is, as Mr. Palmer has reported, an inclination to add a Druse area. The frontiers between the districts are still to some extent provisional and liable to adjustment, and the whole arrangement appears to be an

* See No. 114.

attempt at greater administrative convenience. I doubt whether it will be radically modified at present. Beirut is of course now in the Great Lebanon. Whether it will maintain its position as a port is open to question. As other ports and railways are built it will have several serious competitors. At present a beginning is being made with the relaying of the railway from Tripoli to Hama.

The complaint as to the Great Lebanon being treated as a French colony and as to the appointment of French "conseillers" who practically control the Administration is not a new one. Mr. Fontana has dealt with it in several despatches, notably in his No. 11. It seems to me that the French Administration should be able to deal with such complaints.

I have, &c.

H. F. SATOW.

E 3142 117 89]

No. 115

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)

No. 11.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 25, 1921

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to report that the bridge destroyed by Arabs is said to have been destroyed by Mureiweh and his followers.

My source of information is the Director of Public Works in the Arab Government who had accompanied the French "délégué" and other notabilities from here to Derna to open a new civil hospital there.

Mureiweh was a follower of Faisal, who fled this city upon the French occupation, and was condemned to death by the French by default.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER

E 3345 117 89]

No. 118

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 28, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 11 of the 25th, I have the honour to report that Mureiweh was accompanied by Mahmoud Faour. The two had in all about 150 horsemen with them, and then split up into at least two sections.

Mureiweh, accompanied by about seventy, has since attacked and pillaged the village of Shagara in the caza of Kunetra, killed the headman (a Circassian), drove off cattle to the value of 5,000L., and took off as prisoners fifteen Syrian gendarmes.

I have the rest from an unimpeachable source.

French troops in an armoured train were hurried to the spot, and some fighting must have taken place, as about forty French wounded have been returned from Derna and admitted to the French hospital here. 450 Syrian volunteers, part of a local volunteer levy of 1,000 men collected in this town by the French some time ago, have now been despatched to the Kunetra caza.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER

E 3509 117 89]

No. 120

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 22.)

No. 15.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 2, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 28th February, I have the honour to report that Mureiweh and Faour's bands amounted in all to 300 men. The French have further despatched four companies of Senegalese and one field battery via Derna with the intention of clearing up the entire district. The raiders have already been

it is not considered safe yet to run trains

[6658]

[illegible]

No. 121

Lima Peru, March 2, 1934.

This draft Constitution is not the one drawn up by Fatah Khouri, referred to in my No. 3.

E. S. PALMER

Enclosure in No. 121.

Memorandum by Farhan Sharaif, presented to the French Delegate

* The President will represent the National Assembly, and must be not less than

(Seal of Farhan Sheraf of Karyat Tuna.)

(No date)

[E 3511/117/89]

No. 122

Conrad Palmer to Earl Curzon,—(Received March 22)

(No. 17)

Demascus, March 8, 1921

My Lord

The boundaries given below may also help to elucidate the draft boundaries of the projected independent Druse Emirate given in my No. 16 —

Boundaries of State of Damascus.

to Aleppo. Hama is thus within the Damascus zone.

Grand Llanos. In some spots the boundary follows the Aai River (Orontes).

Tillemans. For the rest of Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920
No. E 16081 4164 44

The following kame are therefore in the Damascus State —

The following names are therefore in the Damascus State
Deraa, Ezraa, Kuneitra, Wadi-el-Ajam, Zebdan, Damascus, Duma, Jarrud, Nebk,
Hama, Jib-el-Jarraih, Kuryatin, Iamur, Ma'ad, Safaryat, Al Hamra and the Jebel
Druse and the Druse Hauran, the kazas of which are: Sweida, part of El Mezmieh.

The Druse State—to be separated from the Damascus State—would include 130 Druse and ten Christian villages.

I have, &c
C E S. PALMER

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon. — (Received March 22.)

Massachusetts, March 5, 1911.

My Lord

Sixty-seven of them had also attacked the village of Fik, where they killed three persons.

My informant was the French general here.

In spite of the statement in paragraph 1 above, the British liaison officer at Beirut, while returning by night to Damascus from Tiberias in his motor-car in spite of warnings not to attempt the journey, was fired at by two or three men near Kaniha.

I have 24

S. PALMER

No. 124

Conant Palmer to Earl Curzon — Received March 20

Guatemala, March 7, 1921

Sheikh Ali Farhat of Dera, an agent of M. J. and Fakour, is stated to have visited Darnagan in disguise until to-day, and while here to have warned Fakour of the despatch of French troops to Derna.

Farver, who had been in that community, promptly returned into the Ajlun

My informant added that the Circassians round Kusaia are adopting an anti-French attitude; as also Emir Said el Jemrah of the Abdu Kader family—who had formerly been considered pro-French, and who is now at Zawieh in the Kusaia

Publishing

With reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 21st February the same informant considered that gun-running caravans for Mesopotamia were most likely to pick up their cargoes at Derna and Adra both of which are the principal ports of the Gulf of Suez. The Derna and Adra ports are of almost daily occurrence

I have, etc.

C. E. S. PALMER

No 125

Foreign Office to General Haddad Pasha.

Foreign Office, March 23, 1921.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to refer to your conversation with Mr. Lindqvist on the 13th March wh. also said that the Government and the Turkish Nationalist delegation by which Urfa and Antak were to be ceded to the Ankara Government, you handed to

2. In reply I wish to point out that the frontier between Turkey and Syria is defined in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and will only become effective on the entry into force of that instrument, which has not yet been signed by all the Allied and Associated Powers.

3. With the coming into force of the Turkish Treaty, France, as guarantor for Syria, will be responsible for the integrity of the territory covered by the terms of her Treaty with the Ottoman Empire. The interests of the H. Majesty's Government are not directly concerned in the matter.

1 am. &c.

LANCLOT OLIPHANT.

No. 126

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 26.)

Le 10 Mars, au cours d'un entretien avec l'Ambassadeur de France, M. de Courmoult, Comte Curzon of Kedleston a bien voulu rappeler les efforts faits à diverses reprises par le Gouvernement britannique pour empêcher le Prince Abdallah de se maintenir dans la zone placée sous mandat français et d'abstenir de toute intrigue dans la zone placée sous mandat français et plus particulièrement au Haïman. M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères avait même ajouté que l'intervention du Roi Hussein venait d'être provoquée à cet effet.

L'Ambassadeur de France a été heureux de porter ces informations à la connaissance de son Gouvernement.

M. Brund s'y est montré fort sensible. Il a toutefois invité le Comte de Saint Venant de lancer à ses frères syriens une proclamation faisant appel à leurs sentiments de "solidarité musulmane pour lutter contre les colonisateurs français" coupables d'avoir "mis en un moment le trône éché par la Syrie sur une politique de rapprochement et d'amitié envers tous les peuples sans distinction".

... donnent les renseignements les plus fantaisistes tant sur les forces réelles dont dispose l'Émir Abdullah que sur les événements diplomatiques...

Le Gouvernement britannique auprès de l'Emir Abdullah n'a pas jusqu'à présent donné de résultats appréciables.

de résultats approximatifs.

En présence de ces actes caractérisés d'hostilité, le Gouvernement britannique a dû, pour la préservation de la réputation qui nous fait à l'étranger, prendre des mesures de précaution. Le Gouvernement britannique ne peut pas se permettre de laisser croire que les intérêts de la Grande-Bretagne en Syrie et au Liban sont en danger. Les populations indiennes de ces pays ne seraient pas en mesure de comprendre la situation et pourraient interpréter comme une preuve de divergence dans la politique suivie par la Grande-Bretagne en Orient.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire sénat., etc.

Ambassade de France, Londres
le 25 mars 1992

No. 127

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30)

Damascus, March 9, 1921

My Lord.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a sketch of the system of administration now in force in the State of Damascus.

Every Syrian employee must have the approval of the French mission before definite appointment.

In spite of the number of high officials, the departmental staffs have been reduced, and it is claimed that the system is more economical than previously.

Censorship—It must be noted that there is a strict postal censorship in Damascus and passengers on the train made to be searched to see if they are carrying letters. There is also a press censorship.

The French civil and military missions are still paid from the French military budget.

There is no election by suffrage to posts in the Arab Administration. The Governor is appointed by the French, and he sits on the Council of the Government, or "Medjliss-el-Mudara". There are no longer styled Ministers, but Directors-General, and correspond to the old departmental heads of a vilayet. Each head draws up his departmental budget which is submitted every three months to the Finance Department, which the French Consul-General considers.

The Governor has under him an Inspector ("mufettish"), some of whom are important, e.g. —

Inspector of Police Department: Sheikh Ibrahim Fubeich, and director of 3rd Division of Public Security. He is also Director of the Secret Police and in close touch with the French mission, and was appointed directly by the latter.

Inspector of the Justice and Correspondence: Sam-el-Aza.

Postal Censor: a cousin of the Governor.

Inspector of the Justice and Correspondence: Sam-el-Aza.

Postal Censor: a cousin of the Governor.

Inspector of the Justice and Correspondence: Sam-el-Aza.

Postal Censor: a cousin of the Governor.

Inspector of the Justice and Correspondence: Sam-el-Aza.

Postal Censor: a cousin of the Governor.

(C)—The Collateral French Organisation.

Délégué of the High Commissioner and head of both sections of the French mission here: Commandant Catroux.

1. Civil Section.

Head of mission and Conseiller for Interior: M. S. [unclear]

Conseiller for Agriculture and Commerce: M. Flan [unclear]

(The two above are *de carrière*.)

Conseiller for Finances: M. M. Rind.

Conseiller for Justice: M. Sironx (a Beirut lawyer).

Conseiller for Public Works and Municipal Affairs: Commandant Veyrier.

Conseiller for Sanitary Affairs: Colonel Delmas (Chief Medical Officer of the 3rd French Division here).

Conseiller for Beaux-Arts: a M. Feyrolle is expected some time.

French Inspectors—

Police: M. Carrette.

Public Debt: M. Wagner.

(By "Public Debt" I refer to the old Ottoman Public Debt.)

Military Section

A French Colonel of the 3rd Division is attached to the French mission here as a liaison officer between the French and the Turkish military authorities.

French Major General: M. de [unclear]

French Captain: M. de [unclear]

Legal Affairs and Courts-martial: Captain Maure.

Finance and Comptabilité of the Mission: Lieutenant Fouchet.

It will be seen that there is a French conseiller for each Arab Department, and

A somewhat awkward situation is created by the presence of Major General Goylet, commanding the 3rd French Division, as the French délégué has only the rank of major in the military hierarchy.

I have, &c.

G. E. S. PALMER.

Note.—There are also—

A French commissaire for the Hedjaz Railway (the portion within the Damascus State): Captain du Cree de Villeneuve.

A French commissaire for the Damascus-Hamah Prolongement Railway: Commandant Cauvin.

A French inspector of the Post and Telegraph Department: M. Fayard.

(A.)—Organisation of the State of Damascus.

Three mutessarifiats, or liwas.

Damascus, which has five cazas: Duma, Jerud, Nebk, Zeldani, Wadi-el-Ajam Kuneitra).

Hama, which has three cazas: Keryatin, Jeli-el-Jarrah and Tadmor (Palmyra).

Hamah, which has two cazas: Salim and Hamrah.

Each caza (under a kaimakam) and mutessarifat has a Court of First Instance and a Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal is at Damascus (of. my No. 13 of the 28th February).

The taxes and revenues will form the subject of a separate despatch.

(B.)—Arab Administration

Governor ("Hakim Mukataat-en-Sham"): Hakk Bey-el-Azem.

1. Directors-General ("Mudir Aam"):

Interior: Ata Bey-el-Ayoubi.

Justice: Badi Bey-el-Mouayad.

Finance and Revenue: Hamdi Bey En-Nasr. (Replaces old defterdar of vilayet.)

Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works: Dr. Chakir Kaim. (A former dragoman of this consulate.)

Education: Mohamad Bey Kurd Ali. (Also Press Censor.)

Military Affairs: Nassuh-el-Boukhari.

2. Medjliss-el-Shura—

President: Sheikh Abdul Mohsen Effendi Estouani (acting).

Members: Asad Bey Hardar, Emur Taher-el-Jezzerli, Sheikh Abdul Kader Khatib, Nejem Eddin Bey-el-Droubi, and Amin Bey-el-Hachimi (secretary).

The Mutessarif of Damascus ("Merkaz") is Shakir Bey-el-Hambaki. There is also a mayor and town council and a mudir, or "Rais el-Ulama" (Mohammed Saïd Bey Boukhari), who has a post similar to the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople.

There are further mudirs (directors of lesser rank):—

Police: Hamdi Bey-el-Jelad.

Consular Service Bureau: Halim Harfouch. (Formerly Foreign Relations.)

Public Health: Dr. Aractingi. (Also director of the St. Louis French Civil Hospital.)

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 24.)

My Lord,

REBEL RING. I have the honour to report that the actual leader of the attack on the village of Shagara was Sheikh Abdullah of the Naum tribe, though Mureweed was with him. The village was a K... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported.

The Naum tribe has its encampments in the Kunetra district. I have been informed that the Naum tribe has been in the habit of attacking the British... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. No. 18 of the... was... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported.

My Druze informant added, with reference to my No. 16, that upon enquiry believed that Tadmor was also a likely place for... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported.

It may be of interest to add by way of... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. These confirm information supplied me some weeks previously by this Druze in nearly every particular.

I have, &c

C. E. S. PALMER.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30.)

N

M

I HAVE the honour to report the following information which has reached me from Druze sources —

1. Sherief Abdullah has transferred his camp from Maan to Amman, which town the British representative promptly left.

Abdullah... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. My informant... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. The Naum tribe has been in the habit of attacking the British... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported.

2. Sherief Nuzar... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. Look the opportunity... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. A letter to... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported.

There are also intrigues in his favour in the Merj Ayoun.

3. Abdullah has sent letters to Nabih Azmah... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. W... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported.

4. Abdullah... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. The Naum tribe has been in the habit of attacking the British... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported.

His cousin K... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. Volunteers to... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported.

5. Abdullah... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported. The Naum tribe has been in the habit of attacking the British... of the Naum tribe, as previously reported.

6. Abdullah is not giving any regular pay to his followers, but has promised to reward them with the spoils of Damascus, and meanwhile makes them a daily *largesse*.

I have, &c

C. E. S. PALMER.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30.)

Il résulte d'une information émanant de Jérusalem, que le Haut-Commissaire britannique du mandat palestinien aurait décidé, en invoquant des raisons d'intérêt public, de suspendre l'exploitation des tabacs concédés à la Régie cointeressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman par le Gouvernement ottoman et la Dette publique ottomane, et que le Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté aurait l'intention de contester la validité de la concession du 4 août 1913, sur laquelle est basée l'exploitation dudit monopole.

2. Le Gouvernement français admet parfaitement que, pour des raisons d'intérêt public, les autorités ottomanes puissent suspendre l'exploitation des tabacs en vertu de l'article 311 du Traité de Sèvres, bien que ce dernier ne soit pas entré en vigueur; toutefois, si cet article doit être appliqué, il doit l'être intégralement. Or, les alinéas 3 et 4 dudit article ont prévu, pour estimer les dommages subis par les sociétés en cas d'annulation de leurs contrats, la constitution d'un tribunal arbitral, qui, "jugant en droit et en équité, devra prendre en considération tous les éléments d'appréciation sur la base du maintien avec réadaptation du contrat." Ce n'est donc pas au Gouvernement du mandat britannique à décider si l'acte de concession du 4 août 1913 est valable ou non — c'est au tribunal arbitral, prenant en considération "tous les éléments d'appréciation".

3. Le Gouvernement de la République, considérant la Régie cointeressée comme un de ses ressortissants, serait en droit de protester contre la suspension immédiate du monopole; il serait d'ailleurs amené à le faire au cas où Sir Herbert Samuel persisterait dans son refus de s'en remettre intégralement à un tribunal arbitral pour se prononcer sur tous les éléments du litige.

4. En l'espèce, les décisions à intervenir ont des conséquences qui dépassent la portée des intérêts purement privés, étant donné que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane est intéressée dans l'exploitation de la Régie des Tabacs et qu'elle est en droit, au nom des porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans, de veiller à un règlement équitable de cette affaire.

5. L'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de porter ces faits à la connaissance de M. le Comte Curzon de Kedleston, et lui serait reconnaissant de vouloir bien lui faire connaître le plus tôt possible la réponse du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté au sujet de cette question.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire avertit, &c

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 29 mars 1921

CHAPTER IV.—MESOPOTAMIA

E 2611 576 931

No. 131

Earl Curzon to Mr. Duns

Foreign Office, February 28 1921

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 25th inst. in relation to the application, in territories of State of the United States Government, relative to the application, in territories placed under mandate, of the principles of equality of treatment and opportunity and referring more especially to the petroleum resources found in the Near East. His Majesty's Government are pleased to observe that the United States Government appreciates the general policy adopted by His Majesty's Government in territories under military occupation. I note, however, that Mr. Colby makes certain observations with regard to the San Remo Petroleum Agreement which appear to indicate that the scope of that agreement is not fully understood.

2. The co-operation of British and French interests in regard to oil production in the Middle East was first discussed in the early part of the year 1919 by the British and French Governments. It was then decided that French interests might be given some participation in the production of oil in various regions. The proposal was then carefully considered, and it was found possible to come to an agreement based on the principles of mutual co-operation and equality. The British and French interests were equally considerable and of the same kind. The agreement aimed at no monopoly or exclusive rights, and could only become effective if its application conformed to the general interests of the region.

As regards the provisions in the agreement relating to Mesopotamia, the subject of a concession granted before the war by the Turkish Government to the Turkish Petroleum Company. The position of such concessions in territory detached from Turkey is expressly safeguarded by articles 311 and 312 of the Treaty.

Prior to the war the position in regard to the Mesopotamian oilfields was as follows:—

The concessions for all the oilfields of the two vilayets (provinces) of Mosul and Ispahan were bestowed by the ex Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1904. The British Government was not acquiring any oil rights in these particular districts. This situation was so far admitted and recognized that in 1904 the Anglo-Turkish Railway Company, nominally a Turkish Company, but in reality a German concern, was authorized by the British Government to carry out preliminary surveys of the oilfields and secured the option for their development on joint account.

4 The Civil List in 1900, considering the agreement with the Anatolian Company at an end, entered into negotiations with a British syndicate for the purchase of the Anatolian Company. The negotiations were conducted by the Ministry of Finance, to which Department the Memorandum in 1900 was submitted. The negotiations were concluded in 1901 and the company was sold to the British syndicate for the sum of £1,000,000.

5 In 1912 endeavours were made by German interests to secure the formation of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation, Ltd. (T.P.C.), a joint venture between the Anglo-Berberian Petroleum Company, Ltd. and the British Petroleum Company, Ltd. The object of pursuing the matter and of widening the scope of their activity in oil operations in other parts of the Turkish Empire, they formed a British limited

liability company called the Turkish Petroleum Company (Limited), the capital of which was partly British and partly German.

6. This development was succeeded by a series of negotiations entered into between the British group and members of the Turkish Petroleum Company for the amalgamation of the rival interests and for pursuing jointly the application before the Turkish Government for the grant of a concession for the Mesopotamian oilfields. These negotiations, in which the British and German Governments took an active interest, terminated in the early part of 1914, when an agreement was reached for the fusion of the interests of the original Turkish Petroleum Company and of the original British group in the new Turkish Petroleum Company. This agreement was signed not only by the parties immediately interested, but also on behalf of the British and German Governments respectively. The German share in this new company was fixed at 25 per cent.

7 In consequence of this arrangement, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was able to make the necessary representations to the Turkish Government for the grant to the Turkish Petroleum Company of the oil concessions in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad, while representations of the same nature were made simultaneously to the Porte by the German Ambassador. The negotiation between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government was not confined to the question of the Turkish Petroleum Company, but covered a wide field and involved mutual concessions of very material importance. As a result the Turkish Government, on the 25th June, 1914 through the Grand Vizier, informed His Majesty's Ambassador, in an official communication, that the Turkish Ministry of Finance having been substituted for the Civil List in the matter of the petroleum deposits known or to be discovered in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad, had consented to lease the said deposits to the Turkish Petroleum Company, Ltd., on the following terms:—The Turkish Government was to retain a share in the enterprise as well as the terms of the contract. I should add that during the war the German interests in the company were liquidated, and thus came into the hands of His Majesty's Government.

5. From the facts as narrated, it will be seen that the Turkish Petroleum Company's right to the lease of the oilfields in the two vilayets rests on an official undertaking given by the Turkish Government to the two Governments concerned after prolonged diplomatic negotiations. In the circumstances the oil rights in the vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul cannot be treated merely as a matter of abstract principle or without reference to the special character of the negotiations which preceded the war. Had no war supervened, and had Mesopotamia remained till now under Turkish rule, the exploitation of these oil deposits would long since have begun. It can hardly be contended that His Majesty's Government should now question the validity of an undertaking granted by the Turkish Government in return for consideration received. And I may add, since the United States Government will reasonably expect His Majesty's Government to recognize the rights acquired by the Standard Oil Company in Mesopotamia from the Turkish Government that those rights which are based entirely on the grant of a prospecting licence are no stronger than the rights of the Standard Oil Company in the United Kingdom. The United States Government had definitely undertaken to transfer a valid and already existing concession

9. In this connection I feel bound to remind you that the attitude of the United States Government in suggesting that His Majesty's Government should disregard the rights acquired by the latter in the oil properties in Mexico is in direct conflict with that adopted by the United States Government in regard to similar United States interests in oil properties in Mexico. For instance, in his letter of the 25th November, 1920, to M. Posqueira, the Mexican representative in Washington, Mr. Colby expressed particular satisfaction at the statements made in M. Posqueira's letter then under reply to the effect that President de la Huerta and President-elect Obregon had declared that article 27 of the new Mexican Constitution "is not, and must not be, interpreted as retroactive or violative of valid property rights."

10 It will be seen from the above facts that the acquisition by the French Government of the Turkish Petroleum Company represents the allotment to the French Government of the former German interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company in return for facilities by which Mesopotamian oil will be able to reach the Mediterranean. The agreement, so far as it relates to Mesopotamia, may therefore be said to be the adaptation of pre-war arrangements to existing conditions, and in this respect His Majesty's Government, far from acting in any selfish or monopolistic spirit, may reasonably claim to have consulted the best interests of the future Arab State. Neither the rights of the

Turkish Petroleum Company nor the provisions of the San Remo Oil Agreement will preclude the Arab State from enjoying the full benefit of ownership or from prescribing the conditions on which the oilfields shall be developed.

11. I have not failed to observe the large amount of public attention directed to the reported resources of Mesopotamia, which, Mr Colby states, furnish a peculiarly critical test of the good faith of the nations which have given their adherence to the mandate principle. Apart from the fact that these resources are as yet entirely unproved, I can discern nothing in this principle which compels the mandatory Power to discriminate against its own nationals, who, after years of arduous negotiation, secured certain rights, and would, but for the war, have long since been actively at work, in order to afford an equal opportunity to other groups which before the war were not actively concerned in the petroleum resources of Mesopotamia.

12. I have noted with interest the allusions which Mr Colby makes to the estimates which have been framed of the distribution of the petroleum resources of the world. While I agree that such calculations are of subsidiary importance in this connection, I think it is worth noting that the United States possesses only one twelfth approximately of the world's petroleum resources, but I may be permitted to point out that in 1919 the chief geologist of the United States Geological Survey stated that "the criteria on which such estimates can be based vary in every degree of inadequacy in the different regions," and he was then referring to estimates dealing with the United States only, and was not taking into account the infinitely more problematical resources of countries still partially or wholly unexplored, from a geological standpoint.

13. Mr Colby's statement that the United States controls a home production of petroleum which, whether it is about to reach its maximum point or not, is actually and potentially vast, while in neighbouring countries it possesses a predominant interest in oil-bearing regions of the world, is a statement of the existing situation admits of no dispute.

14. While the potentialities of the future are necessarily problematical, the undisputed fact remains that at present United States oil produces 70 per cent, and American interests in adjoining territory control a further 12 per cent, of the oil production of the world. It is not easy, therefore, to justify the United States Government's insistence that American control should now be extended to resources which may be developed in mandated territories, and that too at the expense of the subjects of another State who have obtained a valid concession from the former Government of those territories.

15. His Majesty's Government are, nevertheless, glad to find themselves in general agreement with the contention of the United States Government that the world's oil resources should be thrown open for development without reference to nationality. I observe, however, that by article 1 of the Act of the Philippine Legislature of the 31st August, 1920, participation in the working of all "public lands containing petroleum" is reserved to the United States or of the Philippines, and I cannot but regard this enactment as in contradiction with the general principle enunciated by the United States Government. It is true that Mr Colby does not attempt to refute the statements contained in my note of the 9th August last concerning the action taken by the United States Government to prevent the exploitation by British interests of such resources in Haiti and Costa Rica.

16. In your note of the 26th July the attention of His Majesty's Government was called to the existence of reports to the effect that the officials charged with the administration of Tanganyika territory have accorded privileges to British nationals that have been withheld from other nationalities. It is true that there were some reports of controversy that I recall this matter to your attention, but rather from the conviction that misunderstandings between our two countries over oil questions, and indeed our present correspondence, are largely due to the spirit engendered by reports of precisely this nature, which, on dispassionate examination, can frequently be found to lack any basis of truth. In the absence of official reports, which the United States Government were requested to furnish, I can only express my regret at being unable to prove positively that the reports quoted by you are based on misapprehension.

I have, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

CHAPTER V.—ADEN AND ARABIA.

B 455 455 91 J

No. 132

Acting British Agent, Jeddah, to Earl Curzon — (Received January 10, 1921)

(Secret.)

My Lord

Jeddah, December 21, 1920

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 20th December, 1920.

Copies of this report have been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt, and his Excellency the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

I am, &c

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.

Acting British Agent

Enclosure 1 in No. 13

Jeddah Report covering period December 11 to 20, 1920

Local Situation.—Since the submission of my last report further developments of the situation created by King Hussein's action in the matter of refusing to recognise certain foreign passports, and in regard to the case of the imprisoned British subjects, have been reported to your Lordship in the two telegrams dated the 11th and 14th December, respectively.

2. King Hussein took the opportunity, in replying to my remarks on the anonymous letter resiling him as being under foreign domination, and for having betrayed the Arabs, to refer to events in Syria as fully justifying such accusations, and contradicting solemn agreements and oaths.

Concerning the accusation of interference in the internal affairs of the present moment against the interests of my Government, and stating that his rules were in complete accordance with our own as to passports and national status.

King Hussein, in his reply, stated that he hoped that in a very short period everything would be settled in one of two ways, either of which would place him in a position to state that he might write a line to His Majesty's Government the result of which was not hidden from me.

I was not however to think that this was in the nature of a threat such as my intimation to the kaimakam of Jeddah that if necessary the Soudanese subject claiming my protection would obtain it.

3. In a postscript, in his own handwriting King Hussein stated that his letter was not written with any object or from fear of "Never-Never" but from a feeling of the results of which will appear in a short time, and from personal disagreements and preserving all honour.

The above letter, which was written under stress of circumstances, and to which I made due allowance, was to have been transmitted by the hand of Alkhalaf, but he was unable to do so, and the letter was not sent until the following day.

4. I was recently asked for an interview that night, but at the last minute telephoned that I was unable to do so, as I had been informed that I was ill, and that my illness was an excuse.

5. Certain portions of the above letter, which I had read and found that King Hussein has been attempting to repeat his tactics at the time of the difficulties raised by him over the quarantine. Three incidents which I had not otherwise intended to enlarge on, and which occurred within a few days of each other, confirm this view.

A completely baseless accusation was made that the customs police boats watching the harbour had been maliciously cut adrift from the gangways at the time the matter was investigated at once, before the Director of Customs had time to communicate with the British Consul. The British Consul had no knowledge of the matter. The Director of Customs, who I had the afternoon of the 11th, requested to the gathering of the British Consul, the Director of Customs a registering and the same day, the British Consul had been due to a mistake.

The same captain who had already been searched in a previous

with the local rules when leaving shore, the necessity for compliance with these rules having been notified previously by the agency to all captains of British ships calling at Jeddah. The captain, having already been searched and not understanding Arabic, told him to go away in Hindustani and boarded the launch. The man thereupon seized hold of the launch, still shouting, and ordered the rials to stop, in spite of my officer's order to proceed.

Fortunately this officer behaved with commendable discretion and got the launch away without any incident. I received within a few hours a protest that one of the customs officials had been interfered with in the normal execution of his duty, and had been beaten on the quay by an officer of the agency.

Although there was every justification for doing so, I had not intended taking any action after the report from my officer, in view of the undesirability of giving King Hussein any opportunity, however trivial, of forcing unpleasant incidents on the agency and taking advantage of them, as on a former occasion.

This accusation could not, however, be allowed to pass, and pointing out that the staff should not be subjected to such treatment, I requested through the kaimakam an apology from the Director of Customs for the conduct of his subordinate in laying hands on and attempting to stop the launch, when I would consider the matter closed.

The Director of Customs has repeated the accusation in none too polite terms.

He is King Hussein's favourite and right hand man, and it may be taken as certain that the above incident, when coupled with others, was not accidental. The subordinate would never have dared to act as he did without instructions from his superior.

Finally, the agency medical officer was asked to go round to a house to inspect some curio. He was taken upstairs and shown into a room, which he had no sooner entered than loud cries of "Nasran!" were raised below. The only occupant of the room was a Christian.

4. On the following day I was informed that the local Passport Committee was satisfied that the Sudanese referred to above, who had been detained for over three weeks, was a British subject, and would be permitted to return to Suakin.

Happily nothing further transpired as to my medical officer.

While being averse to laying undue stress on seemingly trivial incidents, I considered it advisable to report the above fully, as an indication of the conditions which may be expected to continue until it is impressed on King Hussein that if he expects to be treated as the ruler of an independent State and to possess the privileges due to his position as such, there are certain obligations and courtesies incumbent on him and his officials in dealings both with the subjects of other States and their representatives in Jeddah.

5. The two unjustly imprisoned British Indians were again brought before the mahkama, and told they would be released if they accepted a new judgment entailing payment of two-thirds of the present maintenance ordered.

They refused to accept the jurisdiction of the court, stating they were British subjects, and asked that the case be referred to their consul.

In order to obtain their release, I advised them privately to agree without future prejudice to their case.

They accordingly borrowed the money, paid it into court, and were released.

I am informed the court ordered that this sum was due for the period already spent in confinement, and that future sums due were to be paid, during the absence of their father, to an agent appointed by him.

Subsequent to their release I received an intimation from Mecca that these men were Hachimite subjects, having been born in the Hedjaz, and questioning my intervention in the case at all.

I had been careful both in writing and in telephoning to Mecca, to refer on each occasion to these men as British subjects. This was the first intimation in over five weeks, in replies from the King or officials, that they were not recognised as such.

The Government was accordingly furnished with documentary evidence (of which King Hussein was already well aware) as to their status.

6. A telegram in clear stating that H.M.S. "Clematis" was due at Jeddah was received on the 15th December.

The Sudanese left the same evening without any trouble. H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 17th.

Recent incidents and the King's attitude and actions as affecting foreign rights had been keenly followed and discussed, and the visit appears to have had a markedly

King Hussein having at the last moment given way, and as it was hoped this would be the last of the kind for some time it was agreed that it was not desirable for H.M.S. "Clematis" to prolong her stay and thus excite comment. She sailed for Port Sudan and Aden on the 19th.

The news of the departure of the ship was somewhat double-edged, and the ship was given a handsome present of supplies.

7. The general question of the rights of foreign travellers and residents remains the same.

Subjects are not recognised as such if born in the country or possessing papers issued or renewed since the outbreak of war.

There are grounds for hope that he may have now realised the unwisdom of his behaviour, in the somewhat changed tone of his present communications to me, and of his action on larger issues.

GENERAL

Ibn Saud.—There are many rumours as to a large force having begun to assemble in the neighbourhood of Asherah.

Spread of Wahabism in the Hedjaz. Enquiries made during the last few months tend to show that secret adherence to Wahabism is on the increase. Two-thirds of the population of Jeddah and about half of the latter class are said to be in sympathy. The outlying villages have been openly so for some time.

As regards motives, there is no doubt that the desire to be on the safe side in the event of invasion, but other motives—and this applies especially to Mecca and Jeddah—are genuine disgust with malpractices such as have tended to exist at the centres of all religions, and a reaction against the present state of affairs under King Hussein.

It is probable that should any general invasion of the Hedjaz take place the hope of the Mudawana would risk extermination.

Although the matter was carefully explained, King Hussein chose to insist on his right to the control of his own customs.

The report returned to Cairo under cover of the usual letter given at the King's request, to his nephew Sherif Jussuf, who is in the Hedjaz, is being obtained from Egypt.

The ex-Russian colonel, who is still in Mecca, is now confirmed from India as en route for the Crimea.

The current rate being somewhat over 8. This was possibly due to his order of £1 24 000 (paper) for 24 000 peregrines, which he had ordered for himself and servants. Confirmation or otherwise of this statement is being obtained from Egypt.

Anybody contravening the order is imprisoned. Press—Nos. 439, 440 and 441 of the "Al Qibla," and No. 17 of "Al Falah" are forwarded herewith.

No. 439 is almost entirely devoted to an article from the "Review" written by Colonel Wilson.

Much capital has been made out of the latter, and I am only awaiting a reply from Colonel Wilson to take up the matter. He appears to have been accidentally or deliberately confused with another officer.

The French consul-general drew my attention, unofficially, to the effect of the article and the sentiments expressed. Nos 440 and 441 contain further references to the above, praising the writers for their lack of prejudice, and fair presentment of the Arab case, referring to the recognition by Great Britain and France of the Arab army as an Allied force, and abusing the French on various counts. No. 441 quotes from the letter addressed by King Hussein in August 1918 to the High Commissioner, laying stress on the question of frontiers, referring to a letter from the High Commissioner on the subject of Syrian matters and concluding with a reference to King Hussein's proffered resignation.

"Al Fatah."—Also refers to the same article from the "National Review".
W BATTEN, Major, I.A.
Acting British Agent

Enclosure 2 in No. 132

Abstract of Mueen Report ending December 10, 1920

- 1 There is nothing of political importance to report
- 2 It is stated that the former system under which mutawwifs bought the hereditary right of canvassing and arranging for pilgrims in separate sub-divisions of the Moslem world, the pilgrims having no say in the matter, is to be revived. This system was one of the evils of the Hamidian régime, abolished some twelve years ago, and its revival would place pilgrims at the disposal of the landowners, and the selection of their exonerates.
- 3 As the fees for obtaining the farming of such rights were high—from 500 to 1000—according to the importance of the district—King Hussein may be contemplating this change for financial reasons.
- 4 Improvements in the city ordered by the King, and involving extensive improvements have caused some discontent leading in some cases to violence.
- 5 The King has approved of the opening of an Indian pharmacy for pilgrims, on condition that the business shall be entirely under Arab direction.
- 6 Great scarcity is reported in the Taif district.
- 7 Insecurity continues in and around Medina.
- 8 Current Reports and Rumours.—An alliance between the King and the Imam is reported.
- 9 Ibn Saud has been approached by emissaries of the Pan Islamic movement to persuade him to forsake his connection with Great Britain.
- 10 The Nationalist forces and those of Emir Abdullah have effected a junction north of Maan.
- 11 The 15th of January, 1921, has been fixed by the Bolsheviks for a general rising throughout the world of all sympathisers and disaffected persons against their Governments.

Enclosure 3 in No. 132

Shipping Intelligence to December 20, 1920

The following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and the 20th December, 1920

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	cargo discharged.
Dahabieh ..	British	P. Sudan ..	Suez ..	Dec. 11, 1920	Dec. 12, 1920	Passenger
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian	Suez ..	Maan ..	" 12, "	" 12, "	"
Kenshi ..	British	" ..	P. Sudan ..	" ..	" ..	"
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian	Maan ..	Suez ..	" ..	" ..	"

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived at Jeddah on the 17th December, 1920, and departed on the 19th December, 1920

[E 456 456 91]

No. 133

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921)

(No. 60.)
My Lord.

Aden, December 23, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward for your Lordship's information a copy of the Thirty-first Aden News Letter dated the 22nd December, 1920.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 133.

Thirty-first Aden News Letter.

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 8th December, 1920:—

Yemen (Upper and Lower)

News regarding Ibn Saud's movements is conflicting. One report states that he has been in the neighbourhood of Sada owing to sickness among his soldiers, while another states that he is in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Al Hudaydah states that the tribe of Ma'arib and the tribe of Hashid are wavering between the Imam and Ibn Saud and that Hashid tribe are wavering.

According to an informant Sayid Abdullah Ibrahim, referred to in previous letters, despatched 200 men to Al Udain and an equal number to Badan, for what purpose it is not clear. The party sent to Badan was attacked on arrival and suffered forty casualties in killed and wounded.

There is a report of a meeting between the Zaidi and the Imam at Sada. The Imam is reported to have been in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Sada states that the Imam is in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Sada states that the Imam is in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Sada states that the Imam is in the neighbourhood of Sada.

There is a report of a meeting between the Zaidi and the Imam at Sada. The Imam is reported to have been in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Sada states that the Imam is in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Sada states that the Imam is in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Sada states that the Imam is in the neighbourhood of Sada.

There is a report of a meeting between the Zaidi and the Imam at Sada. The Imam is reported to have been in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Sada states that the Imam is in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Sada states that the Imam is in the neighbourhood of Sada. A report from Sada states that the Imam is in the neighbourhood of Sada.

Two Turkish officers, Mustapha Azou and Tewfik M. H. were recently arrived here from the Yemen, gave the following information:—

There are 60 military Turkish officers in the Yemen, 45 of whom are now employed by the Imam. There are, in addition, 30 civil Turkish officers employed by the Imam. There are, in addition, 30 civil Turkish officers employed by the Imam. There are, in addition, 30 civil Turkish officers employed by the Imam. There are, in addition, 30 civil Turkish officers employed by the Imam.

men in actual warfare. There are a few irregulars in the Yemen, but they are not of any great importance. The only regular force in the Yemen is the Yemeni Army, which is composed of regulars and irregulars. The regulars are the Yemeni Army, and the irregulars are the Yemeni Militia. The Yemeni Army is composed of regulars and irregulars. The regulars are the Yemeni Army, and the irregulars are the Yemeni Militia. The Yemeni Army is composed of regulars and irregulars. The regulars are the Yemeni Army, and the irregulars are the Yemeni Militia.

The guns at Taiz were given by Said Pasha to Sherkh Mahomed N Mawid. They were at Mawid until the Imam sent down a letter of the 14th

...a point that the number of casualties he suffered has relieved the anxiety. Sickness broke out at Sand's amongst Ibn Saud's men and he has had to retire. In the opinion of the informant, with two aeroplanes and 10,000 men Ibn Saud could have taken Sana in half an hour.

The ammunition factory under the Amazon, George, is still turning out unlimited

A lance-corporal of the 1st Yemen Infantry in Aden, who had proceeded to the Yemen, reports that men who are known to have served in the 1st Yemen Infantry are fined from 50 to 100 dollars, or in default have to suffer an imprisonment. Two deserters from the Yemen Infantry are said to be acting as informers and report the return of the Yemen Infantry men.

This same corporal states that while he was at Dhala on the 2nd December 1891 Jimma soldiers entered the place and that another force of 400 arrived at Keta. On enquiry he learnt that these troops were sent for the invasion of the territory occupied by the Kutabi, Hamdani and other tribes in the Aden Protectorate.

...ance-corporal states that Ibb is full of troops and that the Zendis have taken from the Torka.

Aden Protectorate.

According to a report the Zaidis have arrived at Dhala and more
The Indian commander at Dhala intends to send a party to
The Indian commander at Dhala intends to send a party to
The Indian commander at Dhala intends to send a party to

An informant from Dhala states that small parties of Zeidis have been arriving for the past week or more. The Zeidis are led by persons of known men. He says that 100 men of the Dhala garrison are armed with new Italian magazine rifles.

A party of Mauoris and Makhdamis (Subehis) in our province have raised the Sannat among of the Subehis and are now in the act of raising the Sannat among of the Mauoris and Makhdamis.

...put away a flock of sheep and goats. The Abdah Sultan is trying to settle the

Makbil Abdulla referred to in the last letter is now residing in the U.S.A.

Aden, December 22, 1920.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

E 737 4 917

No. 134

Record of Conversation between Earl Curzon and the Emir Feisal

THE Emir Feisal, who has for some time been engaged in conversations at the Foreign Office concerning the position in Arabia, having asked to see me. I received

him and General Haddar Pasba this morning. The following was the gist of the long conversation that ensued :

The Emir began by protesting that he was a man of peace, and preferred to settle all disputes by conciliatory methods. He wanted to settle them in the present instance in co-operation with the British.

The situation that troubled him and his father, King Hussein, most was that which now existed in the Hejaz. Not merely the borders of that State, but even the Holy Cities were threatened by the menacing activities of the Wahabites, who, under the leadership of Ibn Saud, were bent on a war of militant aggression, and might at any moment descend upon Mecca. In these circumstances, what were the British Government, who had guaranteed the frontiers of the Hejaz State, going to do? The responsibility was theirs.

I replied at once that I was aware of no such guarantee as peculiar to the British, and that the Government of India had no such guarantee as peculiar to the British. I then said that the Government of India had no such guarantee as peculiar to the British, and that the Government of India had no such guarantee as peculiar to the British.

single Power only—he could then appeal. Faisal did not dissent from this, but said that what he feared was an early, even an immediate, attack, which he could not himself get back to the Hejaz, pressing him to return at once to advise his father, in time to avert. I reminded him that our latest news, no doubt better known to him than to me, was that Hussein had gained a victory over the invaders, and that there was consequently no cause for alarm. He admitted this, but said that the danger was recurrent, and could only be removed by the British Government assuming complete responsibility for the defence of the Hejaz, and letting Ibn Saoud know that if he attacked it would involve hostilities with Great Britain.

I replied that for nearly three years I had been trying to settle this dispute between the two rival chieftains, and had proposed conferences and meetings between them at various places. But they refused to do so. They said that they would meet me at the place where I was, but they would not come. They would send their men to fight me, but they would not come. They would send their men to fight me, but they would not come.

Then the truth that we could not send troops to defend our frontier was made plain to us. What was the meaning then of calling upon us to defend the inland frontiers of the State?

The Emir explained that what his father wanted was the present of a small fleet
to provide the armament to one day with which to attack a group of tribesmen.
Two parties would meet and agree upon a frontier; there should be no need of active
fighting in order to secure it.

Petzel then complained bitterly of the system under which, while his father now

I said at once that there could be no question of this. The subsidy that had been

I said at once that there could be no question of this. The subsidy that had been

tenance of peace and order, we should assign a specific sum for the Arabians peninsula. It would then be possible to pay a not of course comparable with the war subsidy, but still enable him to liquidate liabilities and start afresh with a receipt of an extravagant allowance.

Emir Ali was expected in Mecca this week having been summoned by the King to report on the situation at Taif. This visit was postponed at the last moment. Reinforcements have been sent from Mecca to Taif, together with a further quantity of supplies.

King Hussein cannot reconcile these movements and the encirclement of Mecca on the north threatened by the attacks on Dafeina and Mahani (on the direct Medina route) with the truce agreed upon until the result of Ibn Saud's deputation was settled nor does he know what to say regarding our wish that he should not open breach by precipitate action, in face of the dangers threatening him.

He has intimated that he will be forced to take measures to protect himself from any attack he may be to meet on the coast of the Hedjaz. He has also intimated that he is anxious to excuse him from the strain of waiting for the issue of the negotiations now proceeding in London, which he appears to consider are proceeding unfavourably for himself, while the danger of a collision with Ibn Saud draws daily nearer, coupled with our apparent refusal to allot sufficient supplies to the Hedjaz, is proving beyond his endurance.

King Hussein insists on treating the inability of India to increase the normal allotment of supplies, owing to shortage of stocks, as a deliberate attempt to coerce him, and continues to state that the Hedjaz has a document showing that the so-called stoppage of supplies is due to representations from Ibn Saud, to whom he ironically refers as "King".

A telegram received to-day from King Hussein states that Khalid has attacked Bani, three hours to the south-east of Taif. He asks how Great Britain can allow him to be so dishonoured before the world by the mamurs of another of her Allies, after his repeated warnings after his agreeing to a mutual truce, and even after his offer to abdicate in favour of Ibn Saud to extricate himself from his difficulties.

The latter allusion refers to various remarks which he has previously made needless to say, in an ironical vein.

The telegram concludes with the reference to Hodeidah mentioned above, and a disclaimer of responsibility for further bloodshed.

In the absence of reliable information from other sources it is difficult to appreciate accurately the present situation.

On the one hand it would certainly appear, from the rumours and reports in circulation recently, and from the statements of King Hussein that the Akhwan have disregarded the admittedly very unsatisfactory agreement arrived at four months ago.

Whether those concerned are acting independently, or as King Hussein alleges, by orders from Ibn Saud, it is not possible to say.

The situation has been reported as restless since September and the King's preparations at Taif, culminating in his sending Emir Ali to take command and prepare for a possible attack, prove at all times the genuineness of his fears.

On the other hand, his former exaggeration of minor incidents, and continued attempts to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

The situation has so far developed since my telegram No. 373 of the 27th November that the implementation of similar measures by the King would become practically a certainty should further incidents occur.

Should the King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

Every endeavour has been made to improve the use of troops, apart from the fact that the King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

It is difficult to keep the King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

privileged position, which entitles him to our unconditional assistance and to ignore

King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

4. *Accusations against General Gouraud.*—The King has sent me the copy of a telegram sent to the Hedjaz representative in Cairo, for communication to his Majesty, in which General Gouraud is accused of having committed atrocities against the Arab army by General Gouraud, and alleging that atrocities were committed by the French.

5. *Capitulations.*—An Italian subject practising law in Jeddah was ordered to be immediately arrested by the King and deported by the next steamer on advice given in a divorce case was not in accordance with the King's judgment.

I understand the Italian envoy protested energetically, and informed the King he would if necessary personally have him released, and that any attempt to deport him would be prevented.

King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

6. *Quarantine Quay Incident.*—While the apology requested from the Director of Customs, referred to in the last report, has not been directly forthcoming, I have received an ambiguously worded letter on the subject from Mecca which could be taken as satisfactory, to which I made a suitably friendly reply, and the matter can therefore be considered as closed.

7. *Supplies.*—With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 41 of the 14th December, I have been asked to send a telegram to the Director of Customs, referred to in the last report, has not been directly forthcoming, I have received an ambiguously worded letter on the subject from Mecca which could be taken as satisfactory, to which I made a suitably friendly reply, and the matter can therefore be considered as closed.

King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

King Hussein's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

8. *Arm's Traffic.*—With reference to a communication from his Excellency the High Commissioner in Egypt as to the possibility of arms being conveyed to Mecca by means of Italian ships through some port of the Red Sea, I informed the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, during his recent visit, of the activities of the Italian steamer "Nilo." This vessel is apparently permitted to call at Kundalah, among other places, while King Hussein objects to the Aden Hodeidah service being extended to that port.

9. *Non Moslem Cemetery.*—This cemetery, outside the Jeddah walls, has fallen into disrepair. Apart from other considerations, it is inadvisable that it should appear in any way to be no concern to the non-Moslem community.

At a meeting of the foreign representatives it was therefore agreed that each agency or consulate should contribute a fixed sum yearly for maintenance as from 1st January 1921 and the sum of £1000 was agreed upon. A sum of £1000 on each was settled, and in addition some 700 have been collected privately.

It is item will be therefore submitted in forwarding the budget for the agency.

11. *W. R. P.*—The Akhwan's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

12. *P.*—In view of the fact that the Akhwan's intention to take the offensive, and to attempt to make capital out of them, have been taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

respect in strict accordance with the instructions received from his father. His father demanded that these pledges should now be fulfilled.

Mr. Lindsay said that the main difficulty in which His Majesty's Government found themselves at present was due to the fact that the King of the Hedjaz had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles. Until he had done this his right to discuss the disposal of the areas liberated from the Turks by the principal Allied Powers could not possibly be recognised by them. His Majesty's Government were anxious that the Emir should induce his father to place himself in a position to discuss the provisions of the Treaty of Sévres by ratifying the Treaty of Versailles. If there were difficulties in the way the Emir had only to explain them, and His Majesty's Government would do their best to remove them.

The Emir said that his father's difficulties were easy to define. The King of the Hedjaz would not accept a treaty which included provisions for the mandatory principle and the division between two European Powers of the countries for which the Arabs had fought and died.

Mr. Lindsay said that he could well understand that the King of the Hedjaz, who was far away, might be apprehensive about the meaning of the word "mandate" and about the mandatory principle. He would be glad to know whether the Emir shared these apprehensions.

The Emir replied that after his experience in Syria he did most certainly share them.

Mr. Lindsay again reminded His Highness that he was not empowered to discuss, and did not intend to discuss, the actions of the French Government. Was there anything in what Great Britain had done in the areas placed under their mandate to which either the Emir or his father objected?

The Emir replied that he was aware of nothing to which exception could be taken. He had the fullest confidence in the intentions of His Majesty's Government, but he would be glad to see the mandates for the British spheres, and to discuss them with His Majesty's Government. He reminded Mr. Lindsay that King Hussein, who had himself taken the initiative in the Arab revolt, had not only raised no objection to British assistance, but had made it a condition of his entering the war on the side of the Allies. There could be no stronger proof of his confidence in their sincerity. He was prepared to say nothing whatever for the present about the French sphere in view of Mr. Lindsay's instructions, and merely to enquire what His Majesty's Government proposed to do in their own zone.

Mr. Lindsay said that if King Hussein had ratified the Treaty of Versailles, and thus regularised his position as an original member of the League of Nations, copies of the different mandates which were now before the Council of the League would already have been communicated to him.

The Emir replied that he did not wish to discuss the mandates in their character of mandates, but in the light of the original British pledges given to his father, and with the object of discussing freely with His Majesty's Government to what extent their provisions fulfilled these pledges.

Mr. Lindsay returned to what the Emir had already said about King Hussein having stipulated that he should be assisted by His Majesty's Government. The provisions of the mandate were merely the definite formulation of the lines on which British assistance would be given, and their acceptance by the League of Nations was essential for His Majesty's Government to be in a position to give that assistance. King Hussein had not only asked for British help, but had stipulated that no other Power should concern itself with the future of the Arab countries. It was clearly necessary to obtain the consent of the other Allied Powers for the special position of His Majesty's Government in this respect, and this could only be done by obtaining acceptance of the terms of the mandates.

The Emir said that, even so, his father wished to be consulted about the provisions of the mandates, not in his capacity as a member of the League of Nations, but in his prior capacity as the recognised spokesman of the Arab peoples, with whom His Majesty's Government had entered into a definite agreement.

Mr. Lindsay said that, before accepting the right of the King of the Hedjaz to have a voice in the future of all the Arab peoples, it would be necessary to consider whether the Arabs themselves wished him to represent them. His Majesty's Government were already in treaty relations with a number of independent Arab rulers, and could not accept any modifications of these agreements except with the consent of the rulers concerned.

The Emir said that a promise had been made to his father that there should be no alteration in the status of the Arab peoples, and that the right to modify any treaties which existed between His Majesty's Government and independent Arab rulers at the time when he entered the war. He only feared that if other reservations were now made about the various areas under mandates, His Majesty's Government had receded from the promise.

Mr. Lindsay said that he was sure that the Emir would be able to explain the original reservation referred to, not only to Mesopotamia, but to all the Arab countries. At the same time, it must be remembered that his original undertaking had been that Great Britain would recognise and support the independence of the Arabs. If King Hussein succeeded in obtaining the consent of all the Arabs within the areas in which His Majesty's Government were free to act to the constitution of a new kingdom, His Majesty's Government would be bound to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in the near future. Certain of the independent rulers of Arabia being at the moment in actual conflict with King Hussein.

The Emir said that he had previously disclaimed any intention of discussing the future of the Arab peoples, but that this was almost unavoidable. He suggested that it would be time to discuss the future of the Arab peoples, and to submit a statement showing completely what the Arabs represented to His Majesty's Government. He trusted that except in the case of the independent rulers of Arabia, no other Arab ruler would be in a position to object to this.

and promised to lay it before the Secretary of State.

Foreign Office, January 20, 1921.

E 1090 4 91

No. 137

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

N. 111

M. 111

Foreign Office, January 24, 1921

Lt. Col. H. B. A. was on duty at the Foreign Office on Friday the 21st January and, in the course of a general conversation dealing with unimportant matters connected with the forthcoming meeting of the Conference at Paris, asked him to allow him to see a few of the documents which were being prepared for the Conference. He was shown a number of documents, and was particularly interested in the proposals for the future of the Arab peoples. He was particularly interested in the proposals for the future of the Arab peoples.

He said General Gouraud was the most popular general in France, and any proposal which was made to him would be well received. He was particularly interested in the proposals for the future of the Arab peoples, and was particularly interested in the proposals for the future of the Arab peoples. He was particularly interested in the proposals for the future of the Arab peoples, and was particularly interested in the proposals for the future of the Arab peoples. He was particularly interested in the proposals for the future of the Arab peoples, and was particularly interested in the proposals for the future of the Arab peoples.

As far as the Arab peoples were concerned, he had the greatest sympathy, and, owing to his having been in Morocco with General Gouraud, he had the greatest sympathy. He said it was incredible to anyone who was not a Frenchman that the Arab peoples could continue to carry weight as an exponent of the Arab peoples.

[6689]

2 K 2

Power, but had actually visited European countries. M. de Saint-Aulaire consequently felt that the views of Faisal they would be leaning on. Therefore, from the point of view of their own special interests, and from the view of maintaining the friendship of France, it was alike desirable that His Majesty's Government should have nothing to do with Faisal.

Sir Eyre Crowe thanked the Ambassador for the frank way in which he had expressed his views, and said he felt at some disadvantage because, the treatment of all questions relating to these mandated territories having been transferred to another Government Department, he must naturally hesitate to express any opinion or make any statement that might involve their responsibility. He would observe, however, in the first place, that, so far as he was aware, the Emir Faisal had not up to now come forward as a candidate for the rulership of Mesopotamia. M. de Saint-Aulaire seemed to think that the British Government was free to make what choice it liked in imposing a ruler on Mesopotamia; this was certainly not so. His Majesty's Government were quite determined to carry out their promise to set up a native Arab State, and take into account the wishes of the population in the selection of a ruler; whether the people of Mesopotamia would demand to have Faisal for their King or not, Sir E. Crowe did not say, but it was obvious that if such a demand were put forward it would not be for the British Government to turn a deaf ear to it. Sir E. Crowe repeated the well-known argument of His Majesty's Government being vitally interested in keeping the goodwill of the Arabs, which was more important to the British Empire than to any other country. His Majesty's Government had entered into definite obligations to King Hussein, and it was not for the British Government to turn a deaf ear to the Arabs to say that Great Britain had abandoned them after making use of them for the purpose of winning the war against Turkey.

As regards the personality of Faisal, he had to tell M. de Saint-Aulaire frankly that his estimate of his character entirely differed from that formed by General Gouraud. He would be the last person to set up his judgment against that of General Gouraud in regard to Faisal, but he asked himself on what the latter really rested. Apparently General Gouraud was being attached to Faisal's alleged duplicity and his offer to believe him capable of such falsehood, and, as he believed that General Gouraud did not himself understand Arabic, and that therefore Faisal's remarks could only have reached him through an interpreter, he wondered whether it was not possible that some misunderstanding had arisen in the course of the inevitable translation. He told M. de Saint-Aulaire how His Majesty's Government, on their part, had drifted into a position of great delicacy towards King Hussein, and found themselves in the presence of a misunderstanding left unexplained until they accidentally discovered years after the event, that a few words said in a conversation, which had been faultily rendered into Arabic, were the cause of all the trouble. Similar misunderstandings were known to have occurred on other occasions in analogous circumstances. Was it out of the question that something of this sort happened in the present case? He begged M. de Saint-Aulaire to believe that he was not impugning in any way the good faith of either of General Gouraud or of whoever may have been the interpreter, but he could not altogether discard the possibility of a mistake having occurred.

In any case he assured the Ambassador that whatever decision His Majesty's Government might eventually have to take in this matter would be taken with due regard to their determined policy of preserving the good understanding with the French Government.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
EARL CURSON OF KEDLESTON.

E 1139 466 91]

No 138

Major Batten to Earl Curson.—(Received January .)

(No. 4)

My Lord,

Jeddah, January 10, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 10th January, 1921.

This report and despatch have been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia and

I have &c

W. BATTEN, Major, I: A

Acting British Agent

Enclosure 1 in No. 138.

Jeddah Report for the period January 1-10, 1921

SUBSEQUENT to the raid on Basal, the villages in Wadi Layah were attacked and reports were in circulation that the Mudayana were preparing to encircle Taif, and were about to attack Yammouh and a second up the Wadi Layah, while a third was reported as advancing along the Wadi-el-Lanjan towards Mecca.

King Hussein confirmed the news of the attacks in the Wadi Layah, adding that the Mudayana were able to hold their own, and that attacks nearer Taif had been repulsed and the Mudayana were being driven back by his troops, who were instructed to reconnoitre on the further movements of the raiders.

His Majesty's Government, however, ordered Emir Ali to act on the defensive as far as possible, but to be prepared to take the offensive if necessary.

His Majesty's Government with impatience

expressed his regret and grief over the attacks on the Mudayana, and the fact that they would be shut out of Arabia, as a consequence of these

attacks. The Mudayana, however, were not the only tribe to be affected. The Shammar, to the south of Shabiyah (Shabibiyyah), and collected great loss. Now there was further news of the Mudayana attacking the Imam with the intention of unlawfully taking possession of the Imam's territory.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

The Mudayana were without its coming to a head.

his well-known popularity with the Bedouin, but the latter's intention is apparently to evade this order and return to join his brother in Medina.

2. It has been suggested that King Hussein's real object in continually overstating the case against the Akwal in general and Ibn Saud in particular, is to persuade His Majesty's Government that such raids as those reported are instigated by Ibn Saud, in order to obtain material aid against him.

Should His Majesty's Government intervene in his favour, difficulties will be created between ourselves and Ibn Saud by embroiling us in the dispute.

Should such a situation arise, Ibn Saud would not only be weakened and the King gain proportionately, but the latter would have the satisfaction of having endangered the relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, whom he cordially detests.

While King Hussein has been very loyal in the past, his present temper is such that it is not considered he would be deterred by any scruples from acting contrary to the interests of His Majesty's Government, should he hope to gain any advantage by so doing.

It is with regret that I have to record this opinion, but the King's behaviour during the last year, however justified in his own eyes, makes it difficult to arrive at any other conclusion.

Medina is a city independent of the King, under Sherref Shahaat. One of the reasons for the return of Emir Ali is stated to have been the difficulty, if not the danger, of his position as Governor, while the real power lay with Sherref Shahaat, who is commonly credited with designs against King Hussein and his sons. He, and more especially Sherref Nasir, have great influence with the tribes, as well as in Medina itself, and King Hussein could do nothing against them should they revolt.

A branch (Hussein) of the Ashraf clan, the ruling house, and that King Hussein does not deal with him as a subordinate but that is their due, and has not rewarded Sherref Nasir in particular sufficiently for his services in the revolt.

The King is well aware of these feelings, and has held the families of both Sherref Shahaat and Nasir in turn as virtual hostages for their good behaviour.

It is stated that Sherref Nasir is so disgruntled with the King's attitude that he would be willing to revolt, and even canvass the throne should an opportunity arise, aided by his popularity among the Bedouin as a military leader.

His intention, after his return from Syria, was to liquidate his property and reside in Egypt, but the King, having now permitted his family to return to Mecca, has to retain him under his own eye in Mecca, or under Emir Ali's orders at Taif.

Reports as to Sherref Shahaat being virtually in revolt against the King have been current ever since Emir Ali's departure from Medina.

The above information is interesting in view of the fact that in a recent conversation with a partisan of Sherref Nasir he attempted very guardedly to sound me as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government should Ibn Saud attack King Hussein, or any other person revolt against him.

It appears to be generally believed that we are supplying the King with arms and money, and would support him against any form of external or internal attack.

There appears to be a tendency to lay some of the blame for the present unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Hedjaz at the door of the British, for having been the cause of King Hussein's exaggerated idea of his own importance, resulting in his assurance that he can do as he pleases with the certainty of support from His Majesty's Government.

Ummejeh.—It is reported that after Sherref Mohsen's arrival the situation in this district improved considerably, and all is now quiet.

Capitulations.—The Italian consul stated in the course of conversation that King Hussein's change of attitude regarding the case of the Italian subject, mentioned in the last report, was due to his informing the King that not only did the Italian Government maintain that the procedure in force under the Turks held good until the formulation of some new agreement between the Allies and the Hedjaz, but that both the British and French Governments supported the Royal Government in this view.

Pilgrimage.—The last of the pilgrims bound for India, numbering some 200, were despatched by the steamship "Koweit" on the 9th January. They represented the

remainder of the Meccan pilgrims who have been waiting for the departure of the steamship "Koweit" for them was arranged to leave for Bombay by the company concerned, which had already granted free passage to the pilgrims.

Admiral.—This officer left by the same steamer for India en route for Japan and Suera. As his papers were unexceptionable, they were endorsed for the journey to Bombay. A report on his prolonged stay in Mecca, and that he was able to furnish have been sent as a measure of precaution to Bombay and Bagdad.

In the course of conversation he mentioned he had originally been proceeding to the East. He later stated that he was not continuing his journey, as there was no object in proceeding further after the collapse in the Crimea.

He appeared from his manner and conversation to be a soldier of fortune seeking employment rather than a political intriguer, but his journey from Syria via Bagdad to Jeddah and Mecca, when there was a choice of direct steamers via Egypt, and return after a stay of some weeks in Mecca, cannot but appear strange.

He did not once visit the Haram while in Mecca, and was unwilling to talk about the situation in Mecca.

His comment on King Hussein was that he was a shy old man.

A number of notes of the Soviet Government have appeared in Jeddah, said to have been sent from Syria and Medina.

Prophet.—Two respectable British Indian traders were not permitted to board the steamer which had steamed out. I had intervened in their favour, necessitating reference to the authorities.

All those desirous of going on board a steamer must first sign a guarantee that they will return, and I was informed that this rule was necessary to prevent people leaving the country without authority.

Soudan Telegraph Account.—An anticipated, the Soudan Telegraph Account, which has been rapidly accumulating account has been repudiated.

The Hochimite Government has further taken exception to the notification of increased cable rates by the Eastern Telegraph Company being sent through the Soudan Government, and does not apparently recognise the right of this company to alter its rates.

Wool and Hair.—The Director of Hedjaz Industries at Beleg has been in Jeddah with a view to obtaining supplies for the Egyptian frontier districts Administration. King Hussein has very generously presented 1,000 okes of hair, including some wool, as a gift to the Administration, but efforts to arrange for a regular supply have so far not met with success.

Mecca Report.—An abstract of the current Mecca report is attached, together with a report by Captain Nasraddin Agha on his return to Mecca.

The latter confirms the view taken above as to the present situation.

Press.—Nos. 445, 446 and 447 of "Al Qibla" are forwarded herewith.

No. 445, under the heading of "The Arabs and their Allies," discusses the reasons for the entry of the Arabs into the war and the present state of Arabia as compared to the progress enjoyed by other small countries after the war.

No. 446 contains a translation of certain statements of Mr. Lloyd George as to the position in Ireland, including references to the actions of French press correspondents.

No. 447 contains a translation of certain statements of Mr. Lloyd George as to the position in Ireland, including references to the actions of French press correspondents.

Arab allies to the detriment of the former.

No. 447 quotes Mr. Lloyd George's speech on the subject of the French and Russian Keval, and comments very appreciatively on his statements as to Smyrna, Aleppo and Damascus, and his mention of the Arab view of Great Britain's relations with France.

The current number of "Al Falah" has not yet been received.

The notification asked for in the case of the article attributed to Colonel Wilson has not appeared, and King Hussein has evidently no intention of helping in the matter.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.

First Aden News Letter

Secret

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 22nd December, 1920

YEMEN

Our agents at Menakha and Bajil report that the greater part of Jebel Reima is now in the hands of the Imam, and that an attack on Jebel Bura is impending. As planned by the ex-Vali, Mahmud Nadhim, and has already despatched troops to Jebel Milhan for the capture of Zaidiya, the Idrisi's base for Bajil. An attack is expected to be made simultaneously on Obal and Jebel Bura. Six thousand soldiers with 100 cavalry, 200 mules, 20 big guns, and 6 machine guns are said to be concentrated at Menakha awaiting orders to advance.

The Menakha and Bajil agents state that the Tihama tribesmen are determined to fight the Zeidis to the last, and that Sheikh Ismail Baghaw of the Qubra is busily engaged in collecting his tribesmen for the purpose.

According to later reports, Hujjaila and some other places in the vicinity of Obal have been captured by the Imam after severe fighting, in which two of the Qubra leaders are reported to have been wounded and one to be missing.

Sheikh Mahomed Tahir, the Idrisi commandant at Bajil, and the Qubra sheikh, Abu Hadi, are reported to be on indifferent terms with each other. Sheikh Abu Hadi is said to be at heart pro-Imam and a great friend of Mahmud Nadhim, though he does not show his inclinations openly. Before the capture of the Jacob Mission, the Imam had named Sheikh Abu Hadi as his Qaimmaqam at Bajil. Public feeling at Bura is said to be tending in favour of the Imam as a result of Mahmud Nadhim's propaganda.

The Menakha and Bajil agents report the arrival of 700 Imamite soldiers at Menakha on the 6th December. They were despatched to Saafan and Waal.

It is said that under orders received from the Imam, Sheikh Ali Salama attacked the fort of Al Hamala, in the vicinity of Madwal, on the 7th December. He was, however, forced to retire by the Idrisi Qubra combination, and suffered many casualties, and was himself wounded.

The Imam is reported to have promised Sheikh Ali Mikdad of Anis the Amulship of Bura after he has conquered the place. The latter is said to have left for Jebel Bura with 600 men.

Sheikh Munassar Saghir Maruf, of the northern Zaranig, is said to have written to the Imam openly declaring his loyalty to the Imam. It is said to be due to a present he has received from Sayed Mustafa.

The ex-Vali, Mahmud Nadhim, continues his anti-Idrisi propaganda in correspondence with the Tihama Sayeds and the Sheikhs of Bura, Reima and Saafan. Yusuf Hassan, who is in the Idrisi employ at Bajil, is reported to be an agent of Mahmud Nadhim, and is reported to be in contact with Jamal Bay, resident at Marawa. The latter lives next to Sayid Abdul Kadir, the Mansab of Marawa, and his duty is to keep an eye on the Sayed, who is the most influential man in the Tihama. Khalil Bey, who is the resident of Marawa, is also reported to be in contact with Mahmud Nadhim's agents in Hodenda are Omar Mizjaji, Arif Kharsa and Mirjan Harazi.

Our agent at Zaidiya reports that the Imamite forces have commenced, as also the installation of a telegraph line between Zaidiya and Hujjaila and 7 head of camels.

The agent also reports that Hamood Abdulrab and Hameed bin Ali, the notables who arrived at Zaidiya with 500 head of camels to secure their tenders for the revenues of Zaidiya, Hara, &c. The Amil of Zaidiya, however, refused permission for the armed men to enter the town and the party remained outside the town for two days' stay outside the town.

The Idrisi troops are reported to have advanced on Beit-el-Fakih. This report is confirmed by Captain Fitch, R.N.

Our Sana agent reports that, in compliance with the ex-Vali's request, the Imam has despatched 500 men to Menakha. The agent also

reports the despatch of 800 Zeidis to Reima via Bilad Anis and of 240 regulars with 2 guns to Hujjaila and 120 mules laden with ammunition to Zaidiya.

The agent further reports that the agents of the Imam and the Idrisi who were asked by the Imam to supply 2,000 men each, have expressed their willingness to supply the Imam with 2,000 men each, but they are unable to supply the Imam with 2,000 men each, as the tribes in the vicinity of Sana are said to have refused to supply the Imam with 2,000 men each. The number of armed men in Sana at present is about 5,000.

YEMEN (UPPER AND LOWER)

A report states that Ibb is now quiet as the result of orders received from the Imam. The Imam has ordered the Zeidis to be quiet in the district of Ibb.

Nakib Mahomed Husen As-Suh, headman of Khawlan, who was written expressing a desire to befriend the British Government, states that Ibn Saud went against Waala, Yafa and Bilad Anis, but that he was repulsed and that a large booty fell into the hands of the local inhabitants.

ADEN

It is stated that the Imam's orders to Sayed Yahya, the commander at Dhala, are that he should be quiet in Dhala but that the Sayed has been interfering with the Imam's operations outside Dhala on his own responsibility.

Some Zeidis, who have undoubtedly advanced far into the Aden Protectorate, and I am unable to believe the report that their operations are directed by Sayed Yahya contrary to the wishes of the Imam.

I have received numerous reports that unless the Katribi Sheikh, Mahomed Saad, who is the head of the Zeidis, is removed from Dhala, the Imam's operations will be hindered. It is also reported that the Imam has ordered the Zeidis to be quiet in Dhala.

A party of Zeidis is said to have been despatched to collect tithes, which the Haushabi Sultan has promised to pay. I await confirmation of this report.

Reports received lately indicate that lawlessness is increasing in the Subehi country. In my last letter I referred to a raid made by the Mansab and his followers on the Subehi country. It is now reported that the latter section have burnt the Makhdam crops. Skirmishes are also reported between the Subehi, the Mansab and Attawt, but the consequences of these skirmishes are not yet known.

A report is also received that the Imam has ordered the Zeidis to be quiet in the Subehi country. It is also reported that the Imam has ordered the Zeidis to be quiet in the Subehi country. This order has expired and the Zeidis have resumed their operations in the Subehi country.

The Katribi Sheikh writes that a party of fifteen Zeidis are carrying tithes in the Aden territory. The Alawi Sheikh has appealed to the Imam to protect them.

Owing to reports having reached Aden regarding the Imam's operations at Al Hujjailab and the suburbs of Obal and indicating a state of alarm at Bajil, I sent an Aden Agent to Hujjaila for a special report. His telegram, received this morning, states that the Imam has ordered the Zeidis to be quiet in the Subehi country, and that the Imam has ordered the Zeidis to be quiet in the Subehi country. Within Qubra the Imam's operations are reported to be quiet.

Aden, January 12, 1921

E 1639 27 911

No 140

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

No. 5 Confidential.)

My Lord,

In continuation of my telegram No. 4, dated the 15th January, 1921, I have the

I have already expressed my views in the telegram referred to above, and venture to urge that the course suggested may be adopted with the least possible delay.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 140

Captain Fakhuddin to Major-General Scott

I BEG to submit the following remarks on the present political situation in the

As far as I can judge from a careful consideration of the conflicting mass of information before me and from watching the recent abortive attempts at peace from the side of the Government, I think it is fair to say that the Government of the South does want a peaceful settlement with the Union as well as ourselves, but the following are the chief impediments in his way:-

1. The presence of Mahmud Nadim and some other Turks in the Yunnan total number is not less than about 700. It is beyond question that Mahmud Nadim is the evil genius of the Muslim in nearly all the latter's plans and actions. It is he who is responsible for an incoherent, persistent and fearfully violent campaign of calumny and misrepresentation against the Idris, who is considered by his party as a state of apostates on account of his alliance with us. It is he who has ever been

[illegible]

3. The Imam is surrounded by a party of his own countrymen who are violently pro-Turk and wield a considerable influence among the people. The chief among this clique are:—

(d.) Syed Kasm-i-azmi, the principal sherkh of Honi Abdul Karim

(b.) Abu Nuth.

(c.) Some of the mashukhs of Rada, Anis, Khanlan and Arhah. These men are generally those who were the recipients of honours, titles, and handsome stipends from the Turkish Government, and naturally they have strong leanings towards them and wish for their return. They are the mavericks of Mahmud Nisim, who does his level best to keep up their hopes of the return of the Turkish rule by representing to them that, though by the exigencies of a lost war the Ottoman Government was obliged to sign an armistice according to which the military forces in Yemen had to surrender and evacuate, the civil Turkish Government was still there, and as soon as the peace is concluded the military will return and everything will be the same as before. Nor is it a wonder that these people should believe in these plausible statements as, according to an Arabic proverb, "Uqul ul Arab fi amsihum" (i.e., "the wisdom of the Arabs is in their eyes"), and, when they see the Turkish Wali (or Governor) is still in Yemen, they cannot help believing these statements and expecting that in the course of time the final peace will come and the things shall be restored to their original condition.

3. Being notoriously parsimonious and greedy, the Imam desires the Turks back for the gratification of his avarice, as he expects to get thereby not only the arrears of his subsidy, but to be rewarded for his loyalty.

In view of the above facts it is apparent that, for the sake of peace and tranquility in the Yumen region, the British Government should take steps to ensure that the Yumen should be evacuated from here as soon as possible. As long as Mahmud Nadhim remains in Yumen tranquility in this land is impossible.

This evacuation can be carried out easily. It is true that we have repeatedly

Turks that we are ready to defray their expenses to Constantinople, if they will surrender themselves to us, and they realise themselves that what we owe to us is properly treated and duly repatriated to his country. But I am afraid that not enough to draw them all out of Yemen at present. Their difficulties are quite pitiable. Mahomed Nadhim's description of these people's condition, in his letters to his Government, sent through us as well as through the Consul at Aden, are no exaggerations of the actual distress amongst them. I am sure, since he wrote these epistles, but the non-receipt of their appeals, and the reticence of the Ottoman Government to his pathetic submission of these appeals to the proper authorities, has made the people sceptical of the actual affairs and driven them to despondency, despair and desperation. A desperate man in their condition is capable of doing anything.

May I therefore request you to kindly give your serious consideration to the importance of the question of the evacuation of the remaining Turks from Yemen at the earliest moment, and invite the immediate attention of the Ottoman Government to the appeals of Mahmud Nadhim mentioned above, and get the required assistance. About a year and a half back Mahmud Nadhim wanted £T. 20,000 for his relief. The necessity for the same is more than ever felt now, although, of course, a number of officers and men have surrendered and left since then, yet the distrust of the remaining portion has increased on account of the accumulation of their debts and other trouble. On receipt of this money, which will, of course, be properly distributed under our supervision, the work of evacuation can be easily carried out. I expect the following results from this evacuation:

1. Tranquility in the political affairs of the Yei on and peace in this part of Arakan.

ment between the Idrii and the Imam and between ourselves and the Imam at an early date.

3. These settlements will end

(a) To the immediate improvement of the condition of the Island, and consequent facility in the task of the administrative authorities.

(b) To do away with the necessity of keeping a field force in our protectorate, and thus considerably curtailing our expenditure in this line

6. It will put an immediate stop to the activities of the Italian and others.

In this connection I may mention the following news for your information:—

In June last, when I returned from here with Syed Mustapha-el-Idrisi, I heard from a fairly reliable source that Mahmud Nailum had received from his £ T. 300 in gold to defray the expenses of two representatives to be sent to Constantinople to the Ottoman Parliament, and that two representatives were sent to Constantinople via Mecca. Subsequently, however, the news was but I have recently been able to verify the original report and learn that two Yemenite representatives reached Constantinople in the beginning of September last. They are said to have exhibited violent anti-British views, and are still at Constantinople.

M. FAZLUDDIN, Captain, I.M.S.

December 24, 1930.

E 1805 455 91)

No. 141

Major Batten to Earl Curzon — (Received February 4)

(No. 9, Secret)

Mr. Lord,

Jeddah, January 20, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 20th January, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia and the Political Resident Aden.

1 have, &c

W BATTEN, Mayor, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Jeddah Report, January 11-20 1921

(Secret.)

1. Situation in Taif District.

THE statement that negotiations were proceeding between Emir Ali and Khalid ibn Derwish was confirmed, and no further collisions have taken place since the submission of the last report.

His Highness is the only one of the Sherrefian family on speaking terms with Khalid, and appears to have been successful in making a settlement.

The following is extracted from an account, dated the 13th January, received from a reliable informant:—

The Sherrefian cavalry and delegates from the opposing forces met in the Wadi Layh, the ensuing discussion being quite friendly.

On being questioned as to the presence of Khalid's forces so near Taif, the latter greeted the Emir's officer in the name of Sherref Hamza-el Feir Mansur and his tribe and the Ateibah of Sherrefs Shukit-ibn Zeid and Amud, stating these tribes had written that they had of their own free will agreed to pay "zakat," which Khalid's forces had accordingly come to collect.

The Sherrefian officer asked for an armistice of five days in order to convey this information to Emir Ali, and the parties separated.

Emir Ali informed the King of the allegations implied in the above against these Ashraf, and it is stated King Hussein summoned Sherref Hamza and accused him of dealings with Ibn Saud, which he stoutly denied. The King informed him that he was well aware of his intrigues and would take measures accordingly.

The King telegraphed to Emir Ali to occupy Sherref Hamza's property in the Wadi Layh, and to destroy it.

Preparations had been made for an advance to the mouth of the Wadi Layh.

Khalid's forces were reported to have occupied two posts established by the Sherrefian troops two hours west of Ashairah.

A fight occurred between some Hedjaz tribesmen and a party alleged to be Mudayana, resulting in about eighty casualties on both sides. Four shikhs from the former asked for a truce, which was granted, but two were detained as hostages, the remaining two proceeding to Taif to report and informing Emir Ali that unless he could arrange the matter satisfactorily himself, they would take the necessary steps themselves. The Emir is reported to have told them to be patient, as a steamer was expected with a large consignment of guns, machine guns and munitions, on the delivery of which the aggressors would be satisfactorily punished.

The above does not agree with the reported looting of Sherref Hamza's property by the raiders mentioned in the last Mecca report, but appears to confirm the statements as to the dissatisfaction of the border Ateibah and their readiness to join in any attack on King Hussein. Their sympathy with Ibn Saud is common knowledge, but I am still of the opinion that recent events have no wider significance at present.

Future events may depend on the issue of the attack reported against the Shammar.

2. King Hussein and France

The King telephoned in a great state of agitation over a document received by him from the French consul-general requesting his views in reply to a notification of the French Government relating to the import of arms into Algeria, Lybia and elsewhere.

He stated he did not understand it and would have nothing to do with it, and only dealt with His Majesty's Government in such matters.

This notification appears to have been made by the French consul-general at the desire of his Government in the ordinary course, the Council of Ambassadors having requested the French Government to be concerned.

The King appeared to think that there was some implication against himself as to traffic in arms, and there was some difficulty in persuading him to change his mind and make a suitable reply.

I am unaware whether the above is an accurate representation of the facts submitted to the King by the French consul-general, but in view of the feelings entertained by King Hussein towards France, it is felt the communication of similar matter would be more desirable through the channel of this agency.

3. Claims of Indian Pilgrims

Reminders are being received in relation to these claims, and reference is made to the robbery and ill treatment of pilgrims, and the action taken to obtain redress, in a questionnaire on last year's pilgrimage received from Bombay.

Subsequent to the first submission to the King of the claims made to myself and the Mecca representative and to their repudiation, a further claim and statement of complaints was received from the Haj Committee of Karachi.

The King refuses in effect to consider any claims other than those submitted to him personally, which latter, however, he has always shown himself ready to meet in a sympathetic spirit.

He is exceedingly jealous of any action which may be taken to imply that he is not the sole protector of his temporary guests in the Hedjaz, and owing to the suspicion with which he views any participation on the part of the British agent in matters affecting the safety and welfare of the Indian pilgrims, the great majority of such cases obtain no redress.

It has been of no avail to point out that hundreds of pilgrims, particularly those who suffered most from extortions, robbery and violence, had no opportunity of submitting their complaints personally, and that in the case of many of the better educated they naturally brought their written claims to their representative in Jeddah for submission to the Government.

A large number of these claims represented the cost of the return railway-fare and camel hire from Medina to Yenbo, the pilgrims having been ordered to return by another route, and having to bear the additional cost in full.

Representations to Emir Ali at Medina received no satisfaction, and the pilgrims were referred to Mecca, which, in the ordinary course, they would not again visit before their departure for India, when returning by the Rabegh route.

4. General

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived from Suoz, en route for the southern station, on the 11th January, and sailed on the 14th.

A certain financial stringency is evident at present, especially in Jeddah, where the arrival of the first pilgrim ships from Java is eagerly awaited.

Extracts from the Mecca report to the 11th January are attached.

Captain Nasiruddin's remarks on the present attitude of the King regarding his resignation are interesting.

I am inclined to discount the probability of an open rapprochement between the King and the Kemalists. It is reasonable to suppose it would have materialised sooner had there been real grounds for it, at the time when King Hussein's attitude made any event possible.

This possibility must, however, be still kept in view.

5. Press

No. 448, 449 and 450 of "Al Qibla" and No. 21 of "Al Falah" are forwarded herewith.

No. 20 of the latter paper is stated not to have been issued. It was more probably confiscated, as before, and a copy will be obtained if possible.

No. 448 of "Al Qibla," under the heading "The future will show you what you were ignorant of . . .," insinuates that the Jews in Palestine are there for no good purpose, and gives an instance of alleged Zionist pro-Bolshevik agitation, concluding with a statement of the prior claim, from long residence, of Arabs, whether Christians or Moslems, to Palestine.

No. 449 continues the above article and discusses the present position of the French in Syria, and the views expressed in France as to the advisability of remaining there.

No. 450 of "Al Qibla" is in the 1st issue of "Le Temps" in No. 13,326 of "Al Ahrum," also a translation of Mr Lloyd George's speech in reply to suggestions for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres, and with reference to suggested negotiations with Mustapha Kemal.

No. 21 of "Al Falah" maintains that, in the present situation of Arab affairs, there are only two alternatives for the Arabs—complete independence or death.

[illegible]

$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$

THE following steamers arrived at, and departed from, Jeddah between the 11th and 29th January, 1921:—

10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----

$M_{\text{eff}} = M_{\text{eff}}^{\text{eff}}$	$r = 0$	$r = 1$	$r = 2$	$r = 3$	$r = 4$	$r = 5$	$r = 6$	$r = 7$	$r = 8$	$r = 9$	$r = 10$	$r = 11$	$r = 12$	$r = 13$	$r = 14$	$r = 15$	$r = 16$	$r = 17$	$r = 18$	$r = 19$	$r = 20$	$r = 21$	$r = 22$	$r = 23$	$r = 24$	$r = 25$	$r = 26$	$r = 27$	$r = 28$	$r = 29$	$r = 30$	$r = 31$	$r = 32$	$r = 33$	$r = 34$	$r = 35$	$r = 36$	$r = 37$	$r = 38$	$r = 39$	$r = 40$	$r = 41$	$r = 42$	$r = 43$	$r = 44$	$r = 45$	$r = 46$	$r = 47$	$r = 48$	$r = 49$	$r = 50$	$r = 51$	$r = 52$	$r = 53$	$r = 54$	$r = 55$	$r = 56$	$r = 57$	$r = 58$	$r = 59$	$r = 60$	$r = 61$	$r = 62$	$r = 63$	$r = 64$	$r = 65$	$r = 66$	$r = 67$	$r = 68$	$r = 69$	$r = 70$	$r = 71$	$r = 72$	$r = 73$	$r = 74$	$r = 75$	$r = 76$	$r = 77$	$r = 78$	$r = 79$	$r = 80$	$r = 81$	$r = 82$	$r = 83$	$r = 84$	$r = 85$	$r = 86$	$r = 87$	$r = 88$	$r = 89$	$r = 90$	$r = 91$	$r = 92$	$r = 93$	$r = 94$	$r = 95$	$r = 96$	$r = 97$	$r = 98$	$r = 99$	$r = 100$
$M_{\text{eff}} = M_{\text{eff}}^{\text{eff}}$	$r = 0$	$r = 1$	$r = 2$	$r = 3$	$r = 4$	$r = 5$	$r = 6$	$r = 7$	$r = 8$	$r = 9$	$r = 10$	$r = 11$	$r = 12$	$r = 13$	$r = 14$	$r = 15$	$r = 16$	$r = 17$	$r = 18$	$r = 19$	$r = 20$	$r = 21$	$r = 22$	$r = 23$	$r = 24$	$r = 25$	$r = 26$	$r = 27$	$r = 28$	$r = 29$	$r = 30$	$r = 31$	$r = 32$	$r = 33$	$r = 34$	$r = 35$	$r = 36$	$r = 37$	$r = 38$	$r = 39$	$r = 40$	$r = 41$	$r = 42$	$r = 43$	$r = 44$	$r = 45$	$r = 46$	$r = 47$	$r = 48$	$r = 49$	$r = 50$	$r = 51$	$r = 52$	$r = 53$	$r = 54$	$r = 55$	$r = 56$	$r = 57$	$r = 58$	$r = 59$	$r = 60$	$r = 61$	$r = 62$	$r = 63$	$r = 64$	$r = 65$	$r = 66$	$r = 67$	$r = 68$	$r = 69$	$r = 70$	$r = 71$	$r = 72$	$r = 73$	$r = 74$	$r = 75$	$r = 76$	$r = 77$	$r = 78$	$r = 79$	$r = 80$	$r = 81$	$r = 82$	$r = 83$	$r = 84$	$r = 85$	$r = 86$	$r = 87$	$r = 88$	$r = 89$	$r = 90$	$r = 91$	$r = 92$	$r = 93$	$r = 94$	$r = 95$	$r = 96$	$r = 97$	$r = 98$	$r = 99$	$r = 100$

H M S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 11th January and departed on the 14th January.

E 1565 97 91

No. 142

(No. 003)

Cairo, January 21, 1921

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1242 of the 22nd November, 1920, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter from the Quarantine Board respecting Hajj pilgrimages and quarantine arrangements.

I love, &c

ALLENBY, F M

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 142

President of the Quarantine Board to the High Commissioner

9.5

Alexandria, January 11, 1921

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 20th November, enclosing extracts from the report of Major Marshall save to make the following observations:—

1. The board is quite aware that the authorities in Jeddah do not follow the international convention with regard to quarantine, and very much regret this. The question of international regulations has been discussed at the Office d'Hygiene publique in Paris.

Non-Egyptian pilgrims are not allowed to disembark at Egyptian ports on their return journey from the pilgrimage, except by special permission of the Ministry of Interior.

Owing to the lack of sufficient steamship accommodation, the foreign pilgrims had to wait till the last voyage of the "Kanah," as, on its previous journeys, it was fully taken up by Egyptian pilgrims.

ment to provide even this reduced accommodation for the pilgrims, and to ensure their transport to and from the Holy Places.

3 Pilgrims returning from the Hedjra must undergo the regulation quarantine measures at Tor. It was found that some pilgrims were attempting to get round this regulation by booking as first or second-class passengers on the mail-boats of the Khedivial Line. This was an infringement of the regulations. The mail-boats call regularly at Tor, and the pilgrims therefore were disembarked there (whenever their

The official decision on this question is annexed.

other pilgrims had to remain at Ter. His criticism is quite correct, but the long

66687

234

period that the various parties were detained at Tor was due solely to want of ship accommodation to ferry them back to Egypt, and not to any extension or prolongation of quarantine measures.

The arrangements for shipping accommodation are not in the hands of the Quarantine Board.

5. The suggestion that "it would have been easier, less expensive and more acceptable. I think Major Marshall, in this critical suggestion, has exceeded the limit within which his position allows him to offer an opinion. Besides which, he is wrong.

(1) The international regulations lay down that such measures must be carried out at Tor.

(2) No accommodation for landing large bodies of pilgrims and no properly equipped camp, nor the necessary offices, hospitals, water supply, electric lighting, laboratories, disinfection plant, &c., is in existence at Suez, nor could it be improvised, except at very large expenditure.

I have, &c.
ALEC GRANVILLE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 142

Extract from Regulations respecting Quarantine Measures.

Conseil sanitaire, maritime et quarantenaire d'Egypte.

Séance du 21 septembre 1920.

L'ARTICLE 5 des Dispositions générales du Pèlerinage ayant donné lieu à une discussion, le Conseil a pris la résolution suivante dans sa séance du 21 septembre 1920.

"Les navires ayant à bord des pèlerins de la dernière classe en proportion des navires à pèlerins; mais les pèlerins de toutes les classes amenés par lesdits navires subissent les mesures générales imposées aux pèlerins.

"Les bateaux en question qui ne font pas escale à Tor débarqueront leurs pèlerins à Suez ou à Port-Saïd."

E 1927 456 91]

No. 143

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon. — (Received February 14.)

(No. 6. Secret.)

My Lord,

Aden, January 27, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 143

Second Aden News Letter.

(Secret.)

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 12th January, 1921. —

TIHAMA

The latest reports from Hodeida indicate a temporary Imamite occupation. The report that certain

Qubra leaders were wounded and missing is now found to be incorrect. The Menakha-Bayl agent writes that the Idrisi and Qubra are fully prepared to check any Imamite advance on Tihama, strong rumours of which still continue. It would appear that the pro-Imamite Party in Hodeida is responsible for the circulation of much false news of Imamite victories. This party consists of Tahir Rajab and five other merchants who have been assisting Mahmud Nadhum in his propaganda work. They are said to have laid a scheme before the Imam, which has been strongly backed by the ex-Vah, for the occupation of the Tihama by the Imam pending the return of the Turks. The first step is stated to be the despatch by the Imam of a big expedition to drive the Idrisi out of the Tihama, as the latter, being our ally, is not considered by the schemers a fit ruler for Hodeida. The Imam has been assured that the British evacuation of Hodeida could easily be arranged once a big force entered the Tihama. It is said that under this scheme it is provided that the ex-Vah with his Turkish party should administer the whole of the Tihama with the exception of Hodeida, which is to be administered by the merchants themselves under the supervision of the Vah. The Imam is said to be satisfied with the scheme.

The Imam is said to be satisfied with the scheme. No particulars as to their contents are known.

The Political Officer, Hodeida, reports the death of Muhsen Haghir Maruf, the sheikh of the northern Zaranqa, at the end of last month.

One of our secret agents reports that Abdul Shaker, the Italian agent at Khoka, has been buying land and houses at Khoka and Kataba, and exporting and importing goods to and from Italian ports by a weekly service of dhows.

The telegraph line between Zabed and Tuz is still under construction. The line between Zabed and Tuz is still under construction.

Our agent at Zabed reports that the Imamite Inspector of Tihama, Abdul Ibrahim, referred to in previous letters, has returned to Tihama. During his stay at Khoka he built two military barracks at the public expense. The agent states that the revenue of Zabed last year amounted to 7,500 dollars, whereas this year the people were forced to pay 25,000 dollars.

The Political Officer Hodeida, reports that a dhow, which arrived from Musowah in the last week of December, brought letters to Tahir Rajab and party and the ex-Vah from Mahomed Amin, the sheikh of Jebel Reima, and Qadhi Hamud-al-Harazi, referred to in my letter dated the 25th November, 1920, and in my official letter No. 55, dated the 30th November, 1920. The purport of the letters to Tahir Rajab and party is said to be that the writers were well treated by the Governor of Asmara, who informed them that no definite settlement had been arrived at between the Turks and the Allies, that the Turks had not renounced their claim to the Yemen; and that a Mixed Commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Turkish Governments would arrive at Hodeida shortly to negotiate with the Imam and the Idrisi.

The sheikh of Jebel Reima, however, states that nothing more than polite conversation passed between him and the Italian Governor, who asked if the British had taken no steps to protect him against the Imam, but made no statement as to the

The sheikh of Jebel Reima and the Qadhi arrived at Aden from Musowah about three weeks ago to ask for British protection for their country and an immediate subsidy. I informed them that I could not accede to their request, as it was our policy to avoid any interference with the internal affairs of the Arabs. The Qadhi has returned to Hodeida, but the sheikh of Jebel Reima is still in Aden.

YEMEN (UPPER AND LOWER)

A Turkish officer, Captain Ahmed Kamal Ali Raza Pasha, late of the Sana gendarmes and General Staff, officer II to the Imam, who lately arrived from the Yemen, gave information which in the main corroborates the statement of Mustapha Azam and Tewfik Mahomed, the substance of which was given in my News Letter of the 22nd December, 1920. Captain Ahmed Kamal states that the ex-Vah Mahmud Nadhum is employed by the Imam as Inspector-General on a salary of 200 dollars a month, that he was deputed by the Imam to go to Menakha and negotiate for peace with the

A person claiming British subject status must prove his lineage or parentage, are presumed by King Hussein to be Hashimite subjects, until they can establish proof to the contrary. By recent regulations, passports of later date than 1914 are not admitted as evidence. Palm Indians, of whom there is a certain colony, are recognised as British subjects; the claims of other British or British-protected

residents—Somalis, Hadhramis, Egyptians, Indians, &c.—are vigorously contested. So long as capitulatory privileges are withheld from such persons, it is improbable that many will be found to assert a claim certain to prejudice their immediate interests and unlikely to result in any material advantage.

Mecca

Captain Nasiruddin estimates the number of British and British-protected residents of Mecca at 20,000, excluding from this calculation those Indians of families long domiciled in the Hedjaz who have in the course of generations lost all touch with their mother-country. After excepting, also, the doubtless considerable number

domicile, rather than to the accident of birth in Egypt, as a test of Egyptian nationality; there must remain some thousands of persons in Mecca whose original and continued connection with India, Aden, the Straits Settlements, Afghanistan and other treaty States and dependencies gives them a good title to British protection. It cannot be said that these persons have ever in the past been zealous to proclaim their status: in 1905, the latest year of which a complete record is available, only twenty-six inhabitants of Mecca were issued with certificates of registration, but their claim on us is good whenever they choose to present it. They hesitate now to do so from fear of the consequences of their action, should it become known to the King. They wish to be registered, but on condition that their registration be secret. So much may be gathered from the tentative overtures of leading Indians. They want certificates, in case of future trouble, but they are afraid lest the rumour of their application for these documents may accelerate the trouble they apprehend. They do not wish to parade their British nationality until they have cause to invoke British protection. In individual cases, there is a manifest intention to "have it both ways," to pose as a loyal subject of the Hashimite Government until circumstances make it expedient to produce, as a trump-card from the sleeve, a certificate of British nationality. The majority, however, are anxious only to escape the Royal attention. While they do not wish to be credited with a desire to disclaim Hashimite subjection, on the other hand, wish to be credited with a desire to disclaim Hashimite subjection.

If the British agent were in a position to guarantee them full capitulatory privileges, they might be more ready to register.

The difficulties of their position are evident, and their anxiety to dissemble is comprehensible, but it is considered that certificates of registration should only be issued to those who make straightforward application for them. It is generally undesirable that the grant of such certificates should be attended by pledges of mutual secrecy, and the Hedjaz, where everything becomes known sooner or later, and where frankness and sincerity characterize our policy, seems of an atmosphere peculiarly unpropitious to the innovation.

Jeddah

As with the colony in Mecca, the British and British-protected subjects in Jeddah have been issued since October last by this agency, all to Indian residents of Jeddah and almost all to Patnis, who are, as stated above, recognised in any case as British subjects by the Hashimite Government. The Indian colony of Jeddah numbers 175 heads of family, sixty-eight were registered in 1905.

There are about fifty Egyptian residents in Jeddah, none are registered.

Medina

Details of the British and British-protected residents of Medina are not available. A few British subjects are reported to be in Medina, but they are not registered. It is stated that a number of British subjects have preferred to remain in Mecca, have preferred to remain in Mecca, have preferred to remain in Mecca.

It is evident that dissatisfaction with the present régime has led many to Mecca. So long, however, as it is considered undesirable to enforce the Capitulations, they feel themselves to be at the mercy of the Hashimite Government. But if and when His Majesty's Government obtain from the Hashimite Government

some measure of capitulatory privilege for British nationals in the Hedjaz, a rush of applicants for protection, proportionate to the privileges at issue, may quite certainly be anticipated.

At present, however, with British subjects at the hands of the Government, he breaks the discreet silence which he has hitherto observed, and invokes our aid. Hence frequent correspondence with the King, and laboured arguments, of birthplace, parentage and domicile, with discussion which could well have been summarised in a certificate of registration, had the man, before the blow fell, had the courage to take one out.

But even where papers have been taken out, the King is prepared to disregard them, as the Kabul case, referred to in recent reports, has shown.

What is the result? The King's rôle is limited to watching cases in the interests of British subjects, after due notification of the arrest of a British subject and the reason therefor has been made to him by the Government. In practice even this formality is neglected until the facts are discovered and a protest made by the agency.

Briefly, any intervention on behalf of British subjects is resented as an attempt to interfere with the sovereign rights of the Hedjaz, the most jealously cherished of these being the right to refuse to individuals rights accorded to them elsewhere.

Arbitration Inter se

The question of the relations of British subjects in the Hedjaz inter se is of importance and requires early settlement. At present, recourse is regularly had to the local courts, which administer the Sharia law. Disputes are also settled by the arbitrators, by whose decisions the parties pledge themselves to abide. It is, of course, desirable. But a case which has recently arisen between Patni Indians, and which has been referred by the King to this agency for settlement, shows the dangers of the present anomalous situation. The parties are two brothers, Abu Bekr Fazil and Mohamed Fazil, the former of whom managed for many years a business in Jeddah in which both brothers, with an uncle, were equal partners. Three years ago, Mohamed Fazil, who had hitherto lived with his uncle in Patni, recalled his brother on some pretext to India, came to Jeddah himself, and annexed the business. The matter was referred to arbitrators, who found for Abu Bekr on every head, and ordered the brother to disgorge. The latter appealed against the decision to the court in Mecca, supported by a ruling purchased from the Grand Qadi. The King passed the whole case to this agency for action.

The facts of the case are clear, and I consider that Abu Bekr Fazil would win in any court of law. But, unless the procedure of the Capitulations be formally revived, this agency is powerless to punish the offender. There is no court to make an order, and no sanction of redress. The precedent of reference by the King to the agency is too valuable to ignore, for if the matter were referred back to Mecca with a ruling in favour of the defendant, the delicate question of capitulatory rights would alike be prejudiced, incidentally the case, on the Fetwa of the Grand Qadi, might well go against Abu Bekr Fazil.

In the meantime this unfortunate man is reduced to a state of destitution, and he daily petitions the agency for justice, which cannot apparently be done until a ruling is given. Abu Bekr Fazil, prosperous on his ill-gotten wealth, resists all pressure not backed by legal sanction.

Were the Capitulations in force, Mohamed Fazil could be made to pay, or to suffer for a refusal. Were the Capitulations never in any form to be revived, the case would remain a scandal, and a measure of justice would be denied. It is urgently required as to the measures which should be taken to terminate a scandal and to ensure justice.

Comparative Treatment of British and Arab Subjects

I am unable to add anything to Captain Nasiruddin's remarks under this head. The King's conduct of the Kabul case, referred to in recent reports, bears out the view that the British subjects in the Hedjaz are in a position of disadvantage, as it is a disqualification for representation on the local councils or on the "Shirket-el Wataniyyeh."

24

- It should be added that nothing in the above refers to British and British

No. 146

Major Edition to Earl Carson - (Received February 17)

No. 14

Mailed _____ January 30 1921

I HAVE received your letter dated _____ report for the period ending December 31, 1920.

Copies of the report and hospital bills have been taken back to London and Aden.

Et cetera 1 m. No. 126

Termination of Hostilities with Khalid

At arrangement as regards supplies is stated to have been made for the future and a list of the items to be supplied is attached to the report.

t, enford

Emir Ali und Abdallah

Unconfining

A notification has, however, at last been obtained from the Government that the dues to be collected in Jeddah this year will amount to 32½ piastres, including ^{taxes} ² four hours only for which the charge is 7½ piastres, is contemplated.

$$^{\circ} \phi_1^+ \phi_2^+ \phi_3^+ | \phi_1^- \phi_2^- \phi_3^- \rangle$$

B

[Not printed]

I beg to send you the above copies of communications which are like others concerning the same matter of protest or so but only as a matter of reminder for fear they may have been forgotten

The proof of this is that I have not discussed them, for fear it may be trouble-
some to His Majesty's Government. I have been in Syria since I first came
to Taraba in the year 1887 (1919) transgressing against the country in an official
manner relying on and trusting in the perfect and high knowledge of His Majesty's
Government of the facts of the case. I am more than ever convinced of their
principles than anybody. But if we consider with the least care the present situation
in all the Arab countries, we will find it quite contrary to the contents of such
communications above mentioned.

Here is the Honourable Ibn Saud transgressing against Ibn Sabah and Ibn Rashid in the countries, and against us and Asir. Here is also the Idrisi transgressing against the Imam. This is in spite of the decision of the deputation, composed of Great Britain's representatives who came to us in the last pilgrim season, to advise His Majesty the King to put an end to the relations with the Honourable Ibn Saud, and to stop any acts of transgression.

or expected that the country would be faced with the slightest part of such a task as being on the trial of the situation at the time the Government not to condemn the country for my offence if ever they have felt the same from me. For my ends and aims are to be grateful and faithful with everyone in the world.

May God grant success to all

HUSSEIN

January 29 1921

Enclosure 3 in No. 146.

Shipping Intelligence.

The following steamers arrived at, and departed from, Jeddah between the 21st and 30th January, 1922

Stationshöhe	Fläche	Einfluss	Zeit	Verlust	Zeit	Verlust
1. Station	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
2. Station	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000
3. Station	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000	3000
4. Station	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000	4000
5. Station	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000	5000
6. Station	6000	6000	6000	6000	6000	6000
7. Station	7000	7000	7000	7000	7000	7000
8. Station	8000	8000	8000	8000	8000	8000
9. Station	9000	9000	9000	9000	9000	9000
10. Station	10000	10000	10000	10000	10000	10000

E 2042 4 91]

No. 147

Foreign Officer to the Emir Fund

Your Rights:

[illegible]

The Department was informed that the new negotiations for the League Treaty (which in passing has not been signed by His Majesty King Hussein) that may have resulted in the passage of a new and possibly radical treaty and/or modifications will affect the Arab countries.

[6668]

EN 2

"REGINALD WINGATE, General,
"His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner, Egypt"

3. Should however questions arise in the course of the discussions which may affect the interests of these countries, His Majesty's Government would willingly support a proposal that you should be heard.

I have &c
R. C. LINDSAY

E 2403 4 91]

No. 145

Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George. — (Received at Foreign Office, February 23)

Confidential.

Dear Mr. Lloyd George,

I have written to the Foreign Office stating that my august father desires to attend the forthcoming Conference as his representative, for reasons that I have given. I now write to you personally, as the President of the Conference, to inform

1. The Conference is to consider measures to secure peace in the Middle East. His Majesty King Hussein has an equal right with the other Allies to be represented, and that to exclude the Arabs would be unfair.

2. The Hedjaz is still at war with Turkey. That is a state of affairs which should not continue.

3. His Majesty King Hussein has certain rights which have been neglected in the Treaty of Sévres, especially those dealing with the Arab population connected with religious questions that have devolved upon him.

4. His Majesty King Hussein is the only Arab ruler who is recognised by the Allies. The other would not secure peace in the Middle East. The object of the Conference is to secure peace in the Middle East.

5. The Allied Powers are aware of the present state of dissatisfaction among the Arabs, if they are represented and know that their case is being heard, their dissatisfaction will be removed.

6. The British Government have no objection to my father's presence at the Conference. The British Government have no objection to my father's presence at the Conference.

7. The British Government have no objection to my father's presence at the Conference. The British Government have no objection to my father's presence at the Conference.

8. The British Government have no objection to my father's presence at the Conference. The British Government have no objection to my father's presence at the Conference.

I remain, &c
IBN UL-HUSSEIN

Enclosure in No. 145

Telegram received on February 17 by General Daddad Pasha.

S III answer. Invitation of Mustapha Kemal to Eastern Conference to meet 21st February in London and neglect of Arabs has shown patriots' confidence is placed in the British Government.

Adhesion to movement of woman's mission has aroused feelings of young men, and certain young men who had taken refuge in Egypt and elsewhere have begun to

move, if things go on like this and Arabs are prevented from defending their rights.

Events may well occur in Syria which will give rise to the ruin of the country. People are everywhere asking whether Arabs will have a delegate at this Conference or not. Decisions of this Conference will be barometer for Maan movement.

E 2502 4 91

N 159

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 588)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 25 1921

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your information, copy of a memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on a conversation which took place on the 9th February between the French Ambassador and himself regarding the relations of the French and the British with the Arabs.

I am, &c
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Enclosure in N 159

Record of Conversation with the French Ambassador respecting Arab Relations

THE French Ambassador recurred in conversation with me to-day to the question of the Emir Feisal. He said he had had an opportunity of again speaking with General Gouraud, and had repeated to him the suggestion I had thrown out on a previous occasion as to the possibility of a meeting between the Emir and the Emir Feisal having arisen owing to the fact that the conversation had to be carried on in Arabic through an interpreter.

General Gouraud had at once explained that this suggestion offered no solution because, as a matter of fact, the conversation had taken place in French. It had been a *tit-for-tat*, and General Gouraud said it was impossible that he should be under any misapprehension of what Feisal said. I gather that what he actually did say was not quite that he was willing to join the French in turning out the English, but that, if the French would support Feisal, he would be in a position, and willing, to let them have all they wanted in Mesopotamia in the matter of oil. I thanked Count de Saint-Aulaire for this information, but did not pursue the subject. I confess that even now it seems to me that Feisal's remark, whilst it may be interpreted as showing determined hostility to England, may in fact have had a much more innocent meaning, its real significance must clearly depend on the whole trend of the conversation.

In any case, Count de Saint-Aulaire made it very clear that the French Government remained determined in their opposition to Feisal. He said they could not understand what services the British Government thought Feisal could render. It had been shown that he had no authority in Syria, as regards Mesopotamia, a more or less representative Arab assembly at Damascus had declared for Abdullah. I replied that the British Government were not primarily actuated by a desire to extract services from Feisal. Their relations with the Emir were conditioned partly by the very great services which he had already rendered to the Allies in the war against Turkey and partly by their anxiety not to have Feisal as an enemy in future. In their view Feisal was not so powerless and without influence as the French seemed to believe. The British position in the Middle East would be seriously affected in a general way if Mecca were to become the centre of an anti-British movement, and the connection of Feisal with Mecca, already very close, might any day become closer still in the event of Feisal succeeding his father as the Sherif of Mecca and the King of the Hedjaz.

I repeated what I had already told Count de Saint-Aulaire, that the candidate for the rulership of Mesopotamia was for the present Abdullah. It was the intention of His Majesty's Government to proceed very shortly with the definite establishment of an Arab State in Mesopotamia, and the French Government were to undertake and in accordance with their mandate. If Abdullah were the candidate chosen His Majesty's Government would no doubt recognise him, assurances being exacted to guarantee ourselves and also the French against any hostile movement or proposal. The British Government should set up an Arab ruler, probably of the Sherifian family, in the Transjordan.

Count de Saint-Aulaire at once said that such an arrangement would meet with no objection on the part of France. They had no wish to oppose Abdullah, their objection was to Feisal personally. I said I understood this and, if I might again refer to the danger of a discontented or hostile Feisal. I asked Count de Saint-Aulaire whether he had considered the effect on Feisal's position of a situation in which he would sit in Mecca and say that his brother had been welcomed by the

British in Mesopotamia, another member of his family had been established by the British in the Transjordan and that he himself had been driven out of Syria by the French.

The Emir Feisal was at present here in London, but he would shortly have to return to Mecca. Was it not worth while to consider what steps could be taken to mitigate Arab discontent as impersonated by Feisal? I suggested that one way of effecting this might be to do something to assure Feisal and the Arabs generally that the promises given by the Allies as to the setting up of native Arab States in the territories conquered from Turkey with Arab help were being practically fulfilled, or on the point of being fulfilled, not only in the British mandated territories, but also

Count de Saint Aulaire admitted at once that something would have to be done along in that direction. The present moment was not very favourable, because the check recently inflicted upon the French at Aintab by the Kemalists made it undesirable for the French to talk openly of withdrawal: this might have the appearance of running away from the Turk. But French public opinion, like public opinion in England, was complaining of the sacrifices, pecuniary and other, of the continued occupation of the mandated territories, and it was quite certain that the French military garrisons, not only in Cilicia but also in Syria, would have to be reduced very materially. The condition of Syria, however, was not entirely singular to that of Mesopotamia, there were several divergent interests and different nationalities: there were the Syrians of the coast, there were the Catholic Maronites, the Druses of the Lebanon and the Arabs of Damascus. Count de Saint-Aulaire thought that for this reason the French Government would be unlikely to favour the setting up of one ruler over the whole of Syria. They would prefer the creation of a number of federated smaller units.

I said that if this were so, would it not be judicious in the present circumstances to begin with the Damascus region, bearing in mind that the four Arab towns in that region were specially mentioned in the Sykes-Picot Agreement as destined to remain under Arab rule? It was possible to expect that the understanding between England and France which would enable them to inform Feisal that in accordance with the pledges given by them, native rulers were about to be set up in Mesopotamia in the Transjordan and in Damascus, then, even if Feisal himself were excluded, it would be a great advantage to the Arabs had not been fulfilled. It seemed to me that there was a great advantage for many obvious reasons, in arriving at a definite understanding between our two Governments covering their policy in the whole of these regions, and that as we were about to enter a Conference with the Kemalists, I hoped advantage would be taken of this opportunity to effect a general settlement.

Count de Saint Aulaire was loud in his thanks to me for explaining so frankly the way in which I looked at the situation. I told him that what I had said was my own opinion. I had received no instructions or authority from Lord Curzon to speak to him on the matter at all, and I did not wish my remarks to be taken as formal proposals or suggestions of my Government. Count de Saint Aulaire said that he would nevertheless reflect on what I had said, and expressed the hope that it would bear fruit if more formal negotiations were to be authorised later on.

February 9, 1921

E A C

E 3882 35 88

No. 150

Report on the Political Situation in Palestine and Transjordan for the month of February 1921, — Received March 1

THOUGH the text of the draft mandate (prematurely published in the "Jewish Chronicle") was reproduced in some of the local papers, yet the situation has been little, if at all, affected.

Moslems and Christians found in the text nothing either to allay or to increase their apprehensions.

There are some who hesitate to regard the published text as a final version of the instrument destined to control the fate of Palestine in the immediate future. There are those who hope that the policy of the British Government may yet undergo a change, and others who anticipate that the League of Nations, at any rate, will introduce important modifications.

The approaching conference of the Allies for the reconsideration of the conditions are opposed to the political dismemberment of the territories situated between the Taurus Mountains and the Sinai Peninsula.

Efforts are being made to collect signatures to a protest against the separation of the territories, geographically as well as ethnographically and historically. This protest is believed to be a document proclaimed by the Allies. Propaganda in the form of a leaflet containing arguments in a similar sense have been received from the Union Sirio de Torren, Coah, Mexico, and copies have been distributed in Palestine and in Transjordan.

There has also been a good deal of coming and going on the part of Arab Nationalists. Two members of the Syrian Congress, Auni Abul-Hadi, late Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Amir Feisal's Government, and Kamel Qassab, recently arrived in Jerusalem from Egypt. They have since proceeded to Maan to see

with his Excellency the High Commissioner. An account of this interview was forwarded in despatch No. 83 of the 12th February, 1921. Rud Bay Es Sulh has come from Damascus to Haifa.

These journeys seem to show a renewed effort on the part of Arab Nationalists in Egypt, in Palestine and in Syria to achieve their ends by co-operation.

Near East Conference, although representatives of the Kemalist Party, which since the Conference

there is a tendency among some Christians in Haifa to entertain and discuss the

which, particularly among the merchants and some of the richer people, are apt to be of a just administration will, it is confidently anticipated, succeed

of delegates of the Chambers of Commerce in Palestine and heads of Departments in the Administration. The meeting lasted all day, and a great variety of subjects were discussed. It gave much satisfaction to all present, as indicating a desire on the part of the Government to hear at first hand the views of business men and as an important step towards a form of representation in respect of business interests.

In Galilee the recent Haifa Congress and the subsequent attempts to gain support of the resolutions decided upon have caused an increased interest in the question of Jewish immigration, and, in the sub-district of Jenin, some excitement has been caused by the fact that some of the new shops that are being constructed by the municipality is being let to a Jew.

expressed by the Arab population owing to an unfortunate and unfounded impression that the Government intends to further the settlement of Jews in a manner detrimental to the interests of the Arab population. A large proportion of the Imperial domain (Jiftik), yet it was unjustly taken from them and is theirs in equity, while others consider that, although they can produce no title to possession, yet long usage has given them prescriptive rights as cultivators. Any such rights will, of course, be respected.

In Samaria, and particularly in Nablus, the age long dislike by the inhabitants to be a sentiment common to this part of the country, yet its organised and effective expression is the work of only a few of the more eager and energetic individuals.

In the Haifa district where Jewish politics play an almost greater part than those of any other section, there are increasing signs of somewhat acute differences between the members of the various parties (some Balahevik) and other Jewish parties; on the 17th a meeting of advanced Communists was held in Petach Tikvah. The Jewish inhabitants of the colony desired to read the place of the meeting, but were prevented by the police.

On the 19th a fight, resulting, however, in no serious casualties, took place between the members of the Mafage Poale Socialism and those of the Hapoel Hazzair (a Liberal

labour society established about fourteen years ago, representatives of both groups being engaged upon irrigation work near Yebna. On the same day another encounter between the Madage Paale Isma'ia and other Jews occurred. The situation calls rather for patience than anxiety.

The Beerseba district is, as usual, quiet. The population are anticipating a rich harvest due to the unexpectedly plentiful rainfall.

In the Gaza district the situation is also satisfactory on the whole, though there is not in this area the same almost complete detachment from political questions as at present appears to characterise the Beerseba district.

In Jerusalem the month has passed quietly. The Mufti is seriously ill, and is not expected to recover. The question of his successor is one that touches many interests and is consequently preoccupying many minds.

Both the French and Italian detachments have now been withdrawn from Palestine. Excellency the High Commissioner, and a farewell interview of a cordial character took place between him and the officers of the

During the month a general Awkal meeting was held under the presidency of the High Commissioner to discuss questions relating to Muslim Awkal and religious courts. Among the points discussed was whether the Waki budget should be submitted for sanction to the High Commissioner. The Mufti of Haifa was the chief objector. I was pointed out to him

by the first general Awkal meeting held on the 29th November, 1920.

I gave effect to this decision was due

Though acceptance in present conditions, might prove in the future. They frankly stated that they had no fear whatever so long as the present High Commissioner held office; but, they asked, what guarantee have we for the future?

The High Commissioner stated that he appreciated their view, but thought their fears groundless. His Excellency suggested that, if they so desired, the agreement might be concluded for a period of five years only. After further discussion in private the committee stated that their confidence in the High Commissioner had induced them to abandon opposition to the clause, and they did not ask for any time limit.

In Transjordan the arrival at Es-Salt of Sherief Ali during the month still impaired the authority of the Local Government. Some of the tribes in the neighbourhood have ceased paying taxes, and this again has placed the Local Government of the Belka (the best organised of all the Transjordanian Governments) in financial difficulties.

Letters have been received by local notables from Amur Abdallah saying that he is shortly to be among them. The Town Amman has been decorated in anticipation of his arrival. The Amur Abdallah has always emphasised the importance of maintaining good relations with the British representatives, and that Great Britain is the friend of the Arab cause and that France alone is the enemy. One (perhaps the main) object of

the visit is to secure more firmly implanting such a conviction in the minds not only of his immediate and avowed followers, but also in those of waverers in Transjordan, would give him the moral backing which he is in danger of losing owing to the

intentions. To succeed in more firmly implanting such a conviction in the minds not only of his immediate and avowed followers, but also in those of waverers in Transjordan, would give him the moral backing which he is in danger of losing owing to the

authority of the Local Government. It is hoped that the Amir's visit will not unduly impair the position held locally by the French in respect of the unfavourable effect of the French methods in Transjordan.

Refeim Pasha, of Kerak has now been in Jerusalem for a month. He recently declared he would resign, and has only recently been persuaded to agree to continue in his post.

Recent reports from his district indicate a resumption of tribal quarrels due to the absence of any effective authority.

Deputations have been received from the people of Tafle begging for assistance in setting up a form of Government. Neither the inhabitants of Kerak nor those of Tafle are at present inclined to abandon hope of ultimate assistance from His Majesty's Government.

In Ajloun the jealousies of the local sheikhs and the absence of any central authority prevent the formation of an efficient Administration. The people as a whole are orderly and more interested in agriculture than in politics, so that the Sheriefian agents, though active, have not hitherto succeeded in rousing much enthusiasm.

E 2965 455 91

No 151

Hajjar Batten to Earl Curzon — (Received March 7.)

(No. 15. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, February 20, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 20th February 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c

W. BATTEN

Acting British Agent

Enclosure 1 in No. 1

Jeddah Report for the Period February 1-20, 1921

Secret

Visit of King Hussein to Jeddah

HIS Majesty arrived on horseback on the morning of the 15th February, at the head of an imposing escort of Bedouin with streaming banners, an impressive and dignified figure.

His sons had preceded him the previous evening by car, a form of conveyance which King Hussein with characteristic energy seldom employs.

He slept the evening prior to his arrival as simply as his followers, on a carpet under the stars. The King carries his years remarkably well and appeared to be in excellent health and spirits.

In general conversation that morning during the course of my first visit, he showed that charming side of his personality which so impresses all who meet him on such occasions, but on turning for an instant after taking leave, I noticed the mask had fallen and it was a different man, brooding and sullen, who stood in the place of the kindly and genial patriarch of a moment before.

The French consul general's visit coincided with mine. His Majesty entertained us with anecdotes of Jeddah in the past, and talk of camels and horses. On my enquiring as to the progress of the water-supply scheme for Jeddah, he sketched a grandiose plan for pumping stations and reservoirs near Jebel Hadda, where, however, it appears that the supply is entirely dependent on rainfall in the hills. As anticipated, despite the promises held out of fresh water for Jeddah independent of the condenser, there appears to be no prospect of water reaching the town this year.

The King has been busy for some time sinking new wells and cleaning old ones, and supervising the work of a few Bedouin, under no skilled direction, in attempts to repair the old Turkish aqueduct. Although much has been made of the scheme, the townspeople of Jeddah have been very sceptical as to any benefit resulting, and general fears, which are only too well founded, have been expressed of the danger of a water famine this hot weather. The failure of the rains in this district has accentuated this danger, the reservoirs being empty, and the condenser in such a state that a complete breakdown may well occur.

In addition, the King has resolutely refused all my offers to help in obtaining a supply of coal, depending on what he has been able to extract from the wrecks at Kufidab amounting to some sixty tons only.

In mentioning the difficulty of obtaining coal he remarked that nothing was easier than to substitute the use of oil-fuel. The idea of converting the already decrepit condenser at a moment's notice by a royal wave of the hand appears to have no difficulties for King Hussein, and meanwhile the prospect of a failure of the water supply is seriously disturbing the population, already on very short commons as regards water.

The British Government is generally blamed by the Jeddans for this shortage of coal, and I have recently heard some illuminating remarks on the subject of conditions under Arab independence and Turkish rule, and frank admissions of inability to understand the licence allowed King Hussein to misgovern his people and mismanage the country, resulting in conditions worse than in the time of their subjection to the easy going, if corrupt Turkish Administration.

The French consul-general mentioned that he expected the "Montcalm" to arrive the next morning, an announcement which the King received with marked frigidity, probably for my benefit.

The former's mention of the latest news in Reuter's telegrams caused King Hussein laughingly to stop his ears, exclaiming that all the news from the outside world was bad, and that he wished to hear none of it.

Emirs Ali and Zeid were present, but remained in the background in accordance with Arab custom.

I called again in the afternoon, and presented Mr. Grafton-Smith, who conveyed a personal message from the Viscount Allenby which the King received with gratification.

King Hussein, who had with him Mazhar, son of Ahmed Nedim Pasha, a pleasant looking young Turk who speaks French and English with equal fluency and whom he treated as a great favourite, received us at his ease in his private apartments. During the ensuing interview, lasting about two hours, the King touched but lightly on current questions mentioned by myself, affecting a hearty and

he did not wish to cause mutual embarrassment by entering into serious discussions.

Beyond saying that he had just received a telegram from the Emir Feisal, which he would show me later (but has not done so far), and that he was well, he made no mention of London except to express a wish to pay a visit there in person. He appeared to be anxious about Emir Abdullah, who, he stated, had been in communication with British officers at Amman, but was unwilling to pursue the conversation further in this direction.

His Majesty referred several times to Syria and Damascus sadly, but without heat.

In reference to the collection of a proportion of the Quarantine Dues from pilgrims direct, the necessity of which had been explained as due to the Government's delay in deciding on the amount still liable to revision, King Hussein naively gave as his reason for being unwilling to agree to this, that he could not ask pilgrims to pay what would appear to them as an extra charge, in view of the present lack of special arrangements for their comfort and health.

Were the hospitals and hostels in Jeddah and Mecca, and on the road between, the fountains of water and similar facilities, which it was his intention to provide, in existence, they could have no objection to being charged a small amount in return for his care, but under present circumstances, being ignorant, they would be liable to complain at being charged dues with no visible return.

I explained that the dues would have been collected with their tickets in any case and sufficient notice been given, and that the upkeep of the Jeddah Quarantine Station against eventualities justified the levy of a suitable sum apart from the purely sanitary question of the actual period of detention, whereupon His Majesty

do anything which might cause them to feel they were badly treated.

He went on to discuss grandiose schemes for the amelioration of pilgrimage conditions, and especially for the provision of a proper water supply. The desire of his heart was to carry out all such schemes, but their execution would take time, and where could he find either the necessary materials, water raising machinery, cement for tanks, sanitary appliances, hospital equipment, and so forth?

To my offer, already previously conveyed to the Government as regards water raising plant, together with suitable catalogues and information to place the fullest information, and if he so desired it, technical assistance at his disposal, he replied that this was precisely the difficulty—nothing that was made in Europe was suitable for the Hedjaz, which in material as in political matters was a country apart.

He laughed away suggestions that adaptations could easily be made to suit the special conditions of the country, and that there were many parts of our Empire where similar difficulties had been successfully met and overcome, repeating that nothing which applied elsewhere could possibly be suitable for the Hedjaz.

visions of improvements in the country, but always, it is well understood, under his own direction and to be carried out without outside help in the way of technical advice or assistance. Hence, to take a small instance, the pitiful spectacle of a Syrian "engineer," so-called, with a monthly salary of £100, employed to construct a water supply for the city of Jeddah, and assuring His Majesty that fresh water would soon appear, with the help of God. The competent engineer employed last year at the condenser was dismissed because he was not an Arab.

Referring to the question of a railway to Mecca, His Majesty stated it was all very well for pilgrims from countries where conditions were different to ask for a railway, but what would become of the 52,000 Bedouin who depended for their livelihood on the camel-hire? I remarked that such objections had always been raised to similar projects, and instanced the Hedjaz Railway.

King Hussein remarked that if the Turks, with whom he well knew his own poor Government was unfavourably compared, had not been able to build a railway, he certainly could not be expected to do so.

This led him to discuss the general question of the attitude of pilgrims towards the conditions in the Hedjaz.

Some echo of the complaints made must have reached him for him to discuss the question at all, as King Hussein has always rigidly adhered to the view, which he went on to express, that the harder the conditions of the pilgrimage the greater was the merit.

The Hedjaz was a barren land, whose own inhabitants had the greatest difficulty in supporting a precarious existence. The Prophet had found it so, had said it was good, and if rocks, sand and hardship had been sufficient for Him, who were we in modern times to think that water should flow and gardens bloom in a land which God had sanctified as it was in its original state?

This was hardly in accordance with previous remarks, but to prove the point of the moment, King Hussein is apt to conveniently forget what is inconsistent in conversation as in larger issues.

To this land of desert and scarcity there came from all quarters of the world, where conditions of life were easier and men more soft, a vast army of the faithful, ignorant, who were apt to be unreasonable in comparing Hedjaz conditions with those of their own land. Moreover, the vast majority brought nothing with which to help improve the lot of their successors by adding to the prosperity of the country. On the contrary, they were rather a burden to it, although the task of providing for them was a duty laid on him by God, and he willingly did what was possible to maintain his guests.

Here the King laughingly enquired why the rich merchants of Calcutta and similar places did not perform the haj and help mitigate out of their superfluity the lot of their less fortunate but more pious brethren. It was suggested that riches and piety were not synonymous, whereupon King Hussein said that such people should be made to come, and not only those who far from being of assistance to their Holy Land were frequently a source of anxiety and loss. Last year he himself had supported over 4,000 destitutes who would otherwise have died. In making this statement it is feared His Majesty was drawing somewhat largely on his imagination.

Why did India only send beggars to the Hedjaz, and knowing the inability of the country to provide for their needs, why did not the Indian Government permit enough supplies for their support to be exported?

There followed a discussion on the supply question. I had great difficulty in persuading the King that any delay in shipment of the allotment in no way implied a stoppage of supplies, and again carefully explained the position, assuring him of that he was unwilling to modify his belief that such supplies have been restricted as a form of pressure on himself.

The present scarcity he affirmed, had reacted unfavourably against ourselves, and did not affect him as his people could not understand how it was that in time of war supplies were readily obtainable, whereas they were unaccountably withheld two years after the cessation of hostilities.

He knew quite well that the Indian Government could let him have the comparatively small quantity of supplies required by the Hedjaz if it so chose—this dispute renewed assurances as to the shortage and current conditions in India—but he was well

himself. His Majesty's Government and the Government of India might agree in larger matters, but it by no means followed that they saw eye to eye in everything, and he quite understood the feelings of India in this matter.

However, nothing he could say or we could do could alter the position, and asking gently that he knew of another person on whom India looked with a more favourable eye—Ibn Saud—King Hussein dismissed the subject.

He then asked with some appearance of anxiety if I had any inkling of the real spectacle sent, as he had been informed, and such a point made of impressing on him the importance of the visit, and he had been in doubt as to the proper course to take.

He would not have taken any notice of the last French warship to call had I not pressed him so strongly, and only did so in this instance on account of the rank of the officer making the visit. I again explained that the "Montcalm" on her way to the Far East was calling at ports of importance en route, and was paying him the compliment of a visit in the usual way of international courtesy.

His Majesty said that whatever the reasons might be he could hardly call the admiral a fitting reception in return for his courtesy. It could however, be readily understood that anybody would be averse to meeting at the same table those who had done, and he only trusted that beyond the official banquet on shore, and possibly a return visit, he would not be expected to accept hospitality on board.

He proposed sending the Kaimakam and the officer commanding Jeddah on board, and Emir Zeid with a guard of honour to meet the admiral on landing, and asked if that would be considered sufficient.

Taking into consideration the usual courtesies exchanged in foreign ports, I replied that I fully fell in with his views, and that while anything more would be unnecessary, less might be considered unfriendly in view of the obvious importance attached to the visit, and commending his good feeling in deputing the Emir Zeid to greet the admiral personally on his behalf.

The King mentioned that the visit had caused a great deal of comment, and he himself wondered if it had any political significance. In any case the departure of Emir Ali coinciding with the visit of the warship, and his previous intention of visiting Jeddah, had enabled him to fulfil the courtesies expected of him without straining his forbearance too far.

King Hussein was very bitter on the subject of the Madrasat al Falah, referred to in your Lordship's telegram to Beirut No. 27 of the 14th December, 1920, stating that the staff and the orphans had been expelled by the French authorities, and had all since made their way south and were now in the care of the Emir Abdullah. He asked how such actions could be reconciled with common justice, let alone the conditions of the so-called mandate, a mere excuse for penetration and colonisation for the benefit of a foreign race.

His Majesty was approaching delicate ground, and the conversation was turned into other channels, as any reminder that such questions cannot now be discussed with profit, or any hint that he only makes his own position increasingly difficult by adhering rigidly to ideas outside the sphere of practical politics, or that he is less concerned for the welfare of his own kingdom, merely having the effect of enraging His Majesty and rendering it impossible to deal with him. I am well aware that his complaints against France have their counterpart in similar statements to the French as to Palestine and Iraq, so that King Hussein's unceasing complaints on this subject may to a certain extent be discounted as an attempt, natural under the circumstances, possibly to profit by creating distrust between the two Allies.

On being asked for any news of Khalid's activities, the King informed me he had been driven away from the Tair district from any repetition of such raids, but whispered that he had some papers to show me later.

A typical example of King Hussein's tyrannical methods occurred the same evening. Wandering round the town unaccompanied after dark as is often his habit in Mecca, a habit which has resulted in many entertaining incidents, the King noticed that the water front was cumbered by a number of boats drawn up for repair. The next morning he gave orders that as the view of Jeddah from the sea was spoiled, and that he wished the French admiral to have an unobstructed view of the town, all boats

so drawn up, not in harbour by a certain hour that afternoon would be burnt to the ground. Several boats under construction. The former, which was not in a fit state to take the water, was excepted from the order through the personal intervention of Emir Zeid, on it being pointed out that, the launch being of steel, the cost of burning it would be prohibitive. Feverish activity resulted in the front being cleared, and a number of unfinished boats now repose under water, to the rage and mortification of their owners. The Emir al Bahr was sent for, dismissed and hurried off to Mecca under arrest.

Such are the methods mistakenly employed by King Hussein apparently with the idea of parading his authority, and which only result in his being regarded with contempt by the local officials and inhabitants alike with consternation.

Emir Ali called at the agency on the morning of the 10th. He stated he intended to proceed to Medina via El Ula as he had never visited the tribes on that route, and also to visit the tribes on the coast. The original reason for choosing this route was more probably the fear of difficulties with the Juhaina.

As regards recent events, there had been no question of negotiations between himself and Khalid, whose adherents, drawn for the most part from the Atwah and "some others" (probably the recalcitrant Hedjazis mentioned in previous reports), had made a series of rapid raids and then vanished.

He would have followed the raiders up and punished them, but for the instructions from his father that he was to abstain from any appearance of aggression, following the truce agreed on in September, but broken by Ibn Saud.

He drew my attention to the fact that events elsewhere in Arabia produced as infractions of this agreement were hardly connected with an agreement not to attack the Hedjaz, but His Highness assured me that they possessed proofs that Ibn Saud was the instigator of the whole affair, and that his adventures in Asir, Koweit and Shammar were but preludes to a combination against the Hedjaz.

He informed me he had established a chain of advanced posts north and south-east of the Wadi Layah on the exposed approach to the Tair district, and taken measures for their support in the event of further raids.

The most serious fighting had occurred in the Wadi Layah, his troops arriving just in time to prevent the crossing of the Wadi and driving the raiders back to Kikh (I Aklak) to the east, where he had established an outpost.

Khalid after spending some time at Okheidhir had proceeded to Riyadh, and anticipated that trouble would recur, and feared an attack under the guidance of Ibn Saud himself before long unless His Majesty's Government took steps to ensure peace.

It was most important that something should be settled during the next few months, as it was essential to ensure peaceful conditions in the country for the long year.

The Hedjaz Bedouin had been menaced with extermination if they resisted, nay, more, if they did not openly support Khalid, and such military preparations as had been made were purely to make them feel more secure and be in a position to maintain their fealty to the King.

I informed His Highness that all developments had been reported in the proper quarter.

The "Montcalm" arrived at midday and salutes were exchanged, Contre-Amiral Thoreine calling subsequently on the King. I asked leave to visit the King when convenient, but he announced his intention of calling at the Agency in the evening.

The King sent Emir Ali to announce his arrival while he was calling at the Italian Consulate, and arrived shortly afterwards with Emir Zeid. A short general conversation ensued.

King Hussein with one of his inimitable touches of courtesy, although of course a non-smoker, asked for "an English cigarette," as a compliment to his hosts. I politely puffed at a virginia, remarking that he had last smoked with Colonel Wilson two years ago, but from familiar indications I surmised that his visit was not entirely one of courtesy or to continue the pleasant conversation of the previous day.

King Hussein, taking the Union and Hedjaz flags hanging together in the room as a suitable opening, retained at great length all his troubles until nearly 11 p.m.

He had apparently come primed with a list of every grievance, great and small, and was determined to again unburden himself.

It would be idle to recapitulate in detail what is by now a well known theme but there was a certain amount which was new in his statements. The King was querulous and impatient but possibly owing to the presence of others, restrained himself from the outburst on the verge of which he more than once appeared to be.

He went further than usual in his accusations against Ibn Saud and almost stated in so many words that Great Britain was encouraging him, for some obscure purpose which he could not see.

How could Ibn Saud be declared to whom he himself had lent money and arms before the war, carry out his present adventures, necessitating lavish outlay, without receiving money from somewhere? The inference was obvious, but I had no wish to be drawn into a discussion which would lead nowhere and confined my efforts to keeping the conversation as tractable as possible. The very fact of Ibn Saud's existence now, a grievance with King Hussein, and the fact that His Majesty's Government does not immediately comply with his desire to adjudicate without question in his favour but adds to his sense of injury.

The King could not understand our attitude towards Ibn Saud and laid the blame on Mr. Plulby, on which subject he grew rapidly excited, muttering the name repeatedly.

The King was particularly bitter over the manner in which His Majesty's Government made the payment of the 300,000 rupees conditional on his meeting certain of their views, and affirmed it was an insult to expect him to do at all.

This question had already been worn threadbare and has been the subject of previous reports, but His Majesty was evidently determined not to leave until he had concluded his programme. Correspondence on the subject of this payment was

the occasion, discussing each and the subjects relevant and irrelevant to which they gave rise until even the patience of Emir Ali, who sat next to me, and occasionally whispered not to mind too much what his father said, appeared to be reaching an end. He even ventured once or twice to support my interruptions and remarks, but

of emotion from extreme affection to bitter irony and repressed anger, before

One of the letters produced drew attention to the use in the "Qibla" last year of the title "King of Arab Kings," against which he triumphantly placed the letter of the 30th August 1918 from Sir Henry McMahon on the independence of the Arab countries, and the

King Hussein asked me to say that His Majesty

in referring to the independ

in referring only to the possibility of the renewal,

d. of the Arab Khalifat was quite lost on the King.

mention of the eleventh-hour refusal to accept the Indian Pilgrim Host

by the King, who made the astonishing statement that he had been explicitly informed

that it would consist of only one tent, whereas it was large enough to need 1,000 camels

for transport. The facts of the case were, that King Hussein on being notified of the

200 camels being asked for to send a small unit purely for Indian pilgrims,

this request was refused. I pointed out that he was mistaken and that in any case

it was difficult to see how the size of the hospital in this case an ordinary field

hospital unit—affected the matter, and that I should have thought that once he had

few of his well known solicitude for the comfort and health of pilgrims that it

could be adequate for their needs.

The King angrily replied that he had been deceived and could never allow inter-

ference (as he termed it) with the pilgrims on such a scale and that the pilgrims

themselves would be the first to resent it.

The above is sufficient comment on the real extent of the genuineness of King Hussein's desire, expressed whenever it suits him to pose as an enlightened Monarch, to improve the conditions of the pilgrims.

Other letters were produced with the object of proving the sinister designs of Ibn Saud against himself, but only one, a short note to a certain Hadi Abu Raquba (? of Munjabah, Birk Tihamah) with Ibn Saud's seal, implicated Ibn Saud in any way directly. It was, moreover, dated 1837, and was couched in general terms, stating that all who wished to be safe would be under the protection of God if they belie-

tain letters showed that Khamid had been in communication last November with the notoriously turbulent Beni Harith north of Edda and tribes of the Urdiyah district, also that attempts had been made, apparently without success, to cause a combination between the Ghamid and Zahran, who were asked to meet Khulid at Aklak with the object of capturing Taif and cutting off the water of Ain Zubeida from Mecca.

Another letter of recent date was from Mohamed ibn Abdul Aziz of Edda reporting that Ibn Mufarrah, the rival of Ibn Aith of Edda, and other minor Asir chiefs from the Tihamah had been in Riyadh, but apparently in connection with further designs against Asir, and not against the Hedjaz. King Hussein forwarded me a similar letter some time ago from the same writer complaining of Ibn Saud's

but whatever truth there may be in the belief that Ibn Saud is contemplating a back on King Hussein, the latter insists on treating any aggression elsewhere as equally directed against himself, and as a violation of the truce arranged last September, which referred purely to the Hedjaz. Hassan ibn Aith is at present in Mecca, and the recent frequent reference to events in Asir tend to show that King Hussein is meddling in affairs outside his proper sphere, although it is only fair to take into consideration that he is justified to a certain extent in attempting to take measures to counter intrigues possibly aimed eventually at himself, and that intrigue and counter intrigue are normal to the politics of the country.

Ali ibn Abdu, the Sheikh of Birk, having held up shows proceeding north from Kufidah, King Hussein referred the matter to me, remarking ironically that this man was a partisan of the Idriat, the Ally of Great Britain.

His Majesty repeated earnestly the substance of what Emir Ali had said in the on the importance for arranging for negotiations with Ibn Saud before the age, and said his own good intentions had been proved by his correct attitude of provocation, and his confusing military measures purely to defence when finally forced to take action against those who had disregarded the truce.

Referring to his refusal to sign the Peace Treaty, he said he could not be expected to do so, and that in any case his refusal had been of no consequence, as the treaty would soon be radically altered.

If he had not been a good Moslem he would have committed suicide long ago, as he could expect nothing in a world where force apparently was the sole arbiter.

Had the Arab nation possessed a navy like Great Britain," he bitterly remarked, "things would have been very different," and went on to say that had Great Britain not wasted money over the Archangel expedition and the Dardanelles, this would have been better expended in continuing to support the Hedjaz but for which Turkey could never have been beaten, but it was too late now, and all the early promise of the revolt had been falsified and the good effect lost.

The King, as usual at such interviews, again offered his resignation, employing the somewhat strange argument that if the British Government allowed its Secretary for War and others to resign there could be no difficulty in accepting his own resignation.

King Hussein's wide superficial knowledge of events in the outside world which he is fond of citing and woefully misapplies, is one of the main bars to any reasonable discussion with him.

He again expressed, however, his great desire to visit London, and made indirectly some surprisingly frank admissions of his jealousy of Emir Feisal. His Majesty's Government obviously would not let him (the King) visit England now but why Feisal had been chosen before to attend the Peace Conference, and not himself he could never understand. Feisal was no better than a gramophone repeating the last words he had heard, and had no claim to speak with authority. I reminded His Majesty that the Emir was his own chosen representative but this merely drew from him a snort of contempt.

The King asked me to keep the letters for careful consideration, and concluded with an apology for detaining me so long. I was not to think he was complaining—he had merely wished to present facts which were evident to everybody, and to leave me to draw my own conclusions.

With this parting shot King Hussein took leave courteously and even affectionately at the gate of the agency.

In connection with certain subjects raised at this interview, the translation of a letter received some days previously from King Hussein is attached to this report. The substance of this letter was communicated to your Lordship in my telegram No. 16 of the 31st February.

I called on Emir Ali the next morning. His Highness trusted the interview of the previous night would not be taken too seriously and said he could not but feel embarrassed at certain of the remarks dropped by his father in the heat of the moment, which he knew he did not really intend. The question of Akhwan aggression was again discussed, the Emir repeating his warnings and appeals.

The King sent for the Khedivial agent that morning, in order to arrange for the mail steamer to call at Rabegh for the Emir on his way to Wejeh and flew into a rage

Alexandria asking urgently for permission to arrange this. King Hussein said he was King of the country, and that foreign firms established in Jeddah had to obey his orders without reference elsewhere, or leave, and refused to listen to explanations.

The position of the agent was not enviable, and I accordingly supported him cable by one from the agency, informing Emir Ali and the King that the call would be arranged, and that the agent had not only been quite correct, but had no option but to refer such a request to his principals, while being, as always, ready to help in any matter desired by the King as far as his responsibility extended.

I paid an official call with the officers of the agency on Contr-Amiral Thomine that afternoon at the French consulate.

A banquet was given in the evening at the Haludia in his honour to which all officers of the "Montcalm" not on duty were also invited. The arrangements were on a high level. It is stated by a leading Indian merchant who is anxious to please King Hussein, and the assemblage of Bedouin sheikhs in full panoply under the two Emirs particularly impressive.

The only national anthems played were the British, which was twice repeated, and the Hedjaz, but any embarrassment was avoided owing to the arrival somewhat earlier than the other guests of the agency staff.

King Hussein was very satisfactory. In a somewhat embarrassing stage whisper the King remarked to me once, however, that this had all been arranged in order not to offend the British and that we were the real hosts.

His Majesty visited the "Montcalm" on the morning of the 12th when he inspected the ship and showed great interest in the crew, addressing a few words through his interpreter to each peloton in turn, and making a speech which is referred to later.

I called to bid farewell to Emir Ali and later on to Cavalier Bernabes who was proceeding on leave and on whom the King also called on board the Italian mail steamer. The "Montcalm" sailed in the afternoon en route for Jibuti.

The King spent most of the following day in a visit to the islands, inspecting the quarantine arrangements and talking to the Japanese pilgrims landed from the first steamer.

Emir Zeid called in the morning, showing me at the King's request yet another anonymous letter from the "Egyptian Nation" differing only from former similar missives in the return of the Turks who after the expected revision of the

visited the King in the evening. He had the grace to apologise for his remarks to Great Britain.

I showed him a telegram received from India, from which it appeared that the matter that there was in reality no great shortage, and that in any case Allah knew how to look after his people.

An interesting discussion on the animals and birds of the country, the method of taming them, and general conversation then ensued for about an hour.

He had given orders for the pilgrims to be released from

Agricultural Mission

The King was most anxious to accompany me. He sent his attendant Masad Nedim as a cicerone instead, with the officer commanding Jeddah, and the former's anxiety unduly to lengthen the subsequent pleasant drive was partly explained, on my insisting on returning to take leave and not keep His Majesty waiting by finding that he had left the barracks and was closeted with the French consul general at the Palace, where, after waiting a considerable time until the latter's departure, I took leave after a short interview, during which the King was not in the best of humours.

His Majesty's parting words, after announcing his intention of returning in a week or ten days, were to the effect that while he appreciated the offers made to get anything he might require for the needs of the country, I knew quite well what was the most important matter in which we could be of assistance.

King Hussein left with Emir Zeid shortly afterwards for Mecca.

His visit was a source of not unjust apprehension to the officials and townspeople. Three of the former were dismissed summarily, with no reason given and sent to Mecca, and the Kamakam, who appeared to be in a state of abject fear and had grown visibly thinner, narrowly escaped a like fate, which he anticipates on the occasion of the next Royal visitation. He has been again warned that he should avoid becoming too familiar with foreigners. He has visited the agency not more than half a dozen times in nearly a year.

The King summoned all the local merchants, and told them that while he well knew that they prayed daily for his death, this was unjust to him, but for whom they could not make such handsome profits over the supplies which he caused to be imported, concluding with a tearful exhortation to his "children" to pray rather for his long life. He omitted to mention when some of these same merchants might expect a refund of their "loans," which are extracted on the ingenious principle of giving in exchange, for Jeddah merchants, a note on the local customs cancelling customs dues up to the amount borrowed when enough goods have been entered to cover the loan.

As such loans amount singly to anything between 1,000-10,000, this scheme is not appreciated. In addition, a number of the merchants he addressed are still his creditors for the wheat commandeered last autumn.

The loan system as operated in Medina is even simpler, the unfortunate donor being given an order on the Jeddah Customs, which has been honoured so far in only one case—that of a British Indian who threatened to take the matter up with the agency unless the 1,000/ forcibly borrowed from him in Medina was returned by a certain date.

This same merchant had commandeered from him a portion of a consignment of rice for Medina, costing 4/ per sack, being subsequently repaid by a corresponding number of sacks of bad flour of practically no value.

King Hussein's expected return in a few days is reported to be in connection with the imposition of a new scale of taxes. Dissatisfaction in the town is wide spread, and were it not for the King's stringent regulations, there is little doubt that a large number of his subjects would emigrate.

Intense indignation is expressed at one of the latest examples of King Hussein's tyranny—the case of a local merchant and dhow owner who sent a consignment of goods purchased in Jeddah to Birk where they were sold, the money obtained there in payment being despatched to Massowa, where he has an agent.

The receipt for this having been seen by the Director General of Quarantine who is also King Hussein's chief spy, the latter reported the transaction to Mecca.

The merchant has been fined 3,000/—the amount of the transaction, and the bulk

his fellow prisoners. After several petitions he got two loaves of millet per diem. He is said to be practically naked or not actually naked, as he has got nothing to wear.

The prisoners or their friends continually submit petitions to the King, which are in most cases returned in original to the applicants. Emin Effendi says that in almost every instance the returned petition bears an enquiry in the King's own hand asking about the petitioner and his fault, with the Kaimakam's detailed answer and the King's order pending. The Kaimakam's answers are never clear enough to show to the poor victim the real reason of his imprisonment, and most of them, therefore, do not know of what they are accused. After hearing such stories, one cannot help feeling that it is due to its intricacy that so much injustice is being done. During the Turkish régime, either through the personal jealousy between the Vali or the Grand Shereef, or to some other cause, such glaring injustice was never perpetrated. Now there is no appeal, no redress.

2. In one of the previous reports it was stated that the King was carrying out the very desirable improvement of widening the main street of the town. Needless

pay for the demolition and rebuilding of their premises on given lines. This activity is now encompassing some side streets also. Two instances happened during the period under reference, where houses under construction on plans and site approved by the local municipality had to be pulled down to a depth of nearly 4 ft., involving heavy monetary loss to their owners.

Another case, but of a different kind, occurred on the 25th when the King got a platform on the Jebel Abu Kubaia pulled down. The platform was made by Sheikh Abdul Kadir Shebi, at a height of over 150 ft. above the street level. The King saw the construction from his palace through his binoculars and ordered his slaves to fetch the workmen, who were promptly put in prison. He went and explained the matter to the King and stated that if there was any fault it was his and not that of the workmen. The King released the workmen and Shebi, believing that everything was in order, started the work again. The head workman was apprehended and imprisoned and the platform demolished through municipal action. No explanation was vouchsafed to Shebi, whose family it may be said, is second only to that of the King himself in importance, as bearers of the 'Key of the Holy Kaaba', entrusted to them by the Prophet himself under Divine instructions. The Shebi, however, refused to go to the King a second time for the purpose.

3. There is practically no news of Emir Abdullah and his activities. I only know of one telegram, in poetry, received here about three days back in which the Emir complained of his father's silence and signed himself as the 'Forgotten'. It has been reported to me from several sources that Emir Abdullah is well supplied with foodstuffs and cash. He has stopped Medinites entering his camp, and sent those who had opened temporary hostels at Maan and elsewhere to Medina.

4. There is just a rumour that Emir Ali may proceed to Medina shortly. Emir Zeid is already tired of his life here, and has given out that he will shortly proceed to England to prosecute his studies there.

5. An Indian applied for permission to bring two Hakims and two midwives from India and start a regular dispensary here. On applying to the King he was told that permission for such an enterprise can only be given if all the members of his establishment became Arab subjects. This the applicant could not agree to and he told the King that he cannot break his relations with India and although he has been here for some time yet he is a British subject still. The scheme has, therefore, fallen through. It is a great pity that any suggestion for the amelioration of the local conditions is met with a rebuff and I have reason to believe that Khandwani is also mistrusted for having ulterior motives against the Arab State and this is the reason given me by one who ought to be in the know for Khandwani's requests having so far been received coldly.

Enclosure 3 in No. 131

King Hussein to Acting British Agent, Jeddah

(Translation)

Your Honour,

(After respects.)

February 2, 1921

YOL R Excellency's letter of the 30th January, 1921, has been received. Anyhow Great Britain will find us in the place in which she leaves us, but I have no personal object or private aim to be pleased at getting or to be angry at losing. Great Britain invited me and I found her invitation does not affect my after life and serves us all in our worldly affairs, and anyhow it happened as it happened. And now it appears to her as it may be known from the contents of your letter of the 24th August, 1920 and from the contents of the copies of his Excellency the High Commissioner's telegram therein, in which he says, 'It is not necessary to recount the various matters in which the wishes of His Majesty's Government were not accepted lately, but I note with surprise and regret that the refusal of allowing the Indian Hospital was added to them, &c.' This is also proved by your letter of the 4th August, 1920, in which you state that his Excellency the High Commissioner approves the course you are following as regards the Nejd pilgrims, and also by what is understood from the three points regarding them, and that if I do not act with you in this matter, he cannot obtain sanction for the payment of the 300,000 rupees.

Though I replied to those letters at the time, I am mentioning them now to point out this difficulty which I think is important as it disagrees with the intended principle, and there is no reason why the lowest official of Great Britain should worry about it, and it is not necessary for your sincere friend to bear the least suffering of its trouble and difficulty, nor is it necessary for this miserable country to have its comfort and tranquillity disturbed by such attacks from an ally of Great Britain whose worth and value to her are proved by her allowing him something and depriving others of the same.

This time I firstly beg to draw the attention of Great Britain to how Ibn Saud has transgressed and attacked Ibn Sabah in his country, while the latter has favoured on those who are living from the Saud descendants, and he is the cause of their life and happiness, and he has saved them from destruction.

This very simple matter of transgression proves my innocence in anything which may be attributed to me. Besides this, if you bear it in mind and compare it with his Excellency the High Commissioner's statement communicated by you in your letter of the 4th August, 1920, 'The only object of His Majesty's Government is for peace in Arabia' you will see what Great Britain's official should say and do.

Secondly, I beg to request that the contents of my letter of 21.11.36 to his Excellency the High Commissioner should be reconsidered and executed quite urgently because the material and mental inability necessitates same, and the old date of that request removes every doubt or hesitation.

It is true your Excellency, that nobody is ignorant that patience is necessary in many matters, but what will the case be with things that are not on the same line like other countries to suffer from what is happening in them, as you pointed out.

I beg to conclude by confirming my assurance in the views of one of my known letters referred to above (of 21.11.36), for the pilgrim season is approaching and in asking you to deeply and carefully consider the matter in all respects in order that you may see at least that the Government is still in case of war by all means while it is in its course of growth. This, of course, clearly shows you what we are suffering. God is the best help.

HUSSEIN

* The head of a prosperous Indian firm trading with Jeddah, who has been absent for over two years, and who, on his return recently, was welcomed in the 'Qibla' as a Hashimite subject returning to be laid.

Enclosure 4 in No. 151

Shipping Intelligence to February 29, 1921

Shipping steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 31st January and

Steamships	Flag	From	To	Arrived	Left	Pilgrims (estimated)	Cargo (estimated)
Dakshin	"	Port Sudan	Suez	" 11	" 12		
Amara	"	Suez	Port Sudan	" 12	" 13		
Porto Manafra	"	Masara	Suez	" 12	" 13		
Vergennes	"	Suez	Port Sudan	" 14	" 15		
Manafra	"	Suez	Port Sudan	" 15	" 16		

The French cruiser "Montcalm" arrived on the 10th and left on the 12th February, 1921.

E 2967 455 91

No. 151

Major Batten to Earl Curzon - (Received March 7)

(No. 10)

My Lord,

Jeddah, February 21, 1921

IN accordance with your Lordship's telegram No. 18 of the 19th February, 1921, I have the honour to forward a copy of the Summary furnished to Jerusalem, Reginald A. N. Nobi, to supplement the last issue of "Notes on the Middle East".

I have &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.
Acting British Agent

Enclosure in No. 152

Summary of Events in the Hedjaz for the period July-December 1920

(Secret)

King Hussein Ibn Saud and the Nejd Pilgrimage

KING HUSSEIN refused to allow Nejd pilgrims to come to Mecca pending settlement of the dispute between him and Ibn Saud, and made difficulties over meeting the latter with a view to discussions.

On Ibn Saud's guarantees as to the behaviour of his pilgrims, the King refused to meet them, and the issue was suspended until there should be some change in King Hussein's attitude.

Quarantine

In spite of the apology tendered for the treatment of the Agency Medical Officer and his promise to dismiss the Hussein brothers for their behaviour, the King remained obdurate over the question of control.

Major Marshall, R.A.M.C., after his arrival was allowed to inspect the arrangements and submit recommendations, but control still remained entirely under the Hussein Government.

Visit of King Hussein to Jeddah

King Hussein visited Jeddah, from the 9th to the 19th July.

As the British agent, he raised the question of the right of France to occupy Syria. He did not wish Syria to be annexed to the Hedjaz, but Great Britain should assist the inhabitants to be free in choosing their own form of Government without necessarily coming into conflict with France. All he asked was to be treated as an ally, as well as France, who had no right to territorial acquisitions in Syria, where the whole burden had fallen on Great Britain and the Arabs.

The King also invited the Allied representatives to a joint meeting to inform them that he could not accept the ultimatum from the French Government to Feisal. In accordance with the promises of the Allies, the Hedjaz, Syria, Palestine and Iraq should be entirely independent, and they were one and the same. If Syria was under foreign control he would be false to his promises to the Arabs and the eventual independence of all parts of Arabia.

He referred to the overtures made to him by Jemal Pasha, on behalf of Germany who promised the Arabs independence if they deserted the Allies and excluded by stating that as Great Britain was the first ally with whom he had entered into agreement, he would refer all such matters through the British Government.

The general impression locally and in Mecca at the time of the visit was that the King had been summoned to abdicate, and would have left in one of the warships then in harbour.

Help for Syria

Some troops were despatched northwards from Medina, and it was generally believed that British diplomacy would be successful in arresting the advance of the French, and that they would in any case be unable to defeat the Arab-Syrian army.

Medina

A deputation left to congratulate Ibn Rashid on his succession. Conditions in and around the town were gradually becoming more insecure.

Ismailiyah

The town was attacked by the Ikhwan, and the kaimakam and Government employees driven out, the former kaimakam, who had been dismissed by the King, saving himself. A small expedition was despatched from Yenbo to evict him.

August

Syria

Events in Syria caused great excitement in Mecca, the British Government being criticised for not preventing the capture of Damascus. In Jeddah the effect was somewhat different, owing to the general fear and hatred with which the King is regarded, and the consequent unpopularity of the present ruling family.

Subsidy

King Hussein again proffered a request to be allowed to abdicate, his position being now impossible.

His refusal to meet the views of His Majesty's Government on the question of the subsidy, and his refusal to meet the views of His Majesty's Government on the question of the subsidy, had led to its issue being suspended until there should be some change in King Hussein's attitude.

Pilgrimage

Some 55,000 pilgrims came by sea, and the total at Arafat was variously estimated but did not probably exceed 80,000.

Owing to the abnormal heat and the hardships which, as usual, had to be borne by the pilgrims, the death-rate was very high.

No infectious epidemic, fortunately, broke out and on the whole the pilgrimage may be said to have been a success. Although the hardships, extortions and ill-treatment to which the pilgrims were subjected, and their miserable state under unsanitary and congested conditions after their return reflected very unfavourably on present conditions in the Hedjaz.

King Hussein, after first giving permission, refused to allow the field hospital sent from India to be used, except in Jeddah. Many hundreds of lives would have been saved had this hospital accompanied the pilgrimage, as intended.

Visit of Emirs Abdullah and Ali

His Highness the Emir Abdullah, who came to Jeddah to meet his brother on the latter's arrival from Medina, at an interview with the British agent referred at length on behalf of the King to Syria and the danger apprehended from Ibn Saud and the Akhwan, concluding by referring to the dishonour of the subsidy being withheld as a threat or offered as a bribe. It is difficult to persuade the King, of the justice of the hope that in return for financial help he should do his best to meet the views of His Majesty's Government as far as possible.

Deputation from Riyadh

Ahmed bin Thumayn, accompanied by Khan Sahib Sadiq Hassan from Bal'ur, was sent by Ibn Saud with a letter to King Hussein with a view to arranging some settlement preliminary to a more lasting agreement. The party was well received by the King.

Several meetings took place, at which the deputation, with good will and spirit and endeavoured to persuade the King to meet the deputation half way, but largely owing to King Hussein's obstinacy, the best that could be obtained was a somewhat unsatisfactory agreement for a mutual truce for a short period until the King could receive a more definite proposition from the Government. The reason given in the document finally drawn up, and signed by the King after repeated refusals, for not carrying negotiations further, was the insufficiency of the powers accorded by Ibn Saud to his representative.

King Hussein sent a sealed autograph letter to Ibn Saud, the contents of which are not known.

Indian Soldiers' Pilgrimage

The Indian soldiers' Pilgrimage party expressed dissatisfaction at their reception this year and one or two unpleasant incidents occurred between them and the Bedouin on the return march from Mecca.

General Attitude of King Hussein

Repeated efforts were made to bring King Hussein into a more reasonable frame of mind over the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and other matters, but with no success.

Relations between him and the French representative grew somewhat strained and the visit of a French warship did not improve matters.

Capitulations

The King refused to acknowledge them in any form, although bound to abide by the rules in force under the Turks as to foreign rights until the conclusion of some further separate agreement between the Hedjaz and the Allies.

Supplies from India

The King commandeered the major portion of the cheap supplies specially shipped from India for the Pilgrimage, but which arrived too late to be used for the purpose intended.

The bulk of these supplies were sent to Taif, where military preparations were now reported.

Reported Intrigues with Mustapha Kemal

Reports of communications between Mustapha Kemal and the King became increasingly frequent, but no confirmation could be obtained of their truth.

Departure of Emir Abdullah for Medina

Much ado was made about the despatch of help to the Arabs in Syria. Emir Abdullah left hurriedly, ostensibly to take his brother's place in Medina, with a large following, but it was generally understood his destination was Syria.

Recruiting, which had been very active, fell off considerably on the truth about the alleged sweeping victories over the French becoming known.

OCTOBER

Press

The tone of the local press about this period became increasingly anti-European. The paper "Al Fatah," restarted in Mecca after the flight of its editor from Damascus, was suspended by the King for publishing an article practically amounting to a threat of jihad, in connection with events in Irak, but was allowed to resume publication.

Departure of Emir Abdullah for Mu'at

Emir Abdullah left for Mu'at, it being given out that he was proceeding on tour of inspection.

Precautions against Akhwan

In consequence of rumours as to recrudescence of Akhwan activity, Emir Ali was sent to take command at Taif as a precautionary measure.

Akhwan Aggression

King Hussein complained repeatedly of alleged acts of Akhwan aggression but ~~these were either unfounded or exaggerated~~ in the hope of impressing His Majesty's Government with the imminence of an attack by Ibn Saud, with a view to obtaining our active intervention.

British Mecca Representative

The position of the British Moslem representative at Mecca, which had long been a difficult one, became virtually impossible, his activities being circumscribed in every possible way and the King seizing every opportunity of showing his disapproval of the appointment.

Disregard of Foreign Rights

Incidents had occurred of British subjects being arrested without reference or justification, but these had been so far satisfactorily settled without direct reference to the King.

An ambiguous letter from him on the subject of passports and his refusal to reconsider the case of two British Indians who had been unjustly imprisoned, foreboded his raising the question of foreign rights with us as he had done with the French.

This question became acute shortly afterwards on his persisting in refusing to release the above his issue of secret orders that no foreign subjects would be allowed to leave the Hedjaz unless in possession of pre-war passports, and his refusal to recognise the validity of any papers whatsoever issued since the beginning of the war.

Visit of King Hussein to Jeddah

The King visited Jeddah on the 24th of November to welcome Emir Zeid home from Europe. In a long interview, he recapitulated all his grievances, and his warnings as to the intentions of Ibn Saud, concluding with a tearful prayer to be relieved of his unenviable responsibility. He also alluded to the promises made by the Allies, and again laid the responsibility for future events on His Majesty's Government, but reaffirmed his loyalty whatever might happen.

Refusal of King Hussein to Recognize Passports issued since 1914 and interference with Travel of Foreign Subjects

While he was in Jeddah, certain British subjects were prevented from returning to Singapore by the last available steamer and imprisoned for appealing to the British agent. Their instant release was obtained, but on the same day another British subject was prevented for the second time from returning by the mail steamer to the Sudan. The King's orders were now officially published. All efforts were made to point out to him the unwisdom and illegality of his action, and to obtain a revision or arrive at some satisfactory compromise but without avail.

DECEMBER

(Continued) The tone of communications on this subject from the Government became such that further conciliation was inadvisable, and after a categorical repudiation by the King of one of his own letters written a few days previously, on which some compromise seemed possible, a formal protest was lodged against the action of the Hashimite Government and all liberty of action resorted.

Orders that the police were to stop the above British subjects being taken off in the Agency launch, if necessary by force, were accidentally overheard and the position had become such that the presence of a warship was deemed advisable.

The action of the King had aroused great interest and some excitement, and renewed rumours were in circulation that he intended to break relations with the Allies and was seeking for a convenient excuse, with their natural corollary that a demonstration at Alexandria preparatory to a demonstration, and that the King would be invited to leave in one of them.

Various otherwise petty incidents which occurred led to the conclusion that King Hussein was repeating the tactics employed at the time of the Quarantine controversy, and deliberately attempting to force an unpleasant situation on the Agency.

The news of a forthcoming visit of H.M.S. "Clematis" was received on 1st. The same day the Sudanese in question was permitted to leave without any trouble and although no satisfaction was obtained as regards their case the release of the two British Indians was obtained.

Edna's foreign rights remains the same, but, as anticipated, happily no further incidents have since arisen, it having been borne in on the King that he had gone somewhat too far in his high-handed treatment of this question.

Akhwan Aggression

The many current rumours as to intended Akhwan aggression increased towards the end of the month. Khaid of Khairna being reported as having assembled near Asherah with a large force in company with the Mamur of Taraba, with the alleged intention of encircling Taif and threatening Mecca.

Khaid with his adherents and certain disaffected elements of the Harb raided villages in the Taif district, and reinforcements were despatched hurriedly from Mecca.

King Hussein intimated he could no longer hold his hand in deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government and would take counter-measures, insisting again that it was no longer a question of tribal incidents and raids, but that this aggression was the prelude to a general attack on the Hedjaz under the Ibn Saud.

Information received pointed, however, to these attacks being a raid on a larger scale than usual, and largely a consequence of the resentment caused by the harshness of King Hussein's tribal policy, rather than any such preliminary movement of the Akhwan as reported by him.

The danger of a general collision being caused by any collision in the delicate state of relations both between King Hussein and Ibn Saud and the policy of his own subjects, had nevertheless to be borne in mind.

E 3276 4 91

No. 153

Earl Curzon to Major Batten (Jeddah)

Foreign Office, March 17, 1921

I HAVE to inform you that General Haddad Pasha called at the Foreign Office the 10th March and was received by Mr. Lansley. To General Haddad's enquiry regarding the prospects of his being able to appear before the Inter-Allied Conference taking place in London Mr. Lansley replied that, so far as he knew, the Government had not discussed Arab questions, their attention having been almost entirely occupied with other sides of the problem.

General Haddad then made two points. Firstly, that the French were demanding the Turks for the cession to the latter of Antak and Urfa, which were Turkish towns; that a mandatory had no right to alienate territory if the French did so it would materially affect the prospects of Mesopotamia. His second point was that the appearance before the Conference of the Emir Feisal would be a great advantage.

He had already prepared the speech which he intended to make if summoned to appear before the Conference, and his statement would be most moderate and impartial, being anti-French in tone, for Arab self-government. It appeared, in fact, that to France in the speech would be offset by at least a considerable knock at the principal result, he maintained, of an Arab appearance before the Conference. It would be the strengthening effect it would have on the British position in Arabia, and as, in General Haddad's words, Feisal was to be "our man" it was in our interest that he should have as much influence at home as possible.

General Haddad went on to say that the Emir Feisal wished to discuss the question of the representation of the Hedjaz in Europe and especially in London. His own view, although Mr. Lansley gathered that someone else's view, either the Emir Feisal's or King Hussein's, was wider, was that one man should suffice for all Europe. Mr. Lansley stated that his view—a purely personal one—was that diplomatic representation abroad was the new toy of a newly created State, and that there was a tendency to attach exaggerated importance to it. Intrinsically, too, though it would entail heavy expenditure, it would be of little actual utility, for there would be no use in having a Minister abroad if there was not an organised foreign office in Mecca, nor would such a representative be used by any foreign Power for business purposes, which would continue to be conducted as hitherto through their representatives at Jeddah. Mr. Lansley, in fact, gave the general little encouragement on this point, and the latter said that he would revert to this question later on.

Finally General Haddad stated that he had seen in the "Times" that the Emir Abdullah was said to have taken Irbid, but he felt sure that the statement was not true, and he was telegraphing for a report about it. Mr. Lansley agreed that he did not believe the statement to be correct.

I would add that since this interview took place General Haddad has been received by the Conference and made his statement, but the proceedings amounted to no more than an altercation between M. Briand and himself in which no approximation to unity was made.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 3359 4 91

No. 154

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 818)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 19, 1921

I HAVE to inform you that towards the close of the recent Inter-Allied Conference here General Haddad Pasha was allowed an opportunity of expressing the Emir Feisal's views in the course of a conversation with the Prime Minister, M. Briand and myself.

On this occasion M. Briand promised to put Haddad Pasha in communication with M. Berthelot, and undertook that either here or in Paris the latter should see him. Following on this promise General Haddad wrote to request an interview, but I am

[666]

242

would have to return to Kamaran. This would mean on the arrangements presumably made in anticipation of a certain average of detention at Jeddah that the administration under his present rules would in practice be unable to claim more than the fixed proportion of P.T. 37½ and possibly suffer a loss of anticipated dues, and that the notification of this sum again as partly representing a period of one day's detention gave rise to those very objections he had mentioned, in that the first day's quarantine, which he took as a matter course, was in itself contrary to the convention.

After a lengthy discussion during which the sanitary aspect of Kamaran, for and Jeddah was again explained King Hussein finally appeared to understand the position of the two former as guardposts of the Hedjaz against infection and outwardly acquiesced but it remains to be seen how far he will carry his words into effect when the question arises.

After further discussion and persuasion the King again flatly refusing to consider a lump sum, he finally definitely agreed that shipping companies would only be asked to pay the fixed proportion announced, and that further dues, if any, would be collected for the future.

I was only able to persuade him to adopt this compromise by pointing out that announcements of collecting more on tickets than the amount notified, and that it was impossible for a business concern to legislate for a variable sum on a small scale, and that even if a system of refunds of any excess were arranged as was done in certain cases last year, the latter system was complicated and in practice difficult to operate owing to the vast number of pilgrims and the inevitable difficulty of tracing individual cases. I further pointed out that part of the excess complained of was represented by the normal commercial commission for service and the difference on the gold exchange, in fairness to the companies whom he had publicly accused of wholesale extortion, and finally that the rules as they stood practically forced companies to the very action of which he complained.

King Hussein's complaints, however, serve to accentuate that portion of Messrs. R. J. Farver's and W. H. Lee Warner's memorandum dealing with the amount collected by shipping companies from pilgrims in excess of the actual dues and to depreciate, if only from the consideration that it gives a hint of the danger ever on the look out for more.

The General of Quarantine had ever refused to pay at once, but on being informed charged at the rate of P.T. 37½ on the day of departure. The King's attitude towards the pilgrims is well illustrated by his fervid offer to let me send anybody I pleased to the islands to see that only the correct amount of dues was collected from the pilgrims.

The nature of these discussions, which beginning four months ago show no apparent sign of being ever satisfactorily terminated is well illustrated by his fervid offer to let me send anybody I pleased to the islands to see that only the correct amount of dues was collected from the pilgrims.

Underlying Causes of King Hussein's Attitude.

As is generally the case with despotic monarchs of King Hussein's calibre he is apt to be very much the tool of those surrounding him if they can win his ear.

In addition to the reasons already mentioned, self-seeking persons were always ready to suggest to the King that the pilgrims were a source of revenue to be exploited for his own benefit.

their sacred land, but desired rather that all such measures should be taken within its borders and not under alien, and especially Christian, control.

A spurious agitation was even engineered last year attempting to discredit the efficiency of the measures taken at Kamaran.

This idea, pleasing to King Hussein for obvious reasons, having once taken root in his mind, is one of the bases on which all his subsequent attempts to cling to entire control of quarantine have rested.

Once King Hussein has formed a fixed idea of this nature, anything to the contrary but serves to confirm it. He has apparently convinced himself, and is never weary of stating, that quarantine detention must be carried out at Jeddah, in order to please not himself, but the pilgrims—that their detention on the inadequately equipped and congested islands of Abu Saad and Wasia is in the nature of a privilege, of which they are only too glad to avail themselves, and that his rules as to the period of detention, his anxiety to add quarantine at Jeddah to that at Kamaran, are in favour of the pilgrims themselves and that he cannot charge them for this privilege unless he gives them the opportunity of availing themselves of its attractions.

In King Hussein's eyes any measures, sanitary or otherwise connected with the pilgrimage, are the peculiar prerogative of the sacred land of the Hedjaz, and as such to be jealously safeguarded. He considers it not only his duty to uphold this himself in allowing it to be shared in any degree by foreigners and non Moslems.

The comparative amenities of detention at Kamaran to being overcrowded, short of confined space of coral sand which constitutes the Jeddah quarantine station, carries no weight with him.

Interested parties further pander to the King's own conviction that the Hedjaz is equal in efficiency to any that could be found elsewhere and he has even asked why Kamaran should not be under his control, as so much importance was attached to the necessary sanitary measures being carried out at that place.

The basis of his tenacious adherence to the outward form of quarantine control is thus both religious and political, arising out of his continually repeated desire to maintain the status quo, and from his jealousy of any interference.

The pilgrimages strengthened by his exaggerated sense of the capabilities of himself and his officials.

It need hardly be said that the political aspect of King Hussein's opposition is one which he studiously keeps in the background in such discussions as arise, but an interesting light on his real intentions is furnished by his statement to a certain (Christian) member of Prince Habib Lutfallah's staff that he would resist to the utmost any foreign control of the pilgrims while on their way to the Hedjaz, or while in the Hedjaz. "Until," in the words he is stated to have used, "I have said good-bye to them on the beach at Jeddah when they can do what they like, and detain them at Kamaran and Tor for twelve months, as far as I am concerned."

Mecca Representatives

The Mecca office was closed on the 23rd February, and Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed sailed for India on the 1st March.

King Hussein's answer to the observations of His Majesty's Government on the abolition of the appointment is attached to this report.

On Captain Nasiruddin paying his farewell visit before the King's departure for Jeddah the latter explained his reasons for his hostile attitude.

He maintained that British policy towards all Eastern questions had been, and still was, mistaken as a whole, and particularly so as regards himself. He failed to understand how it was that His Majesty's Government did not realise the difficulties

his position. He considered himself, in his relations with Great Britain, to be much in the same position as a responsible Minister, as much entitled to a proper consideration of his views and suggestions as any such Minister, and free to resign in the event of his views not being accepted.

The British Government had entrusted to him a ship without rudder or sails, and expected him to navigate her safely through dangerous waters into harbour.

He was being asked to accomplish the impossible, and the question of a British representative in Mecca was a delicate one. He affirmed his loyalty and dependence on Great Britain by stating that he had even asked His Majesty's Government to undertake the representation of his interests in foreign countries, an arrangement obviously advantageous to Great Britain, the refusal of which puzzled him.

He was only too willing to rule under British protection, but for obvious reasons this should not be outwardly apparent to the Moslem world.

The presence of a British representative in any guise at Mecca would be against the interests of His Majesty's Government, and it was as much in the latter's interest as his own that he could not, and would not, agree to any such appointment.

King Hussein added that, as it was, Moslems were only too ready to listen to the allegations as to the Holy Places being virtually under British control, and accused him of being a traitor to his religion. His acceptance of a representative at Mecca would but confirm their fears.

The King wished Captain Nasiruddin to understand clearly that he was not in any way influenced by personal motives, and offered him an assurance to this effect: "I am not influenced by personal motives, and I am not influenced by any reasons in the future."

They then discussed the question of the representation of the Moslem world, and made this unmistakably clear themselves to King Hussein, he would be prepared to modify his attitude but that at present he is genuinely nervous of opinion outside the Hedjaz, though not prepared to acknowledge his fear.

I am, however, not disposed to agree entirely with Captain Nasiruddin, and consider that the real motive of the King's attitude is to be found rather in his fear of the thin end of the wedge of foreign penetration in any form, and that any such demand by Indian Moslems would meet with scant consideration so long as a Moslem representative held an official position under the agency. If the Indian vice-consul is to be deputed to Mecca, as suggested, he is likely to meet with even stronger opposition from the King than hitherto encountered, from the very fact of his being one of the agency staff. As regards protecting the interests of Indian pilgrims, the only practicable solution under present conditions, but this again would require careful handling and be open to objection.

King Hussein took particular pains to impress Captain Nasiruddin with the sincerity of his regard for Great Britain and of his desire to be virtually under her protection, while avoiding its outward appearance, and with his anxiety to remove any misunderstanding as to the true motives for his opposition to the Mecca appointment and in other matters.

He commented at the same time bitterly on our treatment of himself as compared with that of the Imam. This was but a repetition in another form of his claim to be the only ruler in Arabia entitled to our consideration and support.

King Hussein has long since persuaded himself that any divergence of his views from those of His Majesty's Government is in the larger interests of Great Britain, as a convenient excuse for his attitude in many matters and as an added proof of his loyalty and disinterestedness. Any hint that His Majesty's Government is possibly competent to judge of its own interests better merely tends to confirm him in his attitude and to add fuel to the flame of his discontent.

While fond of repeating deprecatingly that he is but a simple Bedu, King Hussein, as a candid friend, reserves to himself the right of dictating his own opinion, considering himself justly aggrieved should it not be accepted.

Visit of Emir Habib Lotfullah to Jeddah

The Emir arrived at Jeddah on the 25th February, accompanied by Malouf Bey and Sirkin Effendi. King Hussein arriving the next day from Mecca to welcome him and thank him for his services. A banquet was given in his honour on the 1st March and several visits and invitations were exchanged with the agency. The ex Vali Ahmed Nedim Pasha, was also in Jeddah during the visit.

The Emir discoursed on many current questions at great length both with myself and in the presence of the King, who appeared to be very much impressed by his arguments, and more than once quoted Prince Habib as an authority who fully bore out his own statements. Much was made of the desirability of the creation of a strong Arab State friendly with and allied to Great Britain, both as a means of satisfying Arab aspirations and as a bulwark against the disruptive tendencies now prevailing in the East.

The question of the presence of the French in Syria was naturally brought to the fore during these informal conversations, and King Hussein has apparently absorbed further ideas on the trend of present politics and movements, one of the least of which being that it would be simple to induce the French to leave Syria by offering them compensation elsewhere, failing their removal by the threat of force.

The King taking his cue from the Emir, had a great deal to say on the subject of Bolshevism and the rôle of an Arab nation in combating its advance in the East, affirming not for the first time that had the emissaries he had provided in 1916 not been mistakenly restrained from proceeding further than Egypt, the whole current of events in Eastern Asia Minor, the Caucasus and further afield up to the limits of Persia and Bokhara would have been altered.

In a conversation at which I was not present the King is reported as stating that the help of the Arabs—and by Arabs he meant an Arab nation, loosely knit, but nevertheless under one titular head, not necessarily himself—was vital to Great Britain to resist the coming attack against India through Persia, both because of the strategic value of the geographical position of the peninsula and because of the material help which would be afforded by friendly Arab forces, especially in Northern and Eastern Iraq. Therefore it would be wiser for Great Britain to conciliate the Arabs as much as possible, help them to fulfil their aspirations, and thus make sure

faithful allies for the future instead of further embittering them by disowning agreements already made, and allowing France, also a so-called ally of the Arabs, to overrun and colonise Syria under pretext of a mandate, and to do the same herself in Palestine and Iraq. A disunited and dismembered Arabia would always be a source of embarrassment and weakness, a reconstituted Arab Empire from the Persian Gulf to the Taurus, closely allied to Great Britain and assured of her guidance and material help, would, on the contrary, form the strongest link in the chain of her Eastern communications.

In this connection, King Hussein has often expressed his firm belief in the inevitable fusion of the present discordant elements in Arabia and the formation of an Arab State. While now with but little hope of seeing this in his time, and disclaiming always any desire to obtain the titular headship of such a State himself, he maintains that all theories to the contrary will be falsified, and that while such a consummation of the reborn ideal of a reconstituted Arab nation, and of the hopes raised by the revolt, may be delayed by the present apparent disinclination of the Allies to further any such ideal from without, it will surely be attained from within, and that within at the most twenty years.

On this he bases his arguments as to the advantage to Great Britain in now promoting rather than retarding the formation of an autonomous Arab State under her aegis, passing naturally to demands for material aid in helping to forward this ideal and to the aggrandisement of the Hedjaz at the expense of others, who, he claims, had no share in the revolt and were even inimical to the pan-Arab ideas, as shown by their conduct during the war.

An interesting light on the manifesto published in India in King Hussein's name, though it has not so far been possible to establish with what degree of authority as to Bagdad being the political and Mecca and Jerusalem the religious centres of such a State, is possibly furnished by a remark dropped by Prince Habib Lotfullah, after an interview with the King, that the time would come when the British representative would be not at Jeddah, which was bound by ties religious rather than political with Mecca, but at Bagdad, or even possibly Damascus, as the future political capital.

Interviews with King Hussein

After the Emir's visit, the King discussed at length the present condition of the Moslem world after the disintegration of the Turkish Empire

Somebody had to take Turkey's place—and who but the Arabs! But, it must be understood, an Arab nation not to be split up into Irak, Syria for the French and Palestine for the Zionists.

As to conflicting interests in "other parts" of Arabia, once the principle of an Arab state was conceded, such difficulties could easily be overcome.

Great Britain, as the predominant Moslem Power, had made a grave mistake in neglecting, after the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, to replace Turkey by an equivalent which would stabilise the Moslem world, now in a great state of ferment owing to the collapse of its traditional head.

It was essential that Great Britain and the Arabs should stand together, in a relation closer than that existing between her and the Porte before the rise of the Young Turks.

As soon as Turkey forsook Great Britain, its doom had been sealed, and as had been the case with the Turks, so with the Arabs—they could only prosper with the British Government as it was in the British interest to make certain of Arab goodwill. The British Government, however, apparently did not consider the question in this light, or it would never have countenanced the sub-division of what he knew would one day, and that soon, become the Arab nation, notwithstanding present scepticism and opposition.

In making much the same remarks to me as he had to Captain Nasiruddin, the King expressed his interest in the Arab cause, but he had reluctantly to contemplate asking Italy to undertake this for him through her consulates, in places where he had no agents of his own.

The King again referred on more than one occasion to the Emir Feisal in much the same manner as before, and I distinctly gathered the impression that he fears the latter has not been sufficiently firm. He is reported to have stated that Feisal is too obviously anxious to please the British and is only a tool in their hands, and that he will not accept any settlement arrived at by him unless it embodies the last letter of his own claims.

It has been suggested that the Italian envoy (now the Italian consul) at Jeddah is at the bottom of King Hussein's present patent distrust of the Emir.

The King at different times showed me various telegrams from London, including the one expressing strong hopes of a satisfactory termination of the discussions, and in connection with another on the subject of operations south of Damascus, assured me that he had again instructed Emir Abdullah not to take any action which might be misconstrued. He had received assurances from the Emir that there was no trouble in the Arab world, and that the only trouble at that time occurring was a certain amount of purely local trouble, normal to Transjordan.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.
Acting British Agent

Annex to Enclosure 1

King Hussein to Major Batten

(Arabic)

Your Honour,

February 19, 1921 (11 6 39)

AFTER respects, I have received your letter of the 18th February, 1921, and noted about the return of Captain Nasiruddin to India. May God grant him safety wherever he may be.

As regards your statement that you are directed to inform me that "this was done in deference to your Majesty's unconcealed objection, &c.," most proudly, and as loud as I can, I boast of this objection, giving no attention to whether His Majesty's Government will take this as a matter of faithfulness and true sincerity, or as opposition to the British policy in the East. I was informed of same in time by your Excellency's office in a letter of the 17th.

I am satisfied by drawing her attention to what the newspapers say and openly attribute to me. Anyhow, is it not better and more preferable that somebody may be a little like me, and that she will make the arrangements and get the wishes which I am opposing and do not assist in carrying out. Nothing is more impressive than

attributing bribe to me in the matter of the Nejd pilgrims, and that if I did not assist them I should not be given the 300,000 rupees.

I conclude by repeating my statement in my letter of 24.5.39, that I accepted the invitation of Great Britain not for a private object or a personal wish so that I will be contented on getting it or excited on losing it, but it is for the general good, and it assures the necessity of this only means which nothing will prevent, especially because of the approach of the pilgrim season, which will be the cause of such discussions and their consequences. God is the best help.

HUSSEIN

1 Incl with 2 in No. 1.

Jeddah Report for the Period March 3 to 11, 1921

(Secret)

Local Stamps and Currency

DURING a visit to King Hussein on the 3rd, he produced three proofs of revenue stamps made in Mecca, and for which he had procured the necessary materials from Egypt. The dies were evidently very creditable pieces of work, and the stamps should shortly be in use. No more postage stamps have been imported for some months, and I am informed the King intends to issue his own when the present supply is exhausted.

I had previously seen a specimen of a coin of the face value of 1 piastre, recently made locally, but dated 1334.

The workmanship was very crude and the metal soft, and it is stated the cost of production of such as had been made was prohibitive. On my asking the King whether he contemplated issuing new currency of his own, he replied that he was not at present doing so, but that he would gradually redeem the corresponding small Turkish coinage, at present a source of embarrassment to the Government, by the issue of "halala," of which quantities have found their way from the north, against gold and silver, their embarrassment can be well understood.

The above coins are stated to be the work of two coiners, imprisoned in Mecca for uttering false money, sent for by the King, and subsequently released on proving their ability to serve his own purpose.

When the King was announced, and further enthusiastic elaborations of the theories advanced at previous interviews were indulged in. The venue was Persia, and the occasion the production of a Reuter's telegram announcing the refusal of Riza Khan to accept the present Anglo-Persian Agreement. The alleged traditional British policy of occupation, followed by withdrawal, only leading to inevitable reoccupation, was prophesied for Persia, leading inevitably to the same vicious circle of Syria, Palestine and Irak.

The King was in his element, laying down broad lines of policy before a receptive audience, and guaranteeing the integrity of Persia, safeguarding the approach to India through Baluchistan, and removing a burden of anxiety and undesired commitments from Great Britain, and I left him indulging this vein to the utmost as soon as politeness permitted.

Further Difficulties over Quarantine

Mazhar Nedim was sent round on the evening of the 4th March by the King to say that the Holt agent, apparently on instructions from the agency, had refused to pay any quarantine dues. I immediately pointed out that this was incorrect, and that the King was probably referring to the difference of P.T. 5, which he himself had agreed should not be demanded, as it had not been collected on the tickets.

Mazhar Bey said he was instructed to show me the regulations on the subject, and produced the Turkish Regulations, marked at the article enjoining the production of all such dues by the masters of pilgrim ships. I conveyed my astonishment and regret that the King should have apparently forgotten his own assurances of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the Kingdom of Hejaz and the British Empire, and incidentally the director-general was apparently using as his guide

gulations which were void, and which the King himself had recognised as such, and asked for an interview in the morning.

The production of the Turkish Regulations so soon was somewhat of a surprise, as I had not anticipated that the King would bring the matter to a head until he was once more ensconced at Mecca, and until the first steamer from Kamaran had arrived.

The subsequent interview was a stormy one, the King tearing his beard and indulging in a diatribe against the interference of foreigners in the pilgrimage, the support by the British Government of exactions against pilgrims and similar heresies.

When he had become sufficiently calm to listen seriously to what I said, he asked me to produce the Turkish Regulations. He affirmed that he had not signed them, and that until a new international board was established on which he would be represented, he would carry out none other than the Turkish Regulations and disregard all innovations made without his approval.

I reminded him of his recent assurances, explained the relation of the Turkish Regulations to the 1903 and 1912 conventions, which had not only been made clear last year, but again recently, and after showing him that the convention, a copy of which I had brought with me, had been signed by the Turkish Government, I eventually obtained from him renewed assurances that in that case he would follow its provisions. Although I was aware that Thabit Bey, who was present during part of the interview, and the King had copies of the convention, the King ingenuously asked for my copy to compare with the Turkish Regulations.

As regards his renewed claim against the Holt agent for the difference of P T 5, and his diatribe against the exactions of shipping companies, during which

he demanded of the director general until informed again that I had seen the letter, whereupon he reaffirmed it in his own name.

The King sent for a 1920 ticket, on which 8 dollars was shown as the charge, tore it in half and threw it on the floor, affirming that he insisted on the difference of P T 5 being paid as retribution for the excessive charges made by Messrs. Holt last year in the name of the Hashimite Government. It took some time to persuade him that two wrongs do not make a right, and that his insistence on this course would but place his Government in the wrong and lead to payment under protest and the inevitable raising of further difficulties which it was to our mutual interest to avoid.

His proving obdurate I said that his decision was much to be regretted, but that the agent would be instructed to pay, leaving the responsibility for the decision on the Government, whereupon the King changed his tone and gave way, remarking that he only did so on my assurance that the question of excessive charges would be investigated, and trusting in the British sense of justice to obtain refund in full for all who had been overcharged, and in taking steps to prevent a recurrence of such abuses.

I pointed out that there would have been no need for any of these difficulties, discussions and disagreements had the Government decided on its quarantine dues in time. I again drew the moral of the advisability of a fixed sum, and explained the difficulties of the shipping companies and the measures taken to refund excess charges which were directly due to the uncertainty of the amount caused by continual changes in the rate, both last year and this.

King Hussein heatedly affirmed that there had been no delay, and that the truth of the whole matter was that nothing he could do was right, that his last director general had been bad, his present one was apparently worse and he himself and the Arabs generally were looked upon with deliberate disfavour by the British Government after which outburst he fervently embraced me, and the interview was terminated.

Thabit Bey accompanied me to the agency, when in less difficult company the whole question of quarantine was amicably discussed.

The fact that the mail steamer then at Jeddah was undergoing disinfection under his orders, owing to a case of plague taken off at Port Soudan, considerably helped this amiable Turk to take a rosy view of the situation, and as far as possible all reasons for misunderstanding were removed. As regards dues, he remarked ingenuously enough that a round sum of P T 50 even was nothing—that P T 100 would be quite legitimate, but that the King was unfortunately averse to charging pilgrims unless they were actually quarantined. He reaffirmed the King's assurances as to following the International Convention, and hinted broadly at his own inability to do more than follow the strict letter of his master's instructions.

Thabit Bey is an ill-instructed, incapable and subservient Turk of a very ordinary kind, assisted by the King's reputed secret adviser in quarantine matters, Hussein's principal spies, fervently anti-European, and the lieutenant of Mohamed Hussein last year.

The director general supports his actions by quoting the King, while the latter is ignorant of technical details, referring all such to the competency of his quarantine officials.

After King Hussein's departure, Thabit Bey triumphantly showed me a letter from the master of the last pilgrim ship to the agent, requesting the latter to pay P T 624 as evidence of the manner in which pilgrims were being cheated. As the steamer in question was Dutch, I told him it would be more to the point if he took the matter up with the Netherlands consul, who had just returned from leave and that obviously there had been a mistake.

The manner in which this document was obtained is instructive.

The manner in which this document was obtained is instructive. The King, in his own name, requested the agent to pay P T 624 as evidence of the manner in which pilgrims were being cheated. As the steamer in question was Dutch, I told him it would be more to the point if he took the matter up with the Netherlands consul, who had just returned from leave and that obviously there had been a mistake.

propaganda among pilgrims as to the way in which they are treated by others in comparison to his own care for their interests.

As regards his allegations against Messrs. Holt, I have telegraphed to Singapore requesting early and full information as to the exact composition in detail of last year's charges, and this season's charge of 7 dollars at the equivalent local exchange rate in rupees, in order that King Hussein may be effectually answered without delay. Though he has not promised to say so officially, his intention is apparently to claim from companies the payment of any refund to himself for distribution, in order to pose as the protector of pilgrims against foreign extortion.

During the last interview reported above, the King asked me how long those pilgrims who had been overcharged would be refunded. He stated that the Kamaran charge of 5 rupees, which he had just previously claimed was not included in the total stamped on the tickets, must be refunded by the British Government. I regretted that the arrangements at Kamaran could not be discussed on the spot, and that any decisions of his own regarding dues at Jeddah, and that it yet remained to be proved whether this sum had been paid out or not, but the King remained convinced that he had further proved his point as to the unjust treatment of pilgrims.

After further formalities, King Hussein left Jeddah on the afternoon of the 7th March, immediately after the departure of Emir Latifah and his party. The latter was promoted to the rank of General in the Sherifian army and made chief aide-de-camp to the King.

Pilgrimage Conditions

During a conversation before breakfast, to which the agency was invited, he talked of his caravan arrangements for this year's pilgrimage, especially to Medina, and stated that by sending a small number of large caravans, suitably escorted, the troubles of last year would be avoided. If the camelmen made any difficulties, he would threaten to send all Medina pilgrims by sea. The King complained that the reports of robbery and violence were either untrue or much exaggerated, and that in any case the pilgrims were themselves to blame for not obeying orders and straggling. He said it was all very well for wholesale complaints to be made, but the difficulty of adequately providing for and looking after a horde of obstinate people of the poorest and most ignorant classes was not sufficiently realised.

The cause of difficulties, and the persistence of dangers, lay, in his opinion, in

the increased facilities for the Haj due to modern conditions of transport to the Hedjaz. Formerly, ships only came once a year, and on the whole only those who were fairly well-to-do and well able to take care of themselves could perform the Haj. Now, owing to modern facilities, the country was flooded by a mass of indigent, ignorant and helpless creatures who were only a burden to it. He even went so far as to add that the Haj was not obligatory unless the intending pilgrim was well able to perform it.

King Hussein's complaints on this score, which refer principally to Indian pilgrims, are surprisingly frank, and considerably at variance with his more familiar rôle of protector and willing host of the Faithful.

The course of a pleasant conversation after breakfast was interrupted by Prince Habib producing a letter from the American Syrian Committee, offering volunteers to join Emir Abdullah, and stating that while Syrians everywhere were ardently desirous of doing what they could for their country, apparently King Hussein was content to leave them in the lurch.

The King was moved to tears, and drawing me aside later, made a further earnest appeal either for support from His Majesty's Government, or for release from his difficulties. It was all very well, he said, replying to my remarks on the letter attached to this report, in the course of which I continued his simile and reminded him of the traditional duties of a captain to his ship, for the Prime Minister and His Majesty's Government to put him off with fair words, but what he desired was some proof of their protestations.

At a farewell visit after the departure of the Emir, the Netherlands consul was present, with a complaint against Thabit Bey for not allowing him or his doctor on board the Dutch steamer to investigate a case of poisoning, until the last of the pilgrims had been disembarked. The King told him to forward anything he had to say through the usual channels, and said he could listen to no complaints connected with pilgrims or quarantine from the consul for Holland, a Government which he roundly accused of encouraging frauds on pilgrims.

Mr. Gobee (the Netherlands consul) concurs in the view, expressed in my report ending the 20th February, that owing to the unfortunate precedent set by the utilisation of the Jeddah quarantine station due to Kamaran not being opened in time to deal with the first pilgrim steamers as arranged, difficulties may very probably arise when the time comes for pilgrims to be disembarked direct, despite King Hussein's protestations to all the representatives in Jeddah.

Should such difficulties occur, the question will not be partly, as last year, the imposition of undue charges for the benefit of corrupt officials, but wholly one of unnecessary detention in excess of sanitary necessity, the question of the method of collection of dues having finally been settled.

In that case, it is submitted that the threat of publication of a notice in the vernacular papers of the countries concerned, that any quarantine detention in excess of that undergone at Kamaran and Tor was entirely unnecessary for sanitary reasons and would be purely on the responsibility of the Hashimite Government, might have more effect on the King than any attempt at interference, or even a combined protest. The consuls here have privately informed me that they agree, the French consul-general stating, however, that he is further prepared to request his Government to advise French Moslem subjects not to undertake the Haj this year in view of the difficulties caused by the local authorities and the insecurity of the country.

Regarding the reason given in the King's letter for the despatch of Emir Zeid to Taif, and also announced in "Al Qibla," the true reason is stated to be not unconnected with the visit of a lady from Egypt, who has now been twice to Jeddah.

The Emir, talking to me over the telephone, was not enthusiastic over his exile, and expressed himself forcibly in English on the subject.

Press.

"Al Qibla."—Number 460 contains a circular to all Syrians abroad from the Syrian Union in Mexico on the usual lines. Nothing of particular importance appears in the other copies, beyond articles and quotations on the present general conditions of the world.

"Al Falaḥ."—The missing No. 24 has been obtained, and contains under the heading "The Arab position to-day" somewhat inflammatory matter on the collapse of the alleged plans of Great Britain and others to profit by the policy of "divide et

impera," caused by the reported reverses of the Greeks in Asia Minor, and the failure of the hopes of dissension between Mustapha Kemal and the Bolsheviks, concluding with an assurance of the participation of the Arabs in the attempts of Eastern nations such as India, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunis to win their independence, and promising them material help.

A telegraphic warning was circulated on receipt of the paper.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,

Acting British Agent.

Annex to Enclosure 2

King Hussein to Major Batten.

(Translation.)

Your Honour,

March 1, 1921 (21.6.30).

After respects. I have received your Excellency's letter of the 1st March, 1921, communicating the message from his Excellency the great Prime Minister. In short, I beg to repeat the expression of my previous feelings which are the trust in, and the reliance on, the British honour and dignity which are well-known throughout the world; and that Great Britain will find me with whoever is joining me in the position in which she will leave us, whatever sort of desertion this may be. Great Britain has given us the command of a great ship to sail with it on the ocean of these terrible things, but then she has taken away from me its map, its instruments and its compass. Are there any means left after that to ensure safety from being drowned and certainly lost, except to get out of this ship? The Almighty God alone knows how strong our relations with Great Britain are, and how firmly we are adhering to them. Having sent my son Zeid, under the circumstances, to the villages of Taif is the simplest proof of what is to be said in respect of the recommendations for calmness and tranquillity which you pointed out.

May God grant success to everybody.

HUSSEIN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 157.

Shipping Intelligence to March 10, 1921.

The following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 21st February and the 10th March, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo discharged.
				1921.	1921.		Packages.
Mansourah ..	British	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	Feb. 21	Feb. 22	..	5,000
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian	Suez ..	Masawa ..	" 22	" 22	..	75
Hellerophon ..	British	Singapore ..	Liverpool ..	" 22	" 22	777	General
Dakshin ..	"	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 23	" 23	..	330
Pak Ling ..	"	Java ..	Liverpool ..	" 26	" 26	562	80
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian	Masawa ..	Suez ..	" 27	" 27	..	(664)
Koweit ..	British	Bombay and Aden ..	Aden and Bombay ..	" 26	Mar. 2	..	474
Dakshin ..	"	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	Mar. 4	" 7	..	2,200
Vergamero ..	"	Suez ..	" ..	" 5	"	1,740
Mansourah ..	"	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 5	Mar. 5	..	269
Kambangan ..	Dutch	Java ..	P. Soud ..	" 7	" 8	1,284	..
Serpentara ..	Italian	Masawa ..	Suez ..	" 8	" 10	..	1,282
Pjotja ..	Dutch	Java ..	Rotterdam ..	" 9	" 10
Iran ..	British	Bombay and Aden ..	" ..	" 9	"	24,200

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL

[C 2143/2754/22]

No. 158.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 154.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 12, 1921.

THE Italian Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon, in order to communicate to me the tenor of the conversation which Count Sforza had held at Paris with the Prime Minister, and to supplement it with some further observations. He had had instructions in this sense at Paris, but had been unable to set upon them owing to my departure immediately after the break up of the Conference.

What Count Sforza had proposed and held in view was a revival of the understanding between Italy and Great Britain which had, in his opinion, been the decisive factor in the Mediterranean situation before the war. Negotiations had, he said, taken place between the two Governments in 1912-13 with a view to putting this understanding on a definite basis, and the Ambassador thought therefore that there ought to be no difficulty in returning to the point at which they had been suspended. I pointed out to Signor de Martino that, while I knew nothing of the particulars to which he referred, the European situation had entirely changed in the last seven years, that there was a different orientation of the Mediterranean States and peoples, and that the solutions or understandings of 1912-13 might not be equally applicable to 1921, and I asked him exactly what the new policy or resuscitated old policy was to be. As to this he was becomingly vague, but when I hinted to him that what Count Sforza had in view was probably a pro-Turk and anti-Greek policy to be jointly pursued by the two Powers, he did not dissent, but rather indicated that Italian support in other matters might be easily purchased by an accommodating attitude in this. While reciprocating the friendly intentions of Count Sforza, I told the Ambassador that it was quite impossible for either of us to ignore the position which Greece had won in the Mediterranean as the result of the war, and I said that I thought we had better await the results of the impending London Conference before we made any fresh dispositions. Much the best policy for the moment seemed to me to be to get the Treaty of Sèvres ratified, subject to such modifications as might be agreed upon, and then to determine the Mediterranean relations of the future.

Knowing from long experience that an interview with an Italian representative cannot take place without eventuating in some petition, appeal or request, I felt no surprise when the Ambassador, after repeating the familiar, but eminently disputable, complaint that Italy alone of the Allies had got nothing out of the war, proceeded to formulate a definite demand. This was that the Tripartite Agreement should be definitely incorporated in the revised treaty.

His Excellency arrived at this end by an ingenious line of approach. He reminded me that the Italian Government had made certain reserves at San Remo about the British mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine. In their present mood of complaisance they were willing not to persist in these reservations, but thought it very desirable that the question of mandates should not be decided until after the London Conference had completed its labours.

Never having regarded the Italian reservations as possessing any but a tactical *raison d'être* (and that of the slightest), I displayed no emotion on hearing of the proffered withdrawal, but pointed out that the matter was no longer in our hands, but in that of the Council of the League of Nations. They had fixed the date of meeting, not we. We had no intention of asking for its further postponement. On the contrary, if we could we should hurry it on, in order to regularise our mandatory position. But even if there was to be further delay it could make no difference to us, since we were already exercising mandatory powers in anticipation of sanction, and must continue to do so. What the Ambassador really wanted, of course, was to be sure of the Tripartite Agreement for Italy before agreeing to the mandates for Great Britain.

As regards the Tripartite Agreement, of the exact form of which I had been the author in London a year ago, I pointed out to his Excellency what he did not appear to know, namely, that it had been deliberately decided not to include it in the treaty because (1) of the criticism that it would be sure to excite and (2) of the difficulty in obtaining the signature of Turkey to any treaty that contained it. I had therefore

proposed, and the Supreme Council had accepted, the idea of a self-denying ordinance between the three Powers, to be communicated to the Turkish Government simultaneously with the signature of the treaty. This had been done, and we could not recede from or reverse this procedure now. If we did there would be a good-bye to the Treaty of Sèvres and to the Tripartite Agreement at the same time.

I then alluded to the despatch of the Angora delegation to the London Conference, and explained quite clearly to his Excellency that, while we did not wish to object to the Italians bringing them over from Adalia to Brindisi if his Government wished to do so, we had no intention either of postponing the date of meeting, which had been settled to meet the general convenience, in order to humour the pretensions of Mustapha Kemal, or of admitting the delegation to the conference as an independent Government, or as the *de facto* Government of Turkey. They must either be incorporated with the Turkish delegation or not be admitted at all. I hoped that the Italian Government would use their influence to bring about the desired result.

The Ambassador undertook to communicate my views to his Government.

I was, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 2184/144]

No. 159.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 515.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 16, 1921.

THE French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and raised the following points in the course of our conversation:—

Firstly, he presented an urgent request from M. Briand that we should not, in deference either to the convenience of the Turkish Nationalist Party or to the representations of the Italian Government, agree to postpone the date of the meeting of the conference on the Treaty of Sèvres summoned to begin on Monday next.

I assured the Ambassador that we had no such intention, and that I had formally communicated our views to the Italian Ambassador. Even if the Angora delegation had not arrived or had not made up its differences with the Constantinople delegation, there would be plenty of business to occupy the Conference in the first day or two of its sittings.

The Ambassador assured me that M. Briand would be greatly relieved by this declaration.

Secondly, he desired to bring to my notice that the French military detachment, like the Italian, was about to leave Palestine.

Thirdly, he asked me whether it might not be a good thing, with a view to producing a favourable atmosphere among the Turks before their arrival in London, to release the Turkish prisoners of war detained since the war at Malta.

I replied that I could not for the moment and without reference remember how many they were or what were the offences for which they had been confined; but I was under the impression that some, though perhaps not the majority of them, had either been guilty of cruel acts during the war or had been embittered opponents of the Allied cause. I would look into the matter, but even supposing release were practicable it would seem to me to be better policy to hold the concession in reserve until we saw how the Turkish representatives were going to act, instead of giving it away in advance.

His Excellency next informed me that his Government was strongly of opinion that the total figure of German reparation, which under the Treaty of Versailles had to be fixed before the 1st May, should be determined at once by the members of the Reparation Commission sitting in Paris. It would not of course be possible to arrive at more than an approximate figure, but it was essential that this should be done, and he begged that instructions should be given to Sir John Bradbury to the same effect.

Lastly, he enquired whether I had any information as to an impending advance by the Greek forces in Asia Minor.

I replied that we had more than once heard that such a movement was in contemplation, but that it was not viewed favourably by our military authorities either here or at Constantinople, partly because they were doubtful of its success and partly because it was really a political move intended to prejudge the issues before the coming Conference. At the same time, I said, we could not actually prevent the Greeks from

undertaking it if they chose. My own inclination was to think that if any real risk were to be attached to it they would shy off at the last moment.

The Ambassador shared this view, but suggested that the real object of the movement, if undertaken, might be to revive the waning spirit of the Greek soldiery.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[C 6247/2740/18]

No. 160.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 987.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 23, 1921.

THE French Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon and raised at once the question, as to which there appears to be some misunderstanding between the French and British Governments, of the new customs arrangement being set up, as one of the agreed sanctions, in the territory beyond the Rhine. This misapprehension related to two points. In the first place, the French had offered to assist the British and the Americans with soldiers to constitute the necessary cordon along the new customs line. This, the Ambassador assured me, had not been done with the slightest intention of encroaching upon the spheres of occupation, either of America or of Great Britain, in which they had no right or desire to interfere, but solely because their superior local force would enable them without difficulty to produce the men whom the Allied Powers, owing to their greatly decreased effectives, might find it difficult to supply. It was, in fact, an act of courtesy on the part of the French Commander-in-chief.

I gladly accepted this explanation, and had indeed, as I said, entertained no other view.

The second misunderstanding had arisen in connection with the arrangements to be made on the customs line. At the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris your Excellency, he understood, had raised some objection to the French proposals, but in reality these referred not to the new line on the eastern side of the occupied territory, but to the old line that separated the French and Belgian territory from the occupied areas. The proposals made by the French Government related to this older line, and they realised quite well that the new trans-Rhenish customs barrier could only be set up as a result of agreement between the Allied Powers.

I said that the telegrams which I had received from Paris as to the Allied Conference yesterday did not seem to me quite to bear out this contention, for it was clear to me that the French Government had there been speaking of the new customs frontier, and had reproached His Majesty's Government for their slowness in carrying it into effect; M. Jules Cambon having actually used the word "tergiversation" in connection with the British attitude—a phrase which your Lordship had naturally and properly resented. There was real reason for thinking that the French were desirous of moving with unreasonable precipitation in the matter. What had, in fact, been the procedure laid down? The Supreme Conference had instructed the Rhineland Commission to prepare a report which should contain proposals for the organisation of the area and the institution of the tariffs to be imposed therein. This report had only reached His Majesty's Government through the Ambassadors' Conference a few days before. It had been examined in the Cabinet only yesterday; it was found to raise questions of a very difficult and technical character. For my own part, I could not but regret the haste with which, in our desire to satisfy the French, we had, almost without investigation, accepted this particular sanction at the recent London Conference. The more I looked into it the more did it seem to be fraught with great difficulties and perils, not the least of which was that, in our desire to hit Germany, we might injure and even ruin the occupied territories themselves.

The question was emphatically one for experts to thrash out, and at the Cabinet yesterday a committee of experts had been set up with instructions to examine the report and to report upon it to His Majesty's Government with all possible expedition. Further, we were sending out a technical adviser to Coblenz to assist our representative there, and although it was nothing like as easy for us to find a staff of customs officials as it was for the French, who had a great organisation almost upon the spot, yet we

should do our best to supply what was necessary in this respect. All this, however, meant a little delay. It was out of the question that the French Government, however sensitive they were on the point, should risk a decision or endeavour to force upon the Allies a scheme, of the wisdom of which they were not convinced.

From your Lordship's telegram I gathered that Mr. Robertson was being summoned to Paris before the next meeting of the Ambassadors' Conference on Friday, and in reply to the Ambassador, who admitted the force of my arguments and pressed only for a rapid decision, I said that we would do our best, only I could not promise to give instructions to your Lordship before that date.

His Excellency then turned the conversation to the East, and enquired whether our own information bore out that which had been received by the French Government, to the effect that at Constantinople there was a stiffening of the attitude of the Turkish Government, the two parties—those in the capital and those from Angora—having mutually agreed to stand out for better terms than those which had been offered in London.

I said that our information, though not full, was much to the same effect, but that personally I feared that the prospects of an agreement would be retarded, not so much by anything done at Constantinople, as by the anticipated resumption of hostilities between the Turks and the Greeks. There seemed to be no doubt that the Greeks were going to resume the offensive, and although I thought myself that from the larger point of view this was a mistaken policy, it could not be denied that, in view of the large reinforcements which Mustapha Kemal was alleged to have secured by his recent agreement with the French Government over Cilicia, their attitude was an intelligible one and dictated by motives of self-preservation.

The Ambassador stated that his information agreed with ours, namely, that the attack was to begin to-day, and he then gave me his prognostication of the results of such an occurrence.

Mustapha Kemal did not, he said, propose to fight the Greeks at Eski-shehr or in that neighbourhood. They would thus gain a bloodless victory at the start. He would retire to Angora, mass his forces there, and would then harass the Greeks by guerilla warfare. In this way the conflict would be protracted for months, with consequences for the prospects of a settlement which could not but be deplored.

From Anatolia it was an easy transition to Syria, and the Comte de Saint-Aulaire proceeded once more to give me, with great fulness and no small emphasis, the French view of the situation that would be created by the reappearance of the Emir Feisal in Eastern parts. He told me that the British consul at Damascus had been saying some foolish things about the desirability of the French making terms with Abdullah and setting him up as King in Syria, and that the rumour was widely believed that the British Government were about to make Feisal King of Mesopotamia, Abdullah Emir of Transjordan and the other brother, Ali, Emir of Abu Kemal.

As regards Abdullah, I remarked that it was quite true that this son of King Hussein was, and had for some time been, in Transjordan, but he had gone there, not at our instigation, nor with our knowledge, and the whole of our efforts had been devoted since his arrival to preventing him from indulging in intrigue or hostility against the French across the Syrian border, an object for which it was more than likely that he had entered the country. We had brought the strongest pressure to bear upon King Hussein through Feisal to suspend any such activities, and it was entirely due to our influence and loyalty to the French that they had not assumed a more serious form.

As to the future, I had no means of knowing whether Abdullah wanted or would consent to be Emir in Transjordan, or what were his ambitions. As he was upon the spot it might be difficult to get rid of him, and if the people of Transjordan wanted him, I could see no reason why they should not have him.

As to Ali and Abu Kemal, this was the first that I had heard of such a project, and I had not seen his name mentioned in that connection. The plan of setting up a separate emirate in the north under him was one which had not originated with us, and of which I now heard for the first time.

The Ambassador might rest assured that we knew nothing about it.

His Excellency then reiterated the familiar French arguments against the adoption of Feisal by the British. He said that not only had he been a traitor to the French, but he had also been a traitor to us. In his conversation with General Gouraud he had offered to side with the French against the British and in return to give the former the complete exploitation of the oil wells of Mosul.

Sir Eyre Crowe had suggested that there might have been a misunderstanding owing to the inability of General Gouraud to understand Arabic, but this explanation could not be accepted, inasmuch as the conversation was conducted in French, of which Feisal had a good mastery, and General Gouraud was most explicit as to the words which had been employed.

To this I replied that I did not of course desire to contest the veracity of General Gouraud, but that if the Emir Feisal had used such language, which was conceivable, the circumstances must be taken into account, and it must be remembered that he was only using the traditional weapons of every Oriental in an anxious position, who invariably offered his services alternately to both sides in order to see what were the best terms that he could get. In the East we must expect such tactics, and if any Government were to decline to deal with an Oriental chieftain because he had at some time intrigued against them, or offered to side with another party, no transactions would ever take place. We did not, therefore, consider ourselves debarred from treating with Feisal by any such reports, which were further, I believed, entirely denied by him. However, as the Ambassador had raised the question of Feisal and Mesopotamia, I wished to take the opportunity of making quite clear to him, in language which could not possibly be misunderstood, the attitude which His Majesty's Government felt bound to adopt.

Since Feisal came to England the Foreign Office had had no official communication with him with regard to Mesopotamia, and he had had no communication with us. He had never mentioned the word "Mesopotamia," and had never asked us to support his candidature, or indeed hinted that he desired or intended to become a candidate. This did not mean that he might not conceivably do so; but it did mean that no plot existed between us on the matter.

The position in Mesopotamia was this:—

Just as the French had found themselves involved in enormous difficulties in Cilicia and in Syria, difficulties from which they had only been able to extricate themselves in Cilicia by wholesale retirement, and from which it was more than probable that they would only find release in Syria by a somewhat similar expedient in the future, so the British Government had encountered difficulties in Mesopotamia which had involved them in overwhelming responsibilities, in constant and fierce criticism in Parliament and in the press, and in the expenditure of money, which was altogether out of reason to expect that we could continue to bear.

In these circumstances, we had publicly announced our intention, which was indeed in strict accordance with the declaration of policy, affirmed by the French as well as ourselves in November 1918, to let the Arabs of Mesopotamia set up their own Government. They had been engaged for some time past in taking the necessary steps. The time must shortly arrive when the people of Mesopotamia would tell us whether they desired a single ruler, and if so, whom. When that moment arrived, should they be sufficiently united in favour of any candidate who could give us good reason to suppose that he would be able to set up a stable government in that country, we should accept him. There were, I believed, several candidates in the field. There were two local candidates, both of whom were pressing their claims. Supposing one or other of them was asked for by a united Mesopotamia, then we should take him. Supposing, on the other hand, they asked for Abdullah, who at one time had been mentioned as a possible candidate, but who, so far as I knew, had not yet put forward his claim, we should take him. Supposing they asked for Feisal, we should take him. I wished there to be no misunderstanding on this point. We should have to make our decision in the interests both of ourselves and of Mesopotamia.

We had, since the mandate was given to France for Syria, and since their position in Cilicia had been recognised by the Powers, never lifted a little finger to interfere with their political arrangements there. Personally, I thought that many of these were gravely mistaken, and I anticipated that the French would soon be driven to the solution to which we were being forced in Mesopotamia; but when that day arrived, or if it had arrived earlier, and if they had been called upon to nominate a single ruler for Syria, whether they had chosen Feisal, Abdullah or Ali, or anybody else, we should not have objected. We should have regarded it as their affair, and not ours. In the same way, I could not admit that they had any right to interfere with our choice in a similar case in respect of Mesopotamia. We certainly should not arrive at a decision with any desire to embarrass the French, or act in a manner unfair or disloyal to them, but the interests both of expediency and of honour would compel us to take a candidate who represented the unfettered choice of the people.

The Ambassador, who had listened to these remarks with attention, said that he did not dispute our perfect right to act in the manner that I had foreshadowed. What he did say was that whatever justification we might have, or whatever explanation might be given, nothing would alter the conviction of the French people that this was a deliberate plan on our part, which could have no other result than to render their position in Syria more difficult. It was a matter of sentiment rather than of reason, and he did not want to be open to the reproach of not having warned us fully in advance of the impression that would be produced upon his country.

I said in reply that I was fully aware of the existence of this sentiment, having been repeatedly reminded of it by M. Berthelot, General Gouraud, M. Millerand, M. Briand and others.

On the other hand, I desired to be equally free from reproach of any lack of candour, and it would be impossible for the French Government at a later date, should things take the form of the appearance and adoption of Feisal as a candidate, to remain in any doubt as to what the attitude of the British Government might have to be.

We should make the greatest mistake if we were to quarrel about such matters. The problems which confronted us in the East were much the same, and in the long run we should probably both be driven to almost identical solutions.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.